

Images of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in the Public Opinion of the Late Qing Period

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Hs the paramount political and religious leader of Central Tibet, the thirteenth Dalai Lama Tupten Gyatso (1876-1933) had a considerable influence on the political situation of both political and ethnographic Tibet during the late Qing and early Republican periods. His reign (1895-1933) was a turbulent period when Tibet encountered the outside world, and external events began to influence internal Tibetan affairs. Though there have been many studies of the thirteenth Dalai Lama in both English and Chinese,¹ few have focused on public opinion in the late Qing period in terms of the attention paid to and the general understanding of this Dalai Lama.² A clear understanding of influences shaping public sentiments about the thirteenth Dalai Lama in the late Qing period is relevant for our examination of late Qing policies of administering Central Tibet and the evolution of the situation in Central Tibet.

1. Background of the Dalai Lama's Exile (1904-1909)

The thirteenth Dalai Lama was born in 1876 and took over the reins of the Lhasa government in 1895. The major problem Tibet faced right

¹ Major books on the thirteenth Dalai Lama include: Charles A. Bell, *A Portrait of the Dalai Lama: The Life and Times of the Great Thirteenth* (London: Collins, 1946); Tokan Tada, *The Thirteenth Dalai Lama* (Tokyo: Center for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1961); K. Dhondrup, *The Water-Bird and Other Years: A History of the 13th Dalai Lama and After* (New Delhi: Rawang Publishers, 1986); Glenn H. Mullin, Christine Cox and Namkha Tashi et al, *Path of the Bodhisattva Warrior: The Life and Teachings of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publishing, 1988); Zhu Qiyuan and Xirao Nima, *Zhonghua minguo shiqi dalai lama yu zhongyang zhengfu de guanxi* (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2004); Luo Bu, *Gandan pozhang shiqi Xizang difang shi zonglun: Yi shisan shi dalai lama xinzheng gaige wei zhongxin* (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2010), etc.

² One exception is Lu Xiangliang's article in Chinese which discusses views of the thirteenth Dalai Lama in public opinion in the late Qing period. In addition, Wendy Palace's article also uses news reports and articles in missionary newspapers in English to examine the Dalai Lama's activities in Peking (Beijing) from September to December 1908. For details, see Lu Xiangliang, "Qingmo gonggong yulun zhong de shisan shi Dalai Lama", *Lilun jie* 11, 2011, pp. 119-21; Wendy Palace, "The thirteenth Dalai Lama in Peking September–December 1908", *Asian Affairs* 29, no. 2, 1998, pp. 171-80, DOI: 10.1080/714857154.

before and during the early years of his reign was the menace of the British in India. Tibetans feared the threat would put the survival of Buddhism at risk. Before the Dalai Lama assumed political power, hostilities broke out over Sikkim. The Tibetans had territorial suzerainty over Sikkim, but they had ceded control over its foreign relations to the British. In mid-1886, Tibetan forces occupied a strategic position in Lungtar (Rlung thar)³ which commanded the trade route between Darjeeling and Tibet. They ignored the British demand that they withdraw. In early 1888, after diplomacy failed, the British sent an armed force through Sikkim, which expelled the Tibetans and took over Sikkim. These actions resulted in “the Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet” in 1890 and the “Regulations Regarding Trade, Communication and Pasturage to Be Appended to the Sikkim-Tibet Convention” in 1893. These agreements recognized the Sikkim-Tibet border and allowed for the opening of a British Trade Agency at Yatung (also written as Yadong; Gro mo), just inside Tibet. Nevertheless, the Tibetans ignored any agreements signed between China and Britain regarding Tibet. Consequently, these events not only severely undermined the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Tibet and the interests of Tibet. It also greatly reduced the prestige and popular trust of the Qing dynasty.

After the thirteenth Dalai Lama assumed political power, he continued Tibet's policy of excluding European influence—a stance that had been implemented since 1792. At the same time, he increasingly resisted Chinese influence over Tibetan affairs. However, he began to show an interest in the West and in Russia, in particular. This was greatly influenced by his close associate and political advisor, the Buryat lama Agvan Dorzhiev (also Dorjiev, 1853/4-1938), who was a Russian subject.⁴ Dorzhiev had studied at Drepung monastery from 1873⁵ to the mid-1880s.⁶ He excelled in his studies and was appointed as the

³ In Tibetan it is also rendered as Lungtur (Lung thur), and in English it is also written as Lingtu.

⁴ Sources on Dorzhiev's background and diplomatic activities include John Snelling, *Buddhism in Russia: The Story of Agvan Dorzhiev, Lhasa's Emissary to the Tzar* (United Kingdom: Element, 1993); Alexandre Andreyev, *Soviet Russia and Tibet: The Debacle of Secret Diplomacy, 1918-1930s* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003), pp. 20-39; Nikolay Tsyrempilov, “The Open and Secret Diplomacy of Tsarist and Soviet Russia in Tibet: the Role of Agvan Dorzhiev (1912-1925)”, *Asiatic Russia: Imperial Power in Regional and International Contexts*, ed. Tomohiko Uyama (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 216-34; Zhou Weizhou, ed., *Yingguo Eguo yu Zhongguo Xizang* (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2000), pp. 174-81, etc.

⁵ *Chö-Yang: The Voice of Tibetan Religion and Culture*, Year of Tibet Edition (Dharamsala: Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs of H.H. the Dalai Lama, 1991), p. 80.

⁶ In the mid-1880s, after fifteen years of study, Dorzhiev attained the title of *tsennyi khenpo* (also rendered as “Tsanid-Hambo”, Tib. *mtshan nyid mkhan po*), which

“study partner” (*mtshan zhabs*) to the Dalai Lama. To Tibetans, he was popularly known as Sokpo Tsenshap Ngawang Lobsang. Through him, the Dalai Lama learned about Russia and its increasing influence in Central Asia. To counterweigh the threat posed by the British, the Dalai Lama began to seek ways to increase contacts with other countries, including Russia. As a result, between 1897 and 1901, under the instructions of the Dalai Lama, Dorzhiev undertook several journeys to Russia and Europe as a Tibetan emissary.⁷ The subjects of the discussions and consultations were Russian political and military assistance to Tibet and the possibility of a Russo-French alliance to resolve the Tibet problem.⁸

The presence of citizens of the Russian Empire such as Dorzhiev and others in Tibet and also Dorzhiev’s diplomatic activities could not go unnoticed by the British in India. Reports about the presence of hundreds of Russian military advisers in Lhasa and a secret alliance formed between the Dalai Lama and Czar were received by the British government by 1900. These alarmed Lord George Nathaniel Curzon (1859-1925), the Viceroy of India (1899-1905), who was a popular proponent of active confrontation with Russia.⁹ In particular, reports in the Russian press about Dorzhiev’s diplomatic missions as a Tibetan emissary further aroused suspicions in Lord Curzon and others that Russia was drawing Tibet into the Great Game to control the routes across Asia. Subsequently, Lord Curzon and others publicized without restraint that Russia would pose a direct threat to India.¹⁰

roughly translates as “Master of Buddhist Philosophy” or “Professor of Buddhist Metaphysics”. See John Snelling, *The Sacred Mountain: Travellers and Pilgrims at Mount Kailas in Western Tibet and the Great Universal Symbol of the Sacred Mountain*, Revised and Enlarged Edition (London and the Hague: East-West Publications, 1990), p. 232.

⁷ While the Tibetans may have had purely local interests in playing the “Russian card”, some historians are certain that Dorzhiev had broader goals in mind arguing for a pan-Buddhist movement merging all Buddhists into one state under the aegis of the Russian Empire. For details, refer to Helen Hudley, “Tibet’s Part in the Great Game”, *History Today* 43, no.10, 1993, pp. 45-50.

⁸ See Nikolay Tsyrempilov, “The Open and Secret Diplomacy of Tsarist and Soviet Russia in Tibet”, p. 218.

⁹ Nikolay Tsyrempilov, “The Open and Secret Diplomacy of Tsarist and Soviet Russia in Tibet”, 218. Lord Curzon was appointed to implement British foreign policy changes in relation to Russia (i.e., active confrontation with Russia), and such policy shifts occurred when a conservative majority came to power in Great Britain in 1899.

¹⁰ British Indian strategists were always deeply concerned with the issues that might threaten the security of British India, and began to see Russian expansion into Central Asia in the nineteenth century as a threat. While the notion of a Russian threat originally related to the northwest frontier, in the late 1880s it came to be applied to the Tibetan frontier (McKay, 2003, pp. 71-72). After the Arrival of Lord Curzon as Viceroy of India in late 1898, the Russian threat— “real or imagined”—became

In 1903, this suspicion and fear prompted Lord Curzon to take a more direct approach. Specifically, he began setting up a permanent British mission in Tibet to maintain British interests. Under the leadership of Colonel Francis Younghusband (1863-1942), British forces launched a second invasion of Tibet.¹¹ Forces occupied such strategic towns as Chumbi (Chu bed; Ch. Chunpi) and others. When the British troops marched toward Lhasa, they were fiercely blocked by Tibetan troops. But the newly appointed *amban* You Tai (also Youtai, 1844-1910), serving as *amban* from 1902 to 1906, used all means to obstruct and undermine the Tibetan troops' struggle against the British. As a result, the Tibetan troops had to retreat in defeat. In July 1904, the British troops pressed on toward Lhasa. Consequently, the thirteenth Dalai Lama was forced to flee Lhasa, without notifying You Tai. Using the Dalai Lama's secret flight and his apparent lack of "respect" for the Qing court as excuses, You Tai memorialized to strip the Dalai Lama of his title and to have the Panchen Lama placed in charge of Tibetan affairs.¹² The Qing court believed You Tai's statement and approved his request. Since Ü and Tsang had split into distinctive factions, the Panchen Lama argued that it would be inconvenient for him to be concurrently in charge of Ü. Instead, he requested assigning the oldest disciple of the Dalai Lama to be temporarily in charge of Tsang.¹³ In this way, the Panchen Lama tactfully declined the Qing appointment. These actions of the Qing court led to ill feeling not only between the Dalai Lama and the Qing court but also toward the Panchen Lama. This situation prepared the way for endless troubles for the Tibetan situation in the future.

2. *Accounts of the Dalai Lama's Escape from Lhasa and Exile in Urga*

Newspapers in China reported the flight of the Dalai Lama and his whereabouts. One of them read as follows:

a major concern, and apparent evidence for Russian involvement in Tibet rapidly increased. For details, see Alex McKay, "19th-Century British Expansion on the Indo-Tibetan Frontier: A Forward Perspective", *The Tibet Journal* 28, no. 4, 2003, pp. 61-76 and Alex McKay, "The British Invasion of Tibet, 1903-1904", *Inner Asia* 14, no. 1, 2012, pp. 8-9.

¹¹ Younghusband led the 1903-04 British expedition to Tibet, whose putative aim was to settle disputes over the Sikkim-Tibet border. However, by exceeding instructions from London, the expedition controversially became a de facto invasion of Tibet. See George N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question*, reprint of the 1889 original (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967), p. 277.

¹² You Tai, "You Tai zoudu" (diyi juan), *Qingji chouzang zoudu*, Disan ce (Beijing: Guoli Beiping yanjiuyuan shixue yanjiuhui, 1938), p. 14, p.18-19.

¹³ "Ming Dalai dizi quanshe qianzang zhuwei", *Dalu* (Shanghai) 3, no. 13, 1905, p. 7.

Since the British troops entered Lhasa, the Dalai Lama was scared and fled. Nobody knows where he went. According to a letter from Xining received by the *amban*, it appears at present that the Lama was in Chaidamu (Tswa 'dam), Qinghai Province. Measures were taken to prevent him from fleeing to other places. We have heard that the telegraph sent by the *amban* had already reached Beijing.¹⁴

Furthermore, *Wanguo gongbao* (also transcribed phonetically as *Wan Kwoh Kung Pao*; *The Globe Magazine*),¹⁵ a missionary newspaper, openly published articles in Chinese vilifying the Dalai Lama and Tibet. First it translated and published "An Investigation into the Dalai Lama" ("Dalai Lama kao"). Originally published in the *Times*, this article was full of biases and prejudices. For example, it viewed Tibetan people's devotion to the *Geluk* school of Tibetan Buddhism as "ignorant and crude", and it maintained that the thirteenth Dalai Lama was "cold-hearted and obstinate, and acted recklessly on impulse". It also denounced the Chinese government's brutal and tyrannical rule in Tibet, and it implied that the deaths of several Dalai Lamas at a young age could be traced to the murderous hands of the Chinese government. It held furthermore that the reason the thirteenth Dalai Lama had been able to take over the reins of the Lhasa government upon coming of age was that he was secretly protected by the "Society for the Protection of the Country" in Tibet.¹⁶ This article seriously harmed the Dalai Lama's reputation. Subsequently, *Wanguo gongbao* published another short article, which cited Younghusband's short excerpt on the Dalai Lama from his paper published by the Royal Geographical Society.¹⁷ Younghusband had stated that Tibetan monks did not sincerely venerate the Buddha at all. He portrayed Tibetan monks as "lazy, filthy, greedy, selfish, stupid and ignorant of human affairs" and further belittled them as being devoid of any merit. Having placed themselves among the ranks of the civilized people, the authors of the article condescendingly maintained that Tibet "was not useful for the world at

¹⁴ "Dalai Lama zhi zongji", *Lujiang bao* 85, 1904, p. 12.

¹⁵ Its predecessor was *Zhongguo Jiaohui xinbao* (*Chinese Church News*), a weekly news magazine set up by an American Southern Methodist missionary named Young John Allen (aka Lin Lezhi) (1836-1907) in 1868. In 1874 it was renamed *Wanguo gongbao* (*Chinese Globe Magazine*). The magazine aimed to introduce broad knowledge of Western geography, history, culture, politics, religion, science, art, industry and other general items. For details about *Wanguo gongbao*, see Xiantao Zhang, *The Origins of the Modern Chinese Press: The Influence of the Protestant Missionary Press in Late Qing China* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 46-61.

¹⁶ Lin Lezhi and Ren Baoluo, "Dalai Lama kao", *Wanguo gongbao* 192, 1905, pp. 9-15.

¹⁷ I have not been able to locate the original paper written by Francis Younghusband.

all".¹⁸ Such statements had a great impact on public opinion in China and internationally. It made the Tibet issue much more complex, and it created many obstacles hampering the Chinese government's effort to rectify Tibetan affairs.

The Chinese press also paid close attention to the Dalai Lama's exile in Urga, Mongolia. Several reports dealt with the Lama's reception upon his arrival in Urga in late 1904. For instance, *Datong bao* (*Great Harmony*) reported that the Mongol nobility and common people all came to pay homage to the Dalai Lama and offered a great amount of silver to him.¹⁹ In addition, another newspaper *Dalu* (*The Continent* [Shanghai]) provided a detailed account of the Dalai Lama's arrival at Urga and the reception he received there:

Leading several thousands of his followers, recently the Dalai Lama arrived in Urga, with 200 loads of luggage carried by camels. Since the local people have been looking forward to his arrival for a long time, upon his arrival in the vicinity of the city, though it was extremely cold, over 20,000 people, including Han Chinese and Mongol officials, monks, officers, soldiers, shopkeepers, etc., all went out of the city several kilometers to welcome the lama. When [the party] reached the city proper, the local authorities again paid their respects by firing cannons. As soon as [the Lama] reached the city, he stayed at a hall prepared in advance, where the local monks often went to pay respect to the Lama. At the time, the monks in the Mongol regions and those in regions to the north of Lake Baikal all came to pay homage to the Lama. With the permission of Russian officials, the monastic leader Chindoyev (?)²⁰ from eastern Siberia came all the way to pay respect to the lama.....²¹

Furthermore, though the Tibetan usual practice forbade [the Lama] from meeting with Europeans, the report points out that the Dalai Lama did so this time.²²

At the time, Chinese reporters and journalists were very indignant at the Dalai Lama's going into exile in Urga. Apparently, many suspected that the Dalai Lama's intention was to seek help from the Czar. One news report in *Tongxue bao* (*General Studies Newspaper*) went so far as to head a report with the title "The Dalai Lama is a scoundrel". The

¹⁸ Lin Lezhi and Fan Yi, "Xizang lama zhi chengdu", *Wanguo gongbao* 196, 1905, p. 63.

¹⁹ "Mengren chongbai Dalai", *Datong bao* 3, no. 18, 1905, pp. 1-2.

²⁰ The first character of the name of this monastic leader is not clear.

²¹ See "Dalai lama zhi Kulun", *Dalu* (Shanghai) 3, no. 3, 1905, p. 18.

²² See "Dalai Lama zhi Kulun", *Dalu* (Shanghai) 3, no. 3, 1905, p. 18.

report specifically points out that the Dalai Lama was planning to travel to Russia and how anxious authorities in Beijing were upon learning of the news. The report held that the Lama's visit would definitely place the Mongols under Russian influence. Consequently, authorities had already dispatched officials to stop the Lama from proceeding to Russia. It further stated that the only way to preserve Tibet would be to send a Mongol prince or duke to welcome the Lama solemnly and politely to Beijing. There, the authorities should allocate a big monastery to him, attentively provide for him, and take strict measures to prevent him from visiting Russia.²³ Meanwhile, the Chinese provincial officials were also aware of the danger posed by the Lama's intention to visit Russia via Urga. Earlier on the governor-general of Sha'anxi and Gansu provinces, the governor of Xinjiang, and others had sent telegraphs to the Qing court. All of them warned the court to take strict precautions against the Dalai Lama's seeking refuge in Russia via Urga.²⁴ Imperial Envoy Yan Zhi, who oversaw the reception of the Dalai Lama, was also aware of the Dalai Lama's contact with Russia.²⁵ At the time the news about the Dalai Lama's imminent visit to Russia was spreading like wildfire. The detailed account of the Dalai Lama cited above further claims that the Dalai Lama had once received a Russian officer.²⁶ The statement reads: "[They] talked for a long time. Some people say that the Lama would go to a major monastery near Lake Baikal, and others say that he would go to St. Petersburg".²⁷

It was also rumored that the Dalai Lama had borrowed 60,000 rubles from Russia, but an investigation conducted by the Qing government turned up no evidence.²⁸ Interestingly, in reviewing many news reports about the Lama's imminent visit to Russia, there is only one brief report about his serious rift with Jetsün Dampa, the religious ruler of Mongolia, and it does not include any details about the increasing tension between them. With the title "Kulun lama can Dalai lama" ("The Urga Lama's impeachment of the Dalai Lama"), the news report opens by pointing out that the Dalai Lama was still in Urga.

²³ "Dalai wulai", *Tongxue bao* 1, no. 15, 1906, p. 454.

²⁴ Cited from Lu Xiangliang, "Qingmo gonggong yulun zhong de shisan shi Dalai Lama", p. 119.

²⁵ Zhongguo diyi lishi dang-anguan, Zhongguo zangxue yanjiu zhongxin, *Qingmo shisan shi Dalai Lama dang-an shiliao xuanbian* (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2002), p. 93.

²⁶ This official must be Shishmaryov, the Russian consul to Urga. The Dalai Lama asked him directly whether Russia would protect Tibet from China and Britain. For details, refer to Nicolai S. Kuleshov, *Russia's Tibet File* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1996), p. 38.

²⁷ "Dalai Lama zhi Kulun", *Dalu* (Shanghai) 3, no. 3, 1905, p. 18.

²⁸ "Chaban Dalai Lama zhi jiekuan", *Dalu* (Shanghai) 3, no. 10, 1905, p. 6.

Continuing that he had not begun his journey back to Tibet on pretext of illness, it then simply states that recently the Lama had a falling out with the Urga Lama ("Kulun Lama"), referring to Jetsün Dampa, and adds that the latter "sent a secret memorial to the [Qing] government, claiming the Dalai Lama was actually a person who would do harm to China".²⁹ Furthermore, in view of the Dalai Lama's conflict with Jetsün Dampa, the aforementioned imperial envoy, Yan Zhi, memorialized to have the Dalai Lama quickly return to Tibet.³⁰

3. *Representation of the Dalai Lama during His Exile in Shanxi*

In 1905, the Qing court issued an edict to the Dalai Lama that ordered him to return to Central Tibet.³¹ Since the British troops had not completely retreated yet, the Dalai Lama was not willing to do so. Claiming that he was ill, the Dalai Lama did not embark on his return journey to Central Tibet. According to the news report in *Dalu* (*The Continent* [Shanghai]) published in 1905, the Lama tried various ways to delay his return.³² Eventually, the Dalai Lama accepted the decree, and agreed to return to Central Tibet. However, another news report states that the Lama was travelling slowly, stopping and staying at various places along the way. In particular, it mentions that the Dalai Lama was still staying at Jingning city (present-day old Qitai town, Qitai county of Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture) in Xinjiang province.³³ After he reached Qinghai, Zhang Yintang (also written as Chang Yint'ang, 1866-1935), the imperial envoy who was dispatched to investigate and rectify Tibetan affairs by the Qing court in 1906,³⁴ maintained that the British were against the Dalai Lama's returning to Central Tibet. Zhang suggested the Qing court order the Dalai Lama to temporarily postpone his journey back to Central Tibet. Having accepted Zhang's suggestion, the Qing court had the Dalai Lama stay at Kumbum (sku 'bum) monastery to pass the winter. The officials who received the Dalai Lama were resentful toward him. They complained that he had a haughty and condescending attitude and accused him and his large entourage of willfully exacting money and goods. They argued that since the Lama had a large entourage, their daily expenses

²⁹ "Kulun Lama can Dalai Lama", *Dalu* (Shanghai) 3, no. 11, 1905, p. 4.

³⁰ Zhongguo diyi lishi dang-anguan, and Zhongguo zangxue yanjiu zhongxin, *Qingmo shisan shi Dalai Lama dang-an shiliao xuanbian* (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2002), p. 93.

³¹ "Ming Yan Zhi song dalai huizang", *Dalu* (Shanghai) 3, no. 6, 1905, p. 8.

³² "Dalai Lama buyuan huizang", *Dalu* (Shanghai) 3, no. 9, 1905, p. 4.

³³ "Yuchi Dalai lama huizang", *Guangyi congbao* 152, 1907, no page no. marked.

³⁴ Zhang Yintang's tenure in Tibet was just under a year, from the end of 1906 to 1907.

were enormous. The report stated that there were altogether over 2,000 Mongol followers travelling with the Dalai Lama and complained that the Lama and his entourage were perverse and violent. It mentioned that, wherever they went, they would “extort” money and provisions and plunder cattle and horses. It especially highlighted their need for a great amount of food. Satisfying this daily demand required slaughtering one hundred sheep and thirty yaks.³⁵

In 1907, the Dalai Lama claimed that he had not acclimated to Xining and requested the Qing court’s permission to stay at Mt. Wutai (Riwu Tse’nga; Ri bo rtse lnga). The Qing court approved his request. One news report in *Datong bao* (*Great Harmony*) stated that after the Dalai Lama and his entourage had reached Shanxi Province, they continued to be extravagant and wasteful. It suggested that to win over the Dalai Lama, the Qing court had allowed the Lama to demand whatever he desired and did not hesitate to use state funds to satisfy his needs.³⁶ Followers in various regions and even high officials and prominent gentry went to pay homage to the Dalai Lama in an endless stream along his path. In addition, local officials and common people in Shanxi complained that most of the Dalai Lama’s retinue were domineering and lawless. Thus, local officials and common people in Shanxi found their presence disruptive, and they were tired of dealing with them.³⁷

Another news report with the title “Dalai Lama ziju dishi” (“The Dalai Lama considers himself as the Imperial Tutor”) also recounts the reception of the Dalai Lama, his conduct in Taiyuan city, and the cost of provisions for his trip:

The Dalai Lama of Tibet made a pilgrimage trip to [Mt.] Wutai. On the eighth day of the previous month when he travelled via the outskirts of Taiyuan city in Shanxi Province, he temporarily stayed there. All officials under the provincial governor went out to the suburb of Taiyuan to welcome the Dalai Lama. The protocol for receiving the Dalai Lama was very solemn and grand; canopies and banners were yellow, and all guards of honor were also dressed in yellow ... After [the Lama] arrived at the governor’s office, [he] only saluted the governor, then sat still. [The Lama] considered himself to be the Imperial Tutor ... It is said that after [the Lama] had stayed [here] for several months, [he] would set out for [Mt.] Wutai. It is also learned that the provisions for the Lama on his trip through the region cost approximately as much as tens of thousands of gold coins. (The editor’s note): Who are

³⁵ “Dalai gouliu Xining qingxing”, *Guangyi congbao* 130, 1907, p. 7.

³⁶ “Dalai lama dijin shi”, *Datong bao* 9, no. 8, 1908, pp. 31-32.

³⁷ “Jinsheng buyuan Dalai Lama jiuliu”, *Datong bao* 10, no. 5, 1908, p. 35.

the Dalai and Panchen? [They] troubled us to provide for provisions and furnishings for them to such a great extent. Alas for the people, sweat and blood are gone! Who is to blame? [Blame] the aggressive Imperial Tutor.³⁸

Compared with other reports, the cost of provisions for the Dalai Lama during this trip seems to have been grossly exaggerated. Yet, like the previous news report, this one also criticized the Dalai Lama for being haughty and condescending and lamented that the hard-won money of the people was wasted to provide for the Lama during the trip.

The Dalai Lama sent his special envoys to Beijing to get in touch with the great powers. Consequently, Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia each dispatched officials to Mt. Wutai to call on the Dalai Lama. The Chinese believed that the British envoy had united with the American envoy and was making additional efforts to win over the Dalai Lama so that the latter would be inclined to take a pro-British stance. This event drew the attention of the Chinese press.³⁹

The Dalai Lama's purported actions and manners in Shanxi Province caused public opinion in China to feel resentment toward him and to find him unsatisfactory. One article in *Tongxue bao* condemned the Dalai Lama as being a "scoundrel" (Ch. *wulai*), stating that "since the Dalai Lama stayed in Mt. Wutai, the ground of Shanxi was immediately one *chi* (equivalent to 1/3 meter) lower." This was attributed to the Lama's indulging in wanton extravagance. The article argued that it was intolerable for [the local government] to provide [for him and his entourage]. It even claimed that "if the Buddha had a soul, he would never allow such savage monks to disturb the world".⁴⁰ The article provided further explanation from eight different perspectives.⁴¹ Some aspects of the article were certainly exaggerated, but it is true that the reception of the Dalai Lama incurred a considerable expense. When the state treasury was short of funds, it would be inevitable that such expenses would be criticized. Citing the report in *Jilin gongmin ribao* (*Jilin Citizen Daily*), another article published in the same newspaper called the Dalai Lama a "devil" and referred to him as "a person who did harm to the whole of Tibet". The Dalai Lama is also described as not knowing anything and as being "wanton and tyrannical". Appealing to the Qing government to quickly take appropriate measures to deal with the situation in Central Tibet, it proposed to send shrewd

³⁸ "Dalai Lama ziju dishi", *Ban xingqi bao* 1, 1908, p. 35.

³⁹ "Ji Dalai Lama laijing shi", *Datong bao* 9, no. 20, 1908, pp. 32-33; "Meishi jinye Dalai Lama", *Datong bao* 10, no. 1, 1908, p. 37.

⁴⁰ "Dalai wulai", *Tongxue bao* 5, no. 16, 1908, p. 497.

⁴¹ "Dalai wulai", *Tongxue bao* 5, no. 16, 1908, pp. 497-98.

and efficient officials to quickly rectify the internal affairs and diplomacy of Central Tibet, and not to allow the Dalai Lama to participate in politics.⁴²

4. *Accounts of the Dalai Lama's activities in Beijing and his escape to India*

In 1908 the Dalai Lama wanted to go to Beijing to have an audience with the emperor; after much deliberation, the Qing court approved his request.⁴³ When the Dalai Lama arrived in Beijing, the Qing court received him with great fanfare.⁴⁴ The Qing court dispatched the assistant minister of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (*Lifan bu*) Da Shou and the right councilor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zhang Yintang, to be responsible for the reception of the Dalai Lama.⁴⁵ And Emperor Guangxu and the Empress Dowager Cixi personally received the Dalai Lama.⁴⁶ Reportedly, they ordered the Dalai Lama to meet them and to see them off by kneeling down in front of them during the feast.⁴⁷ During the Dalai Lama's stay in Beijing, the Qing court lowered the status of the Dalai Lama in terms of the protocol of their meeting, the Lama's right to memorialize the emperor directly, the granting of a title to him, and other aspects. All of this contributed to the Dalai Lama's dissatisfaction with the court⁴⁸ and shattered the Dalai Lama's hope to resist the *amban's* reform by relying on the Qing court.

Public opinion at the time continued to criticize the Dalai Lama for being extravagant and for being all too well provided for by the Qing court. The news report "Dalai Lama zheyang kuo ma" ("Is the Dalai Lama so rich?") recounts the following:

Apparently, as soon as the Dalai Lama reached Beijing on the fourth day, the authorities granted him tens of thousands of taels of silver. [They] also gave him countless bolts of silk and satin woven by the people of Sichuan. This is interesting. Now, it is said that every day, the assistant minister of the Board for the Administration of Outlying Regions (*lifan yuan*) Dashou is practicing the etiquette for having an audience with the emperor. Everybody, close your eyes and think

⁴² "Guanyu Dalai shijian", *Tongxue bao* 6, no. 1, 1908, p. 13.

⁴³ "Er-shi-yi ri yu Dalai lama laijing bijian", *Dongfang zazhi* 5, no. 7, 1908, p. 3.

⁴⁴ "Zhi dalai ruijing zhisheng", *Datong bao* 10, no. 10, 1908, p. 30.

⁴⁵ "Chu bari pai Da Shou Zhang Yintang zhaoliao Dalai Lama", *Dongfang Zazhi* 5, no. 10, 1908, p. 93.

⁴⁶ "Er-shi ri Dalai lama jinjian yu renshou dian", *Dongfang zazhi* 5, no. 10, 1908, p. 96;

"Huangshang shuli dai Dalai", *Datong Bao* 10, no. 3, 1908, p. 13.

⁴⁷ "Shiri dashi ji: er-shi-liu ri", *Anhui baihuabao* 3, 1908, p. 5.

⁴⁸ "Dalai buping", *Tongxue bao* 6, no. 7, 1908, p. 209.

about this: This Da[lai] and that Da [Shou], one bald and the other with a pigtail, have assumed the posture of performing a *kowtow* and attending feasts together for a while. If we say this is not anything worth seeing, then there can't be anything else that is so funny. There is another terrible thing: It is said that every day the Dalai spends 13,000 taels of silver—the hard-won money of the people—and he is only a bald [monk].⁴⁹

This short report clearly expressed the author's indignation against both the Dalai Lama and the assistant minister Da Shou (i.e., the Qing authorities). The tone of the entire report is sarcastic. Without showing any respect for the Dalai Lama, the report uses denigrating words such as "bald" (Ch. *tu*) to refer to the Lama. Words used in the report are mostly slang, and the report was written in vernacular. Thus, we can probably surmise the purpose of writing and publishing the report was to have the general public learn about and condemn the activities of the Dalai Lama.⁵⁰

Similarly, starting with the phrase "The Dalai is as stupid as a deer or a pig" ("Dalai chunru lushi"), another news report condemned the Dalai Lama for being extremely barbaric by harassing the public to provide for him during his stay in Shanxi Province. It not only censured local officials such as the governor and others for not daring to intervene in the Lama's activities and for attending upon him with extreme respect. It also denounced the Manchu emperor and the empress dowager for respectfully treating him as a guest of honor and criticized princes, dukes and other officials for paying homage to the Lama. The report acknowledged that the Dalai Lama and his entourage were acting like extremely "stupid beasts". At the same time, it also suggested that to prevent the Lama and Tibet from falling under the control of Russia in the north or British in the south, the Qing authorities had to give the Lama and his entourage preferential treatment and tolerate their activities. Yet, the report maintains that allowing the Lama and his entourage to do as they wished without any restrictions was to enable the "beasts" (Ch. *yeshou*) of Tibet to degrade civilized countries such as China.

One can tell from the context that the report was written by a Chinese student studying abroad at the time. The author pointed out that if Chinese students studying abroad—himself included—were slightly careless about their manners and conduct, those whom they had insulted would reprimand them. Arguing that how Chinese officials

⁴⁹ "Dalai Lama zheyang kuo ma?" *Jingye xunbao* 30, 1908, pp. 58-59.

⁵⁰ The report was published in *Jingye xunbao*, a vernacular periodical launched by students of China College (*Zhongguo gongxue*) in 1906.

dealt with the Lama and his entourage reflected the savageness and extreme freedom enjoyed by Chinese officialdom, the report cited a few cases in which Chinese diplomats and officials had exhibited absurd, unprofessional, or inappropriate manners and behavior in public and on diplomatic occasions. However, when these diplomats or officials were asked whether they had encountered any restrictions or humiliation during these occasions, all claimed not only that they were treated with special regard as officials but also that all their inappropriate manners and conduct were forgiven by foreigners. Indeed, these Manchu authorities considered Chinese students studying abroad to be so narrow-minded that they often attempted to restrict their own conduct by claiming their conduct might be disgraceful, resulting in considerable loss of their freedom. Finally, to show how “ridiculous” it was to treat the Dalai Lama and his entourage as the Qing authorities had been doing, following the logic of the previously mentioned officials, the author speculates on how Manchu rulers would be treated were they to visit foreign countries. The author sarcastically deduces that—in the future, after China had been carved up—if the Manchu emperor and empress dowager having the same qualification as that of the Dalai Lama came to visit foreign cities such as London, Paris, and Berlin, they would be able to do exactly what they would in China and go about as they wished without any regard for local laws and practices and without any intervention from foreign authorities. The author ends his report with a question, “However, is the Manchu government concerned about being carved up?”⁵¹ In sum, this piece clearly denotes resentment not only toward the Dalai Lama and his entourage but, more importantly, toward Manchu authorities. Moreover, it also reflects the anti-Manchu sentiments of the general public.

Due to the eagerness to “save the nation from subjugation and ensure its survival” (*jiuwang tucun*) and “consolidate the borderlands” (*gonggu bianjiang*), Qing officials as well as the common people held that the Qing court should lose no time in rectifying Tibet’s affairs by taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the Dalai Lama’s presence in inland China. At the time, the newly appointed *amban* Zhao Erfeng⁵² sent a secret telegraph to the Qing court requesting to have the Dalai Lama stay in Beijing so as to reorganize the affairs of Tibet.⁵³ Several reports stated that some ministers had memorialized

⁵¹ Jingguanzhe, “Dalai Lama”, *Xin shiji* 67, 1908, pp. 13-15.

⁵² Though Zhao was appointed as the *amban*, he declined the post and recommended Wen Zongyao, another Han official hailing from Guangdong. For details, see Dahpon David Ho, “The Men Who Would not be Amban and the One Who Would: Four Frontline Officials and Qing Tibet Policy, 1905-1911”, *Modern China* 34, no. 2, 2008, pp. 210-46.

⁵³ “Zhengfu yiyun jiliu Dalai”, *Datong Bao* 10, no. 10, 1908, p. 31.

the court to confer the title "religious king of Mongol and Tibet" on the Dalai Lama. This would indicate that he was especially in charge of religious affairs and was forbidden to interfere in Tibetan politics. In response, the Dalai Lama expressed his unwillingness to accept the new charge and title.⁵⁴ The minister mentioned in the previous report must have been Zhang Yintang. Zhang submitted the "Memorial Concerning Internal and External Affairs and Dealing with the Aftermath" on January 13, 1908. There Zhang proposed to abolish the offices of the *amban* and the assistant *amban* and to appoint an Inspection Commissioner of Tibet (*xingbu dachen*), who would be granted greater power to administer Tibet. Zhang also advocated reducing and recapturing the administrative power from the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama and having them especially in charge of religious affairs only.⁵⁵

Many articles published in various newspapers also suggested that the Qing court should separate politics from religion in Tibet. For instance, one article states "[We] show the tactics of loose rein to the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama; while [we] show them great respect with necessary courtesy, in reality we have restrained their real power".⁵⁶ Another article suggests that "the old system of the *amban* should be restored, and the *amban* should still control the power of diplomacy, military and finance As for the Dalai Lama, he should only be allowed to be in charge of religious affairs, and should not be permitted to interfere with any administrative affairs".⁵⁷ Still another report claims that rectifying the affairs of Tibet was the right of China as the sovereign state and reforming Tibetan politics need not to be restricted by the Dalai Lama.⁵⁸

The call for "separating religion from politics" in Tibet in the public opinion of China was quite strong and powerful. However, at the time, the Qing court's determination to rectify the affairs of Tibet did not allow for any change. The thirteenth Dalai Lama was extremely dissatisfied with the situation. Indeed, it seems that this prompted him to be more eager to seek support from the great powers. Reportedly, the Dalai Lama had close contacts with envoys of the great powers, and the

⁵⁴ "Qingjia Dalai fenghao", *Datong Bao* 10, no. 10, 1908, 31; "Qingjin Dalai ganshe zhengzhi", *Daong bao* 10, no. 12, 1908, p. 29; "Dalai bu rongyi jiayu", *Anhui baihuabao*, 2, 1908, p. 6; "Shiri dashi ji: Er-shi-yi ri", *Anhui baihuabao* 3, 1908, pp. 3-4.

⁵⁵ Zhongguo zangxue yanjiu zhongxin, Zhongguo diyi lishi dang-anguan, eds., *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi dang-an shiliao huibian* (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 1994), Vol. 4, p. 1558. For details about Zhang's activities in Tibet, refer to Dahpon David Ho, "The Men Who Would not be Amban and the One Who Would", pp. 210-46.

⁵⁶ Tian Lusheng, "Xizang dashi tonglun", *Guangyi congbao* 172, 1908, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁷ "Zhengdun Xizang tiaoyi", *Guangyi congbao* 175, 1908, pp. 1-4.

⁵⁸ "Lun zhengdun Xizang buke zhuanxun Dalai zhi yijian", *Guangyi congbao* 184, 1908, pp. 1-2.

British were also making great efforts to win over the Dalai Lama. Thus, the Chinese authorities and the public believed the Lama's contacts with envoys increased his centrifugal tendency day by day.⁵⁹ Interestingly, one news report specifically mentions that the Dalai Lama was proficient in spoken and written Russian. It points out that all the clauses in "Measures for Administering Tibet" drafted by the Dalai Lama himself were written in Russian; he directly interacted with the Russian envoy upon paying a return visit to the latter, though he employed interpreters when paying return visits to envoys of other countries.⁶⁰

Barely two months after the Dalai Lama arrived in Beijing, the Guangxu Emperor and Empress Dowager Cixi passed away one after another. As the Qing authorities were busy with funeral arrangements, they had the Dalai Lama return to Central Tibet.⁶¹ On his way back to Central Tibet, the Dalai Lama was said to have remotely controlled the Lhasa government's effort to resist "New Policy Reforms" that *amban* Lian Yu was in the process of implementing and to have had clandestine contact with Britain and Russia.⁶² He was also accused of inciting monks to gather a mob to besiege the Qing troops stationed in Tibet.⁶³ To ensure the implementation of the "New Policy Reforms", *amban* Lian Yu had memorialized a request to transfer Sichuan troops to Tibet to suppress the mob.⁶⁴ In response, the Dalai Lama dispatched Tibetan troops with the intent of blocking the Sichuan troops' advance into Central Tibet.

After the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa, he became almost completely antagonistic toward *amban* Lian Yu. Not only did he stop providing supplies to the office of the *amban*, he also wrote a letter to assistant *amban* Wen Zongyao to impeach Lian Yu. In the letter, he listed nineteen crimes Lian Yu had committed and requested someone to replace him. Seeing that the Sichuan troops' advance into Tibet was already a certainty, in February 1910 the Dalai Lama went to see Wen, again; the two agreed to handle various issues peacefully. After Wen returned to the office of the *amban*, he consulted Lian Yu concerning how to deal with the issues together with the Dalai Lama. Stubbornly

⁵⁹ "Si gongshi jinjie Dalai Lama", *Datong bao* 10, no. 11, 1908, 24; "Dalai huibai ge zhushi zhi xiandao", *Datong bao* 10, no. 14, 1908, p. 31.

⁶⁰ "Shiri dashiji: chusan ri", *Anhui baihuabao* 4, 1908, p. 3. Another news report about the Dalai Lama's audience with the emperor in the Renshou Hall also mentions in passing that the Dalai Lama was fluent in Russian. See "Er-shi ri Dalai Lama jinjian yu renshou dian", *Dongfang zazhi* 5, no. 10, 1908, p. 96.

⁶¹ "Er-shi-ba ri Dalai Lama Huizang", *Dongfang zazhi* 5, no., 12, 1908, p. 155.

⁶² "Xizang jinshi zashu", *Dongfang zazhi* 7, no. 1, 1910, pp. 20-21.

⁶³ "Zangseng weigong guanbing zhi haiwen", *Guangyi congbao* 210, 1909, p. 11; "Zangseng weigong guanbing zhi haiwen", *Datong bao* 11, no. 24, 1909, p. 30.

⁶⁴ "Xizang qingdiao chuanbing tanya", *Guangyi congbao* 9, 1909, p. 192.

adhering to his own opinions, Lian Yu refused to co-sign the official communication to the Dalai Lama; moreover, he deleted the article "peacefully handle various issues". Consequently, Wen had to sign the official communication alone and send its translated version to the Dalai Lama to make the latter feel at ease. Not long after, the vanguard forces of the Sichuan troops reached Lhasa and clashed with the Tibetan troops. The Dalai Lama left Lhasa with apprehension. Upon learning the news, Wen tried to persuade Lian Yu to dispatch troops to stop the Dalai Lama, but Lian Yu refused to listen. Later, it was too late to send troops to chase and stop the Dalai Lama, and eventually the Dalai Lama fled to India. The details of the event were reported in *Dongfang zazhi* (*The Eastern Miscellany*), which lamented and grieved over Lian Yu's stubborn actions that were to sow the seeds for disaster in the future.⁶⁵

After Lian Yu reported the Dalai Lama's exile into India to the Qing court, the Qing court issued an edict abolishing the Dalai Lama's title again. It also ordered Lian Yu to look for another young reincarnation for the Dalai Lama and decreed to have the Panchen Lama temporarily placed in charge of affairs in Tibet.⁶⁶ The Qing court passed a resolution to retrieve the political power of Tibet. It reads as follows:

In the future, all religious affairs of Tibet are to be handled by the newly installed Dalai Lama. Before a regular province can be established in Tibet, all business affairs and foreign affairs of Tibet are to be dealt with accordingly by the *amban*, following the order of the Qing government. The Dalai Lama should not interfere in these affairs by exceeding his authority.

Meanwhile, the Qing court also sent diplomatic notes to all envoys of various countries stationed in China. This notified them not only that all future government affairs of Tibet would be reported to the Qing government for approval before being implemented by the *amban* but also that the Qing court would not recognize any private agreements the Dalai Lama had signed with any foreigners.⁶⁷ The Dalai Lama requested Britain, Russia, and other countries to intervene on his behalf. Thus, these governments made inquiries to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs about this issue. Thereupon, the Chinese Ministry of

⁶⁵ "Xizang Dalai Lama taodun yuwen", *Dongfang zazhi* 7, no. 3, 1910, pp. 4-6.

⁶⁶ Wen Tian, "Xuanton er-nian zhengyue zhongguo dashi ji", *Dongfang zazhi* 7, no. 2, 1910, pp. 21-27.

⁶⁷ "Jueyi huafen Xizang zhengjiao quan", *Datong Bao* 13, no. 13, 1910, pp. 28-9; "Zangwu tonggao geshi", *Waijiao bao* 10, no. 22, 1910, p. 17; "Xizang zhengjiao fenli zhi jichu", *Datong Bao* 13, no. 19, 1909, p. 29.

Foreign Affairs publicly proclaimed the crimes committed by the Dalai Lama, claiming that the Dalai Lama “is domineering and excessively arrogant, acts willfully and lawlessly. His action of taking up arms and mobilizing people caused popular resentment [against him] to rise high”. The proclamation maintained that dismissing the Dalai Lama would not affect the system of the government of Central Tibet.⁶⁸ After weighing the pros and cons, Great Britain and Russia eventually did not interfere on the Dalai Lama’s behalf. Chinese newspapers reported on the responses of the great powers toward the Dalai Lama’s request. Reportedly, while Great Britain stated that it would not interfere with affairs of Central Tibet, Russia also clarified that it did not invite the Dalai Lama to come to visit Russia. Furthermore, Japan was said to have commented that the way the Qing court dealt with the Dalai Lama showed that Chinese policy toward the rule of its dependencies had improved.⁶⁹ Public opinion in China did not oppose the Qing court’s action of abolishing the Dalai Lama’s title. To the contrary, some criticized the Qing government for punishing the Dalai Lama too lightly. A report “Lun chaoting chengchu Dalai shi” (“A discussion of the Qing court’s punishment of the Dalai Lama”) claimed that the Qing court had, by all means, treated the Dalai Lama with leniency, had received him with courtesy, and had forgiven his wrongdoings many times; in sum, the report held that nothing could extenuate the Dalai Lama’s action of not thinking about the grace of the country, defying the order of the Qing court, and fleeing to a foreign country. Meanwhile, it denounced the rumor that the Dalai Lama was planning to travel to Beijing via India to seek to redress the alleged injustices done to him as “the talk of the young and innocent in their sleep” (*tong-ai yiyu*).⁷⁰ One can see from the style of the writing that the author of the news report was motivated by Han-Chauvinistic thought. The author hoped that the Qing government would reclaim political power over Tibet, carry out reforms, transform the social traditions of Tibet, and consolidate the border region. The Dalai Lama’s reputation in the public opinion of inland China had reached its lowest point.

The Diplomatic Review translated and published the review about the Dalai Lama’s exile into India by the Swedish explorer Sven Anders Hedin (1865-1952). First published in a British newspaper, Hedin’s article maintained that the Tibet issue was just tantamount to China, Britain, and Russia playing a game. In his view, when the Dalai Lama went

⁶⁸ “Waibu xuangao Dalai zuizhuang”, *Guofeng bao* 1, no. 5, 1910, pp. 77-78.

⁶⁹ “Ying-e lianguo zhi yijian”, *Dongfang zazhi* 3, 1910, cited from Lu Xiangliang, “Qingmo gonggong yulun zhong de shisan shi Dalai Lama”, p. 120; “Sanxu Xizang yaowen”, *Datong bao* 13, no. 6, 1910, pp. 30-1; “Lun Xizang zhibian”, *Waijiao bao* 7, 1910, pp. 18-20.

⁷⁰ “Lun chaoting chengchu Dalai shi”, *Guangyi congbao* 232, 1910, pp. 1-5.

into exile at Urga, Russia did not grasp the opportunity firmly; when the Dalai Lama went to Beijing to have an audience with the Qing emperor, Qing China did not take advantage of the opportunity either. And now that the Dalai Lama was in exile in India, one would have to wait and see whether the British authorities would be able to seize the opportunity to support Tibet's independence or bring Tibet under its control. In Hedin's view, the Dalai Lama was only a political chip—something of a rarity that could be hoarded for a better price. In the eyes of foreigners, the Dalai Lama played a decisive role in solving the Tibet issue. In contrast, when we look at the attitude of the Chinese people toward the Dalai Lama, both government officials and the public had very bad impressions of him and viewed him as an obstacle to reforming Tibetan administration. They even urged Lian Yu to find the reincarnation as soon as possible to replace the thirteenth Dalai Lama, and this caused the Dalai Lama to despair. Later the Qing court proclaimed a discontinuation of the search for the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, agreed to provide an allowance for the Dalai Lama, and sent people to get in touch with the Dalai Lama on several occasions.⁷¹ The Qing court hoped that the Dalai Lama would return to Tibet, but the two parties could not agree on the conditions for his return.

From this point on, news reports continued to appear around the Dalai Lama. These included such stories as the Dalai Lama's meeting with the Viceroy of India, or a rumor about the Dalai Lama's plan to travel to Russia to meet with the Czar, or a report of the Dalai Lama's death in India;⁷² however, these were all short news reports. One can see that public opinion was no longer concerned with the Dalai Lama. Instead, the Chinese people began to pay close attention to the New Policy Reforms in Tibet; public sentiment hoped that the New Policy Reforms implemented by *amban* Lian Yu would initiate a new situation in Tibet, safeguard sovereign rights, and consolidate the defense of the border.

Conclusion

Looking back at reports about the Dalai Lama in newspapers and periodicals from the late Qing period, we find that the Dalai Lama only attracted the attention of the public opinion in China after he went into exile in inland China. This attention was stimulated by the second British invasion into Tibet in 1904. Before this event, the Dalai Lama, the

⁷¹ "Zhengfu zhi duidai Dalai", *Recheng* 1, 1910, pp. 8-9; "Nigei Dalai jintie fei", *Datong Bao* 13, no. 11, 1910, p. 27.

⁷² "Dalai yu yindu zongdu", *Guofeng bao* 1, no. 5, 1910, p. 82; "Dalai Lama shi shouduan", *Xiehe bao* 21, 1911, p. 11; "Dalai Lama zhi jinshi", *Xiehe bao* 16, 1911, p. 1.

political and religious leader of Tibet, was only a vague symbol in the minds of most Chinese people. Foreign missionary newspapers represented by *Wanguo gongbao* (*The Globe Magazine*) published articles whitewashing the British invasion into Tibet and vilifying the Dalai Lama without restraint. These reports seriously undermined the image of the Dalai Lama in the minds of the Chinese public.

During the Dalai Lama's stay in inland China, the Qing court did not hesitate to spend a large sum of state funds to receive the Dalai Lama with solemn ceremonies and various privileges. Initially, the Chinese public was curious about the leader of the Geluk school of Tibetan Buddhism. Thus, it would have been quite natural for them to pay close attention to him. However, the Dalai Lama was accused not only of being domineering and arrogant toward high-ranking officials in inland China but also of failing to discipline his retinue. He and his retinue were perceived as extravagant and wasteful and considered to have demanded supplies without any restraint. Thus, according to public opinion, they had harassed and disturbed local regions where they stayed or had passed through. The current circumstances in China were already difficult, and this naturally led to resentment of the Dalai Lama. Furthermore, the Dalai Lama's stay in inland China allowed him to have close contact with officials of the great powers who were stationed in China. Frequently, news from Central Tibet and the Sichuan borderlands reported that monks and Tibetan troops had attacked the Chinese government troops and were obstructing the implementation of New Policy Reforms. All this impacted public opinion and dramatically tarnished the image of the Dalai Lama. After the Dalai Lama returned to Central Tibet, he once again mustered Tibetan troops to obstruct the Sichuan troops' advance into Tibet. Later, after he went into exile in India, he requested Great Britain, Russia, and other countries to pressure the Qing court to intervene on his behalf. Reporting on this, the official news coming from the Chinese government led the Chinese people to denounce the Dalai Lama. Both orally and in writing, they expressed their indignation with the Qing court having spent enormous funds to receive the Dalai Lama, only to have it lead to such bad results. They maintained that merely stripping the Dalai Lama of his title was too light a punishment for his actions. To reclaim the political power over Tibet as soon as possible, they appealed to the Qing government to separate politics from religion in Tibet.

In short, the reputation of the Dalai Lama in the public opinion of China was utterly ruined. Eventually, the Qing court was unable to handle its relationship with the Dalai Lama appropriately, and the Dalai Lama remained in exile in India. After the 1911 Revolution, the Dalai Lama returned to Central Tibet and launched "the movement to

drive out Han Chinese". Subsequently, the conflict between Han Chinese and Tibetans became acute and greatly strained the relationship between Central Tibet and inland China. This had a negative impact on the situation in Tibet during the Republican period.

Bibliography

Abbreviations:

DB: *Datong bao* 大同报 (*Ta Tung Pao*) [*Great Harmony*]

DL: *Dalu* 大陆 [*The Continent (Shanghai)*]

DZ: *Dongfang zazhi* 东方杂志 [*The Eastern Miscellany*]

GC: *Guangyi congbao* 广益丛报 [*Broad Benefits*]

TB: *Tongxue bao* 通学报 (*Tung Heoh Pao*) [*General Studies Newspaper*]

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