Occasional Papers in Sociology and Anthropology

Volume 1



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Editor
James F. Fisher

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The Sociology and Anthropology of Development

INTRODUCTION[1]

James F. Fisher

The papers collected in this volume are the fruits of faculty labors in a new institution in Nepal: the Central Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Tribhuvan University. Though the institution is new to Nepal, the disciplines are not; for close to three decades Nepal was a happy hunting ground for scores of foreign anthropologists and the occasional sociologist. Their numbers and activities have continued to increase at an exponential rate. Every now and then a Nepalese field assistant would be trained abroad, but there was no sustained, systematic instruction in anthropology or sociology available anywhere in the country[2].

This imbalance began to be corrected in late 1981, when classes were initiated for the first 'batch' of M.A. students of the recently established Department of Sociology and Anthropology on the Kirtipur Campus of Tribhuvan University. It was my privilege to be invited to serve as Visiting Fulbright Professor from 1984 till 1986 in the Department (then known awkwardly, but officially, as the Instruction Committee), where I arrived just before the first M.A. theses were being presented in 1985.[3] Present at the creation, more or less, and as a teaching member of the faculty, I experienced the ferment and enthusiasm of the nascent Department as an ingredient in its mix. One of my assignments was to serve as editor of our first volume of *Occasional Papers*.

Despite the lace of a perduring institutional base, there has been considerable discussion in recent years both of what sociology and anthropology might become, and what they should do in Nepal. Programmatic statements on these issues were issued in published proceedings of two national conferences on social science held in 1973 and 1983.[4] Whether or not it is faithful to the original blueprints, the Department is now a going concern, and it seemed to me it was time for a stocktaking. After the clarion calls and exhortatory rhetoric have faded, what kind of

research and teaching were we in fact doing? That is the question each of the following essays, in its own way, answers.

The 'theme' of this volume, then, is its intention: to illustrate the breadth and depth of our intellectual interests, both pedagogical and research, as they have developed in these first few years. Some of the essays describe the vision we have of our mission. Bista draws on a lifetime of anthropological experience and distinguished scholarship to stake out the distinctive kind of anthropology and sociology that Nepal needs to nurture. His view of a pragmatic, developmental discipline is echoed in Bhattachan's careful assessment of the curricular possibilities and constraints. My own view endorses these positions and buttresses them with some theoretical caveats. I further argue that development problems demand a range of research border than that which is conventionally considered under this rubric.

Chhetri's essay exemplifies the possibilities inherent in investigating such an ostensibly "non-development" topic as cultural identity. Yet inter-ethnic dynamics clearly must be sensitively attended to in policy planning, especially in Nepal, where migration (Chhetri's main focus) has become the key political and social issue of the 1980's. The articles by Gurung, Pandey, and Upadhyay also take ethnicity and stratification into account, but their major focus is on the use of resources. Gurung examines not only the problems of forest management, but also the generally unheralded measures hill villagers have devised as solutions to them. Pandey shows how poverty in a Tarai village results from a lack of fundamental resources, primarily land, exacerbated by population shifts. Upadhyay addresses resources of a different kind, specifically people, and reminds us that no material improvement can be made without adequate education and training of young people. Most of the youth of Nepal, like the rest of its population, lives in rural areas, making the solution to the problem Upadhyay has identified difficult. None of the essays here offers panaceas, but pinpointing crucial problems is always the first step towards their solution.

Similarly, Mishra makes no pretense of providing a set of easy answers to the fundamental problems he raises, but his incisive and devastating analysis of "development" exposes

conundrums that are otherwise all too easily ignored by the burgeoning development industry. He makes it clear that the mindless pursuit of empirical studies, no matter how "applied" the orientation, is not enough. Rather, a clear sense of history and theory must inform our research efforts, and these must in turn be imparted to the next generation as they pass through the educational system.

That is exactly where the efficacy of the ideas in this volume will be put to the test -- in the students who emerge by confronting them. We have not attempted to draw up a final time-table for the development of either sociology and anthropology in Nepal, or of its society, but we have tried to make a beginning. These essays constitute a benchmark against which we may test the future progress and relevance of the Department, the disciplines, the faculty, and students.

NOTES

1. I am grateful to Navin K. Rai for his careful reading of and helpful suggestions on the entire manuscript.

2. See Bhattachan's essay for a summary of sporadic, though abortive, attempts prior to the 1980's to introduce sociology/anthropology into the university system.

3. The roster of M.A. Theses illustrates the range of interests of the first group of students:

   Pandey, Tulsi, *Poverty and State Policy*
   Upreti, Laya Prasad, *The Role of Forests in the Village Economy*
   Chaulagai, Tilak Prasad, *The Guthi System among the Newars of Kirtipur*
   Bhattarai, Tika Prasad, *Briddhasramka Briddhaharu*
   Rajbhandari, Bhupadas, *Patterns of Forest Use in Aiselukharka Village*
   Ojha, Hari Kumar, *Women's Participation in the Handloom Industry*
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   Chhetri (Bista), Gyanu, *A Socio-economic Study of the Gaine of Pokhara*
   Pandey, Chandrakant, *The Role of Emigration in the Life of the Magars*
   Sharma, Shrikrishna, *An Anthropological Study of Festivals*
   Basnyat, Sandhya, *Farming, Carpet Weaving, and Women*
   Khatri, Naniram, *A Study on the Supply of Firewood by Women*
   Sharma, Reshraj, *Attitudes of Graduate Students Towards Abortion*
   Olee, Seeta, *A Socio-economic Profile of the Danuwars of Jhapa*
   Laudari, Rajendra Prasad, A Study of the Chepang Community of Shaktikhor
   Manandhar, Bimala, Fertility History of Working Women
   Pokharel, Bindu, Breast-Feeding Behaviour of Working Mothers Koirala, Prayagraj, The Role of Domestic Animals in Peasant Economy

4. Social Science in Nepal, Institute for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, 1974; Social Sciences in Nepal: Infrastructure and Programme Development, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, 1984.

NEPAL SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY/ANTHROPOLOGY

Dor Bahadur Bista

In Nepal, where tradition dominates so much of our lives, it is ironic that with regard to sociology and anthropology we have no tradition at all to follow, but only one to establish. This also makes our task relatively simple: all we have to do is make an honest effort without any pretensions, because we cannot be any better or worse than we really are. We must remember that in the field of sociology and anthropology we are starting with a clean slate. We have to admit with all humility that we do not know exactly what design will ultimately emerge. But that need not deter us from acting, because if we hesitate and fumble, others will make their advances.

We have already made two important beginnings: first, the decision to construct a single course of study for students of Sociology and Anthropology; and second, the decision to find a single professional association for Sociologists and Anthropologists. Thus the dye is already cast. All we have to do now is to apply our principles to the tasks at hand.

Nepal (compared to many other countries around the world) has had the unique advantage of developing the discipline of anthropology in a relatively short span of time. Until 1950, Nepal was isolated and inaccessible to outsiders except for peoples from adjacent and contiguous areas. So there was no way anthropology, which was primarily developed by Western societies during their colonial period, could have developed or been practiced in Nepal until scholars from Western societies were admitted into the country and allowed to conduct their studies. As a land with a multitude of linguistic, cultural and ethnic groups living in a relatively small land area, Nepal attracted Western scholars and students in increasing numbers from the 50's up through the present.

All this activity has produced a considerable amount of literature, published mainly in the West in the form of journal

articles, monographs, reports, and dissertations submitted to graduate departments of sociology and anthropology. Even though some of the reports and most of the dissertations do not ever appear or become accessible to Nepalese readers, they can nevertheless be read by serious students with a certain amount of initiative and effort. In addition to this, there is also quite a substantial ethnographic literature published in Nepal in English and Nepali, mainly by the teaching staff of the Panchayat Training Institutes, the Royal Nepal Academy, and many other Nepalese who are working in other sectors of the government or at the university.

Since materials written in Nepali are rarely read by foreigners, the fragmented nature of the reports available so far in Western languages has produced a very curious image of Nepalese in the eyes of Western people, something which is often reflected in the questions they sometimes ask about us. In other words, the separate, specialized studies do not add up to a general and composite picture of Nepalese society at large. Most of the works done so far talk only about one micro-situation or another, representing only a fragment of the total truth about Nepal. Some reports -- studies of the contact zones showing conflict or co-ordination -- also represent only a small area and depict localized small communities. None of these materials explain much that is useful and meaningful for the planning or administrative purposes of the country. Some of them, however, are useful for the development of the science of the discipline itself. There are anthropologists who consider that this is the limit of what anthropology can contribute, but this view is largely outdated. Anthropology can certainly study not only separate communities but also the process of integration among different ethnic groups and castes. Applied anthropology is a widely accepted discipline.

That anthropology in Nepal should "come of age" as in many developed countries around the world is obvious, as it serves two important functions. First, it promotes and defends the national culture and helps maintain the national identity of the country and its people. Second, it studies (to whatever possible extent) all the aspects of different Nepalese cultures, in addition to other outside cultures, and joins together the international

community of social scientists for the promotion of science and for the broader cause of service to humanity. It is time that we share the burden and responsibility of the international community of anthropologists. This is what is meant by "coming of age". Nepalese anthropologists can certainly work towards the development of theoretical concepts, modes, paradigms, and processes based on their studies of the different aspects of Nepalese society and culture while acting as a catalyst in the process of national economic development.

Studies for the sake of science so far have been conducted mainly by foreign anthropologists. It seems that this will continue to be the case for some time to come. But what about the promotion and defense of our own national culture? This is what Nepalese anthropologists alone can do; outsiders can not be expected to do this. Nepalese anthropologist will have to study various societies at the micro-level before they can talk meaningfully about the promotion and defense of a national culture. The plural Nepalese society still needs to develop a composite culture acceptable to the majority, so that the Nepalese population can identify with it, and derive a sense of belonging, pride and satisfaction from it. This can happen only if all are given the freedom to play their own role without one dominating the other. The present competition and disorder among different ethnic, linguistic and religious groups cannot continue forever. It is unrealistic to expect that a single group could win out in all the spheres of language, religion, lifestyle values and material culture. The state will have to promote an integrative approach. This is where Nepalese anthropologists could play a very crucial role in the coming decades, and that is why I see the need for a Nepalese school of anthropology as not only obvious but absolutely essential. Nepalese anthropologists cannot continue to play the clownish role of an adjunct to an alien style of thinking nor remain a slave to sterile and outdated life-style. They will have to create their own little arena where the future of Nepal is taken constantly into consideration in their deliberations, writings, researche and publications. Kinship and marriage, religion and social control, as separate institutions, cannot occupy all our time forever.

Anthropology may need to maintain the tradition of western thinking for its own sake in some big-name universities. They can afford to do so. Their departments of anthropology usually are one among dozens of other disciplines and in a university which is one among several hundreds. As such, those scholars and graduate students, if counted among millions of graduates of their own society, are only an infinitely small and insignificant minority. But Nepalese graduates or scholars in anthropology are among the extremely privileged few who are expected to play very significant roles in their country, even when comparatively their number is just as insignificant as the number of scholars in the West. Imagine the burden of responsibility a Nepalese graduate of anthropology would shoulder in the continuing process of modernization of the country. This is not the case with most anthropologists of the industrially advanced and affluent societies of the world. Anthropologists from such societies should continue to conduct research for their own sake. A few individuals may even continue their Bohemian style. In contrast, the Nepalese graduates of sociology and anthropology can have very responsible jobs in the near future if they are encouraged to adopt a constructive attitude towards work, their society, and their training. By constructive attitude I mean a positive and future-oriented attitude in place of over-romanticized nostalgia, or an insecure and thoughtless mimicry of the West. Is it not obvious that we cannot really mimic and follow the style of thinking of our Western counterparts no matter how competent and qualified they themselves may be?

Qualified they all are. In technical fields or in hard sciences, which do not regard human sentiments and institutions as important, we can continue to be guided by the West in the future. But in areas involving human institutions, sentiments, values, and cultural behavior generally we cannot rely on or seek advice from our Western gurus and advisors beyond a certain limit. In generalizations and in abstractions our Western colleagues can still be very helpful. The best among them have had much broader and global perspective. But we cannot rely too much on an expert on one ethnic, regional, or caste group to forever advise courses of action. Nevertheless, we can complement each other if we carefully steer our courses of development in the field of anthropology.

Hence the need for the Nepal school of anthropology is quite pressing. We will have to keep all of this in mind when we develop the curriculum for the Department of Sociology/Anthropology, as we will have to do this when the first group of undergraduate students finish their courses of study by the end of summer 1987. Unless we keep in mind the need of the country in coming years and the possible role our graduate students will be playing in shaping the future course of Nepalese society, it is possible that we will have provided a very outdated orientation and a useless nonfunctional education to our young people.

Departments of sociology and anthropology at some other universities may not be doing exactly what we want to do. So we may not be able to find a model anywhere. Visiting scholars or graduate students from outside cannot be models either. Their needs and values are different from ours. Our students will have to be strongly oriented towards the observation of the process and dynamics of emergent Nepalese society at an all encompassing level. This will be our Nepal school of anthropology. At this stage, we should not concern ourselves too much with whether or not our graduates will be recognized by one or the other famous universities around the world; that is not yet our priority. Anthropology in its application has always served the interests of the people who have used it. It began as a handmaiden of Western Christian missionaries, followed by colonial governments who used it quite extensively in many parts of the non-western and non-Christian world. In recent decades, applied anthropology has been used by U.N. agencies, WHO, World Bank, and international aid organizations for various types of development activities. Recently, it is also being used by industries and multinational corporations for sales promotions and production expansions.

Our priority at the moment is for graduates who understand the dynamics of Nepalese society and have the ability to project a better future for the people at the lower economic levels and provide a wider base for participation in the creation of a resilient and progressive national culture with a strong national identity. This will be Nepal's own school of anthropology.

SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY CURRICULUM AND THE NEEDS OF NEPAL

Krishna B. Bhattachan

I

Introduction

Although sociology and anthropology emerged in the West during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the disciplines entered Nepal only during the early 1950's at the research level and in 1981 at the teaching level, the latter in a combined form. Thus, sociology and anthropology; so rich and mature in theories and methods, is just five years old in Nepal. Until 1981, Sarana and Sinha's statement about the status of anthropology in Asia was correct: "To the best of our knowledge, anthropology has not been accorded independent academic recognition in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh, although there are some anthropologists working in basically non-anthropological institutions" (1976:210).

In Nepal, however, the situation has changed since then. Sociology and anthropology are now taught at the Master's level at Tribhuvan University. A Master's level program is taught at the Kirtipur campus, and at four other campuses -- Pokhara, Kathmandu, Patan, and Biratnagar -- a B.A. level program has just been introduced. We must now evaluate our past performance and take stock of what we possess of sociology and anthropology curriculum, its relevance to the needs of Nepal, and future demands, needs, and priorities.

With these facts in mind, this paper will outline the development of the sociology and anthropology curriculum, critically review the current nature and the needs of Nepal, and discuss the problems and issues in curriculum development.

II

Development of Sociology and Anthropology Curriculum in Nepal

The sociology curriculum was developed in non-academic institutions, like the training centre under the aegis of the Village Development Program (VDP), which was established in 1953 in Kathmandu. The program offered a course on rural sociology, one of the major subjects in the curriculum, to familiarize rural field workers, social organizers, block development officers, and extension agents with the rural social structure and its problems. The paper on rural sociology focused on rural society, rural family, folk life, and community development (Thapa, 1973: 46). In 1968, when VDP became the Panchayat Training Centre (PTC), the curriculum was revised to focus on rural society, group dynamics, communication, local leadership, panchayat development, social survey, and social planning (Thapa, 1973:47).

Only towards the end of the 1960's did the concerned intellectuals of Tribhuvan University gradually feel the need for separate departments of sociology and anthropology for the promotion of teaching and research. Macdonald recalls, "As a result of concern expressed by the Vice Chancellor of Tribhuvan University about the absence of a sociology department, Professor Ernest Gellner of the London School of Economics visited Nepal in September 1970, with a view to preparing a report on this question" (1973:27). The department of Sociology and Anthropology, one of the major wings in the Institute of Nepal and Asian Studies (INAS) was established on July 15, 1973, to train post-graduate research assistants and students in M.A. or Ph. D. programs.

INAS earnestly planned to develop a B.A. curriculum and to start an M.A. dissertation program (Macdonald, 1973:28). But all their high aspirations, hopes, promises and enthusiasm later turned into a fiasco as INAS, entangled by its own internal problems, could produce only two M.A.'s in anthropology by dissertation before it was denied the right to grant M.A. or Ph.D. degrees (Dahal, 1985:39). At first, this appeared to be a major

setback for the institutional development of sociology and anthropology (Bista, 1980:3). If the Research Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), the successor to INAS, had continued the tradition of granting degrees, it would have badly affected the establishment of a separate department under the Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences. In addition, the Centre would have produced many anthropologists strong in field experience but weak in general theoretical and conceptual knowledge. In other words, it would have completely damaged the growth of sociology in Nepal.

However, this "setback" eventually proved to be useful in developing a department of sociology and anthropology, under the IHSS at the Kirtipur campus. The ending of the degree program at INAS stimulated and stirred the minds of some concerned academicians at Tribhuvan University. They increased efforts, under the direction of the IHSS, to establish a department of Sociology and Anthropology at the M.A. level at the Kirtipur campus.

In March 1978, a meeting was held in Kathmandu, under the chairmanship of Chandra B. Shrestha, chairman of the Geography department, to explore the feasibility of opening a Department of Sociology and Anthropology. The committee was comprised of eleven members[1], representing the fields of Political Science, English, Culture, History, Nepal, Home Science, Psychology, and Sociology. This committee was reshuffled in 1979[2], adding five sociology and two anthropology members, and then was again reorganized into another committee[3], now headed by Dr. Soorya Lal Amatya, Dean of IHSS. This new committee included noted sociologists and anthropologists, such as Prof. Dor Bahadur Bista, Bihari Krishna Shrestha, Dr. Chaitanya Mishra, T.S. Thapa, Dr. Hikmat Bista, and Dr. Linda Stone. They formed a Curriculum and Draft Action Committee (CDAC)[4] to prepare a Master's level sociology/anthropology curriculum (IHSS, 1986). The CDAC prepared a curriculum for a Master of Arts degree in sociology/anthropology which was approved by the Subject Committee of IHSS and the Faculty Board of Tribhuvan University.

The two year program consisted of eight papers. The first four concerned the History of Social Science, Human Adaptation, Social Organization and Economy, and Methods of Social Research (IHSS, 1980). The second four concerned Nepalese Culture and Society, Population Studies, Social Change, and Dissertation and Field Trip (IHSS, 1980). All papers were required of both sociology and anthropology students. Each student completing the degree program would receive a combined M.A. degree in sociology/anthropology. The primary aim of this curriculum was to produce inter-disciplinary experts who would be able to work in planning, managing, guiding, teaching, and research (IHSS, 1980:1). This curriculum was rather lacking in organization and theme. All five faculty members[5], including the chairman of the department, disliked this curriculum from the very day the department opened. They immediately redesigned the four courses required for the first part of the M.A. program. This new curriculum was later approved by the Subject Committee and the Faculty Board in 1981[6]. The same year, the Faculty Board also approved the awarding of separate degrees in sociology and anthropology.

At the end of 1981, the task of redesigning the curriculum was given to the Steering Committee of the Subject Committee of Sociology and Anthropology[7]. Their revised curriculum was approved by the Subject Committee as well as by the Faculty Board. This curriculum contains eight papers, four each for part I and II: Theories in Sociology/Anthropology, Human Evolution and Pre-Historic Culture (formerly Human Adaptation), Social Organization, Methodology of Social Research, Nepali Society and Culture, Sociological Perspectives on Contemporary Nepal, Population Studies (sociology option) or Ecology and Subsistence (anthropology option), and Field Research and Field Report (Dissertation). The Steering Committee wished to offer specialized papers to M.A. sociology and anthropology students, but because of manpower constraints in the department and lack of sociological and anthropological orientation of the students at the B.A. level, all papers except number seven (Population Studies or Ecology and Subsistence) were required of all students.

So far, students holding a B.A. degree in any of the following subjects -- History, Political Science, Geography, Culture, Home Science, Psychology, Economics, Sociology and Anthropology -- are eligible to apply for the degree program. The M.A. level curriculum was presuming that a majority of students come from different fields[8].

In 1985, Tribhuvan University decided to teach undergraduate level sociology and anthropology at four campuses: Trichandra campus, Kathmandu; Patan campus, Lalitpur; Prithwi Narayan campus, Pokhara; and Mahendra Morang campus, Biratanagar. The Steering Committee of the Subject Committee[9] developed three papers at the B.A. level: Introduction to Sociology/Anthropology, Nepali Culture and Society, and Methodology of Social Research. The objectives of this program are to prepare students as middle level professionals in the field, to develop sociological/anthropological understanding of Nepali society and culture, and to conduct sociological/anthropological research independently (IHSS, 1985:1). From the next year onwards, the department of sociology/anthropology at the Kirtipur campus will admit those students who have majored in sociology/anthropology in undergraduate studies. Because of this, the existing M.A. curriculum should be completely revised. More advanced courses should be offered, as they will already be familiar with many courses offered now at the M.A. level.

Sociology, it should be noted here, is offered in some other departments as one of the compulsory papers. For instance, Sociology of Child Development, and Community and Culture are offered to M.A. Home Science students as compulsory papers. Similarly, Sociology of Education is offered to the M. Ed. students. At the Medical school, M.B.B.S. students are offered a paper on Community Medicine. Two papers on sociology -- Sociology of Rural Development, and Sociology of Migration -- are offered to the B. Sc. students in Agriculture at the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science, Rampur. A paper on Rural Sociology is offered to certificate level students in the Institute of Forestry, Hetauda. Most of this undergraduate level sociology curriculum is not good enough and, therefore, needs to be revised to make it more relevant, useful, and up-to-date.

III

Critical Review of the Existing Curriculum in the Light of the Needs of Nepal

In most of the departments under IHSS, graduate students devote at least two years on campus studying general theories and methods. All the graduate courses are designed so that they have little application to everyday life. After completion of their studies, students will have to work, experiencing things which have nothing to do with what they have learned in classrooms for two years. This is exactly why the social sciences are losing their prestige, compared with technical subjects like engineering, medicine, agriculture, and forestry. Nepalese sociologists and anthropologists, however, realized this fact well before the creation of a sociology/anthropology department. They are determined not to repeat the mistakes others have made. Therefore, maximum efforts have been made to relate the M.A. and the B.A. level sociology and anthropology curriculum to the needs of Nepal.

Mishra, while discussing the challenges for sociology in the 1980's, has aptly pointed out that:

> "the first question sociologists will ask themselves in the immediate future will be of the form: what problem areas do we work on? what sociology do we teach? what sociology do we learn? and, finally, what we as sociologists, can do?"

He further queries:

> "should sociology focus primarily on ethnography? on ideologies, values, and norms? on development, national integration, and 'modernization'? on education? on poverty? on population and family planning? on land? on other resources? on ecology in general? on defined 'social problems' and 'social welfare'?".
>
> (Mishra, 1981:4)

Sociology and anthropology should throw away ethnography as well as studies on ideologies, values and norms. It should address issues and problems of contemporary interest

like poverty, ecology, planning, resource management, and development, with more substantive concern. In this light, Mishra suggests that theoretically sociology and anthropology should move away from their traditional preoccupations with the study of ideology and forms of ideological expression; methodologically, it should move away from positivism and empiricism; and substantially, it should move away from an exclusive reliance on non-local knowledge (1980: 1-2). Given these, the courses of study, as suggested by Mishra, may focus on themes of social organization, current theories, epistemology and methodology of social research, population studies, political economy and society, social stratification, social change, and current critical issues.

In the above scenario, efforts were made to develop and introduce papers on different aspects of Nepal when the M.A. level curriculum was redesigned in 1981. All five papers of the first part of the M.A. program -- Nepali Society and Culture, Sociological Perspectives on Contemporary Nepal, Ecology and Subsistence, Population Studies, and Field Research and Field Report -- exclusively focus on Nepal. Nepali Culture and Society, an ethnographic paper, concentrates more on continuity and change in various social/cultural institutions. Sociological Perspectives on Contemporary Nepal is more critical and analytic, primarily with substantial concern for the political economy of Nepal. Two other papers -- Population Studies, and Ecology and Subsistence -- focus on important issues in present day Nepal. In addition, students are encouraged to carry out field research in different areas like landlessness, fishery, poverty, forest resources, population (fertility, migration, breast feeding, family planning), resource management, ecology, and local cooperative organizations like *guthi, parma,* and *dhikur.*

In brief, the nature of the curriculum is equally divided between sociology and anthropology. Working within the given university framework as a combined department, it is a Herculean task to do justice to either sociology or anthropology. The curriculum is loaded with social and cultural anthropology fused with sociology. Of the three other major wings of anthropology, Physical Anthropology and Archaeology are only minimally represented, and Linguistics is absent altogether.

Curriculum: Research Oriented or Theory Oriented?

Some sociologists and anthropologists are of the view that the overall focus of the curriculum should be to give enough theoretical orientation to the students. Therefore, if our aim is to produce sociologists and anthropologists who are able to compete with their Western counterparts, research methodology or research work should not be the main emphasis. They insist that our aim is not only to produce researchers but also to produce planners, administrators, and teachers. I, however, am in favor of giving priority to research-oriented curriculum because theory and research should go together.

IV

Main Focus of the Curriculum

The M.A. level sociology and anthropology curriculum should focus on the following:

A. Philosophy/Objective

The Philosophy of the M.A. sociology/anthropology curriculum should be geared to enable students to become planners, administrators, development experts, advisors and social researchers who will contribute to expediting the process of development and change in Nepal.

B. Programs

With regards to the above mentioned objective, the M.A. level curriculum may incorporate the following programs:

1. The Whole curriculum should be related to the needs of Nepal. In other words, Nepal-oriented papers should be introduced right from the first year.
2. General sociological and anthropological theories and research should be utilized to better understand Nepali culture, society, and economy.
3. Separate full-fledged papers should be developed in major areas such as agriculture, forestry, rural development, development planning, health/medicine, people's participation, population, urbanization, ecology, political economy, education, social stratification, social change, national integration, national issues, ethnicity, poverty, and social problems.
4. More emphasis should be given to first-hand field research experience instead of purely theoretical orientation. Students should get practical research experience by developing a research proposal, participating in various research activities, such as basic research, action research, applied research, participatory research, and social survey.
5. The curriculum should incorporate on-the-spot observation of various institutions and on-going programs related to development and change in rural as well as urban areas.
6. People who have experience in the relevant areas -- planning development programs, extension programs, and research-- should be invited to share this experience with students.
7. Reading assignments and book/article reviews should be required of each student in order to substantiate lectures.
8. Each student should develop and present at least one seminar paper each academic year.
9. Educational tours in different parts of rural Nepal should be included for practical experience of village life.
10. More specialized and optional papers should be offered to both sociology and anthropology groups.
11. To cover more topics and fields, each paper should be divided into two groups containing two different topics. This will provide scope for 14 topics (excluding dissertation) instead of only 7 topics.
12. Some courses on computer programming, such as word processing and data processing, should be provided to second year M.A. students.

V

Problems and Issues

The following problems and issues related to the sociology and anthropology curriculum have a bearing on its growth in Nepal:

Sociology and anthropology: Fusion or Fission?: Although sociology and anthropology in Nepal have been fused so far, the debate on its fusion or fission is still going on, and there are many arguments and counter-arguments. This debate has a significant bearing on the pattern of the sociology and anthropology curriculum as well as the growth of these disciplines in Nepal.

The very first sentence of the curriculum developed in 1980 states: "It is unnecessary in the Nepalese perspective to separate sociology/anthropology as two distinctive fields of study" (IHSS, 1980:1). Dahal (1985: 43), as mentioned earlier, sees this effort as a purely administrative problem and not an academic one. He writes: "This type of common effort negates the academic excellence of a student who is pursuing a higher degree either to become an anthropologist or a sociologist" (Dahal, 1985: 45). Dahal's argument is partially valid. Some sociologists and anthropologists believe that a separate department of sociology will face neither an administrative problem nor an academic problem, but a separate department of anthropology could not exist alone.

Many sociologists and anthropologists fail to understand and appreciate the unification of sociology and anthropology. Neither administrative nor purely academic considerations was a determining factor in the creation of a combined department of sociology and anthropology. Instead, deeply rooted in a philosophical base, i.e., the theoretical perspectives and methodological tools of both disciplines, when synthesized together, would enable to better understand and analyze Nepali society and culture. Therefore, at least in Nepal, the tree of sociology and anthropology should be grafted for its proper growth and development.

Focus on General Sociology and Anthropology in Nepal: Many Nepali social scientists, including sociologists and anthropologists, think that the sociology and anthropology curriculum should focus more on general concepts, theories, principles, and methodologies with less emphasis on one's own society. However, many disagree with this idea and argue that it always should refer to and focus on everyday problems of Nepal. This means we should develop papers exclusively concerned with various contemporary issues of Nepal. If the students spend their whole academic year in understanding different aspects of Nepalese society, this knowledge gained in the classroom will be useful afterwards when they work in international, national, or private organizations in various capacities.

Different Label- Same Content, or Different Label - Different Content?: This issue is closely related with the earlier issue of fusion or fission of sociology and anthropology. It has come up because of the existing provision of granting an M.A. degree of either sociology or anthropology by offering a paper on Population Studies or Ecology and Subsistence -- all other papers being the same for both groups. It has created some technical problems, such as whether a student who has completed an M.A. in either sociology or anthropology is entitled to get another degree by studying the next optional paper only. If the answer is "yes," some sociologist, anthropologists, and other social scientists argue: how can a student get two degrees by studying the same courses with the exception of a single paper? If the answer is "no," why can he not do that? Why should he study all seven papers, which he has already studied and passed, to get another degree?

These, I think, are very serious technical problems which need to be solved immediately by the Subject Committee:

Curriculum: Ideal or Pragmatic?: The curriculum designer always faces a dilemma whether to design an ideal or a pragmatic curriculum; the former implies quality while the latter ignores it. The pragmatic curriculum designer designs curriculum with regards to expertise of the available teachers, availability of textbooks, earlier orientation of students in concerned fields, etc. These considerations ultimately damage the quality of curriculum.

In contrast, the ideal curriculum designer designs curriculum in regard to the needs of the society regardless of the ability of teachers, the availability of text books, the ability of students, etc. Instead, the quality and standard of the curriculum is maintained at any cost.

Quality or Performance: This issue is also related to the earlier issue of an ideal or pragmatic curriculum. If the curriculum is prepared in accordance with the needs and priorities of our society, some teachers may not be qualified enough to teach, and also many students will discover a problem of getting appropriate text books on the subject. On the other hand, if the curriculum is prepared in accordance to the performance of teachers and students, the curriculum would not maintain quality teaching and learning activities.

Curriculum Standard: Indian, Western or Mixed: Some sociologists and anthropologists assert that the curriculum should follow the curriculum of Indian universities, while others argue it should follow that of Western universities. Still some other sociologists and anthropologists insist on borrowing the best of anywhere. But I think we should take the best curriculum we can find and modify it in accordance with our own needs and priorities. We need not to follow the curriculum format of any particular university.

Curriculum: Continuation or Change?: Many sociologists and anthropologists agree that curriculum should be updated every year. But frequent changes in curriculum create many problems for the proper administration of examinations. Because of such complications, the university has decided not to change the syllabus for five years once it is approved by the Faculty Board. Thus, in the existing system, if the curriculum is not up to standard, or if necessary changes are to be made, it would not be possible to do so for at least five years. But to up-date the curriculum and relate it to the needs of Nepal it is essential to review the existing curriculum every year and make necessary changes as and when required.

VI

Conclusion

The Department of Sociology and Anthropology in Tribhuvan University is growing rapidly. Though the department was established only in 1981, the M.A. level curriculum of sociology and anthropology has gradually "come of age". Since the very beginning it has aptly related itself to the needs of Nepal. Despite several administrative and technical problems, sociologists and anthropologists in Nepal are looking forward to happier years.

NOTES

1. The following committee members attended the meeting on Chaitra 28, 2034:

    1. Dr. Chandra Bahadur Shrestha (Geography), Chairman
    2. Dr. Loka Raj Baral (Political Science)
    3. Dr. Yugeswor Verma (English)
    4. Dr. Prem Raman Upreti (History)
    5. Dr. Hit Narayan Jha (Culture)
    6. Dr. Basudev Tripathi (Nepali)
    7. Naresh Man Singh
    8. Rajyashree Pokharel (Home Science)
    9. Sarala Thapa (Psychology)
    10. Dr. Chaitanya Mishra (Sociology)

2. The following committee members attended the meeting held on Baisakh 18, 2035:

    1. Dr. Chandra Bahadur Shrestha (Geography), Chairman
    2. T.S. Thapa (Sociology)
    3. Dr. Khem Bahadur Bista (Anthropology)
    4. Dilli Ram Dahal (Anthropology)
    5. Sudha Paneru (Sociology)
    6. Prabhakar Lal Das (Sociology)
    7. Dr. Prem Raman Upreti (History)
    8. Sita Sharma (Sociology)
    9. Daya Chandra Upadhyaya
    10. Dr. Chaitanya Mishra (Sociology)
    11. Dr. Bal Kumar K.C. (Geography)

3. The following committee members attended the meeting held on Baisakh 8, 2037:

    1. Dr. Soorya Lal Amatya (Geography), Dean
    2. Prof. Dor Bahadur Bista (Anthropology), Chairman of Subject committee of Sociology and Anthropology
    3. Prof. Madhav Raj Pandey (History)
    4. Dr. Hikmat Bista (Anthropology)

    5. Ram Niwas Pandey (Culture)
    6. Dr. Bed Prakash Upreti (Anthropology)
    7. Dr. Chaitanya Mishra (Sociology)
    8. Sudha Paneru (Sociology)
    9. Padma Dikshit (Sociology)
    10. T.S. Thapa (Sociology)
    11. Bihari Krishna Shrestha (Anthropology)
    12. Dr. Linda Stone (Anthropology)
    13. Dr. Khem Bahadur Bista (Anthropology)

4. Curriculum Draft Committee (CDC) members:

    1. Dr. Hikmat Bista
    2. Sudha Paneru
    3. T.S. Thapa

5. Dr. Chaitnya Mishra, Krishna B. Bhattachan, Padam Lal Devkota, Ram B. Chhetri, and Padma Dikshit.

6. The Subject committee meeting held on Paush 9, 2038 was attended by the following members:

    1. Dr. Soorya Lal Amatya (Geography), Dean
    2. Prof. Dor Bahadur Bista (Anthropology), Chairman
    3. Dr. Chaitanya Mishra (Sociology) Chairman of Department of Sociology and Anthropology
    4. Padam Dikshit (Sociology)
    5. Ram Bahadur Chhetri (Anthropology)
    6. Padam Lal Devkota (Anthropology)
    7. Dr. Khem Bahadur Bista (Anthropology)
    8. Dr. Hikmat Bista (Anthropology)
    9. Krishna Bahadur Bhattachan (Sociology)
    10. S.M. Zahid Parwez (Soliology)
    11. Ram Niwas Pandey (Culture)

7. The working group was comprised of:

    1. Dr. Chaitnya Mishra, Coordinator
    2. Dr. Hikmat Bista
    3. Krishna Bahadur Bhattachan
    4. Ram Bahadur Chhetri
    5. Padam Lal Devkota

8. Many Students with a B.A. degree in Law and Journalism; with a B. Sc. and M. Sc. degree in Physics, Chemistry, Botany, Zoology, and Agriculture; with a B. Com. and M. Com. degree have shown a strong desire to join the department. As of now they are not eligible to apply for admission. I personally think that those interested students having degrees in science, medicine, forestry, engineering, and management should be made eligible to apply for admission in sociology and anthropology. They are often more competent than students having degrees in social sciences. Here it should be noted that many well-established sociologists and anthropologists all over the world have backgrounds in disciplines other than sociology and anthropology, but even so they have been able to contribute much in sociology and anthropology.

9. The committee was comprised of:

    1. Dr. Chaitnaya Mishra
    2. Dr. Navin K. Rai
    3. Krishna Bahadur Bhattachan
    4. Padam Lal Devkota
    5. Om Gurung

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"ROMANTICISM" AND "DEVELOPMENT" IN NEPALESE ANTHROPOLOGY[1]

James F. Fisher

It has become almost a public mantra, repeated by high and low government officials, foreign observers of the contemporary scene, and increasingly, the citizenry at large, that "development" now occupies pride of place in the national agenda of Nepal. From that stance it is but a short step to the position that "development" is what anthropology should be all about in Nepal too; in this view, without such a development orientation anthropology would be merely a frivolous luxury the country can ill afford.

The preeminence of "development" having been thus established -- for the country and for the discipline -- the next point in the argument is that anthropologists in Nepal are uniquely situated to spot forms of social organization and decode cultural patterns, both of which are frequently seen to be obstacles to "development," with which myopic economists, provincial political scientists, and culture-bound psychologists have been unable to cope. The anthropologist, so attuned to the minute and exotic differences that exist between this ethnic group and the one in the next valley, will stride onto the scene and, like Manjusri at Chobar, cut through the developmental impasse that seems to stymie us at every turn.

Despite the cogency of this argument not all anthropology (so the critical line goes) is development-oriented. In fact, the besetting sin of most foreign anthropology (and until recently most Nepalese anthropology has been foreign) is that rather than being development-oriented it is just the opposite -- that is to say, it is entangled in the false consciousness of "romanticism" and, therefore, not relevant to the country's needs.

I should be clear from the outset on two points: one is that I agree wholeheartedly with the position of my colleagues in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology (including the

contributors to this volume), which has been sharply articulated by Professor Bista: namely, that the first order of business for Nepalese anthropology is that it be bent to the service of the nation. The second point is that I myself am an unabashed and incurable romantic -- like many anthropologists, I am drawn to other cultures because I can't stand my own. The rest of this paper attempts to reconcile this apparent antinomy.

The romanticism charge has been leveled by several of my friends and colleagues. For example, my colleague, Mr. Devkota, writes of the "unfortunate trend" of the "traditional romantic approach" which western anthropologists have introduced. For him it is "a matter of shame that western anthropologists are romanticizing our people like the *bhakku*" (animal for ceremonial sacrifice?). Instead Devkota calls for "action-oriented analysis which can provide means and schemes for the betterment of the concerned people's lot" (1984:50).

In a similar vein, Gauchan's recent M.A. thesis in Home Science (1986) suggested that the voluminous writings by foreign scholars on the Thakalis had often romanticized them. Dr. Harka Gurung wrote in a recently published essay that it was "romanticization of the rural" -- a notion introduced from developed countries -- not to recognize that rapid and extensive urbanization is an essential ingredient for successful development (1984:249). Professor Bista, in this volume, cautions Nepalese students against indulging themselves in "over-romanticized nostalgia."

Nor is the accusation of "romanticism" hurled only by Nepalese at foreigners. Sherry Ortner began her book on Sherpa ritual by saying:

> "Nepal is certainly one of the more romanticized places on earth, with its towering Himalayas, its abominable snowmen, and its musically named capital, Kathmandu, a symbol of all those faraway places the imperial imagination dreamt about. And the Sherpa people ... are perhaps one of the more romanticized people of the world, renowned for their mountaineering feats, and found congenial by Westerners for their warm, friendly, strong, self-confident style."
>
> (1978:10)

The essential ingredient missing in all these views is an explicit statement of what is meant by either "romanticism" or "development," for without such an understanding such discussion can easily degenerate into either exhortatory sloganeering (a modern version of the tribal chant) or mere name-calling, neither of which advances Nepal's developmental interests. As for the definition of "development", we have been unusually unreflective and wishy-washy, even by the conventionally evasive standards of the academy. As no one seems to have a clear concept of what the definition is, we have tried to hide our ignorance by looking for an equivalent term in Nepali. Since there is no term in Nepali for "development," we have indulged ourselves in the ultimate obscurantism of ferreting out a Sanskirt word -- "*vikas*" (in Nepali, bikas) -- to use as a label for all the things we are doing, trying to do, or trying to prevent, in improving living standards in Nepal.

A working definition of development as it is currently practiced would include as essential components the fact that it 1) attracts large amounts of foreign currency, 2) most of which is used to buy foreign goods, or 3) employ foreigners (many of whom are unemployable in their own countries), to do jobs which, increasingly, many Nepalese are qualified to hold. (The final irony is that although many of these foreigners maintain a standard of living they could scarcely dream of in their own countries, they are paid a 25% bonus because Kathmandu is a "hardship post.") Add to that the open secret that most foreign aid benefits primarily the Nepalese elite, and one can define "development", not without reason, as the process by which the wealth of poor people in rich countries is transferred to the rich people of poor countries. I offer this characterization of "development" only to show the extent to which it has become an intellectual wasteland of vast proportions. Rather than merely farming ourselves out to the highest development bidder, we sociologists and anthropologists should look at development critically as part of an effort to cultivate this wasteland so that it yields more than it has so far.

While I think anthropology in Nepal can, should, and has to be "development" oriented, and while I agree that some

scholarship has been "romantic," I also think that in casual use these terms are vacuous and that the former arguably includes as many sins as the latter. In what follows I propose a much boarder program for anthropology in Nepal, based on a revisionist understanding of "development" and "romanticism".

Whatever Nepalese critics may mean by it, I understand the term "romanticism" to refer to two distinct types of scholarly phenomena. The first is simply "inaccuracy" of a certain, systematic kind in ethnographic reporting. Since I have accused my friends and colleagues of being imprecise in their use of this term, let me give a specific example of what I mean by it.

Professor Furer-Haimendorf (1964) described the Sherpas as people unfettered by the hierarchical constraints of orthodox Hindu society and its concern with pollution and purity; in this view Sherpas are, unlike Hindus, free, open, democratic, and egalitarian. Later on Ortner discovered that Sherpas do indeed have an elaborate conception of pollution (1973) and that their society is fairly saturated with hierarchy (1978). Haimendorf's view of the Sherpas is romantic because it distorts ethnographic facts, by downplaying the importance of the khadeu/khamendeu distinction and eliminating Kamis from Sherpa society all together. This is akin to glorifying free Athenian society while neglecting the fact that it also included slaves. Thus the Sherpas become portrayed in an idealized, romanticized fashion -- as jolly little gnomes. I think I understand the reason for Haimendorf's error. He approached the Sherpas after a lifetime of research experience with tribal groups surrounded by the much more conspicuously hierarchical Hindus of peninsular India; lacking knowledge of the Sherpa language which would have given him the necessary clues, he therefore overlooked or minimized Sherpa concern with pollution and hierarchy. It is one of many kinds of ethnographic mistake, and we can see its source, but it is still a mistake that needs to be, and in this case has been, corrected.

But there is anther, significantly different kind of foreign anthropological reporting which has been labeled "romanticism." The second reason foreign researchers often strike Nepalese scholars as "romantic" is that the former are practicing in the field

the same ancient and honorable tradition they preach in the classroom, namely the anthropological doctrine of cultural relativism.

The notion of cultural relativism goes back to the roots of American anthropology, to its founder, Franz Boas, and his students, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. The basic idea of cultural relativism is that each culture has to be judged on its own merits and by its own values not by the ethnocentric yardstick of an alien, technologically more advanced, usually more Western culture. For Boas and Benedict, cultural relativism was an absolutely necessary antidote to seeing the world exclusively through Western eyes. It was also an effort to find positive value in the non-Western world, rather than scorning it as merely primitive and backward. It was an attempt to jolt the American public out of their gratuitous and arrogant assumptions of superiority and into the realization that parts of the world beyond American shores have positive contributions to make to our modest planet.

All Nepalese, whether they realize it or not, are immensely sophisticated in their knowledge and appreciation of cultural differences. It is a rare Nepalese indeed who knows how to speak only one language. Those who have not lived in the U.S. may find it hard to appreciate how a transcontinental, monolingual, monocultural milieu can construct a nearly impenetrable, self-serving, insufferably parochial worldview. Probably no other nation, with the possible exception of China, has been more arrogantly unquestioning of its own assumed superiority.

All this emphasis on cultural relativism sounds enlightened and progressive enough, but its implications are quite profound for both anthropology and development. For the Western anthropologist a prime objective becomes capturing the way of life of non-Western people in all sympathetic a light as possible. It is true that people in Nepal are very poor, and Bista correctly argues that the primary mission of Nepalese anthropology will be to contribute to the understanding and transformation of that poverty.

That contribution is fundamental and critical, but there is more to say about the people of Nepal than that their average per capita income is low. One can also describe the positive aspects of their lives, including their sense of community and morality, their religion and worldview, their rituals, music, folklore, and sense of humor, their honesty, tolerance, and honor, and the meanings they construct of poverty and beauty, authority and oppression, beauty and violence, love and prestige. If the rest of the world has been consulted on these matters, Nepal also deserves to be entered into the record. Nepal's accomplishments deserve equal time with its problems. That is, one can identify and explain all the factors that contribute to human misery -- as Oscar Lewis (1951) did in the Mexican village of Tepoztlan -- and still report and describe the elements that make life worth living -- and even emulating -- as Robert Redfield (1930) did in the same village. To stress a point, it is true that Mozart was impoverished, exploited, and in such poor health that he died well below the average life expectancy of Nepalese today, but that is not the only thing worth noting about him.

Cultural relativism also has implications for development. For if we want to measure other cultures by their own standards, "development" takes on a very different dimension. Viewed in this way, a given society may be already "developed" in ways that "don't count" in the development game. And to play that game successfully requires taking into account the assets a society already possesses as well as its liabilities. Nepalese were building (and *planning*) one of the great artistic civilizations of the world at a time when it would be an overstatement to say that British culture existed; astonishing feats of agricultural engineering on steep mountain slopes were being accomplished when Europeans were slaughtering each other in self-righteous Crusades -- the Hegelian slaughterbench of history par excellence. Development assistance may be necessary, but it needs to be given with a more historically informed humility and accepted with a stronger sense of previous accomplishments.

In addition to "anthropological romanticism" we need to consider the possibility of "reverse romanticism" -- that Nepalese planners, in trying to measure their society solely by the criteria of the World Bank, the IMF, or USAID, are romanticizing the

West. At the least we must acknowledge the spate of problems that has followed in the wake of modernization there. This is a modern version of what the sociologist Veblen (1915) identified as the privilege of historical backwardness. That is, there is a penalty for taking the lead, and those that follow can avoid the leader's mistakes. It is worth asking why it is that increasing numbers of tourists come to Nepal. The reason has to do with more than the beautiful mountains. The reason is that Nepal has retained something the West has lost in the process of becoming "developed," and we come here, among other places, looking for it. That the quest may be frequently misguided and romantic is a reflection on the wayward wanderer, not on Nepal.

What, then, does anthropology have to offer Nepal? One thing it can do is what it has always done -- cultural history, ethnography, symbolic and materialist analysis, and the like. But isn't this irrelevant to "development"? To argue yes is to argue that people are nothing more than so many producers and consumers of calories, or income (it does not matter which, since both should be increased.) But surely the nature of a group's basic culturel identity -- to cite just one example -- is as important as anything else in determining its future. I therefore suggest that a book like Mary Slusser's *Nepal Mandala* -- at one level arcane cultural history -- may have at least as much relevance to development in the long run as many small--scale studies of, say, agricultural productive, because the former helps clarify what a people are and have been -- necessary and insufficient preludes to determining what they will become.

Dr. Chaitanya Mishra has asserted (1984) that there is little point in a book devoted to such an exotic topic as spirit possession in the face of widespread disease and malnutrition. I disagree with his assessment on two grounds: one is that it is intellectual imperialism. That is, I believe that in development as with any other topic one should start with concerns most important to people "on the ground," and spirit possession certainly qualifies in this regard. This is my anthropological bias to take local peoples' views seriously. But a second reason is simply that health conditions cannot be improved until local healing practices are well understood. An example from Khumbu illustrates this point. The Khunde Hospital is one of the most

modern, well-equipped, superbly staffed hospitals in rural Nepal. But the Australian anthropologist John Draper reports that the hospital sees fewer patients now then it did 15 years ago. Why? Because a large panoply of traditional healers exist to whom Sherpas, in many cases and for complicated reasons, prefer to go for their ailments. Thus, while at first glance it may seem merely exotic or "romantic" to study traditional healers, in fact no advancement in the health of Nepal's citizens will be possible until their indigenous medical practices and beliefs are understood. In the first place, successful public health planning requires such knowledge; and in the second, it is at least an open, empirical question whether people are better served by traditional practitioners than we may assume.

My final example of "romanticism" is the much-maligned "ethnographic approach." As I have already damned Furer-Haimendorf, let me now praise him. His monograph, *The Sherpas of Nepal* (published in 1964, it was the first ethnography of a Nepalese group) contains a section describing the civic, public-spirited institutions of Sherpa villages in Khumbu. One such institution is that of the by now well-known *shing nawa,* or forest wardens, whose job it was to enforce the ban on cutting green trees for firewood. When Sagarmatha National Park was established, or one might say imposed, some 12 years after the publication of Furer-Haimendorf's book, there was virtually no input from the citizens who would live within its boundary. Nor did the bureaucrats who established it bother to read Furer-Haimendorf's ethnography. Had they done so, they might have been spared some of the difficulties that have plagued them ever since, particularly with regard to vastly inflated firewood prices and consequent raping of local forest lands. In 1982 the National Park belatedly recognized the value of the *shing nawa* and made a half-hearted attempt to reinstate them. But to his credit the ethnographer had got it right the first time, and good ethnographies have many such "relevant" contributions to make to development. The problem with ethnographies is not so much that they are romantic, but that they are unread. One of our primary goals should be to see that our work -- ethnographic or otherwise -- is read and used by those who make or implement policy.

Finally, I would like to close by arguing that there is still another contribution we anthropologists and sociologists can make. In addition to shedding light on the kinds of practices, beliefs, and institutions mentioned above, anthropology has a grand and glorious theoretical tradition which gives a large-scale, long-range perspective on humanity. The principles of evolutionary and world-wide cultural variability can help us escape from the myopia of minute field studies. Nepalese anthropologists must read case studies from other developing societies to understand the lessons others have to teach and to put them into a larger theoretical and comparative frame. Anthropology as a discipline, then, gives us the conceptual tools to explain contemporary change. We already have all the answers we need; what we need are the right questions.

What are the implications of this for our agenda?

One implication is that we need to look beyond our masses of statistics, our impeccable methodological formats, and our mountains of ethnographic facts, at the broader issues. Rather than simply producing ever-larger cohorts of what Dr. Chaitanya Mishra has elsewhere so aptly termed "bikas wizards," who sprout like weeds around every well-funded project or the latest development fad, anthropology and sociology need to produce people with some critical vision of the big picture. This will require a willingness to examine, for example, the large structural impediments Mishra astutely describes in his article in this volume, as opposed to merely continuing the desultory tinkering with anachronistic systems characteristic of so much developmental social science research and action.

There is a clear and present danger, therefore, in anthropology and sociology being co-opted by development agencies and organizations, in our becoming compliant social technicians in the service of bureaucrats rather than critical practitioners of our crafts. It is as tempting in Nepal as it is in the United States to put money only into "applied" research -- projects that promise immediate results. But in doing so we neglect basic research, which in the long run may be more important and fruitful. The line between "basic" and "applied" research, or between "romantic" and "relevant" research, can be all too facilely drawn.

Theory cannot be neglected because it determines what kinds of questions we will ask. For example, if human society is a seamless web, then we should not have to choose between studies of "kinship and marriage, religion and social control," which Bista wants to deemphasize, or ignore "ideology, values, and norms" in favor of "poverty, ecology, planning, resource management", as Bhattachan suggests. Topics like marriage and religion, or ideology and values, cannot be excluded from such vital topics as poverty and resource management, because the former represent fundamental categories through which people live and perceive the world and, if it comes to that, "develop." We cannot afford to ignore Max Weber's insight, enduring legacy, and monumental scholarship showing that these are crucial variables in the process of modernization.

Anthropology and sociology need to be concerned with the general questions and the universal problems that have inspired the minds of its best practitioners. It is not just a matter of anthropology's micro-studies vs. sociology's macro-studies; it is a matter of confronting timeless issues and searching for theoretical principles vs. grinding out chi-squares that some ministry or international agency needs to justify its existence. We need far more of the kind of historical, analytical, and theoretical framework which Mishra's essay in this volume represents. To avoid being either mystified or minimized, development must be understood in larger contexts.

To produce people with this kind of vision we need to expose our students to the great ideas and cross-cultural data that are the backbone of the field. Of course we need to be Nepal-oriented, but neither can we ignore, simply because they are not Nepalese, the classic studies that have been done elsewhere in the world. To take one example: Colin Turnbull's classic ethnography of the pygmies of central Africa shows how they have achieved a remarkable and productive symbiotic adaptation to the rain forest. It illustrates the larger generalization that the hunting and gathering period of human existence provided the best-fed and healthiest humans in the history of our planet. That may sound like more romanticism, but it is only a prosaic fact of the evolution of our species. Anyone who reads Turnbull's book is compelled to wonder uncomfortably what "development" could possibly mean in the context of Bantu villages. But few development planners in Nepal will have seriously considered that rather than add the hunting-and-gathering Raute -- a similar

group -- to the rolls of marginalized and immiserated peasants, it might be better to leave them alone -- which happens to be also their own stated performance. We ignore such options because of our bourgeois and ethnocentric assumptions (both Nepalese and American) that permanent houses and indoor plumbing are necessary for the good life, and that anyone who wanders through the forests hunting monkeys is automatically underdeveloped. That this option may be the most unlikely-to-be-accepted suggestion of all time should not deter us from making it. Anthropology is a subversive science.

At the other end of the scale one needs to look critically at examples of successful development elsewhere. The Punjab is a classic case of the successful installation of Green Revolution agricultural technology. It is also a war-torn, divided society. This is not an argument that stability should take precedence over other considerations -- indeed, successful development may be inherently destabilizing. But it does indicate that we should not allow spectacular technology to blind us to its painful repercussions.

What I recommend, therefore, is that in our training we keep track of world-wide developments in our fields, adding to our arsenal those that will aid Nepal. I also recommend that when setting our research priorities we take into account the sheer bulk of anthropologists and sociologists who now do research in Nepal. Given the enormous quantity of sociologists and anthropologists, both foreign and Nepalese, now willing, eager, and able to do research in Nepal, it is not necessary to choose between "basic" and "applied" research, even if that distinction were more sensible than it seems to first glance. With the anthropologist population approaching a density of one in every village, there is room for all sorts of studies. If someone wants to study spirit possession, or the history of a temple, or the origins of landlessness, or resource management, the only wise restriction is that it be done by well-trained people sensitive to the developmental implications of their interests. Fortunately the Central Department of Sociology and Anthropology is now producing such scholars.

Let a hundred flowers bloom. In the era of development, we need not fear a shortage of scholars who will fasten their sights on it.

NOTES

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MIGRATION, ADAPTATION AND SOCIO-CULTURAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF THE THAKALIS IN POKHARA* [1]

Ram Bahadur Chhetri

Introduction

The purpose of the present paper is to discuss adaptation, cultural continuity, and change among the immigrant Thakalis in Pokhara, Nepal. The Thakali community has attracted considerable attention in recent years (Bhattachan 1980, Chhetri 1980, Furer-Haimendrof 1966, 1981; Gauchan and Vinding 1977; Iijima 1963; Manzardo and Sharma 1975; Messerschmidt 1975; Vinding 1984). However, studies dealing specifically with adaptation and change among the migrant Thakali groups in various parts of Nepal are lacking[2]. Migration is not a new phenomenon for the Thakalis. In the past most of them were involved in a process which may be characterized as cyclic or circulatory migration[3]. This brought them into contact with other communities in the lowland villages, towns, and cities of Nepal, and thereby initiated among them a process of social and cultural change and adaptation.

Some important arguments emerge from the discussion that follows which may be pointed out in the beginning. First it is argued that adaptation is a two way process, i.e., it involves an interaction between the immigrants and the host society. In this process both parties undergo adaptational changes, although one of them may change more than the other, which leads many of us to view the process of adaptation from the migrant's point of view only. Second, the process of adaptation may not necessarily lead to the assimilation of the in-migrants in the host culture and society. This becomes more true when the host society itself is multi-ethnic in character (as is Pokhara) and also when in-migrants in question mostly share the same social, cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds (as in the case of the Thakalis in Pokhara) and originate from the same geographical

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region. Therefore, even though social and cultural changes may be observed in culture-contact situations, this does not necessarily lead to the creation of a fully homogeneous social and cultural setting in the place in question. This tells us why the "breakdown hypothesis" (Nair 1978:3) and the "melting pot" ideas do not hold well as viable theoretical concepts in discussing social change.

Instead, what may be observed is adjustment, or adaptation, which may be defined as a process whereby a group's or community's social, cultural and economic life is modified to suit the needs of the new setting. In the discussion below, an attempt is made to answer two main questions: (a) To what extent have changes taken place in the socio-cultural institutions, values, and norms of the migrant Thakalis in Pokhara? and (b) In what respects are the migrants adapted or adjusted? In the process of answering these questions, it will be shown that the "integration" of the migrants into the urban setting is mainly on the basis of their common economic interests while, at the same time, maintaining their distinct identity in terms of social and cultural life.

A third line of enquiry is: How does adaptational change among the migrant Thakalis affect the Thakali community at large in their native habitat? This question is relevant because the migrant Thakalis have maintained close and continuous contact with their kinsfolk in Thak Khola. Another question is: How does the migrant Thakali society evolve over generations? And a final question, basically related to the ones above, is: How do the Thakalis in Thak and outside (in the Hills and in the Tarai) differ from each other over time? This paper, based on two field expeditions among the Thakalis in Pokhara and Thak Khola, attempts to answer these questions.

The Thakalis are culturally a Tibetan group of people[4]. They are divided into four exogamous and patrilineal clans: *Gauchan, Tulachan, Sherchan and Bhattachan.* Their mother tongue, known as *"Tamhaang Kura"*, is a dialect of the Tibeto-Burman language family. The Thakalis are of course also fluent in Nepali which is the official/national language of Nepal.

Originally, Thakalis belonged to a small area known as Thak Khola or Thak Satsae (Thak in Short) surrounding the Kali Gandaki river in the district of Mustang in Dhaulagiri zone in west Nepal (See Map). In Thak, the Thakalis had a mixed economy consisting of agriculture, pastoralism and trade.

However, they were not highly dependent on agriculture and pastoralism although these were very important parts of their economy. The location of Thak in one of the important trade routes across the Himalayas, on the other hand, "led the Thakali to specialize in long-distance trade" (Blaikie, Cameron and Seddon 1982:150). The conferring of the title of *Subbas* on some prominent Thakalis by the Nepal government in 1869 (Messerschmidt and Gurung 1974:201), and then the granting of customs contracts, increased Thakali control over the then important salt and wool trade between Tibet, Nepal and India. Their trade relations with Tibet helped them to attain a relatively high standard of living which otherwise would not have been possible through agriculture and animal husbandry alone. In the past, the Thakalis were, in fact, acting as a link in the barter trade between Nepal and Tibet -- bringing in salt and wool from Tibet in exchange for cereals. This trade later closed down for two reasons: (1) the availability of less expensive salt from India, and (2) political changes in Tibet, resulting from its Chinese takeover in the early 1950s[4].

The years between the abolishment of the customs contract system and the political change in Tibet presumably provided the Thakalis with the much needed time for adaptation to the new economic realities -- and the search for a new economic niche in the Hill and the Tarai region to the south. The migrations of the Thakalis in the beginning could be characterized as exploratory. It was purely circulatory and/or seasonal. In the second stage, however, it became a semi-permanent move: still seasonal but many of them now had some kind of "winter living place" in the lowlands. In this stage many Thakalis established *"Bhattis"* (inns and restaurants) along the trails during the winter months and many of them are seen going through this transitional stage even today. In the third stage, many Thakalis moved out of Thak permanently. This time, they also had kinsmen already settled in the lowland towns and cities, who presumably were not only the motivators but also the ones who provided the newcomers with necessary help in the beginning to get settled down.

Iijima (1963) gives an anecdote which sheds light on the views of the Thakalis in the past with regard to migrating southwards, especially to the plains:

> "around 1930 Anangman Sherchan, a member of a prominent Thakali family, was appointed Treasury Officer of the central

government and assigned to the Tarai, the 'Land of Awal' (the land of malaria fever) in southern Nepal. His family members and other Thakalis bid him a tearful farewell, certain that they would never see him again if he went to this 'fearful land'. Contrary to their expectations, Anangman Sherchan returned to Thakkhola safely."

(1963:46)

Implicit in Iijima's description is the questionable point that Thakalis had not traveled to the south before this date. Nevertheless, the anecdote corroborates the fact that the Thakalis (as did other hill people) in the past used to think that moving south was not a safe thing to do. But once the southward move started, the Thakalis seem to have migrated in streams, often leaving the villages in Thak almost deserted.

Furer-Haimendorf, who had visited Thak in 1962, visited the area again after fourteen years and observed "The majority of the Thakalis of Tukche [a one time important village in Thak] had moved to Pokhara and other places in the middle ranges, and Tukche had the appearance of a dying town" (1981:177). The situation is not as grave as depicted by Furer-Haimendorf, but the fact remains that Thakalis (who once were reluctant even to visit the southern plains as suggested by Iijima's anecdote6) are proliferating to all corners of Nepal.

A look at the 1981 census reveals that today Thakalis are found all over Nepal. It should be cautioned, however, that census figures (see Table 1) do not give us the total Thakali population in Nepal. They only show Thakalis who in the 1981 census reported Thakali as their mother tongue. This is important for the discussion of adaptation and socio-cultural change and, therefore, will be taken up later. At this point, however, I want to emphasize the fact that Thakalis are seen as a very mobile community. Of the total Thakali speakers in Nepal only 46% are registered in Dhaulagiri Zone, their native homeland. This figure could decline further if the exact number of Thakalis were known, which may be approximately ten thousand. The fact that Gauchan (1980:20-27) gives the number of Thakalis living in only 14 districts as 5,330 in 1978 is an indication of the reality. Also, the 1978 demographic survey of Pokhara Town Panchayat showed 606 Thakalis in the town while the 1981 census showed only 223 Thakali speakers. Thus we have sufficient reason to believe that the actual number of Thakalis in Nepal is more than



Thak Khola (from Furer-Haimendorf, 1975)

the number who reportedly Thakali as their mother tongue in the 1981 census.

Table 1: Distribution of the speakers of Thakali as mother tongue in different Zones of Nepal by rural and urban residence 1981.

Zones	Total	%	Rural	%	Urban	%
Mechi	47	0.89	41	0.78	6	0.11
Koshi	164	3.10	127	2.40	37	0.70
Sagarmatha	368	6.96	359	6.79	9	0.17
Janakpur	362	6.84	362	6.84	-	-
Bagmati	214	4.04	115	2.17	99	1.87
Narayani	554	10.48	523	9.89	31	0.59
Gandaki	622	11.76	399	7.54	223	4.22
Dhaulagiri	2438	46.10	2438	46.10	-	-
Lumbini	263	4.97	198	3.74	65	1.23
Rapti	42	0.79	42	0.79	-	-
Bheri	77	1.45	66	1.25	11	0.20
Karnali	67	1.27	67	1.27	-	-
Seti	41	0.78	40	0.76	1	0.02
Mahakali	30	0.57	28	0.53	2	0.04
Total:	5289	100.00	4805	90.85	484	9.15

Source: Census of Nepal 1981.

From Table 1 it becomes evident that Thakalis have migrated and settled in different places in the Hills and Tarai region of Nepal: mostly urban areas, but some rural areas as well. Pokhara is one such place where their number is gradually increasing. Pokhara is the administrative center of the Western Development Region as well as the Zonal and District headquarters of Gandaki Zone and Kaski district, respectively. Pokhara is also a municipality in it's own right. Besides the various government offices, there are a number of banks, modern hotels, small scale industries, educational institutions, hospitals, and various other modern institutions. The heterogeneous population of the city is comprised of people from a number of castes and communities, such as Brahman, Chhetri, Newar, Gurung, Thakali, Magar and many others including recently resettled Tibetan refugees (Table 2).

Table 2: Community Population Distribution of Pokhara (1978).

Name of Community	Population	%
Brahman and Chhetri	17,489	48.30
Newar	6,386	17.60
Gurung	4,320	11.90
Pariyar	3,184	8.80
Magar	1,507	4.20
Thakali	606	1.70
Muslim	426	1.20
Lama	325	0.90
Tamang	176	0.50
Others	1,767	4.90
Total	36,189	100.00

Source of data: Demographic Survey of Pokhara Nagar Panchayat, 1978. Carried out by the Nagar Panchayat and Prithwi Narayan Campus, Pokhara.

Pokhara serves as a link between Kathmandu and the adjoining districts, as it is the terminus of the Prithwi Highway. Furthermore, the Siddhartha Highway, which links India and the interior of Nepal, also ends there. It also serves as a stopover for Thakali traders who come down from Thak Khola as well as others who come from villages around Pokhara on their way to Kathmandu, Bhairahawa, and elsewhere. In fact, Pokhara is the nearest market center for the hill people in the region. Thakalis, who are well known for trading and business skill, have thus found Pokhara one of the better places to resettle.

Migration and Adaptation: Background

As the process of migration comes into prominence, studies of diffusion of cultures, acculturation, assimilation, integration, adjustment, adaptation, etc., in relation to migrants begin to draw more and more attention. Talking about the rapid increase in migration studies by anthropologists during the second half of the 20th century, Graves and Graves state that "a wealth of descriptive material from all over the world is now available, providing a comparative perspective on the adaptive strategies which the actors in this modern drama display" (Graves and Graves: 1974: 117). Migrations are not isolated events and are generally associated with some kind of economic, social and cultural change to which people make an adjustment and/or

adaptation. Migration brings together at the destination populations with different social and cultural background, thus initiating a process of change in the social, economic, religious and cultural lives of the people in question in order to make adaptations and/or adjustments vis-à-vis each other.

Pokhara, where the present study was made, has been one of the fastest growing towns in Nepal. This becomes evident if we look at the population figures for the town over the years (Table 3). In a period of about 30 years the absolute increase in the town's population was 42,887, or a growth of 1142%. The rapid growth of Pokhara could be attributed partly to the reclassification of the town area (i.e., annexation) and partly to natural growth. But by looking closely at the way this urban center has been expanding, it becomes evident that in-migration substantially contributes to the growth of population in the town. Between 1961 and 1981 there were some annexations. The city increased from 11 wards in 1961 to 18 wards in 1981. But most of the annexed wards also had immigrants, settled in different localities, giving birth to a number of *bazaars*. Thus the argument here is that unless there was a continuous inflow of migrants into the area the city would not have grown to the present size. The figures in Table 4 also support this argument. The number of Thakali families settling in Pokhara has been increasing during recent years. The in-migrants, however, belong to various communities, and the Thakalis are just one of them.

Table 3: Population Change (growth) in Pokhara, 1961-1981.

Census/Survey	Population	Absolute Change	% Change
1952-54	3755	---	---
1961	5413	1658	44.15
1971	20611	15198	280.77
1978*	36189	15578	75.58
1981	46642	26031	126.29

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Pocketbook.
* Demographic Survey of Pokhara Town Panchayat jointly conducted by P.N. Campus and the Nagar Panchayat.

Table 4: Migration Stream of Thakalis to Pokhara (Until 1980)

Period	# families leaving Thak	# families settled in Pokhara
Before 1943	6	4
1944 - 1952	10	6
1953 - 1962	16	13
1963 - 1972	16	18
1980 - present	2	9

Source: Field survey 1980. Fifty household heads were interviewed in the field survey.

The main reasons for migration in Nepal seem to be the economic disparity between regions created by a rapidly changing man-land ratio, the low productivity of soils, the lack of alternative employment opportunities in the hills, and the perceived economic and social advantages in the lowlands by the migrants. Migration in Nepal is not a new phenomenon. Rana and Thapa state aptly that it is "practically as old as the history of its [Nepal's] colonization by people from the north as well as the south" (1975:45) However, most of the internal migratory movements in the past, at least from the Himalayas, were seasonal, cyclical, or circulatory. The people from the Himalayan region migrated down to the south during the winter months to escape from the harsh weather and went back to their homes once the winter snow started melting. This kind of circulatory movement is not typical of the Thakalis only. Similar seasonal movements have been noted for the Sherpas of Nepal (Furer-. Haimendorf 1981), the various Bhotiya (Himalayan) people of India (Bhandari 1981: 213-214) and several other groups of people in Nepal.

Thus, various push and pull factors have been responsible in gearing the process of migration in the country (Shrestha 1979). The various reasons given for migration by the Thakalis in Pokhara have been summarized in Table 5.

Besides the reasons summarized above some families also expressed their subjective judgment toward the social life in Thak. They believe that the society in Thak was "backward".

With respect to the causes of migration and the process of adaptation, we can also talk of the role of family and kinship, frequency of visits to the destination before finally settling down, and also whether the move was direct or in phases (Table 6).

*Table 5: Reasons for migration

Factors	Number of responses*
Stated reasons for moving out of Thak	
Environment (severe winters)	11
Lack of cultivable land	4
Lack of occupation	33
Lack of medical facilities	23
Lack of educational facilities	19
Lack of transportation facilities	7
Stated reasons for moving to Pokhara	
A center for trade and business	33
Presence of relatives	10
Nearer to Thak	12
Modern amenities (education, medicine, etc.)	27
Employment	2

*Source: Field survey 1980. N=50. Some people gave more than one reason. Thus the total adds up to more than 50.

The role of the family and relatives is seen to be important in the process of migration as well as adaptation. Generally, the migrant families living in an urban area tend to motivate their relatives to move to the place of their new settlement. This is more true in a situation where relatives from the origin keep visiting the migrant relatives in the urban center and vice versa. It is the case in Pokhara, where 88% of the Thakali migrants acknowledged visits of relatives from Thak. It was also found that most of the Thakali families had come directly to Pokhara after leaving Thak. Seventy-eight percent of the families said that they migrated directly to Pokhara, while only 22% stated that they had lived either in Baglung, Syangja or Butwal after leaving Thak before they finally migrated to Pokhara.

Table 6: Steps of move by units and decision

Variables	By step	%	Not by	Step %
Frequency of earlier visits				
None	2	4	4	8
At least twice	-	-	5	10
Several times	9	18	30	60
Unit of move				
Alone	2	4	8	16
with family	9	18	31	62
Decision -making				
Self	3	6	24	48
Parent/Grandparents	8	16	15	30

Source: Field Survey 1980. N = 50.

Frequency of visits is taken as a proxy for assessing the level of information. The assumption is that the greater the number of visits the more information a person will have. A close look at the migratory process (see Table 6) then helps us assume that many of the Thakali families had a fairly high level of information about Pokhara before settling down there. Even among those Thakalis who moved in phases, 18% had visited Pokhara more than twice before they came to live there permanently. Because of the better information they had about the destination, most of them (78% in this case) must have selected Pokhara for settlement right in their first move. This must have helped the Thakalis in the process of their adaptation in the urban setting.

Adaptation and Cultural Continuity and Change

Given the motivation for migration to Pokhara, how are the Thakalis there adapted to urban life? The Thakali community is a dynamic community, actively interacting with the host society rather than passively submitting to the socio-cultural forces of change in the urban life. The notion of adaptation as used here would be in line with

> "a growing consensus among anthropologists that the nature of man is best described as neither totally active nor passive but interactive. Operating within the many constraints which his physical and social environments impose, he seeks to overcome the problems confronting him by choosing among perceived available options"
>
> (Graves and Graves 1974:117)

Any migrant community in an urban setting tends to form a group in itself. Viewed from the structural-functional perspective, it shows itself as a separate system, but at the same time forms a part of the whole urban system. Migrant communities may show marked differences in certain social and cultural patterns from the host society. But nonetheless, they are found to be involved in the process of adaptation, adjustment, integration, acculturation -- i.e., socio-cultural change in general.

Adaptations of migrants in an urban setting might be discussed by using different sets of indices and/or variables, such as residential settlement, housing, occupational adaptation, occupational mobility, family life-cycle change, social adaptation, cultural adaptation and attachment to the origin (Lee and Kim 1981:233). I use the following indices to deal with the adaptation of the Thakalis in Pokhara: (1) Occupational mobility, (2) Participation in Association, (3) Extent of contact with other communities, (4) Internalization of the culture of the host society, (5) Preference for neighbourhood, and (6) Exposure vs. enclosure of the community. Let us now discuss each index in the context of the migrant Thakali families in Pokhara.

Occupation: Originally, the Thakalis in Thak were an agropastoral community (Manzardo and Sharma 1975; Furer-Haimendorf 1966, 1974). They were also involved in the salt, wool, and grain barter trade, but this was not the primary occupation for a majority of the Thakalis now in Pokhara. More than 91% of the migrants said that their primary occupation before migration was agriculture, while less than 9% had business or trade as their primary occupation. However, today 80% of the migrant Thakali families in Pokhara have taken to business as their primary occupation. Business in the case of the Thakalis includes running hotels and restaurants, retail business

in clothes, food items and other sundry goods, and working as contractors for various governmental and non-governmental building and construction works. Only 12% have continued with agriculture and the other 8% have taken to government service or jobs.

When asked about a change in occupation, most of the migrants pointed out that business as an occupation was much easier and also more profitable than agriculture. They were also questioned whether they faced any problems due to the change in occupation in the new urban setting. Only 34% gave a positive answer while 66% of them said that they had no problems right from the beginning. For those who reported having faced problems, the nature of the problems were financial, which were solved with relative ease (as reported) with the help of relatives or other Thakalis in Pokhara. The help was mostly in the form of *Dhikurs,* which is a form of rotating credit[7]. It is thus seen that the Thakalis adapted with relative ease to the new economic structure of the urban setting partly due to help from their community members.

It may be noted that the Thakalis are a close knit and very cohesive group of people. They help their fellow Thakalis in times of need. Another characteristic of this community is that even in adopting some kind of social mobility/change, they do it at the group level. Some have called this "contest mobility" (Schermerhorn, 1978:54). Among the Thakalis "there seems to be not only a willingness to accept social reform, but a desire to embrace it as a community, rather than as individuals" (Manzardo and Sharma, 1975). This kind of group mobility has presumably helped them to adapt rather easily to the new urban setting.

Participation in Associations: Participation in the socio-economic and political associations and/or institutions at the group level as well as at the societal level may also be an index of the level of adaptation or adjustment reached by a migrant community in the urban setting. The Thakalis in Pokhara are all members of the *Pokhara Thakali Samaj Sudhar Samiti* (PTSSS)[8] or Pokhara Thakali Social Reform Committee, which is an institution parallel to the "*13 Mukhiya*" system back in Thak. The PTSSS is a socio-political organization representing only the

Thakalis in Pokhara confederated with the feeling of collectivity and co-fraternity (PTSSS Constitution, 1971, my translation from the Nepali text). Similar Thakali Samaj Sudhar Samitis exist in other urban centers like Kathmandu and Bhairahawa also. The associational clustering of the Thakalis through this institution has enabled them to perpetuate the culture of their place of origin and at the same time it has also made it possible for them to adapt to the new ways of life. This is done by introducing reforms in the socio-cultural practices in accordance with the exigencies of the new situations. Important reforms introduced by the PTSSS are the banning of "marriage by capture" (which according to elderly informants used to be a common form in Thak, which is also reflected in the proceedings of the Lha Phewa festival), consumption of yak-meat, and the shortening of the death-mourning period from 49 to 13 days. This has made the Thakalis acceptable to the Hindu society and also helped them to adapt in Pokhara.

Besides, the Thakalis also become members of the various *dhikurs* (rotating credit associations.) These help the Thakalis to sort out their social as well as economic problems and thereby make it easier for economic adaptation. This association, though a continuity of the *dhikurs* in Thak, has also been subject to adaptational change. The traditional *dhikuri* system had a welfare motive -- to provide economic support to needy Thakalis. This rotating credit association (Messerschmidt, 1978: 141-165)used to function on the basis of the principle of a lottery while today, in urban areas, it is run by the written tender system wherein the highest bidder of interest on the dhikuri amounts gets it. It then serves the interest of businessmen rather than the poor and needy ones. Thus we see an instance of the continuation of a traditional institution with changes in its principles and motives as demanded by new urban situations. It is also an example of an institution (a cultural element in general) given to the host society by an in-migrant group. Membership in the Thakali *dhikuris* used to be open only to Thakalis in the past. But now by opening up the membership to others, the Thakalis have been able to establish economic ties with people from other communities in the urban center. This again is a timely step towards adaptation

made by the Thakalis to widen their economic relations and networks.

Besides participating in the in-group organizations and/or associations, Thakalis are also participating in other social, political, economic and educational institutions in Pokhara. Within a short period, some Thakalis have even gained the status of social workers and politicians in Pokhara. Their extremely resilient and adaptive stance has also given Thakalis a considerable political advantage. This is exemplified by the fact that recently a Thakali was elected as the *Pradhan Pancha* (Mayor) of Pokhara Town. More interesting is the fact that one of two representatives in the Rastriya Panchayat (National Legislature) from Kaski district (1981 - 1985) was a Thakali, who even became an Assistant Minister for Communication in the National Cabinet for some time. Baglung, another district where the Thakalis first came as migrants, also has a Thakali as one of its representatives in the national legislature. These instances reflect not only the adaptive nature of Thakali social life in Nepal generally but also the confidence of people in the host society far more easily than many other people.

Interaction within the group and outside the group: To ascertain the extent of contact or interaction of Thakalis within the community as well as with the outsiders, respondents were asked how often they had participated in such activities as picnics, visiting each other for meals, visiting friends, pujas and other religious occasions, weaning, scared thread ceremonies, marriages, mourning and meetings during the past year. Table 7 summarizes the findings. The in-group interaction is more frequent for the migrant Thakalis with regard to most of the indices except the sacred thread ceremony. The Thakalis do not have a sacred thread ceremony (an initiation rite of high Hindu castes) in their culture and thus the in-group participation in this context is zero.

With regard to their participation in activities with people from other communities, a different picture emerges. Except for such activities as visiting friends, attending marriages, and meetings, their out-group participation is relatively less frequent. This indicates that the Thakalis are socially well-adapted in the host society.

Table 7: Extent of Group Interaction for the Thakalis by Socio-cultural Activities during 1987.

Activities	None		Once		Twice		More than Twice	
Within the Thakali Community								
Picnics	5	(10)	5	(10)	21	(42)	19	(38)
Visits for meals	2	(4)	2	(4)	13	(26)	33	(66)
Visiting friends	3	(6)	3	(6)	6	(12)	38	(76)
Poojas	1	(2)	3	(6)	14	(28)	32	(64)
Religious festivals	1	(2)	3	(6)	14	(28)	32	(64)
Weaning Ceremonies	7	(14)	2	(4)	4	(8)	37	(74)
Sacred thread	50	(100)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Marriages	6	(12)	5	(10)	5	(10)	34	(68)
Death mourning	9	(18)	4	(8)	4	(8)	33	(66)
Social meetings	8	(16)	4	(8)	7	(14)	31	(62)
Outside the Community								
Picnics	30	(60)	3	(6)	7	(14)	10	(20)
Visits for meals	29	(58)	1	(2)	8	(16)	12	(24)
Visiting friends	15	(30)	2	(4)	9	(18)	24	(48)
Poojas	20	(40)	5	(10)	9	(18)	16	(32)
Religious festivals	26	(52)	2	(4)	6	(12)	16	(32)
Weaning Ceremonies	23	(46)	4	(8)	3	(6)	20	(40)
Sacred thread	21	(42)	7	(14)	6	(12)	16	(32)
Marriages	14	(28)	4	(8)	4	(8)	28	(56)
Death mourning	39	(78)	-	-	2	(4)	9	(18)
Social meetings	22	(44)	2	(4)	5	(10)	21	(42)

Source: Field survey 1980, (Figures in the parentheses are percentages.)

Internalization of the culture of the host society: Generally, a migrant community tends to face a situation of conflict between its traditional values and norms and those presented by the host society. In the course of adjusting or adapting, what results is "continuity as will as change", i.e., while some norms and values continue to persist others get replaced by new ones. For example, the Thakalis gave up dressing in Tibetan fashion because this tended to replace them with the Bhote community, generally regarded as inferior by caste Hindus. They have now adapted the Nepali dress pattern as well as the "Western" patterns (cf. Furer-Haimendorf 1966).

Two more important changes are summarized by Furer-Haimendorf: "Just as at the end of the 19th century Yak eating was proscribed, so in more recent years the custom of marriage by capture was formally banned by the headmen of the Thak Satsae" (Furer-Haimendorf 1966:148). The Thakalis adopted the "Kanyadan" (formal giving away of the daughters) form of marriage which is common among the caste Hindus. In the course of adapting to the urban setting by internalizing the culture of the host society, the Thakalis have "Hinduized" to the extent of claiming the status of *Thakuri* (a ruling caste) in the traditional caste hierarchy of the Hindus.

Another important change among the Thakalis has been in terms of the mourning period observed after death. This change was again effected by a resolution of the PTSSS. By reducing the number of days for observing mourning after death from 49 days to 13, they not only reduced the cost of performing various rites (because fewer days means fewer rites), but also have moved towards Hinduizing it. However, differences still exist. Among orthodox Hindus in Nepal, mourning and pollution-avoidance are observed by agnate kinsmen of the deceased for 13 days whereas among the Thakalis even "brothers observe but one day's mourning" (Furer-Haimendorf 1966:150).

Thakalis in Pokhara also have learned the languages of the dominant linguistic group in their locality index of internalization of the culture of the host society by the migrants. It is interesting to note that 58% of the migrant Thakalis said that they speak Newari or Gurung or both in addition to their own mother tongue and the Nepali language which of course is spoken by all. This shows how easily Thakalis adjust to other groups of people in the heterogeneous urban society of Pokhara and elsewhere.

Performance for Neighbourhood: Migrants in urban centers generally tend to prefer living in a locality where they have people belonging to their own community or culture (Nair 1978, Punekar 1974). But in the case of the Pokhara Thakalis in Pokhara, a different tendency is observed.

They live in "mixed settlements" distributed in different areas of the town. Table 8 shows the distribution of Thakalis in different wards of Pokhara. In some of the wards the predominant caste or community is that of Newars while in others it is either the Brahmans, Chhetris, Gurungs or Magars. But the Thakalis seem to be happy in whatever locality they live. This becomes clear from the negative answers given by most of them to the question - "Have you ever thought of leaving this

locality?" Again on being asked about their preference for the type of neighbourhood, 84% of them asserted that they preferred a neighbourhood of mixed settlement, i.e. where there are people belonging to different communities. Only 10% of the families said that they prefer to live only among the Thakalis, and the remaining 6% said that they were in between the two extremes.

The reasons given for their preferences were equally interesting. More than 60% of the families pointed out that a mixed settlement was congenial for the exchange of ideas and cultures, for business and for a better understanding of each others way of life. Some of them (22%) were of the view that people belonging to different castes and communities have different roles to play in the social, economic and cultural life and therefore it is desirable to live among people belonging to different castes and communities.

Table 8: Distribution of Thakalis in Pokhara by Ward, 1980

Wards	Thakali Population	Total Population	Percent of Thakalis
1	122	3545	3.44
2	66	1723	3.83
3	13	2044	0.63
4	41	1567	2.61
5	-	1603	0.00
6	13	2475	0.52
7	64	3975	1.61
8	31	1864	1.66
9	148	2133	6.93
10	28	1760	1.59
11	13	1758	0.73
12	3	1915	0.15
13	11	1818	0.60
14	-	1843	0.00
15	1	2428	0.04
16	52	3712	1.40
Total	606	36189	1.70

Source: Demographic survey of Pokhara Nagar Panchayat 1978, jointly conducted by the Nagar Panchayat and Prithwi Narayan Campus, Pokhara.

Enclosure and Exposure: Total enclosure and exposure are two extreme states to which no known community exactly corresponds. We may, however, talk in terms of the degree of enclosure and exposure of a community. A particular society or community may exhibit the characteristics of an open or exposed society in certain aspects and an enclosed one in others. Enclosure and exposure of a community in relation to others may be analyzed by the use of various indicators such as endogamy and exogamy, ecological concentration, associational clustering, rigidity, clarity of group definition, etc.

In terms of marriage practice, the Thakalis practice clan exogamy and community endogamy. In Pokhara it was found that 96% of marriages were within the same community. Further, it was also found that 50% of the Thakali males had wives from Thak Khola, 34% from Pokhara, and the remaining 16% had wives from Kathmandu, Bhairahawa or Baglung (other places having substantial number of Thakali migrants).

As mentioned above, community exogamy is not socially sanctioned among the Thakalis. A few boys and girls who violated the rule of endogamy have found it difficult to get the relation socially sanctioned. Thus we see that from the point of view of endogamy or exogamy the migrant Thakalis are more of an enclosed group. Strict adherence to the principle of community endogamy among the older generation of Thakalis expresses their inherent feeling towards maintaining group homogeneity in terms of culture, language, etc. But whether the rule of community endogamy can be maintained strictly for long is a pertinent question in this case. A change already on the way is the preference for exogamous marriages among some of the younger generation of Thakalis. In the survey on Thakali youth, only 55% of them reported that endogamy should be maintained. A difference of opinion with regard to upholding a traditional cultural practice is clearly visible here.

With regard to the index of ecological concentration, we saw above (Table 8) that Thakalis prefer to live among people from different communities. They are dispersed in different wards of the town. The nature of their primary occupation also

demands this, and the Thakalis seem to be happy in whatever locality they are living.

Associational clustering: Thakali migrants do not have many clubs or societies of their own in Pokhara. The only community level institution, as mentioned already, is the PTSSS, in which membership is restricted to the people from the four Thakali clans, viz. *Chyoki* (Gauchan), *Salki* (Tulachan), *Dhimten* (Sherchan) and *Bhurki* (Bhattachan). Another institution is a revolving-credit organization known as Dhikur. These institutions have provided group support for Thakali migrants in times of need and thereby helped them to adapt.

Group definition: The Thakali claim of a Thakuri origin is popular, showing that they have a desire to assimilate themselves into the caste Hindu social structure (Bista, 1967; Furer-Haimendorf 1974). This is, however, not the whole truth. The group definition among the Thakalis is very distinct. They have a "we" concept for themselves as against "they" feelings for non-Thakalis. The way the Thakalis define their own group is worth noting here. They refer to themselves as *Tamhaang,* which is defined as a socially accepted child of a man belonging to one of the four patrilineal clans (Gauchan and Vinding, 1977:97).

One interesting question which arose from the survey among the Thakali[9] youth asks: To what extent will the Thakali identity be maintained in the future? Many young and educated Thakalis are gradually giving up learning their mother tongue. The survey on the youths showed that only 25% could speak Thakali fluently. This indicates that the census data on the Thakali community is not reliable[10]. Besides, and this is the important point, it indicates that the group boundary among the Thakalis may blur over time.

Another point to be noted here is the terms and conditions set forth for membership in the PTSSS, which is not open to outsiders or non-Thakalis. When asked "Is membership open to others besides Thakalis?" all the migrants gave a negative answer. When further asked to give reasons for the restrictions, most of them invariably pointed out that "they" do not belong to the Thakali community and have different customs and traditions.

To get an idea of the rigidity of their group definition, migrants were also asked to give their opinions on similarities and differences of food habits, dress, life-cycle ceremonies, festivals, religious ceremonies and place and method of worship between themselves and the non-Thakalis in Pokhara. Except for dress and food habits, more than 85% of the migrants pointed out that they had marked differences with people from other communities. In spite of the perceived differences, however, the Thakalis feel adapted to the urban setting in general.

Summary and Implications

From the above discussion we see that the Thakalis are an enclosed community in terms of the indices of endogamy vs. exogamy and their "group" definition. As far as the cultural and religious aspects are concerned, the Thakalis tend to show an enclosed and isolated character. But when the socio-economic matters come to the front, they tend to be open and showing a desire to adapt to socio-economic life in the urban center. It may further be added that the Thakali migrants in Pokhara culturally form a close knit society whereas socio-economically they form a part of the total urban society.

We also see that migrant Thakalis are preserving some aspects of their indigenous culture with some adaptational changes. This has been made possible by such institutions as the PTSSS and the Dhikuri, which have themselves continued to exist with some modifications in the urban setting. Moreover, their integration into the urban setting has been made possible because of their positive attitude towards changes. Most of the Thakalis were explicit in stating that necessary changes in the traditional cultural norms and practices should be made from time to time to meet the challenges of the new setting. Whereas the structure of Thakali culture has been maintained, many of the functions of their social institutions have changed.

The process of adaptation and socio -cultural change as discussed above is occurring in various aspects of Thakali life, while culturally Thakalis continue as a separate group. With the passage of time and generations, this situation might change. Already the younger generation of Thakalis born outside Thak Khola, i.e., in the towns and cities of Nepal, show a tendency to

give up learning their mother tongue. In the course of time, the Thakali community in the urban centers might become less distinctive than it is today from other communities living in the same socio-economic and cultural setting. And it would not be surprising if in the future we find marked differences in terms of culture, language and religion between the Thakalis in Thak and those who have moved out from their original homeland.

The discussions above have two major implications: one for the Thakali community and the other for the theories of migration and adaptation in general. As for the Thakalis, there are practical implications. The above discussion of how the Thakalis persist and change as a result of migration shows the direction they are heading towards, knowledge of which might help them plan their future strategies.

With regards to theories of migration and adaptation, this paper points out the need for a two-way approach to adaptation. Most studies on migration, adaptation and socio-cultural change tend to look at adaptation of migrants as a one-way process. They show how far the migrants have undergone changes to adapt to their new setting. This is a valid approach but is inadequate. There is a need to look at the process of adaptation as a two way process wherein the migrants are not only undergoing changes but are at the same time introducing some changes in the total cultural system at the site of their settlement. In the case of the Thakalis, the migrants have contributed an economic organization to the host society by introducing the Dhikuri credit system. There is a need in the study of migration to take a closer look at the bilateral character of the process of migrant adaptation: the changes occurring not only to the migrants as they adapt to a new setting but also the changes taking place within the society of destination effected by the new settlers. This paper has demonstrated the heuristic value of adaptational studies of migrants, which might enable us to have a better understanding of the process in general.

NOTES

1. This paper is based on field work carried out between 1980 and 1984. the Initial research was carried out in early 1980 for an M.A. Thesis at the University of Pune. More data was collected later (November 1980-February 1981) while conducting field work as a Research Assistant at the Research Center for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), Tribhuvan University. The information was updated in 1983-1984 while on deputation at CNAS as a Researcher working for the Mustang Integrated Research Program. I am thankful to CNAS for the research opportunities given to me.

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2. For a socio-economic study of migrant Thakalis in Pokhara, see Bhattachan (1980) while for an ethnographic study among the same people, see Chhetri (1980). Manzardo and Sharma (1975) discuss the role of the PTSSS in social reforms among the Thakali community. Studies from other urban centers have yet to appear.

3. There is an extensive body of theoretical and empirical literature on circulation, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to review them here. For an updated treatment of the conceptual and analytical distinctions between circulation and migration, refer to the recent works by Chapman and Prothero (1985) and Prothero and Chapman (1985).

4. For a comprehensive introduction of the Thakalis, see Bista (1967), Iijima (1960) and Gauchan and Vinding (1977). The definition of the "Thakali" is provided by Gauchan and Vinding only.

5. Details on the abolition of the customs contract system are given in Furer-Haimendorf (1975) and Messerschmidt and Gurung (1974).

6. In a recent article Vinding (1984) reports that his informants in 1977 recalled a total of 270 Thakali families having left the Thak Khola region since 1960. Where they go is not reported. He cautions that this figure might be low because of the possibility of recall errors among his informants.

7. The term *dhikuri* is a derivative of the original term *Dhukor*, *'Dhu'* meaning wheat or cereal and *'Kor'* meaning to rotate or to circulate. For the definition and details on *dhikuri* see Messerschmidt (1978) and Chhetri (1980).

8. For details on the structure and functioning of the PTSSS and for its relationship with the '13 *Mukhiya*' system, see Manzardo and Sharma (1975) and Chhetri (1980). The 13 *Mukhiyas* refers to 13 headmen from 13 different villages in the Thak region. The institution is still active, and becomes conspicuous during important religious or social occasions and/or ceremonies.

9. A survey on the impact of urban and modern schooling, etc., on the attitudes of the Thakali youths was done in 1981. Twenty five youths between ages 15 and 30 were interviewed.

10. The census of Nepal does not collect information on community or caste affiliation in the strict sense of the terms. It only provides population distribution by mother tongue, which is certainly not a reliable indication of the size of the communities or groups of people.

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NATIVE STRATEGIES FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Om Prasad Gurung

I

This paper describes interrelationships among pasture, animal husbandry, and agriculture in Tara village in Baglung District, with emphasis on *rittithiti* (local management) system. I hypothesized that native strategies of natural resource management are effective and practical, and this hypothesis has been substantiated with the help of primary data, mostly qualitative, collected from the field by applying ethnographic research methods.

II

Tara village lies between 6,000 and 3,000 ft., northwest of Baglung Bazaar, capital of Baglung District, in western Nepal. The village is bordered by Argal village panchayat in the east, Pandavakhani in the west, Hila in the south and Barangja and Ruma of Myagdi district in the north. There are altogether 497 households. The total population is 3,152 and the total area of the village panchayat is 3,649 hectares[1]. The Tarakhola stream meanders through the heart of the village and cuts the village exactly in half. Along both sides of the stream there are scattered settlements. The climate is temperate and characterized by cold, frost, snowfall and fog in the winter and heavy rainfall and cool wind in summer.

III

The ethnic composition of the village consists of Magars, Brahmans, Chhetris, Thakalis, Kamis, Sarkis and Damais. The Magars are said to be the oldest inhabitants in the village and to have established most of the social customs in the village.

The village is considered the richest in natural resources in Baglung District. The forest and pasture, lands and water have been exploited by village people through the ages. The forest has

provided the villagers fodder, fuel wood, timber, nettle fiber, and wild green vegetables. The major forest type includes *gobresalla* (Pinus wallichiana), *arkhulo* (Quercus fenestrata), *banjh* (Quercus incana), *katus* (Catanopsis indica), *Chilaune* (Schima wallichi), *Kharus* (Quercus semecarpifolia) and *utis* (Nepal alder). The village is also rich in wild animals and fowls. Mineral resources also exist in the village. In the past, the villagers were diligent miners of iron and copper, but this is no longer true today. However, quarrying of stone and slate is a very common practice in the village. Except in a few cases, water is not used for irrigation. There is a lack of irrigated land in most parts of the village. The cold water of the stream provides fish and facilitates the growth of wild green vegetables along the banks.

IV

Agriculture is the main component of the village economy, and it is largely supplemented by animal husbandry. Employment outside the village is rare. Because the village is quite isolated, the villagers were not attuned to the opportunities that soldiering offered and were not recruited. Very few are serving in India and they are mostly labourers. Because of this fact, the village people must depend on agriculture and animal husbandry for subsistence.

Ecologically and climatically Tara is not very suitable for agricultural productivity. Although the average landholding size per household is relatively larger (2.9 hectares) in Tara than in many hill villages of Nepal, agricultural productivity is barely enough to feed her growing population. Types of arable land includes mainly the *sim, char* and *panch*, [third, fourth and fifth class] which are less productive, and require more manure to make them fertile. All the arable lands are *pakhobari* (dry land). Irrigated land is only 3.6 hectares in the entire panchayat. According to the village people, they are able to grow 6.5 *muris* of major foodgrains (approximately 400 kg) in one *hal* (0.0677 hectare) of cultivated land, if the manure of two to three large ruminants is utilized.

V

Animals' contributions to the agricultural economy of Nepalese hill villages are remarkable. Animals are regarded as a source of socio-economic status. Besides their manure, draft

service and dairy products, animals contribute extra income to village people. Every villager understands the economic value of their animals. A village proverb says, *tangmuni mitho, puchharmuni pitho,* which means "animals like buffalo and cattle have milk under their belly and manure under the tails." In other words, such animals are useful simultaneously in several ways. Because of this fact the village people place much emphasis on animal raising and keep as many animals as they can. The panchayat records of Tara show the total population of different livestock as follows: buffalo 2,587; cattle 1,952; sheep 1,591, and goats 953. The total population of all types of livestock is 7,093, which comes to 14.25 per household or 2.24 per head in the village panchayat. Magars also raise pigs in small numbers and fowls in large numbers, but these animals are not being considered in the present study since they play a very small role in agricultural productivity.

VI

Feed supply is the most pervasive constraint on livestock production in many hill villages of Nepal. Because the village people depend heavily on the forest for fodder, most researchers allege the depletion of Nepal's forest resources and consequent soil erosion is due to the encroachment of the over population and overgrazing of uncontrolled number of livestock in forest areas (cf. Pandey: 1969, 1983; Miller: 1984; New Era: 1980; Naston: 1983; Bose and Ojha: 1968). Although the population growth and uncontrolled number of livestock have certainly caused a decline in natural resources and soil erosion has been a major problem in many hill villages of Nepal, the situation in Tara is not that bad. Because the village people have their own *rititthiti* system of grazing management, this has served as a control mechanism for resource management. This is why the Tara village panchayat has been selected for the present study purpose.

The feed resources for livestock in Tara also primarily come from the forest. The forest has provided the animals both forage and pasturage. *Katus, phalant, banjh, kharus* and *arkhaulo* are the main fodder trees in the village. The leaves of *gobresalla, chilaune, bilaune* and *utis* are used for animal bedding. The crop residues of rice, wheat and barley, and millet straw and maize

stalks are also used as animal fodder during winter seasons. But by and large the animals depend on grazing all the year round.

VII

As in the mountain regions, Tara village has no open grazing lands or *kharkas*. There are few marginal lands where animals graze during the winter season. In Tara the grazing lands includ mainly the forest. The animals graze under the shadow of trees. In the village almost all the herders have a rich knowledge of ethnobotany. This suggests the intimate relationship between the peasants and the world of the plants. They know some of the poisonous plants (like *angeri, guras* and *pore*, trees of the rhododendron family) harmful to domesticated animals and they have native veterinary medicines. Jiro Kawakita (1964:30) also found a similar situation among the Magars of Sikha-Ghara of Nepal.

In Tara almost all the grazing lands lie at the elevation between 7,000 feet and 9,000 feet. The local people call the grazing land *lekh/dhuris*. There are more than twelve main grazing lands each having a local name such as Lamu, Thulduri, Fagus, Dhunre, Madam, Malrani, Argathum, Tinchule, Julpe, Thundu, Sangdor and Naibeli. The *lekh/dhuris* include a board range of area which have been supporting a large number of village livestock for several years; if managed as in the present, they can continue to support future livestock at the same level. Previously all these *lekh/dhuris* were under the control of village heads (*mukhiyas*), but now they are under the control of the panchayat.

The *lekh/dhuris* are located on slopes and sometimes steep cliffs. There is enough drinking water in all *lekh/dhuris*, and they are all rich in grasses. The geographical formation of these *lekh/dhuris* is such that animals can enter them from only a few main passes (*mukhyaghanti*). From these main passes the animals are driven out for grazing. These main passes make it easy to keep the area open and closed for proper management.

VIII

Each household, except for a few Kamis, Sarkis and Damais, who still depend more on their traditional occupations of

smithing, cobblering and tailoring than on animal husbandry and cultivating lands, send their animals to graze in the *lekh/dhuris*. Almost all the animals are herded in the *lekh/dhuris*. Only the best milking animals are stall-fed, because milking animals need more care. The labour requirements for animals depend on the size and types of the animals. Generally one herder is needed for 8 to 10 buffalo or 15 to 20 cattle. Fewer buffalo can be herded, because buffalo are less adaptive to difficult mountain slopes than cattle, and one always has to go after the buffalo to prevent them from falling down difficult slopes. Moreover, buffalo have a higher productive value than cattle, so more attention should be paid for their care. Because of this, a given number of buffalo need more herders than the same number of cattle.

IX

The grazing cycles are somewhat different for buffalo and cattle. The buffalo are driven out to *lekh/dhuris* from the first of Jeth (May/June) and graze their till the last of Bhadra (August/September). The cattle are sent to *lekh/dhuris* from the first of Ashad (mid-June) and graze there till the last of Asoj (September/October). The sheep and goats graze in nearby lower pastures. They are sent out to pasture each morning and brought back to pens each evening, because predators, like wolves, foxes and leopards, always threaten them. They must be kept under constant watch during the day and closely confined at night. Thus grazing is limited to areas relatively close to night pens.

From Asoj (September/October) to Kartik (October/November) the buffalo and cattle move to agricultural farms to manure the field for winter crops. From Mangsir (November/December) to Chait (March/April) the animals are kept in stalls, called *goths*, where they are provided tree fodder and crop residues. During this period the animals are driven out to nearby pasture lands such as *pakho, bhir* or private pasture lands such as *khabari* and fallow lands, and brought back to the *goths*. In the month of Baisakh (April/May), the animals graze in the agricultural farms to manure the fields for the next summer crops. During this month the animals enjoy barely and wheat straw (*loshkhuwani*) in the field. By the month of Jeth (May/June), the animals again move to *lekh/dhuris* for grazing. In this way the animals' grazing cycle is completed.

X

Resource management strategies play a vital role in the agrarian hill societies of Nepal. There is a symbiotic relationship between agriculture and natural resources. Unless natural resources are properly managed, the agricultural productivity will be less than optimal.

In spite of the great contribution of natural resources to agricultural economies, natural resources are declining annually throughout the hills of Nepal. No doubt great efforts have been made by the government and other agencies for better resource management through technical developments. But the emphasis on technical aspects alone is not enough for proper resource management, and social measures adopted by village communities should also be equally taken into consideration.

The existing condition of natural resources, as already stated, is not that bad in Tara village. For many years, generations of village people have heavily depended on natural resources for their agricultural economy. They are aware that the agricultural economy of the village is directly or indirectly related to the quality and quantity of natural resource availability. They say, *jabasamma ban tabasamma dhan* ("to the extent that there is forest, there is wealth.") Because of this general awareness, village people have contributed to pasture and forest management by adopting various old established procedures, such as grazing on rotational basis, fencing the major passes of grazing lands, and imposing fines if someone violates the communal rules for grazing. Hence Tara village provides a useful example of local resource management practices.

Although the village panchayat has taken over all responsibilities of village heads (*mukhiyas*), the *mukhiyas* still play a major role in various communal activities in many hill villages of Nepal. Tara village also is no exception. Legally the forest is under the control of the panchayat, but it does not interfere in pasture/forest management and other communal activities. On the day of Shripanchami (one of the Hindu festivals which falls sometime on the last week of January and sometimes on the first week of February), all the heads from each household

gather together in one common place, customarily at the house of the village head, and make various decisions with regard to resource use for that year. On the same day the date of fencing the pasture/forest and opening the forest/pasture is fixed. Traditionally the first of Baisakh is fixed for fencing the forest and the first of Jeth is fixed for opening the fences. The people reported that the forest/pasture areas are such that there are few manageable open passes and if these could be fenced, animals could not enter them from anywhere. Labour for fencing is compulsory for each household, and those who do not contribute, whether because of negligence or because of engagement in other activities, must pay fines, which ranged from one rupee to five rupees in the early days (now usually five rupees). The total of such collected fines is generally spent for communal feasts.

After completing the fence they perform a *puja* (ritual) called *bansorakni*, sacrificing chicken and lambs to please the forest gods and goddesses which otherwise might cause trouble to animals. The participation in this puja is compulsory for each household. They also perform *Gauripuja* and *Bhimsenpuja*, sacrificing chickens to protect livestock from evils in the jungle. After performing pujas the messenger (*katuwal* of the village) declares the opening of fences. Only then do the people start to move towards the *lekh/dhuris* with their domesticated herds.

The number of domesticated animals is not restricted, but the grazing seasons are restricted. The number of grazing animals averages from 8 to 10 per household. The *lekh*/dhuris are not grazed more than three times a year. One *lekh* is grazed for 10 to 15 days. All the *lekh/dhuris* are not opened together; opening and closing is done on a rotational basis. This practice has been helpful for pasture/forest management.

All types of livestock are not grazed together in one particular grazing land. The village people are quite familiar with the habit and nature of each type of domesticated animal, so they graze the animals separately. Buffaloes are slow browsers and less adaptive to difficult environments, so they are grazed in slopes and plain areas under the shadow of trees. Cattle are grazed in steeper areas, whereas sheeps and goats graze in nearby pasture/forest areas. These practices seem quite reasonable and

useful. First, they help to provide fresh pasturage for all types of animals, and second, grazing separately on rotational basis does not result in erosion and deforestation caused by uninterrupted grazing.

The pasture and forest are also used by the people of other neighbouring village panchayats. But they can graze the animals only in limited numbers, and for that they are levied grazing fees called *shafal*. The rate of grazing fees was one rupee per head of livestock in early days, but now the rate is five rupees. It is collected by the herders and spent for *siddhapuja* and sometimes for communal feasts.

Opening and closing the fences is done by herders themselves. They decide when and which *lekh/dhuris* should be opened first. Besides, the herders burn some of the rough pasture/forest patches in winter in order to remove undesirable and unpalatable shrubs and bushes. This practice allows fresh pasturage to grow for the next grazing season. The herders are usually guided by the village head for all these activities. These old established traditional social measures adopted by village communities still function as a social control mechanism for forest/pasture management in Tara village.

XI

Agriculture is the main stay of the village economy in the hills of Nepal. However, it is based, to a greater extent than is realized by many planers and experts, on the quality and quantity of natural resource availability. Agriculture depends on the use of manure, and production of manure depends on the size and types of domestication of animals. In the same way the size and types of domesticated animals are largely determined by availability of pasture/forest resources for feeding. Therefore more attention should be paid to resource management. Village people should be entrusted with resource management, because they themselves are capable of managing their resources through several social practices, which could be adopted in other hill villages. If their traditional social measures are not taken into account, the technical assistance provided by the government for resource management will be futile. In the same way the policy and programmes introduced by the government for resource management will be merely theoretical.

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NATURAL CAUSES AND PROCESSES OF POVERTY IN MICRO SETTINGS

Tulsi Ram Pandey

Introduction, Methodology and Organization

Since the 1950's Nepal has completed six periodic plans and has now begun the seventh plan. During this period Nepal also has undertaken a number of local development programs. Unfortunately, the achievement in both types of programs has been dismal. The periodic plans failed to solve "problems relating to poverty, backwardness, unemployment and low productivity" (NPC, 1981a). In the local level development programms "a majority of people have been deceived in matters of sharing benefits" (Upadhyaya, 1984:137). "Mere mounting catchy slogans and coining of claptrap phrases" have comprised our development experiences (NPC, 1984:10). Forty percent of all households do not have a per capita daily income of even two rupees (NPC, 1983:XIV). Nepal, therefore, is "poor and is becoming poorer" daily (ARTEP, 1974:1).

These conclusions have their basis in macro-level information. Such information, despite providing a national picture of poverty in border terms, is unable to explain the micro variations. In the context to extreme geo-cultural variations, "poverty" in Nepal is a micro phenomenon as well. A solution in such a context is thus possible only through micro planning, which needs micro-level studies. This paper is the product of one such micro-level study carried out in a small Tarai village known as Vishasaya in Nawalparasi district.

Questionnaire survey, interview, and observation were the basic techniques of information collection. The total number of households in the village is 291. Information related to social characteristics such as ethnicity, family size, educational status of family members, sources of income, sectors of expenditure, other survival strategies, migration status, etc., have been

collected through questionnaire survey. Village-based information was gathered through interview and observation. Field study was conducted in June of 1985.

This paper is organized as follows. The second section following this introduction gives a short account of the area studied and its demographic profile. The third section deals with the nature of village poverty. The causes and processes of poverty are dealt with in the fourth section. The fifth section concludes the paper with some recommendations.

II

Study Locale

Golghat is a small Tarai village in western Nepal located at the northwest corner of the Nawalparasi district. It is an agrarian settlement consisting of both land-owning and landless households. A great majority of its population is immigrant. It is surrounded by thin forest at its northern, southern, and western boundaries. A local stream irrigates its farmland for summer paddy cultivation. However, it remains dry from winter to fall. The abundance of forest cover as a food source has encouraged almost all the land-owning households to keep one or more draft animals. Some keep milch buffalo, cows and goats as well. Paddy and wheat are the major crops along with a little cultivation of mustard and lentils.

Before 2028 B.S. (1971) Golghat was a settlement of only ten indigenous households, locally known as Tharus. After this period it experienced an influx of migrants and now has a total of 30 households. Of the original ten, only six remain. The other four indigenous households have been displaced by immigrants and their (the immigrants') purchase of the land. Among the 24 immigrant households, one is a Newar, two are Chhetris, five are Kamis (blacksmiths), and the rest are Brahmans.

Golghat currently has a population of 206, of which 109 of them are males and the remaining 97 are females. Nineteen individuals are below 15 years of age, nine are above 65, and 109 are in between.

III

Nature of Poverty

A. Definition of the Concept

This paper defines poverty in two basic ways: "bare survival" and "productive survival." The "bare survival" definition has been further divided into two different levels in order of severity. The first is "bare economic survival." At this level, household poverty has been determined through a comparison of annual income[2] with annual need of "simple food" and "simple clothing."[3] At the second level annual income is compared also with annual need to meet regular and contingent necessities.[4] The productive survival dimension of poverty has been measured on the basis of household expenditures on medicine and education.

B. Poverty at the Level of Bare Economic Survival

Questionnaire surveys have explored 26 households whose agricultural incomes[5] were insufficient to meet the determined minimum level for (simple) food and clothing. Nine of the 26 households' incomes were insufficient due to landlessness. In the remaining 17 land-owning households, eight have incomes that are above fifty percent of the minimum level. Only three households in the community appeared to have agricultural income sufficient to meet this minimum level of food and clothing.

23 of the 29 households, however, also earn some income from non-agricultural sources. Livestock raising, business, service in Nepal or India, sale of faggots, preparing construction wood on contract, share-cropping, ethnic occupation such as blacksmithing, etc., agricultural labor and interest are the sources of income outside one's own farming in and around the community. For the six other households, agricultural income accounts for their total income. 21 of the 23 households with additional non-agricultural income earn insufficient agricultural income to meet determined food and clothing needs. Five of those without non-agricultural income are also from the same group. Only two households with non-agricultural income have sufficient agricultural income to meet the determined minimum level.

TABLE I

Number of households by their Agricultural and Total Income sufficient or insufficient to meet their Determined Minimum Expenditure Needs based on Bare Economic Survival and Actual Expenditure Needs, on both Bare Economic Survival and Bare Social Survival*.

Sectors of Expenditure \ Types of Income	Agricultural Income**			Total Income **		
	Suff.	Insuff.	Total	Suff.	Insuff.	Total
Determined minimum on Bare Economic Survival Necessities	3	26	29	9	20	29
Actual Expenditure on Bare Economic Survival Necessities	7	22	29	15	14	29
Actual Expenditure on Economic and estimated Social Survival minimum of regular needs.	--	--	--	10	20	29
Actual annual expenditure on Bare Economic Survival needs, estimated Social Survival expenditure of regular needs, and last year's actual expenditure on contingent Social Survival needs	--	--	--	7	22	29

* Here income and expenditure mean annual income and expenditure.

** These are defined in the text.

Non-agricultural income accounts for the total income of all nine landless households. It even accounts for more than 50 percent of the total income of seven households with agricultural income. Despite this sharing of non-agricultural income among 23 households, its contribution to their economic living is not satisfactory. Therefore, the total income of only nine households seems sufficient to meet the determined minimum level of food and clothing.

Actual expenditure patterns are less than the calculated minimum level for survival. None of the households appeared to have spent the minimum level on food and clothing.[6] This difference is less observable on clothing, though the actual pattern of clothing is different. The villagers, chiefly the male and female heads, purchase a set of relatively good cotton clothes (or sometimes synthetic, the product of Hetauda Textile factory) to wear at ceremonies and festivals. Such items cost almost 1.5

times the determined amount, so that they meet their financial deficit through item reduction. Daughters-in-law are provided with only two sets of saris, blouses and a shawl without underskirt, *patuka* and *chura-dori*. They have to meet these needs from what they get from their parents. Similarly children may not be provided with full clothes. Landless households get also some *thanga tharas* (torn cloths) from their neighbors.

Only one of the households includes lentils (pulse) regularly in its daily diet. Only five households have one milch buffalo each to supply milk for infants. (Two sell some of it.) Farm grown vegetables of land-owning households meet their vegetable needs for about four months. For a few days of spring wild trees' sprouts fulfill that need. For the other months, land-owning households and landless households almost always have to take their meals with *rasa* (boiled water seasoned with salt and probably with chilli, spices, and fermented vegetables). This pattern of food consumption is one of the reasons for a reduction in quantity from what has been determined. This difference appears rather pronounced in those meals which are composed of bread.[7] Despite this minimum level of consumption, the agricultural income of only seven households and total income of fifteen households seems sufficient to meet the actual expenditure need on bare economic survival necessities.

C. Poverty at the Level of Bare Social Survival

The villagers also have to spend money on community based worship, religious ceremonies, and festivals, on gifts to married daughters, on appeasing ghosts and sorcerers, and on smoking, oil and spices -- the regular needs which are very basic for their social survival. If the minimum annual expenditure[8] on these needs is added to the bare economic survival expenditure, the total income of only 10 households seems sufficient to meet the actual annual expenditure.

However, the gravity of the need to repair their houses, sheds and pens, to purchase draft animals, etc., cannot be subtracted from their need on bare social survival. Last year 15 of the 29 households had to spend in one sector or another of these expenditures. If these expenditures are included with those

mentioned above, only seven households have income sufficient to meet these necessities.

D. Productive Survival Dimension of Poverty

The information on the bare survival definition of poverty is itself indicative of its nature at the level of productive survival. However, the level of education of the villagers and their medical behavior has been noted in the following:

(i) Poverty and Education

Of the 192 members, 92 (48 percent) are literate, of which 48 (25 percent) are regular students, 29 (15 percent) are dropouts and 15 (8 percent) are literate without schooling. 44 of the 48 regular students, 5 of the 29 dropouts, and 37 of the 100 illiterate are below 15 years of age.

Adult illiteracy may be attributed (among other things) to the unavailability of schools in the adults' locales during their school age. Child illiteracy, parents' support of maximum education of regular students and the causes of dropouts are quite useful in relating education to poverty. 17 of the 37 illiterate children are not of school age, and eleven have not attended even the free primary school. This is for two basic reasons. First, their parent's inability to provide has forced them to remain without clothing. Second, some of the eleven children have to assist their parents in collecting faggots to sell. Nine children have not attended the school because of reasons not specified.

No householders in the village are optimistic enough to encourage their children to pursue higher education. The unavailability of facilities in the area and their inability to support their children appeared to be the two reasons for their pessimism. Although 20 households have children at some level of education, only four have planned to encourage their children to obtain a high school level education. Seven others have just hoped for it, and the remaining nine have planned to make their children only literate. Their reasons are financial or based on labor need.

(ii) Poverty and Medical Behavior

Exorcism is the principle way of medical treatment. Unsuccessful child delivery cases, fracture of limbs and other such illnesses are, however, treated by hospitalization by all the households. The relationship between poverty and medical behavior can be especially seen in the cases of infant mortality and its causes. Twelve of the studied households together have experienced the death of 23 children. Two of them were accidental, nine (of the immigrants before migration) were due to the lack of hospital facilities. The remaining 12 were caused either by the lack of money for medicine or by the lack of money and hospital facilities.

E. Other Survival Strategies and Poverty

The above information shows the villagers' income insufficient not only to lead a productive life but also to meet the basic income and social necessities of survival. Therefore, they have to follow survival strategies such as the assumption of debt, the selling of land, and eating tubers for their bare survival. 12 households in the community are in debt. Two of the landless households are in debt because they had to arrange death ceremonies of family heads. One household is in debt due to the hospitalization of a delivery case. Seven households are in debt to meet the regular requirements of social survival. Of the remaining three, two have invested in the purchase of goats and bullocks and one has also bought goats to meet food and clothing needs.

From 1978 (2035 B.S.) onward, seven households in the community sold some amount of land. Their being in debt -- caused by the death of a family member for one household, death of a bullock for another one, insufficient income to meet food and clothing for four others, and to bribe officials for the remaining one -- was the cause of land sale by all households. Similarly, in the three months from spring to early fall, eight households (all landless) meet their income deficit through the consumption of wild roots and fruits. This does not mean that land-owning households do not assume debt at all; however, it is an option for them. For the landless it is a requirement even though it is less prestigious socially.

IV

Causes and Patterns of Increases of Poverty

At times indebtedness, land sale, etc., may themselves be regarded as causes of poverty. But more importantly, they are just the survival strategies behind which are some other causes. Immigration, insignificant level of non-agricultural sources of income or employment, and population growth are the major causes of poverty among the villagers. The pattern of population growth also affects its pattern.

A. Immigration

The resource base shared by only ten indigenous households before immigration now has to be shared by 30 households. At 2020 B.S. eight of the ten indigenous households had a hold over 26.6 *bigha* (1 *bigha* = 20 *kathas* or 0.67 hectare) of cultivated land. Two households were landless. Of the total land one household alone had owned 10 *bighas*. This land has since been divided among 22 households. One of these 22 households emerged through family separation from one indigenous household and lives in another community, sharing 1.6 *bighas* from the total land. Another one, excluded from interpretation in the above section has only 2 *kathas* of land. The remaining land (24.8 *kathas*) is now shared by 20 households.

The big landowner of 2028 has not lost his previous status, and retains eight *bighas* even today. Five households own less than ten *kathas*, ten own between ten *kathas* and one *bigha*, and the remaining four own up to 2.5 *bighas*. One notable point is that only three indigenous households have any land at present. Five landowners of 2028 B.S. now have no land at all. Four of them have migrated and one lives in the community with other landless families. The cause of this displacement and the small landholding size is migration.

B. Insignificant Level of Employment Opportunities and Sources of Income Outside One's Own Farming.

Raising livestock, business, preparing construction wood on contract, sharecropping, ethnic occupation, agricultural labor,

interest, etc., are the income sources outside the villagers' own farming. 23 households have some income from these sources.

21 of the 30 total households own 33 head of cattle and buffalo. Of those 21, sixteen also own 181 goats. Cattle and buffalo are specifically for traction. Only two households earn a little income through milk sale. Goats, however, have business value for all sixteen households. Last year, eight households sold some goats for income.

No villager can afford a large scale business. One sells tea within the village and another sells liquor in Parasi Bazaar. One member in the community was said to have earned 1800 rupees annually through teaching the local children. No others are employed in any service within Nepal. It is from employment in India that seven households provide a significant proportion of their household budget. However, this is not more than a reflection of local poverty.

Two-fifths of the household income of five landless households results from faggot sales. Similarly, four of them earn some income through the preparation of construction wood. Since public forests are the sources of faggot and timber these are risky occupations for the villagers. They always have to be alert in order to escape notice of the eyes of forest guards. For the nation it is one of the processes of deforestation.

The overall size of landholding is indicative of the low prospect of share-cropping in the community. Three households have taken land on lease, but all under one *bigha*. Jobs to prepare farms for rice cultivation, to transplant the paddy and its weeding, to harvest the paddy and to prepare farm fields for mustard and wheat cultivation are the most hopeful areas of employment for most of the households. Twelve households (eight landless) have some engagement in these activities, but because of the seasonal nature of these activities, year-round involvement is not possible.

The traditional occupation of the blacksmith households in the study area is confined now to the repair of agricultural tools. Because of zero sales of metal ware, two of such households have closed their anvil completely. Even in the three

remaining households, none have earned more than 150 rupees annually through this business. The only carpenter and mason in the community reports to have an occasional engagement making plows and cots for neighbors or for the community school. He cannot get regular employment in these activities around the area.

As far as interest is concerned, two of the landless households have 9,000 rupees and 1,200 rupees, respectively, in bank deposits. For both these households this money was surplus from the land which they had to sell for debt payment. Only one member of the community is an industrial laborer. There are no other sources of income to the villagers.

C. Population Growth and Patterns of Increase of Poverty

The increase of households in the community is indicative itself of the incidence of population growth and its effect on poverty. To trace the pattern of the increases of poverty through population growth, however, the number of heirs to property must be noted. It has been reported that there were 63 heirs to share the property of the fathers of these 29 households. Now there are already 56 heirs in the new generation to share their own property. Most of their parents are still having children. This pattern of property division at a stagnant level of the rural economy is no more than an indication of an acceleration of rural poverty.

V

Conclusion and Recommendations

The villagers have to meet their bare survival necessities either through debt or the sale of their landed property. Massive immigration into the community, non-availability of productive employment, and population growth have been the major causes of such a poor economic condition. To alleviate this condition the following recommendations can be put forward:

(a) Further immigration should be controlled. This is, however, a problem on the national level. Most of the Tarai villages might have the same experience. To this extent the problem of immigration in Tarai villages can be resolved only though the improvement of the economy of the hill region.

But under the feudal agrarian structure with its philosophy of class co-ordination, the improvement of the rural economy is in itself a question.

(b) Related to the first problem is the growth of population: control of population growth is not possible merely through the distribution of contraceptives. It requires an increase in the level of education and the provision of economic security in old age.

(c) To the extent that the solution of the problem of poverty can be alleviated from within the community has a high prospect of income from livestock raising. Therefore the establishment of animal health facilities together with productive loan programs, even to the landless, may help to augment the villagers' income at the cost of public forest. A perennial irrigation facility may increase the productivity of the land of the landowning households.

NOTES

1. There are, in fact, 30 households in the village. In the process of data collection, information from one household concerning economic variables appeared not to be reliable. Therefore it is excluded from interpretation in the text.
2. This income includes that from one's own farming, share-cropping, livestock raising, business, caste occupation (blacksmithing), service in Nepal or India, wage labor, carpentry and masonry, load carrying, sales of faggots, and preparing construction wood on contract and interest. This is the total annual income of the households.
3. The operational definition of simple food and simple clothing in this paper is presented in the Appendix. On the basis of this definition, the annual need of each household has been computed. But children below weaning age, and other members outside the home with their own income for survival, have been excluded in this computation.
4. Here regular expenditure needs include expenditures on public or private worship, including gifts to married daughters, shamans and ghosts, kerosene; smoking; and additional expenditures on festivals. Similarly, contingent expenditure needs include those of the performance of marriage and death ceremonies, of the construction and repair of houses, sheds and pens, and of the purchase of bullock or buffalo at the death of the existing one.
5. This income includes only that from one's own farming.
6. Annual need of actual expenditure on food for households is computed from what they need for one particular meal. These expenditures are then converted into monetary value on the basis of their local price. Two meals a day are taken into account. Also, the monthly expenditure on oil and seasonal expenditures on vegetables are included. Since the use of lentils (pulse) for all the households except one is insignificant, these figures exclude the price of lentils for all the other households. Similarly, because of the irregularity in the use of vegetables and because of no exactness of the price of vegetables grown in their own farm, the price of farm grown vegetables has also been excluded. Actual expenditures on clothing are determined from what has been spent for the last year (from one Tij to another Tij).
7. Dried bread made of wheat. This bread is mostly taken without lentils or vegetables.
8. No households have kept actual records of expenditures on these matters. Therefore the villagers' estimated minimum expenditures need has been taken into account.

APPENDIX

Simple Meal

For operational purposes, 500 grams of Thapachini (Mota) rice and 50 grams of Masur lentils (pulse) for a hard-working adult and 250 grams of rice and 50 grams of lentils for a child (below 15 years) is regarded as a simple meal in this study. Since 500 grams of such rice costs 2.25 rupees and 50 grams of such lentils costs 0.40 rupees in the local market a simple meal costs 2.90 rupees for an adult male and 1.52 rupees for a child. In addition 2 kgs. of salt per household per month has been included.

Simple Clothing

Keeping in consideration that people of that area have to work in rain as well as in scorching heat, a yearly allowance of various items of clothing and their local price on the basis of culturally allowed but lower quality materials (for examples no villagers wear the kora cloths except at mourning) for adult male, adult female, and male and female child is determined in the following table:

APPENDIX

Clothes Items required and their price

	Items	Numbers required	Price/Piece (low quality material)
for female adult	blouse	2	15 (includes finishing)
	Cholo (for winter)	1	25 (includes finishing)
	sari	3	40 (Indian)
	patuka (waist band)	1	42 (kora)
	shawl	1	25
	bangle, dori	-	14
TOTAL FOR ADULT FEMALE/YEAR			Rs. 257

for adult male	Shirt	3	25 (includes finishing)
	kachad	3	15
	cap	1	5
	underwear	4	9 (includes finishing)
TOTAL FOR ADULT MALE/YEAR			Rs. 161

for female child	frock	2	30 (includes finishing)
TOTAL FOR FEMALE CHILD/YEAR			Rs. 60

for male child	shirt	2	18 (includes finishing)
	shorts	2	15 (includes finishing)
TOTAL FOR MALE CHILD/YEAR			Rs. 66

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FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH OCCUPATIONAL SOCIALIZATION IN RURAL NEPAL

Kiran Dutta Upadhyay

A country's future development is shouldered by the youth, especially in Nepal, where the majority of the populace is young and lives in rural areas. However, rural youth are not being provided with the opportunity to realize their potential. Youth is a transitional period in the personality development process and bridges the stages of childhood and adulthood; it is the period when individuals shape their future careers. Because 1985 was declared "International Youth Year", Nepal should examine the plight of its rural youth, their occupational aspirations and expectations.

First and foremost, this paper aims to operationalize the term occupational socialization. In this study, occupational socialization embraces both occupational aspirations and expectations. Socialization is the process by which the individual learns to conform to the norms of his social group, acquires a status, plays a corresponding role, and emerges with a personality.

Occupational aspiration pertains to the kind or type of work the youth wants to have, whereas occupational expectation refers to the kind or type of work the youth expects to have in regards to economic resources and other opportunities. Occupational aspiration and expectation were categorized as "blue-collar job" or "white-collar job" based on the nature of the work. The youth who hoped for skilled jobs, professional work, labour on and off the farm were categorized under "blue-collar job." Those who would desire and expect official jobs were categorised under "white-collar job."

In Nepalese society, the occupation of the parents has a great influence on the children. The parents' influence on children was also observed in the developed society. In the regard, Nelson (1960:313) opined that American children whose parents

were teachers, journalists and physicians tended to select their fathers' occupations. This indicates that educated parents had a strong influence over the occupational direction of their children.

In the occupational socialization process, education plays a vital role since it may serve as a passport for an individual to move towards the upper stratum of social stratification. If an individual is able to acquire more education, there is a greater probability that he will be able to obtain a white collar job. But the majority of Nepali rural youths lack education and as a result they are compelled to remain in "blue-collar jobs." This may be due to the poor economic condition of their parents.

In this regard, Cabriles' study (1978:43) showed that in the Philippines a financial problem was the major reason for dropping out of school. Other factors, listed in order of frequency, were lack of interest, poor health, changing residences and getting married.

Gasson (1968:317-326) has stressed that there is a strong tendency for the sons of farmers to work in jobs related to agriculture. The following paragraph tries to analyze the proportion of the youth on the basis of two population censuses, 1971 and 1981 respectively.

Table 1 presents Nepal's population by 5 year age groups. From Table 1, it may be inferred that the majority of the population is in the age group under 24 years. This study is concerned only with the responses from people whose age ranged from 10 to 25 years. In other words, the presentation is concerned only with the age categories 10-14 years, 15-19 years and 20-24 years. According to the 1971 census, these groups constitute 11.2, 9.1 and 8.4 per cent, respectively, of the total population of Nepal, which comes to 28.7 per cent. Similarly, according to the 1981 census these groups constitute 11.4, 8.8 and 8.9 per cent respectively, which comes to 29.1 percent. In both cases, the youths occupy more than one-forth of the total population of the country, and the number in these groups has increased. An individual's career begins sometime during this period. Hence, a wise look in these age groups is crucial for policy makers. If these youths do not get adequate opportunities to become better educated and better skilled, they remain unproductive, unemployed, or under-employed, and forced to remain only in blue-collar jobs.

Table - 1: Population of Nepal by Age Group According to Population Census of 1971 and 1981

Age Group	Census of 1971		Census of 1981	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Under 5 years	1,634,110	14.1	2,314,505	15.4
5-9 years	1,743,253	15.1	2,190,446	14.6
10-14 years	1,297,215	11.2	1,707,021	11.4
15-19 years	1,047,459	9.1	1,328,401	8.8
20-24 years	969,675	8.4	1,335,098	8.9
25-29 years	930,287	8.1	1,161,670	7.7
30-34 years	811,401	7.0	975,401	6.5
35-39 years	744,788	6.4	884,572	5.9
40-44 years	609,461	5.3	752,788	5.0
45-49 years	461,098	4.0	618,805	4.1
50-54 years	400,834	3.5	531,322	3.6
55-59 years	257,699	2.2	365,749	2.4
60-64 years	294,230	2.5	367,495	2.5
65-69 years	354,473*	3.1	188,583	1.3
70-74 years	–	–	156,786	1.0
75-79 years	–	–	66,393	0.4
80-84 years	–	–	50,231	0.3
85 years and above	–	–	27,573	0.2
Total	11,555,983	100.0	15,022,839	100.0

*65 years and above

Ginzberg perceived a person's development process in three stages, namely: (a) fantasy choice, the latency period (six to eleven); (b) tentative choice, adolescence; and (c) realistic choice, late teens to early twenties. Super (Ohlson 1964:337) reinforced Ginzberg's point when he said that the "maturation of an individual's abilities, interest and aptitude, his opportunity for testing, and his self-concept influence his career development." It is the nation's responsibility to provide youth opportunities to make them productive citizens.

The rural areas have in-school, out-of-school and no-schooling youths who experience different degrees of the socialization process guiding them in their development. They look at themselves in different ways. It is a fact that rural youths of developing countries are reminded daily that the best road

leads to town. They consider imported commodities to be symbols of high status. The emergence and enthusiasm of this vast potential youth population, if employed in profitable ways, can make Nepal much more prosperous than it now is. Considering these basic truths, it has become a challenging job for planners and policy makers to channel the energy of these rural youths for the country's future development. Keeping this view in mind, this study aims to examine the occupational socialization process of rural youths.

Place and Population of the Study

This study was conducted in Rautahat District of Nepal, which lies on the South-Central belt of the country in the Central Development Region in Narayani Zone. There were 52 village panchayats in the district with approximately 57,300 farm households. Only nine panchayats had high schools, and of those, three were randomly selected: Santapur, Pipra Bhalohiya and Potihahi Dharahari. From the three different sample village panchayats, a proportionate sample of 122 youths (10 per cent) was drawn randomly.

Hypothesis of the Study

The null hypothesis was that the youth's preference for an occupation is not associated with their demographic-socio-economic characteristics or with their family background.

Method of Analysis

The data was classified and analyzed in terms of their statistical meaning and significance taking into consideration the objective. The Chi-square test(X2) was computed. The hypothesis was accepted or rejected at 0.05 level of significance, presented in Table 2.

Presentation

The chi-square independence revealed that marital status of youths was significantly related to occupational socialization. It showed that the majority of those who were married, as

compared to those who were single, aspired for and expected blue-collar jobs. It is safe to presume that the single youths, having less responsibilities in the family, had more possibility of achieving higher education and that they have more mobility than the married youths, and thus they had more knowledge about jobs. These may be some of the reasons why they could aspire to and expect to get more white-collar jobs. Married youths had greater responsibilities to their families and remain engaged in either farming or labour in the village.

The position of siblings in a family was found highly associated with the youth's occupational socialization. The majority of the eldest did not aspire for white-collar jobs as compared to their middle and younger relatives.

The chi-square test revealed that caste of the youth was highly related to occupational aspiration and expectation (Occupational socialization). It is safe to presume that the youths who belonged to the higher castes had greater exposure to alternative occupations, and therefore aspired for white-collar jobs.

Statistically, those who had at least middle and high school education aspired for white-collar jobs. Here the relationship was direct and positive. The youths who had high and middle school educations could expect white-collar jobs because of their exposure to education and employment opportunities.

The chi-square results also revealed that the tenure status and size of farm land of parents significantly affected occupational socialization. Children of owner-cultivators with large land holdings could expect white-collar jobs more than youths whose parents were tenants and had small land holdings. It was obvious that land-owning parents wished to give their children as much education as they could afford. This was made possible because of an adequate annual income. As a result of the better educational possibilities, their children could aspire for white-collar jobs.

Table 2

Socialization (i.e., Occupational Aspiration and Expectation) of Rural Youths Relationship Between the Independent Variables and Occupational

Independent Variables	D F for both Cases	X^2 Values on Aspiration	Level of significance on Aspiration	X^2 Values on Expectation	Level of significance on Expectation
Demographic/ Socio-Economic Factors					
Age	1	0.90	ns	1.17	ns
Sex	1	1.65	ns	1.67	ns
Marital Status	1	4.93	*	8.77	**
Sibling Position	2	28.85	**	19.28	**
Religion	1	1.25	ns	0.09	ns
Caste	4	28.03	**	30.94	**
Level of Schooling	3	50.34	**	41.36	**
Tenure Status of Parents	2	46.60	**	59.91	**
Size of Parents' Farming land	2	35.40	**	22.75	**
Income of Parents	2	40.21	**	34.99	**
Family Backgrounds					
Level of Schooling of Father	3	43.43	**	45.65	**
Level of Schooling of Mother	2	41.68	**	22.07	**
Occupation of Father	3	29.53	**	18.46	**
Occupation of Mother	2	13.40	**	3.21	ns
Number of Children	2	11.68	**	9.76	**
Parents' Influence on Educational Aspiration for the Children	1	15.19	**	17.39	**
Parents' Influence on Educational Expectation for the Children	1	40.65	**	29.95	**
Parents' Influence on Occupational Aspiration for the Children	1	10.94	**	12.99	**
Parents influence on Occupational Expectation for the Children	1	48.34	**	51.96	**

* Significant ** Highly Significant ns = Not Significant

Income of parents was considered one of the major factors. This factor was highly associated with occupational socialization. This relationship was found to be direct and positive. It is safe to predict that parents' income was sufficient to support their families and to educate their children.

From this high income group a few did not aspire for white-collar jobs, which may be due to their academic weaknesses, easy way of life, bad companionship, etc. The middle and low income groups have suffered from a depressed economy and with the problem of food threshold. Almost all the children of the low-income group aspired for blue-collar jobs. This finding resembles the findings of Strauss (1964:257-266) that children from low-income families differ in their occupational choice from those who come from families with high income.

In the case of level of schooling of parents it was found that the parents' educational status was highly significant to the youth's occupational socialization. Children from middle and high school educated parents tended to aspire for white-collar jobs, whereas children of literate and semi-literate parents could expect blue-collar jobs.

From this finding, it is inferred that education is closely related with occupational socialization. Children from educated parents have exposure to more occupational choices.

In the same manner, the chi-square test revealed that occupations of parents were highly associated with the youths' occupational aspiration. However, in the case of occupational expectation, only the father's occupation was found highly associated. Among parents who were full-time farmers, the majority of their children aspired for blue-collar jobs as well as white-collar jobs.

From the findings, it is safe to presume that the children of farmers who were given higher education expected white-collar jobs. Another reason may be that the children did not like to engage in farming due to the hard manual work it demanded. As far as the question of Nepalese rural women's occupation is concerned, women from the well-to-do families do not work outside because of their social status and also because it is not

crucial for them. Besides, rural employment opportunities (except house chores and labour work) are not available for Nepalese women, and these are neither suitable nor crucial for them. This may be one of the reasons why their children aspire for blue-collar jobs. This may also explain why the mother's occupation was not related to youth's occupational socialization.

The number of children in the family was found highly associated with the youth's occupational socialization (both aspiration and expectation). Youths from small families could aspire for white-collar jobs as contrasted with children from medium and large families. The rationale behind this positive and direct finding may be the accessibility of education for children coming from small families. For their parents it may be manageable to provide better education to their children from their limited economic resources, and thus increase chances for their children getting white-collar jobs.

Parents' influence on the educational aspiration and expectation of their children was found to be one of the very important variables for influencing their children to aspire as well as expect white-collar jobs. In other words, statistically these two variables were found highly significant to the youths' occupational socialization. This relationship was direct and positive.

Parents who could encourage their children to pursue education motivated their children to aspire for and expect white-collar jobs. It is inferred that their parents were in a better position to understand the importance and role of education for obtaining white-collar jobs. Another reason might be that the parents who were in a position to afford their youth's education influenced their children to pursue higher education. They knew the prestige of those people who were in white-collar jobs because of their education.

In the same line, another factor -- the parents' influence on occupational aspiration and expectation for their youth -- was also found highly significant to the youth's occupational socialization. It was found that for those parents who influenced their children for blue-collar jobs, the majority of children likewise aspired for and expected blue-collar jobs. Similarly, if

the parents could influence their children for white-collar jobs, the children could aspire for and expect white-collar jobs.

The rationale behind such behavior is obvious. Because the parents were in a blue-collar job, their children were exposed to such work, and similarly with the children whose parents were in a white-collar job. This confirms the findings of Melecio (1976) that there exists a strong relationship between the youths' perceiving the parents' occupational aspirations for them and their occupational choices.

The youth's occupational socialization processes (aspirations and expectations) were influenced by almost all the independent variables which have been taken into consideration in this study except their age, sex, religion, and occupation of the mother. The above findings reject the null hypothesis that the occupational socialization of the rural youths were not associated with their demographic-socio-economic factors and family backgrounds. Hence, there is a crucial need to prepare a constructive plan to provide opportunities of socio-educational services which could tap the potentialities of youths, a great majority of whom are in rural areas. Of course, it is a challenging job for policy-makers, planners and other authorities in this field.

Policy Recommendations: Before implementing any rural youth programme, certain points need to be considered and determined: what needs to be done, where to begin, and how to divide responsibilities. The new programme must begin on a small scale and expand with an increase in trained personnel. What people at the local level want may be entirely different from what national policy-makers think they need. The *felt needs* of rural youths can be the most important consideration and the best starting point in determining the direction and content of a rural youth programme. Programmes based on village needs will create cooperation and enthusiasm with villagers in working for their upliftment.

It is crucial to tap the youths' potentialities by providing them with education and other opportunities, so that they may be in a position to change their socio-educational and economic environment. It is a fact that education serves as a passport for

ascending to a higher stratum and for the social mobility of an individual.

In the Nepalese context, the majority of rural youths are either non-schooling or out-of-schooling. Because they are of school-going age, efforts should be made to get them back to school; and if that is not possible, then it is crucial to devise special vocational programmes for them. In this regard, it will be good to impart skills for employment and income generating activities such as woodworking, masonry, plumbing, and other farm related training. The development of the country is possible only when the youth's developed skills can be utilized.

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DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT: A PRELIMINARY SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE[1]

Chaitanya Mishra

Introduction

The notion of development, despite its universal currency and exhortatory potential, in some ways reminds one of the story of the elephant and the six blind men. "Development" is somehow holy, uplifting and attractive. It is, however, also mysterious. The object is subjectively perceived and the totality of subjectivities does not add up to an objective description and/or assessment. Instead the totality becomes more and more grotesque, unfamiliar and abstract. A goal which is itself mysterious, in turn, inspires a mode of practice which is essentially misleading.

On the other hand, a valid conceptualization of the "developmental problem," would enable us to a) shed the mystery embedded in the notions of development and underdevelopment; b) assess current developmental practice more objectively; and c) sift alternative potential bases for development. Put another way, a valid conceptualization of the "developmental problem" would help us enumerate and analyze constraints against and options for what might be an adequate design for future development.

It is one of the more general central arguments of this paper that a valid conceptualization of the "development problem" can be approximated by analyzing a set of three structural processes: those related to the capitalistic world-system -- the capitalistic world-economy in particular, the internal class relationships within a given sub-world economy, and the form of utilization of political-economic resource. It should be emphasized that these parameters are distinct only analytically; these are parts of a historical process, united within a historical whole. These parameters can be made more specific and their mutual relationships unraveled only as part of an effort geared at

a reconstruction of history. Time, in this sense, is the fourth "process" we need to explicitly consider.

What do we mean when we say that we are underdeveloped? Is the underdevelopment we talk about a characteristic feature of families, communities, regions, classes, the state organization or of the nation-state as a whole? What is the genesis and later history of this underdevelopment? Has underdevelopment been a perennial and constant feature of our national history? Are we experiencing a further development of underdevelopment or are we in a steady state, a "low-equilibrium trap"? What roles have the international economic ensembles played in our developmental history? What has been the role of the various classes of our society in our developmental history? What kind of development have we been talking about in any case? Where do the developmental politics and programmes the state has been laying out in the past fit in this context? Finally, where do we go from here?

Clearly, this is a very tall order and it sounds arrogant to seek sketchy and preliminary answers to these questions. But I audaciously ask these questions because they are fundamental ones which cannot be left unanswered. The majority of us spend most of our time bogged down in details of programme and project administration, text book teaching, small-scale empirical, "disciplinary," or sectoral research and the like, with little time out to consider larger issues. Journalists and ideologues as groups are exceptions -- they have done a much better job of it.

I would like to begin by providing a brief answer to the first question raised above. Underdevelopment in Nepal (as in many other third would economies) should be seen as a process which may be characterized by a) increasing incorporation within the capitalist world-and regional-system in terms of labour, commodities and capital/finance; b) increasing loss of capacity to reproduce indigenous means of subsistence-production, combined with a diminishing or very low capacity to carry out expanded reproduction; c) emergence and growth of the comprador bourgeoisie (whose interests are closely tied with world and regional capitalism) and the state class which contains nationalist components but which cannot lead a national

transformation because of its strong political alliance with the feudal and other traditional -- i.e., precapitalist -- structures and its fast-growing economic and financial ties with the comprador bourgeoisie; d) considerable to serious problems of familial, community-based, regional and national integration arising out of peripheralization and marginalization on the one hand and on the other, the successful resistance kept up by the state, the feudal elements and the comprador bourgeoisie to mass-based political-developmental forms. As noted earlier, we must go back to history to sketch the manifestations of these processes.

The Processes of Capitalism

Before we go back to our history it may be necessary to provide a brief note on the essence of the capitalist world-process. Founded on the ruins of European feudalism, capitalism is a relatively recent human experience; it is less than 350 years old. It has undergone changes during its lifespan; the phases it has gone through in historical sequence are roughly labeled "mercantile," "competitive," and "monopolistic." These phases are marked by important variations, but the commonality is of far greater significance for the present discussion. Capitalism is a political-economic system which thrives on the creation of commodities and on incessant *expanded accumulation.* The essence of the capitalist process is disarmingly simple: the creation of commodities leads to the generation of profit, a part of which is reinvested to produce further commodities and so on. The cycle is repeated and expanded over and over again until a given market is near-saturated.

This was how capitalism began its tenure in certain European towns and cities. The capitalistic production system, however, was so efficient that it overran or dominated all other production systems -- and together with it, local and national institutions -- almost over all of Europe in the next half-century. The successes of the system, in course of a relatively short span of time, produced its own problem -- the saturation of the market.

The resulting demand and supply bottlenecks were then overcome with trans-continental leaps. The era that we know as colonial thus began to take shape. (To be sure, long distance trade and "rich man's trade" in which traders traversed great

distances to procure unusual and therefore high priced items -- as well as more mundane commodities, i.e. salt -- has a history much older than capitalism. But these are instances of primitive accumulation and conspicuous consumption. These exchanges -- primarily barter exchanges -- did not lead to expanded accumulation.) The capitalist economic system thus encroached upon and incorporated lesser cities, towns and villages and families, communities, ethnic groups, tribes and natives in the colonies. Inevitably, many groups were pushed out: various pre-capitalist production systems and social and political institutions based upon such systems of production, less efficient producers (in terms of the rate and expansion of the creation of exchange and surplus values), communities, institutions, class and status groups, and entire states. Social institutions like family, marriage, education, work/employment, along with socio-biological processes (e.g., birth and death) were transformed or modified and adapted to the exigencies of the capitalist frame. However, the capitalist system not only pushed out, transformed, or modified traditional, i.e., precapitalist, institutions, but also created the three major institutions of our everyday life at the present: 1) the core capitalist (developed), semiperipheral and peripheral (underdeveloped) world areas, 2) the class-based nature of the society, and 3) the global interstate system.

The characteristic features of underdevelopment outlined earlier are endemic, to a greater or lesser degree, to all world peripheral formations and constitute a unique and inevitable creation of the capitalist world-economy. Thus, the peripheral formations are entirely normal outgrowths of the inner law of capitalist development -- that of expanded accumulation -- at the world scale. The creation of what came to be known as the third world is really what Lenin meant when he spoke of the widening of the capitalist economy. The continual development of capitalism is contingent on the creation of such peripheries -- it could not prosper without it. This is simply because of the fact that bereft of the continuous creation of peripheries -- which can provide cheaper natural resources and labour power as well as capital/finance and form outlets for the commodities produced -- the rate of accumulation of profit, the engine of the capitalist mode of production, would tend to fall. In the case the capitalist

political economic formation would lose its vitality and crumble rather quickly. If, by now, the fourth- and fifth-worlds have come into existence, these are evidences of the continuing viability of the core as well as semiperipheral and peripheral capitalist formations to widen and deepen (Lenin, once again) the peripheralization of the "primitive," i.e., precapitalist, economies in and around them.

The capitalist encroachment is essentially "economic" -- accumulation is of paramount importance. But to the extent that political and military controls are necessary to ensure unhindered accumulation, such are sought to be established, as in the cases of the multitude of Asian, African and South American colonies. Such controls are established not only in the colonies proper but also in the immediately outlying regions which would, in any case, be under current economic penetration -- for greater accumulative security. The outlying regions, in general, are formed out of relatively weak, small and pliable neighbors who may, depending upon the geostrategic context, be out in the position of a buffer against other capitalist or otherwise powerful precapitalist formations, e.g., feudal empires. While colonialism proper is dead -- not in small measure due to the rise of nationalism in the colonies but also because the political and economic costs associated with the colonies were too high and also because there were softer options -- monopoly capitalism keeps the essence of the capitalist process alive through a variety of means. Thus the whole series of the present-day Asian (and many other) marginal peripheral formation were shaped and reshaped in many ways: hegemony -- nuclear and conventional military-political terrors, military organizations and treaties, invasions, military assistance, anti-"terrorist" offensives, delineation of encompassing security frontiers and spheres of influence, security council resolutions and vetoes etc.; neocolonialism -- trade, monopolies, market extension, aid, loan, capital/financial and debt arrangements, etc.; and finally, the creation of comprador alliances. Thus the shaping and reshaping of the interstate system and the development of underdevelopment in peripheral formations in general and the periphery at the margins in particular, e.g., Laos, Cambodia, Bhutan, Sikkim (?), Sri Lanka, Tibet (?), Nepal, Afghanistan (?).

Indeed, the shaping and reshaping of such states has been a global routine in the last 350 years. It is no coincidence either that capitalism is just about that age.

The Onset of Underdevelopment

It is difficult to locate the onset of underdevelopment in Nepal precisely. A number of "guideposts," however, lead me to locate its beginning during the middle of the 1880s. As most other historical markers, this is only an approximation. If the marker makes sense, we have lived through exactly one century -- five generations -- of this long, drawn-out crisis. To many, and because of the long time-frame envisaged, this will look like a prelude to a too dilute version of the stage of underdevelopment in which we currently find ourselves. To some, it may also look like an effort geared, if innocently, to defuse the seriousness of the present situation. Apart from underscoring our general tendency to experience time in a manner in which the present always looms larger than the past (attributable to a mystification of history which then hides or altogether severs the "living" from the "dead"), I will try to bridge the gap between the "two views" by means of the following arguments: There is little doubt that under-development has developed further in recent years. I would put the cutoff date for "recent years" at 1949-1950. Within the last 35 years, further movements definitely indicate an intensification of underdevelopment. Hence the urgency: a sense of the immediacy of underdevelopment; a "need" to telescope the "developmental problem." I think it is, nonetheless, historically more valid to look at current underdevelopment as part of a larger history of peripheralization. One should be able to see an intensification of an overall trend without denying a past for it. Underdevelopment in Nepal, therefore, has a long history whose roots lie in the continuous, if uneven, process of peripheralization. If it was the world capitalist power, the British Empire, under whose auspices peripheralization and underdevelopment marched ahead before 1947, the Indian dominant alliance has been the immediate motive force in this process in the more recent past as well as at present. The Nepali state alliance, composed of the state class, i.e., the proponents of the various formal political-organizational systems we have created and lived under, the town-based "middle class," the

feudal landed interests and the comprador bourgeoisie which, as we shall see, are largely offshoots of this process of peripheralization, is the main link through which this process is sustained and underdevelopment reproduced.

The Past and the Present: ca. 1700-1884

Let us consider our history ca. 1700-1884: the period of the creation of "Modern Nepal" and the period immediately preceding it, which from now on we shall refer to as "pre-peripheralized Nepal." As in all precapitalist economies the world over, there were immense variations in political-economic forms here. The precapitalist world is a world of seclusion, variation, and the stuff of romantic uniqueness: precapitalist economies are not based on expansion and ever-encompassing levels of integration. At the very least, four economic zones could be discerned; the Himalayan region, the eastern and central hills, the western hills and the Tarai. The four zones differed substantially not only with respect to primary production but also with respect to the resource base, the nature of landholding rights, organization of labour, fiscal system, degree of monetization, expansiveness of the market, class differentiation, relations of production, and so on. Towns located along the relatively densely populated Mahabharat range, and the more sparsely populated northern and southern borders, added to the variation.

At this point, however, it is necessary to establish a "modal" picture, even at the expense of some precision. The precapitalist economies within the early pre-peripheralized Nepal may be said to be variations on tribute-paying-cum-feudal modes of production. Two further points, nonetheless, have to be kept in mind while reading the pre-peripheral history. First, we do not have a clean survey of the political-economy of the Nepali state for the period. Therefore, we shall have to reconstruct one from patchy and selective information available. Second, it should also be remembered that the political-economic system during the pre-peripheral period was itself dynamic due, mainly, to four influences; the changing fortunes of the Nepal-Tibet trade: the decline of the Moghul empire and the rise of the lesser feudatories; the upheavals and reorganizations immediately

preceding and following the forging of the Nepali state; and, most importantly, the rise of the East India Company.

The predominant productive activity was agriculture, including a fair spread of slash-and-burn agriculture both in the hills and the Tarai. The Himalayan region, the 24 Nepal-Tibet trade route areas in particular, the Kathmandu Valley and a few other small areas had been thriving on entrepot, or long-distance trade, for over one millenium -- an almost universal economic mode in a region lying between two different geographical/civilizational areas. The Kathmandu Valley had been enjoying a highly developed agrarian-artisan-trading culture at least from the seventh century onwards. There were few other urban areas, however, and non-sex/non-age division of labour was rudimentary. The *jajmani* system, so entrenched in the plains of India, had a rather weak base in the hills. During the beginning of the 19th century, approximately four-fifths of the total state revenue was comprised of land revenues. Of the total state revenue of Rs. (I.C.) 1.7 million in 1853, 68 percent had accrued from land revenues. Fines, customs duties and sale of *sakhuwa* (sal) timber contributed only small amounts to the state funds. Much was spent on the upkeep of the military. Non-state resources -- i.e., community, family -- played a predominant part not only in public construction projects but also in the military effort: by way of procuring provisions, and construction of trails, culverts and bridges. In part because war preparations diverted a large amount of resources, the state as well as the rulers were almost always short of men and materials, and occasionally borrowed cash from private citizens, often traders. The early state allowance practiced *swadeshi* not merely because of Prithvi Narayan Shah's injunctions against luxuries and imports, but also because a) the community and household political-economic structure was not geared to the creation of large surpluses for the use of the state alliance, b) the mercantilism of the East India Company had acquired neither the economic nor the political edge to enforce itself on the Nepali state, and c) artisans and traders formed an important component of the Nepali state alliance.

The unification and the incipient penetration of mercantile capitalism produced a number of very important consequences for the Nepali society and state. It took a long time (more than

one-hundred years) to unfold. Furthermore, the changes were much more extensive during the last half-century than during the preceding years. The first consequence of unification was to speed up the process the disintegration of the communal political-economic formations, particularly in the central and eastern hills and the enhancement of a tributary mode. Under the pre-existing communal mode, land could not be bought, sold, mortgaged, kept idle or sub-tenanted; it was a community property to be used by house-holds of that community. The much-repeated "self sufficiency of the hills" was essentially anchored in this supremacy of the community over local households, and over other communities and the state. This strength manifested itself in the strength of village-level self-help groups, a highly integrated -- although rudimentary except in the Tarai -- division of labor, conservation, i.e., optimum use combined with reproduction and development of resources, and community leadership. The usurpation by the state of the right to productive assets -- primarily land but also forests and, in some cases, irrigation water -- combined with the separation of the households (and individuals) from the community, apart from weakening the community strengths mentioned above, also led to the creation of rich and poor households. In the relatively cushionless setting of the hill/mountain, the usurpation effectively signaled and strengthening of the forces of marginalization and immiserization there. This was also the beginning of "overpopulation" and ecological deterioration as also of emigration. To put it differently, the central and eastern hills were following the western hills and some of the Himalayan regions where land was privatized and had entered the domain of the market at the latest by the middle of the 18th century. Privatization of land received a major push during the 1854-1868 period when revenue settlements were revised throughout the kingdom and fresh records of individual rights in land were compiled.

If the process of the disintegration of the communal mode and the corresponding strengthening of the tributary mode was hastened in the central and the eastern hills after unification, a very different mode was being born in the Tarai. This was the feudal mode, and constituted the second consequence of unification. The feudal mode gained ascendancy side by side with

the annexation of the Tarai areas. Extensive tracts of forest and agriculture land came under the personal ownership of members of ruling house, high state -- including military -- officials, ecclesiastes, local functionaries as well as local "big men." Most of the feudally-organized holdings were also held under the rent-free *birta* tenure. Exploited largely with the labour of migrants from the adjoining Indian plains who had been pauperized in their native regions through the Company's policies on cropping, marketing and industrial establishments and land tenure -- including the infamous Permanent Settlement of 1795 -- the Tarai resources increased the national production many fold. No less significant, however, was the fact that the agrarian structure there was feudally organized.

The feudal organization of the ownership of resources had three highly significant consequences. First, it increased the power of the state by a) enriching the rulers and putting much greater resources at the disposal of the state, b) firmly incorporating the local feudal lords within the state alliance heretofore made up of the ruling houses and the bureaucratic-military complex, c) enabling it to extend its political administrative arms across the territory.

Second, it worked effectively against the political-economic integration of the hill/mountain region on the one hand and the Tarai on the other. It was this bifurcation in the social organization of production (that is, the operation of the communal-tributary mode in the mountain/hill versus the feudal mode in the Tarai) more than any other factor which produced a largely regionally divided nation. The self-sufficiency of the hills, the defense-related rules which hindered easy travel/ transportation (including passport requirement and restrictive regulations on the use of trails) and the malarial climate of the Tarai -- the three most frequently mentioned reasons for the lack of hill/mountain and Tarai integration -- merely fulfilled the subsidiary conditions. The feudal organization of the ownership of the resources in the Tarai also led to the development of an outward bound ("extroverted") economy which became integrated *not* at the national level, but beyond it -- the produce of the Tarai land and the hill labour power showed a tendency to be integrated within the British Indian and not the Nepali political-

economic space. The hill labour power and the Tarai land -- in their separate yet similar ways -- helped to generate surplus value for the Nepali state alliance and for the British Indian/empire. The implications of this bifurcation will be drawn out in the next section.

The third consequence of unification was the further strengthening of the state by the exercising of monopoly rights in forest products, wild animals, minerals, specific cash crops, and in captive trading of essential commodities in specific internal markets. The state discouraged Nepali traders from setting up shops in India and instead established export centres inside Nepali territory and collected export duties. While income through such monopolies and state trading was used almost wholly to sustain the military buildup in earlier periods (approximately, before 1838), the enlargement of the state trading system, combined with on the one hand the extensive revenue farming, and on the other the absence of wars, meant that a large proportion of the income thus generated began to be very personalized by the members of the state alliance. A very rough estimate indicates that each Rana prime minister appropriated roughly 25-30 percent of the annual state revenue. Jang Bahadur's annual salary for 1863 was approximately Rs. (I.C.) 100 thousand. A soldier's annual salary the same year ranged between Rs. 22 to Rs. 100.

The fourth consequence related more closely to the development of the mercantile form in India. This was manifested by India in the import of hill labour and Tarai products and also by Nepal in the import of the Indian northern-plains labour power in the feudally organized Tarai and the commodities, including luxuries, for the use of the members of the state alliance. The persistence of the Company in trying to open up the Nepali market, beginning with the 1766 Kinloch expedition, was so dogged and resolute that it is rather surprising that the Nepali state could blockade itself for as long as it did. The first interstate trade statistic, for an unknown year in the first decade of the 19th century, gives a total figure of Rs. (I.C.) 435 thousand. The figure had reached Rs. (I.C.) 9.8 million by 1879. The value of exports during this period was four to five times as much as the value of imports. While this information should elate those who

compute our trade balance statistics -- and those who plan for the deficit -- it really ought not to; the initial period of contact between primitive economies and capitalist economics has been to the former's advantage the world over. The difference between accumulation, expanded accumulation, and systematic unequal exchange inexorably tip the balance in favour of the capitalist mode. The importance of the trade figures lies mainly in the fact that they indicate an increasing, yet roughly plateaued, penetration of capitalism in the Nepali political economy.

Limited commodity transaction went hand in hand with the incipient import of the choicest Nepali labour power. That the initial Nepali labour power was utilized not directly for production but for "security," i.e., political-military penetration in the case of the aggressive and rising Company/Empire, only twists but does not change the overall power of capital to draw in labour. Mercantile capitalism was beginning to extend itself to include Nepal within its organization of production. But the scale of import of labour power was, nevertheless, small. The Nepali state alliance right up to the middle-1880s did not allow open recruitment of Nepalis in the British Indian army. A variety of punishments, including the death penalty, were given to those who were found to have joined the British Indian army. The recruits' families back home were systematically harassed. Nonetheless, the Company did have some success in recruitment. And just as importantly, the immiserization of the hills had only made its first appearances.

The Past and the Present: 1885-1949

We now arrive at the 1885-1949 juncture. The processes set in motion 200 years to 60 years back finally matured by 1885. Competitive capitalism was at its peak and metropolitan Britain was the world hegemone. Political-economic processes at the home front almost fully corresponded with the world order. Nepal henceforth would serve as a bona fide member of the periphery. The shortcomings and inefficiencies of the mercantile mode were obliterated and the resistance offered by the state alliance was all but withdrawn.

Prime Minister Bir Shamsher inaugurated his regime by acquiescing to the long-standing demand of the British Indian

government to allow it unhindered access to Nepali labour power of its choice. Indeed, he actively encouraged it and even accepted the British request not to recruit the Gurungs and the Magars in the Nepali army. The breeding ground for the "Gurkha" labour power, which had first been limited to a few locations in Himachal Pradesh and had later spread to Utter Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam, now covered the territory of "independent" Nepal. The Gurungs, Magars, Rais, and Limbus were in the prime list of the British not only because these were the non-Hinduisd components of the Nepali population, but also because they were available in increasingly larger numbers, in large measure due to the (by now) fast-paced weakening of the communal organization of resource use and the consequent immiserization of a substantial proportion of the households in the central and the eastern hills.

As is well known, the recruits poured in. More than 27,000 soldiers were hired between 1886 and 1904. Roughly 200 thousand -- 20 percent of the adult male population in the country -- were drawn to India during the first intercapitalist global war (better known as World War One). Approximately the same number participated in the second global war. The exodus hurt agriculture and the food supply considerably. It also hurt the raising of land revenues. Beginning 1919, the British started to compensate this loss of revenue to the comprador state class by making an annual present of one million rupees. The amount, expectedly, was doubled following World War Two. In addition, the Rana prime minister was awarded a gift of 1,750,000 pounds for his help.

The British Indian officials were very happy that they could force open recruitment. Indeed, the British concern for this "free trade" was so palpable by 1884 that commodity trade with Nepal was regarded by the government of India as a question of altogether minor importance compared to the power of obtaining Gurkha recruits. It was noted for a long time that the British were prepared to make considerable concessions to the Nepali state class for allowing this "access"

Marginalization in the Nepali hills and the demand for labour by capital in parts of India resulted in another strong

migratory "stream." Between 1891 and 1931 there was a five-fold increase in the number of Nepali migrants to Sikkim. Tea plantations in West Bengal (Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri) and forest clearance in Assam attracted a huge body of Nepali migrants. A large number of "Bahadurs" was also created during this period who took on the duties of public and private security maintenance and daily wage labour.

To be sure, Prime Minister Bir Shamsher as well as the later regimes must have been happy with the export of labour power in as much as it brought in a very large sum of cash income in the country by way of remittances, etc., but also because it absolved the state alliance of the responsibility of reorganizing and stabilizing the hill economy. The feudal ownership of the Tarai resources, on the other hand, meant that the expanse of the Tarai could accommodate a relatively small number of the marginalized hill dwellers. Thus, while the marginal quality of the hill areas was continually reproduced in more and more aggravated forms, the immiserized hill dwellers and the resources of the Tarai could not be integrated within the national perimeter.

Indeed, the state class was actively pushing in the opposite direction in four major ways. The first avenue, the export of hill labour power, has been discussed above. The second avenue was trade, both exports and imports. The trade figures shot up from Rs. 9.8 million in 1879-80 to Rs. 30 million in 1890-91. In 1900-01, 11913-14, and 1920-21, the figures were Rs. 39.9 million, Rs. 63.8 million and Rs. 87.9 million, respectively. The huge export expansion became possible due (in addition to the bifurcation of the organization of production in the hill and the Tarai, as discussed above), mainly to: a) the increased tempo of forest clearance in the Tarai; b) the expansion of cultivated area in the Tarai -- almost the entire mid-western Tarai was cultivated during this period; c) the increase in the scale of cultivation of cash crops e.g., opium, jute, indigo, tobacco, sugarcane; and d) the construction of railway lines across the Nepali border. The expansion of import, on the other hand, was based on: a) the enlargement of the state alliance; b) the increase in income through export; c) the increase in the rate of consumption of high-elasticity imported luxuries; d) the sudden

increase in the flow of cash in the hills -- i.e., the stirrings of a remittance economy; and e) the onset of the disintegration of the organization of indigenous manufactures and crafts at the national scale. The massive increase in income was hoarded, used to buy imported cotton goods, metalware, glass ware, cigarettes, gold and precious stones, to build large homes as well as humongous and luxurious palaces (including in the distant countryside *bitra* locations), to the creation and sustenance of a huge body of servants and retainers, to the buying of property, and in hoardings and investments, in India and a number of other world areas, including some of the capitalist metropolitan locations.

The expansion of the Indian railway line just across the Nepali border between 1885-1910 gave a great impetus to this trade. Nepali timber, the primary source of wood for the construction of railway lines all along northeast India, helped capitalism to open up the Nepali market for other commodities. A preliminary version of an outward-bound and expanded capital recyclement regime was played out. It is, nonetheless, interesting to note that the state alliance, ever fearful of the British *military* involvement in Nepal, was wary of fully opening up. Time and again it rejected offers/requests to lay down railway lines inside Nepal and link it up with the British Indian railway system. However, as the trade figures bear out, this resistance was weak as far as commerce was concerned.

The state alliance systematically discouraged household crafts and artisans and traders by allowing imports of everyday consumption commodities on large scales. Household crafts and cottage industries in the hills wee badly hit in particular by the flow of cotton goods and metalware. Raw cotton, extensively cultivated in almost all parts of the hills, lost to machine-produced, cheaper cloth. The skills required to cultivate and process it slowly disappeared throughout the hills. The cash needed to buy cloth, on the other hand, compelled an increasingly larger proportion of hill households to seek seasonal, or "permanent," manual jobs in Indian towns and cities. The rapid expansion of the Indian industrial economy after the World War I, in conjunction with the liberalization of imports following the 1923 treaty, further undercut the basis of craft and industries in

Nepal. Imports boomed -- including from Japan and Europe -- so rapidly that Nepal devalued its currency by 1932.

The 1923 treaty did produce one positive impact on Nepal, however. The guarantee of formal independence, coupled with a general support received from the British Indian government, gave Chandra Shamsher the confidence he needed to carry out several mildly anti-feudal measures. The most well known of such measures was the abolition of (the almost wholly domestic) slavery at state expense and the resettlement of the slaves in Amlekhganj in the central Tarai. The treaty also gave him the confidence to lay down the Raxaul-Amlekhganj railroad and to construct the Bhainse-Kathmandu ropeway line. These acts of further opening-up, of course, led to the increase in the scale of both exports and imports. The post-World War One period in general and the post-1923 treaty period in particular (which, in addition, also saw the establishment of the first college, the first state-sponsored irrigation canal) appeared to provide a lukewarm trend towards state support to national accumulation, although it was along the feudal line. Juddha Shamsher's efforts along these lines were stronger and quite admirable. The mid-1930's formed a period during which an ideology of inward-looking and indigenous national development gained some ground for the first time after Prithvi Narayan Shah. The institution of Udyog Parishad (Industrial/Developmental Board), the promulgation of the Company Law, the establishment of the Nepal Bank Limited, the jute and various other industrial establishments, could have led, in course of time, to the creation of a dynamic national bourgeoisie. The point here, however, is that the 1923 grant of independence was the most important precondition for the potential generation of an independent national bourgeoisie which would have been inherently exploitative and iniquitous but which would also have more or less successfully guarded the state against outside capitalist onslaughts by itself engaging in inward-oriented, expanded accumulation.

The loss of British hegemony following the first inter-capitalist war, the birth of the Soviet Union, the Great Depression and the global processes leading to the second round of the world war provided much incentive to anti-colonial movements in the

colonies. The Indian independence movement was a product of this setting, with industrialists, traders and middle class gentries as its leaders -- precisely a conglomeration which stood to gain most from inheriting the capitalist infrastructure and by establishing a necessarily compromised version of national bourgeoisdom. The major opposition groups within Nepal -- excluding groups which were patently reactionary -- had a similar class basis (apart from the obvious absence of industrial entrepreneurs) and had imbibed a similar ideology. As it turned out later, the ideology internalized by the opposition groups did not serve Nepal's national interest well. This, because the ideology was based on faulty readings of a) the world and regional capitalist process; b) the nationalism of India; c) the rise of communism and the establishment of a communist state in China; d) Nepal's place in the political-economic-military processes in the region; and e) the precise extent of the development of underdevelopment in Nepal and of the processes leading to it.

The Past and the Present: 1950-1985

We now arrive at our most recent period in history, 1950-1985. The onset of the period was itself interesting -- and instructive -- in many ways. Apart from the United Kingdom and India, with whom we established diplomatic relations was the bastion of world capitalism, the United States, which was beginning its tenure as the global hegemone. In 1950, as a frontline state against communism, we began our history as an aid-receiving nation. The Nepali labour power formed part of the global military might in defense of capitalism and was used alternately as a primitive rapid deployment force, a regular front line battalion, and as an anti-guerrilla operations squad against anti-imperialist, nationalist force. The Indian state that had fully supported the Ranas for a couple of years after its independence suddenly switched sides, following the emergence of a communist state up north, and clamped its security frontier up to the Himalayas, thus incorporating Nepal within its military perimeter. Tribhuvan Airport and Tribhuvan Highway were constructed by the fledgling Indian Air Force and Indian Army, respectively. The Indian Army continued to operate the highway long afterwards. In addition, the Indian state, which "preferred"

to deal on monopolistic terms with neighbours and other third world states, enforced a trade treaty which would necessarily narrow Nepal's resource base and make it increasingly more dependent on India. Combined with the "Friendship Treaty" which was exclusively directed against Nepal's only other neighbor, China, Nepal took shape as a near-full-fledged hegemony of the Indian state and the Indian mercantile bourgeoisie. In an immediate sense, these were parts of the costs Nepal had to bear for the 1950-51 "revolution".

The 1950-1985 period was characterized by several elements: a) nationwide, deeper peripheralization through outward-bound flow of resource including commodity, labour power and capital vis-à-vis India and the world capitalist economy; b) immiserization of a very large proportion, probably more than three-fourths of the hill households and two-fifths of the Tarai households; c) a nationwide political coalition of medium and large landed interests and state class interests; d) a very fast growing incorporation of the mercantile bourgeoisie into the state alliance; e) an enlargement of the state alliance, particularly in the towns and district capitals; f) an expansion of the effective scope of the state alliance in the formal political, political-economic and social sectors; g) the diminution of the household and the village-ethnic community; h) multiplication of misconceived, ineffectual anti-poverty state programmes; j) improvements in the transport-communication, education and health sectors which, nonetheless, have largely augmented underdevelopment; and k) an almost total inability to chart a course toward an inward-bound production recyclement -- capitalistic or otherwise -- and an expanded accumulation regime integrated at the national level.

If it is ironic that Nepal's political dependence increased after the 1950-51 "democratic revolution," the degree of economic openness and dependence was even more so. Although it is a historical rule of the capitalist world-system that economically primitive states lose out not at the beginning of the precapitalist-capitalist exchange relationship but only later (loosely, in the medium run), ironically it needed the "revolution" and the resulting "democratic" setup for Nepal to be in the red in commodity transactions. The volume of interstate commodity

trade reached Rs. (I.C.) 265 million in 1956-57, from Rs. (I.C.) 88 million of 1920-21. The figure jumped more than four times during the next 10 years and reached Rs. (N.C.) 1157 million in 1966-67. It almost tripled again in 1976-77 at Rs. (N.C.) 3173 million. It more than doubled in the next five years (1981-82) and reached Rs. (N.C.) 6429 million. Imports as a percentage of GDP went up from 9 percent to 15 percent between 1969-70 and 1979-80 (all figures are at current prices). The composition of interstate commodity trade, on the other hand, continued to reinforce underdevelopment by emphasizing the export of primary goods, principally food items and non-fuel raw materials, which accounted for more than three-fourths of all exports for 1981-82. Imports were mainly composed of manufactured products, fuel, chemicals, and food items. The interstate commodity trade balance is so lopsided by now that the value of merchandise exports for 1981-82 was only one-third of the value of merchandise imports. The balance of interstate payments as a whole turned red for the first time in 1983 despite the fairly large incomes from tourism, remittance by migrant labourers in India and elsewhere, and interstate grants and loans. The dependence of the state on import duties was very high and growing; these formed 25-34 percent of the total annual revenue of the central government ever since the 1970s. What this also means of course is that there is less scope now for national expanded accumulation than before. At the same time, it also means that the existing national resource recyclement regime is rapidly getting weaker.

Hence the increasing deterioration of the ecosystem and of the food, feed and fuel chain and unemployment and under-employment on the one hand and "overpopulation" on the other.

The emigration and remittance regimes -- processes as intimately connected to the capitalist world-system as the import and export of commodities (what are commodities but embodiments of labour!) -- have been strengthened in the last 35 years. More than 4 percent of the total population was emigre in 1961. There is a large quantity of circumstantial evidence which indicates that both Nepali and Indian census systematically under-enumerate Nepal-India migrants. The actual proportion of India-

bound Nepali migrants may be much larger not only for 1961 but also for the later years.

Probably much more important, both in terms of the number of households involved and the scale of remittance, is seasonal migration of labour to India. A number of independent studies on the western and eastern hills report very high rates of seasonal labour migration to India. In general, it appears that 15-20 percent of all households in the hills/mountains may have one or more family members in India for 2-5 months per year as seasonal labourers. The majority of the migrants -- whether seasonal or semi-permanent/permanent -- are young adult males, even excluding those in the Indian and British armies and those in "security duty" in Brunei, Singapore and other semi-peripheral capitalist areas.

The emigre households, in continual pressure to change their structure and lifecycle in keeping with the (uncertain and fluctuating) demand for labour in India or outside (or in the Tarai/Kathmandu Valley for that matter), have deformed themselves vis-a-vis the local organizations of production; that is, the effective structure of the household, the sexual division of labour, the demand for children (including the sex-specific demand for children), work socialization and mode of resource ownership and use have become geared more to the Indian/Tarai market than to the local setting. This is particularly salient in the western region of Nepal which has historically been exposed longer and more intensively to capitalist influences and thus intimately peripheralized. Recycling of local resources is the poorest there and thus the earlier and much faster rate of deterioration of the ecosystem. Contradictions between the long-standing institution of private property and the social and communal nature of production have also contributed to ecological deterioration, e.g., the fast-disappearing common lands, pastures, as also to "overpopulation" and chronic and serious food scarcity there.

The outflow of capital is very difficult to document -- mostly because it is deliberately hidden or camouflaged. Three avenues of leakage, however, may be identified. The first is the profit Indian citizens draw out of their industrial/

commercial/agricultural/ financial/service-oriented investment in Nepal. The scale of such investments is not known, but generally acknowledged as large. Indian investment in Nepal has a long history. The new expansion of Indian commercial capital, however, can most easily be seen in the wholesale and retail trade/smuggling of "third country" goods from Nepal to India, food grain wholesale trade, and remittance through the sale of skilled/semi-skilled labour power. Commercial capital, it should be noted, is recycled very fast and is repatriated at the same speed. The second avenue of capital outflow is the hoarding/ investment/expenditure Nepalis make in India and other states. This is another area where information is lacking. The official figure, for 1950, compiled by the Indian government, showed that the total hoarding/investment made by Nepalis was equivalent to Rs. (I.C.) 44 million. Unofficial estimates, however, are much larger. A fairly substantial proportion of the bourgeoisie, the Tarai landlords and the larger trading houses prominent among them, own properties and investments in India. It is also probable that a few families own properties/investments in other states and capitals. A large amount of potential capital also flows out by way of educational, medical and other expenditures visiting Nepalis make in India.

However, it is through systematic unequal exchange in commodity/labour transactions that capital flows are largely decided. We have already dwelled upon the power of the capital over marginalized labours as well as the increase in commodity transaction, especially import, on the part of Nepal. Unequal exchange is a mechanism of division of labour under which a given political-economic set-up (whether a state or a region or a sector) successively envelops the market of another political-economic set-up because the productivity of the former, per unit of labour, is higher than that in the later (which is also another way of saying that the wage rate is lower in the former than in the later, per unit of production). It is not merely that it takes six months of hard labour for an old man in Salyan to buy a pair of Bombay mills pair of coats; the point is that it shall take even longer in the future. It should be emphasized that this is not a one-shot penetration, but one which works over a long period. It not only displaces the indigenous products, but inexorably works

itself out to undermine the political-economic bases of a peripheral system. This is essentially the regimen under which the multiplier/accelerator gets systematically exported from Nepal to India or elsewhere. This is also why capitalism enforces "open door economic policy" and glibly idolizes the "comparative advantage to the accrued from international trade" and "global partnership." This clearly was the longer run objective of the 1950 Indo-Nepal treaties, as far as the Indian bourgeoisie was concerned. If India has become less blatant about its state-supported capitalism vis-a-vis Nepal, it is only because Indian capitalism is coming of age, i.e., it is becoming competitive at the world level in some production sectors in some markets. It is interesting, nonetheless, that less than one percent of the total Indian aid has gone to the industrial sector.

Development of Underdevelopment: Facts, Levels, Constraints and Options

The facts of the development of underdevelopment at the present, as one of its historical-structural characteristics, are manifold and multilayered. It should be noted that these are facets only when underdevelopment is analyzed in a static frame; in processual terms these "facets" further lead to an enhancement of underdevelopment. The constraints under which the present state alliance lives, and the options it exercises and/or fails to exercise, constitute an important facet of the development of underdevelopment. The state alliance cannot lead a coalition of national bourgeoisie and engage in an expanded capitalist accumulation regime for several reasons: a) peripheralized extensively and intensively for more than one-hundred years, the national bourgeoisie -- the national industrial bourgeoisie in particular -- is a very weak force here; b) firms and industries, at least in the short run, cannot acquire a competitive edge; c) the existing scale of interstate commodity transaction cannot be drastically cut down -- and national accumulation subsidized -- not only on account of local demand and interstate/international pressure for supply but also because a very large proportion of the annual national state revenue -- varying between 25 percent and 58 percent in the last 20 years -- accrues from interstate commodity trade, the bulk of it from important duties and associated taxes; d) the hill households, as well as the state as a

whole, cannot forego the emigration and remittance routine; e) the state alliance cannot afford large-scale proletarianization -- an inevitable consequence of the capitalist accumulative process; and f) because the comprador commercial bourgeoisie has become a prominent component of the state alliance. Thus you have a boom in imports, a boom on trading and smuggling of imported commodities but also an agrarian system which is unproductive and apparently becoming more so -- and an industrial/manufacturing base which shrinks more than it expands. Thus you have emigrant households who feel happy over the fact that the Nepali currency has been devalued against the Indian currency. Thus you have a land reform programme which ties the landlord and the labourer in a relationship which slows down effective landlessness and rural proletarianization but also precludes increases in agricultural production, and which legitimizes the vastly iniquitous distribution of landholding in the hills and the Tarai, which, in turn, (as in a mini version of the *latifundia* agrarian system) sustains the export of primary goods and labour power, the import regimen, and the regional and national class structure. Thus also there is an overemphasis on the transport and communication infrastructure which along with its beneficial aspects increasingly reinforces the image of Nepal as an entity where porters, trucks and aeroplanes bound inside the border -- particularly to the north -- are loaded to the full while those which flow across the border and to the south are three-fourths empty. Thus the lack of success of the well-intentioned New Education System Plan which neither comprehends the relationship among class, production and education in our present set up nor is penetrating enough to be wary of the optimistic forecasts on the expansion of the national economy. Thus also you have immigration into the Tarai, emigration from the hills, immigration from north India and the problems of citizenship and dual citizenship. Finally, you have state-sponsored monopolies, i.e., corporations, which perennially run on the red.

Nor can the present state alliance pave the way for a socialized political-economy -- admittedly a much more far-fetched option, not only because it would obliterate the economic basis for the preeminence of the present state alliance, the larger

landlords and the comprador commercial bourgeoisie in particular, but also because such an option would involve a considerable devolution of authority to local governments and thus be contrary to the larger scale processes of centralization -- a necessary process for the particular form of state we run and the interstate setting we live in -- witnessed since the late -1950s. It is also far-fetched because it would be difficult to enforce, given the highly capitalism-dependent nature of our economy on the one hand and the world/regional capitalist system which, as already discussed, thrives on the basis of continual expansion. Thus you have an import-based commercial bourgeoisie which is prospering and expanding very fast. You have feudal organization in the Tarai which is weakening, in part due to the success of the commercial bourgeoisie, but nonetheless on its feet.

There are other options, e.g. expansive multi-nationalization, but these are even less "realistic." Given the advanced stage of openness, peripheralization and dependence, this may really not be an altogether unattractive economic option on our part -- a production regime which is capitalist both in the best and the worst senses but which would also expand the accumulative base inside the national frontier -- minus the remittances, royalties and interests. But this would have its own costs as well, including proletarianization, break-up of feudal relations and further internalization of domestic politics. In addition, multinationals are necessarily extremely choosy about markets, sectors and profits -- shout run at that -- and thus cannot be expected to tie up the national economy.

Another facet of the development of underdevelopment can be seen in the form of maintenance and change in the class structure. The "Poorest 20" that we belong to, we nurse, and continue to fortify the bases of, one of the highest degrees of inequality in asset and income distribution in the world. The top 10 percent of the households earned as much as 47 percent of the total national income. The bottom 44 percent of the population, on the other hand, earned only 10 percent of the total national income. (Data refer to 1976-77.) Similarly, 10 percent of all households owned 59 percent of all agricultural land area in 1972 -- seven years after the implementation of the much-celebrated

1964 Land Act. The rough but overall meaning of this information is clear; not only the marginalized masses but also the bourgeoisie is continually shortchanged through unequal exchange in various forms of interstate transactions, while the state alliance in Nepal has been quite successful in creating newer sources of internal and external sources of wealth/exploitation to maintain its economic preeminence.

The contrasting generations of architecture in the Kathmandu Valley provide an often overlooked manifestation of this development of underdevelopment. The trade-, crafts-, and intensive agriculture-based, integrated, developed and prosperous community-oriented social life of the *bahi* slowly deteriorated as it was supplanted by singular, splendent, isolated and forbidding palaces built according to Greco-Roman (neoclassical European) specifications and financed through the outward-bound sale of Tarai merchandise and hill labour power. The new architecture reflects a slight enlargement of the bourgeoisie ensconced in much smaller but comfortable, indoor-plumbing homes with grills and high walls topped by barbed wire and/or glass shards with occasional plates which shout at strangers to beware of exotic canine breeds.

Other facets of the development of underdevelopment may be seen at the levels of the community and the household. The community -- in however "remote/inaccessible" an area it might be -- has been weakened a very great deal by now, largely through the processes of privatization, peripheralization and centralization. It is a much less cohesive/cooperative unit than before because community resources have drastically shrunk in the last 35 years, and also because it is increasingly dependent on outside sources for its economics and politics, e.g., on district headquarters, nearby towns Kathmandu, The Tarai, and Indian towns and cities. Its role in running its current affairs and planning for its future have been much reduced. Thus you have the problem of "popular participation" at the community level; the exhortation is becoming shriller precisely when the basis of participation is being rapidly eroded. The household, as can be expected, has not been immune to the development of underdevelopment. As already noted, a substantial proportion of the households, particularly in the hills, have deformed

themselves vis-a-vis income generation, fertility, family relationship and the like.

These process are fairly well reflected in certain other macro-economic indicators. A state which was one of the leading exporters of rice till the early-1960s is systematically importing foodgrain beginning in the 1980s. A state which had one of the highest productivities in rain-fed South Asia till the mid-1960s was along the bottom of the scale beginning in the mid-1970s. Food production per-person has declined substantially. The industrial sector, particularly manufacturing, has remained retarded for a long period at an extremely low level. The composition of inter-state commodity transaction confirms the long-standing predominance of primary goods on the export side and that of fuel, transportation equipment and manufactured products on the import side. The gross national product, per person, increased only by 0.1 percent between 1965-83.

Surely, not all performances are poor. As already noted, there have been definite improvements in certain sectors, e.g., transport and communication, literacy, and public health; no less important is the provision of a nation-wide organizational frame for political administration. However, improvements in these sectors -- barring the public health sector -- have either enhanced underdevelopment or have remained untied with the national production systems.

Recapitulation

Let me summarize the arguments made so far. Development has very little to do with an abundance of resources whether natural or financial, or with advanced or even "appropriate" technology *per se*. We have generated a large amount of resources through agriculture, forestry, small scale industry, trade, remittance, and latterly, through foreign aid. But these have not helped us develop. Development essentially has to do with the social mode in which we reprocess whatever resource we have and distribute the rewards for doing so within a socially bounded unit and, in so doing, recreate the capability to reproduce the cycle. The social unit may be a household, a kinship group, community, tribe, a regional grouping, a nation-state, or even a group of nation-states. But to the extent that we

live in an interstate world system -- itself a contribution of the process which also generated development and underdevelopment -- "development" often refers to the nation-state level and levels subsidiary to it.

Now there are various ways in which the resource reprocessing-capability reproducing-resource reprocessing-cycle can be damaged. Prolonged droughts, blights, epidemics, internal wars and the like are examples. Certainly, there are histories of households and entire communities which have been altogether wiped out by these disasters. But these disasters are *events* which take place rather irregularly. More importantly, almost all societies learn/invent mechanisms to soften the impact of such events, e.g., storage of food items, various prescriptive/ritual modes of re-establishment of amity between warring groups etc. Indeed, some hunting-gathering groups practice selective but systematic infanticide to keep the cycle moving, however unpleasant that particular option might be. The potentiality of systematic damage, nonetheless, is localized: neighbouring hunting-gathering groups may not be required to practice infanticide to keep their own cycle moving.

The advent and growth of capitalism, however, makes damage control in the non-metropolitan areas extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible. This is because capitalism thrives on the basis of incessant expansion. The damage caused by core capitalism to the cycles at the semiperipheral and peripheral areas is regular, systematic, intensive (defined in terms of the degree of damage suffered by the cycle at different levels of organization of production in a social unit) and extensive (defined in terms of the damage suffered by the cycle in different sectors of production in a social unit). Depending upon the guardedness (or openness) of the social unit in question and the relative strength (or relative weakness) of the capitalist system making efforts to expand, the damage becomes progressively larger. At times it becomes irreversible. Progression and irreversibility of damage may occur at various sectors -- manufacturing, agriculture, entire physical ecology of a region, education -- and at various levels -- household, community, state, continent. Monopoly capitalism has the charm that, unlike colonial capitalism, it can damage the cycle at various sectors and levels in the peripheral social units

without necessarily expanding militarily, i.e., by lapsing formal political sovereignty. Expansion operates through markets, of commodities, labour power, skill, capital, finance, treaties and , above all, alliances. Hence the "strength" of the inter-state world system. Hence, in a large measure, the development of the core capitalist areas and its obverse -- the development of underdevelopment -- in the semi-peripheral and peripheral areas.

Let us come back to the resource reprocessing-reward distributing-capability reproducing-resource reprocessing- cycle for a moment. A social unit is a viable entity to the extent that it can keep the cycle moving. To the extent that it has not been able to utilize each of these three faculties within a well-integrated frame at an optimal level, and over the long run, it is undeveloped. To the extent that it keeps the cycle moving by utilizing each of these faculties at the maximal level over the short run, it is overdeveloped. Finally, to the extent that it keeps the cycle moving by enhancing each of these faculties within a well-integrated frame over the long run, it is developed. Underdevelopment, on the other hand, is a cycle which moves only intermittently, or at a speed much slower than used to be normal, or altogether stops, either because one or all of its faculties are impaired or because the integrative mechanisms weaken or fail altogether due to its interaction with an alien cycle, which is running with enhanced faculties within an expanding yet highly integrated frame.

States in the periphery can protect their own cycle from the structural violence of the enhanced, well-integrated and expanding world capitalist cycle only by following one of two potions. The first option is the creation of a dynamic, i.e. capitalist, national bourgeoisie who assume the responsibility to restore the damage, breathe life into the severely weakened faculties and fend off the much more powerful cycle by themselves engaging in inward-oriented accumulation. The state, in this context, would have to take on two other roles, that of containing reactions against intensive internal exploitation from the working class and against the loss of prerogatives and privileges from the state class, the feudals, the urban "middle class" and the comprador bourgeoisie on the one hand and that of controlling the onslaught of capitalism from the outside on the

other. The other option is the creation of a socialized national economy which, in the short run, would assume responsibility to perform tasks very similar to those expected from the national bourgeoisie. The state, in such a context, would have to take on the role of containing the outbursts and prolonged reactions of almost all components of the present state alliance (because this would involve a radical restructuring of the organization of resource ownership, use and distribution of rewards) and also control sustained and systematic assaults from the capitalist world-and regional-system. Both options presume a national *boundedness* as the first requisite: nationalism and development are intrinsically tied; you cannot hope to cultivate one without cultivating the other. This, indeed, is the essence of socialism in the third world. Neither option, it should be emphasized, can revitalize the cycle in the short run. Both options, on the other hand presume a time-bound restructuring of the present state alliance -- immediate restructuring in the case of the second option and a phased, but still definitely time-bound, restructuring in the case of the first option.

"Option," however, is a wrong expression in the present context. It conveys a sense of autonomy of choice on the part of the actor, in addition to a certain time-discretion. We have very little left of either. Nonetheless, an option has to be exercised -- with minimal loss of time -- not the least because the capitalist world- and regional-economy is increasingly making us option-less; it is itself exercising options for us. As I have tried to show, we began to lose the power to decide progressively back in 1885. The cycle began to be damaged and so did our autonomy.

We are near optionless in another sense, too. The one century-long peripheralization and maintenance of comprador structures -- exacerbated beginning the late -1960s -- has left our national bourgeoisie in shambles. The Tarai feudal lords who could, under supportive circumstance, have transformed themselves into a sizable and powerful first-generation national bourgeoisie do not bear that potential any more. The possibility of a viable capitalist, internally accumulative and exploitative political-economic regime must, therefore, be regarded as nearly foreclosed. The ensemble of the "options" currently being exercised --IRDPs, "basic needs", etc., is not at all likely to

breathe life into the enfeebled cycle. The "option," therefore, has to lie with a socialized national political-economy. Repairing the damage, nonetheless, will be a difficult, long, drawnout affair, as the course of the damage itself was. Slogans merely chase dreams.

NOTES

1. A substantial portion of this paper "summarizes" an incomplete monograph on a similar theme sponsored by the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. Authors I have freely borrowed from are Samir Amin, Mahesh Chandra Regmi, Jahar Sen, Ludwig Stiller and Immanuel Wallerstein. Others I have borrowed form include Krishna Kant Adhikari, Giovanni Arrighi, Narottam Banskota, Pranab Bardhan, Khem Bahadur Bista, Piers Blaikie, John Cameron, Brain Carson, Srikant Dutt, Erik Eckholm, Andre Gunder Frank, Frederick Gaige, Johan Galtung, Harka Gurung, Francis B. Hamilton, Brain Hodgson, Bhuwan Lal Joshi, Vaidya Bir Singh Kansakar, Mahendra Lama, V.I. Lenin, Prakash Chandra Lohani, Charles McDougal, Ferdinand Okada, H.A. Oldfield, Devendra Raj Panday, Bhim Bahadur Pandey, Sri Ram Poudyal, Pashupati SJB Rana, Ratna SJB Rana, P.C. Rawat, Leo Rose, Khieu Samphan, David Seddon, Francis Tucker, M.A. Zaman, K.H. Zevering. I have also borrowed from reports prepared by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Kathmandu, the Integrated Development Systems, Kathmandu, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Kathmandu, the National Planning Commission, Kathmandu, and the World Bank, Washington D.C. I have discussed specific ideas incorporated in the paper with Shyam Bhurtel, Dor Bahadur Bista, Dilli Ram Dahal, James Fisher, Khadga Bikram Shah and Ludwig Stiller. While I am grateful to the above mentioned for their reactions, none of these persons and neither the Centre for Policy Research nor the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, the institution I work for, are responsible for the ideas and the overall construction presented here. This responsibilities lies with the author alone.

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