

REVIEW ARTICLE

A CRITIQUE OF LEVI'S THEORY OF THE URBAN MESOCOSM

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"I quite agree with you," said the Duchess; "and the moral of that is—'Be what you would seem to be'—or, if you'd like it put more simply—'Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise.'"

Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*

Robert I. Levy's *Mesocosm: Hinduism and the Organization of a Traditional Newar City in Nepal* (1992) is an exhaustive and daunting study of the city of Bhaktapur through its symbols, ideology, and ritual. Levy initially frames the study in terms of a comparison with his earlier fieldwork in Tahiti, in order to develop an evolutionary schema in which Bhaktapur represents an intermediate type between primitive and modern. As the study develops it becomes clear that the term mesocosm refers implicitly to this evolutionarily intermediate stage. More prominently, however, Levy uses the term to refer to the city as representing an intermediate "organized meaningful world" between the "microcosmic worlds of individuals and the culturally conceived macrocosm, the universe, at whose center the city lies" (2).

Reminiscent of the nineteenth century concern for the relationship of the civil society and the state, the problem is how the private world relates to the public world and how its activities are oriented to the needs and purposes defined in the public one. The private world, used by Levy in the sense of the private religious world of household rituals, simultaneously is affected by the mesocosm and provides its output—religious, social, manpower and so forth—to the intermediate religious world of the city. The mesocosm or intermediate world is organized by a system of symbols which in the city of Bhaktapur is Hinduism, given that 92% of the population and all except 60

out of 6,000 households are Hindu—"this great preponderance of Hindu Newars who are at the center of our treatment of Bhaktapur's symbolic organization" (92). The kind of city being organized is an "archaic" city (used here in the dictionary sense of characterizing "an earlier or more primitive time"—Webster's), which for Bhaktapur is a Hindu city in its full development.

The main concern of this paper is Levy's theoretical method introduced in the first part of the book, which aims to delineate the archaic Hindu city as a universal evolutionary stage and show how Bhaktapur embodies this ideal in its religious and normative everyday life. To establish his position, Levy makes a series of equivocations between Hinduism, Bhaktapur and ideal types found in the literature. Proper comparative method requires identifying the differences as well as the similarities when making analogies with ideal types, and then explaining these differences; but in favor of his argument Levy typically sets up a conditional relationship—for example, 'if this were the case then ...'—and thereafter assumes that the condition held without establishing it. The second and third parts of the book provide an exhaustive study of the religious life of the city which exonerates its theoretical failings without providing substantial support for his earlier arguments. His major mistake is that he wants to make an understanding of the city as a whole while limiting himself to the religious realm and religiously framed normative one without integrating it into the historically arisen material one—production, reproduction, consumption, distribution, exchange, classes, non-religious forms of representation and orientation, and so forth. Thus, though he claims that his purpose is to know the city and its people, my sense is that the real city as it is actually experienced by its residents is never known.

Levy's position is that symbols, particularly those from the Hindu religious realm, being a function of the intimate experience and mental organization of the residents of the city (assumed, not demonstrated), *are* significant as they make the city known to its residents (and now the ethnographer). This leads him to seeing his analysis as having to address two questions: "What is Bhaktapur that a Newar may know it, and a Newar so that he or she may know Bhaktapur?" Although Levy refers to the title of a mathematics paper as the source of these questions, they also paraphrase Dumont and Pocock's rendering of Mauss: "A sociological explanation is finished when one has seen what it is that people believe and think, and who are the people that believe and think that" (Dumont and Pocock 1956:13, quoted in Harriss 1989:127). This position was based on the premise that ideology, particularly caste ideology, ascertainable in large part in texts, constitutes Indian society.

Levy pursues this premise to assert that symbols—that is, the representations of ideology—constitute the city that is known, differing from Dumont and Pocock only in his identifying the operation of many more variables than caste. Although Levy's text repeatedly acknowledges social differentiation, it treats the Newar who knows Bhaktapur as an undifferentiated subject who can be represented by elite religious practitioners. His methodology relies on two highly educated Brahmans and a Vajracharya Sanskrit scholar and art historian, trained and employed in a major American university, to assist in the interpretation. This approach makes for a complex, interesting and authoritative analysis of Hindu symbols and the city as such, but whether interpretations by high caste, high class religious specialists reflect the variety of understanding and interests of Newars in general—ranging from businessmen, bureaucrats, Jyapu farmers, factory workers, house servants, untouchables, intellectuals, communists, and so forth—and the real material life of the city is questionable.¹ The analysis furthermore denies the possibility that other forces besides Hindu ideology affect people, ignores individual experience except in the domain of Hindu symbols, and denies significant orientations and actions except in the sphere of ritual. This is *not* to lessen the significance of the analysis, which is an exemplary and important example of the long tradition of collaboration between anthropological specialists in culture and indigenous cultural specialists—all the more significant because Levy gives recognition to the collegial role of his co-specialists.² But it *is* to dispute the claim by the study that it can represent a Bhaktapur known and experienced by Newars other than the representations of high priests and religious books,³ especially low class, low caste laborers or other exploited and depressed status individuals who make up the bulk of the population.

In order to privilege Hindu symbols, it is necessary for Levy to establish that the initial form of the city was a manifestation of Hindu ideas and that contending influences have not subsequently affected it. Levy identified the historical origin of Newars from 800 B.C., into whom a north Indian ruling class gradually merged and elaborated into an autonomous and unique Hindu Newar culture from about the fourth century B.C. Levy sees the destruction brought by the invasion of the Kathmandu valley by Shams ud-Din Illyas in 1349 as providing the conditions for rebuilding the city according to an ideal urban order, in which Hindu ideas converged with reality. This was brought to fruition by Jayasthiti Malla, who was credited with the city's laws and customs.

Jayasthiti Malla came to represent to Newars the Hindu ordering of Bhaktapur, an order built on an ancient plan ... [44].

Jayasthiti Malla revived, extended, and codified an order that built on preexisting forms and forced them into Hindu ideals of the proper form for a little kingdom, a city-state. Subsequent developments of this order must have been retrospectively credited to him, validated by his name. This order was the mesocosmic order of the Newar cities, which was to last in Bhaktapur for some 600 years [45].

That laws and decrees were framed in terms of Hindu ideas does not mean that Jayasthiti Malla was any closer to realizing them. Jayasthiti could never have established himself in a strong position unless there were elements in the society that had built sufficient strength to support him and whose interests were represented and extended by these laws: Levy points to Jayasthiti's enactment of laws making "property in houses, lands and *birtas* ...saleable" (43, quoting Wright) and allowing "his subjects to sell or mortgage their hereditary landed property" (43, quoting Padmagiri) as indication of his "reordering" of the status system. This does not indicate so much that he "made poor wretched people happy" with the institution of an ideal Hindu order as that he was appeasing certain emergent social interests over old entrenched ones. This possibly implies growing power of state servitor and merchant classes which supported the palace in their nascence but threatened to oppose it as they grew stronger, indicating a dynamic in the society, contradicting Levy's claims of changelessness in the next two pages. By giving custom the force of law, Jayasthiti was recognizing and selecting particular social interests. Most likely, he also thereby put down competing claims which may have been antagonistic towards him, making certain other poor wretches unhappy. Of course contemporary scribes, benefitting from state patronage, praised him in terms of the Hindu ideal of the time. But this is no indication that the reality converged with this ideal. One need go no further than the *Rising Nepal* or the stacks of books formulating, analyzing and praising the Panchayat and current multiparty versions of 'democracy' to see how things work, or for that matter, all the high sounding proclamations of the U.N. agencies on its programs for the teeming colonized masses. Overall, the laws and decrees of the Mallas were a strategy within a process of competition for and consolidation of power and control over material conditions, not of making life better for the poor or constructing an ideal Hindu society. Proper historical conclusions require critical use of the historical material.

Levy interprets Jayasthiti's grandson Yaksa Malla's construction of a moat around the city as both defense and "containment of the city at whose

boundaries Ananda Malla had long before placed protective goddesses. ... even more concentrated and isolated within its boundaries" (45). With his sons' division of the Valley into three kingdoms, "Bhaktapur entered on its long period of relative isolation" (46). Levy wishes to establish that the city still pretty much represents Jayasthiti's ideal in support of his 'mesocosm' hypothesis by showing that the city became isolated and changeless soon after the death of Jayasthiti. But he takes the chronicled history which makes kings into the subject of history at face value, forgetting that kings are the faces given to history and not its subject or content. Such content is found in the interplay of the various groups and social interests making up the society—the palace and its retainers, the army, landlords, merchants and especially the artisans and cultivators, who build, shape, nourish, fight and clean up with their own hands, but who rarely get a chance to write the histories and thus do not enter into them except as praising and acclaiming the acts of those who are doing the writing (as exemplified in the popular Mahabharat and Ramayana Hindi television serials). Levi's analysis in terms of legal forms and personages reinforces representations in terms of symbols, as these forms are secondary and relate through representations. But to identify change or lack of change he must look at why and for whom the moats were built and laws made. That people build moats and laws indicates perception of threat to their order and acknowledgment of change by attempts to prevent it, not changelessness. Because he excluded the countryside from his analysis, he does not show how the relationship of the city to the countryside—key to the definition of the city (Mikesell 1991)—changed or how it related to eventual downfall of the government with the conquest from the countryside.

Levy interprets the conquest by the "Indianized mountain state of Gorkha" in the eighteenth century as the incorporation of Newar society into an "enlarged territory and state" bringing the "long autonomous political history of the Newars" to an end (14-5). He sees the conquest a radical transformation because it makes the Newars into just one of many subjected ethnic groups. Yet Levy argues that because the Gorkhalis used existing institutions to build and extend their rule, Bhaktapur remained pretty much changeless throughout the subsequent Rana Rule up to the "restoration of power to the Shah King" (if "restoration" can be applied to something that existed only in myth). This allows him to say that Bhaktapur was trying to turn history into "what might seem a timeless eternal civic order. In 1973, the city, or most of it, was still trying" (15, again the 'city' is made into subject). He adds that "although under the political control of the Gorkhalis since the late eighteenth century, [Bhaktapur has been] almost untouched by Western

influences until the early 1950s."⁴ He finds support for such a view in a government document, as if these are disinterested sources:

as a major governmental development plan for the Kathmandu Valley of the Nepal government put it, Bhaktapur "has shown very little change throughout the last several decades and thus remains the purist existing documentation of historic Newar towns in the Valley" (HMG, Nepal 1969, 76) [52].

Hereby Levy attempts to establish the origins of the present character of the city in the Malla regime and its changelessness since then. Again, the historical process of conquest cannot be understood simply in terms of its outward appearance as a history of regimes and persistence of symbolic and ritual forms. One must ask what were the underlying forces and interests represented by the establishment and long preservation of the regime and *how* did these interests change. How was product controlled and distributed? What was the nature of the commerce? What was the relationship of city to countryside? How did these relations change over time and what was the effect of the Shah conquest on them? Does not the removal of the palace from Bhaktapur to Kathmandu indicate an essential change in the character of the city?

The shift of palace activities to the court in Kathmandu should indicate that the content of Bhaktapur extends to Kathmandu as well. Bhaktapur lost its status as what Max Weber calls a "princely city" with an immense shift of all the functions that go with it—the court, the gigantic job of provisioning the palace and barracks, the large class of retainers and merchants sustained by this. The commercial class in turn must have controlled much of the surplus from the land while at the same time underwriting agricultural production with credit. The subsequent exodus of Bhaktapur and Patan merchants and their establishment in bazaars the length and breadth of the new polity must be taken as a part of Bhaktapur's history as well.

Given that Bhaktapur's symbolic repertoire is drawn from North India, that it grew upon commerce with North India and Tibet, and that following the Gorkha conquest much of the political and economic content of its life shifted elsewhere in the region, I would think that proper analysis should try to locate Bhaktapur within the regional picture of class and urban development rather than attempt to contrive a closed and changeless city for heuristic purposes so analysis can proceed *as if* it were the case. As an example, Bayly's (1983) study of north India is just such an approach to urban development which places it within a regional context, links the

household and the urban order, and integrates symbols, ritual and the material world into the analysis without reducing one into another.

Levy, in contrast, attempts to build a Bhaktapur framed as a changeless city into an ideal evolutionary type standing between primitive and modern society. Given the city's changelessness, he defines it in the first of a series of equivocations in terms of Redfield and Singer's "city of orthogenetic transformation" in which "local culture was carried forward rather than broken down to be replaced by new means of relation and integration, familiar to us in Western urban history" (19). This gives typological significance to the apparent changelessness, but what of the symbols?

Levy goes on to observe that "Bhaktapur is to a very large degree characterized by a great deal of a certain kind of symbolism" to such an extent as to be "'extraordinary,' of compelling local intellectual and emotional interest." These symbols are "in large part, derived from the vast resources of South Asian 'religious' ideas and images, locally transformed, ordered, and put to use for Bhaktapur's civic purposes." When he then compares these "civic purposes" to the staging of a "choreographed ballet" in which "the city space is a carefully marked stage" (16), the implication is that the score of the ballet is found in the symbols. Furthermore, the "city's conventional arrangements of time" are "the music of the ballet" (implying that the symbols, as the score, determine the time arrangements). This allows the reduction of the lives of the city's residents to a totally predictable nature so that, "if one knows what a person's surname [*thar* or clan] is ..., his or her age and sex, what day of the lunar (for some purposes the solar) year it is, and where the person lives in Bhaktapur, one can make a plausible guess at where he or she is, what he or she is doing, and even something of what he or she is experiencing" (17).

This sounds like the claim of Levy's priestly interlocutors, who have an interest in making the lives of the city's residents subject to astrological charts, rituals and religious texts. Left unmentioned is *who* writes this score, or at least who adapts it. His choice of highly educated Brahmans in the city of Bhaktapur and American universities to assist him in interpreting the score indicates who he accepts as the subject. It furthermore is a highly determined normative order; this would require statistical evidence to verify, which is lacking in the book as it accepts the symbols, ideology and his interlocutors on their own authority. A normative order, furthermore, has to do with *everyday* life. It does not address what people are or have been *making* of their lives—educating their children, expanding their business contacts in India, pursuing posts in the government, affirming, preserving and raising their class and social position, confronting and struggling with the injustice of class and caste, building various kinds of organizations—in

short, *producing* their world in the course of reproducing it—which in my mind is what the city with its symbols and rituals is all about. In contrast, Levy's "significant action" takes us back to ritual activity.

Having made this claim for "considerable social and cultural order in Bhaktapur" (17), Levy further claims that this is a certain order that can be characterized as an "'archaic city' and 'climax Hinduism'" (18). By archaic, he apparently means that Bhaktapur is related to an earlier type of city, given its previous description in terms of an "eternal order." For this earlier type of city Levy draws an analogy with what Paul Wheatley described as the "primary urban generation," or urban civilization as it initially emerged in various areas. He derives this analogy from a need to support his position that Bhaktapur is dominated by symbols, just as the first cities were

"dominated [not by] commercial relations, a primordial market, or ... fortress, but rather [by] ceremonial complex. ... The predominantly religious focus to the schedule of social activities associated with them leaves no room to doubt that we are dealing primarily with centers of ritual and ceremonial. ... Operationally [these centers] were instruments for the creation of political, social, economic, and sacred space, at the same time as they were symbols of cosmic, social, and moral order. Under the religious authority of organized priesthoods and divine monarchs, they elaborated the redistributive aspects of the economy to a position of institutionalized regional dominance, functioned as nodes in a web of administered ... trade, served as foci of craft specialization, and promoted the development of exact and predictive sciences" [19, quoted by Levy from Wheatley 1971:225f].

From this Levy deduces:

Bhaktapur is not an ancient city in terms of historical continuity, but its organization reflects many of the same principles that have been ascribed to otherwise differing ancient cities as members of a certain type of urban community. As a member *in some respects* of such a class it might well suggest, *mutatis mutandis*, something of what they *might have been*, and *may be thought of* as an archaic city [19, emphasis added].

The question is whether the 'reflection' of the principles of the primary urban generation in the organization of Bhaktapur is one of substance and not just appearance. Levy frames the analogy with another caveat: *mutatis*

mutandis (with necessary changes having been made/differences considered'—Websters). Instead of following up and actually considering the differences, he goes ahead to equivocate Bhaktapur with the primary urban generation. This again is incorrect usage of the comparative method because it identifies similarities and uses them to equivocate two different things without dealing with the differences or explaining the causes for these differences.

There are real problems in equating modern Bhaktapur with a primary urban generation. (1) The earliest cities in South Asia, of which Bhaktapur was not, arose as a secondary generation from the primary cities of Mesopotamia and west Asia. (2) Hinduism matured within an already advanced urban civilization prior to its entry into the Kathmandu Valley, and its expansion was accompanied by the relations of this civilization. (3) Bhaktapur was never characterized by the highly centralized redistributive economy, "elaborated ... to a regional dominance," of the primary urban generation with its assemblage of clay ration bowls. (4) Religion and symbols predominated in the primary urban generation because—in the absence of advanced commercial, industrial and military development and the associated rise of competing classes—priests monopolized power in the city. Kathmandu valley cities, in contrast, arose on the basis of comparatively well advanced regional class development. Certainly by the time of Jayasthiti Malla there could be no comparison between the two. (5) Religion only *seems* predominant in Bhaktapur because, with the Gorkhali conquest, the monarchy and its associated retainers, barracks, and provisioning and commercial activities were transferred entirely to Kathmandu; the religious aspect which seems so predominant when the city is taken in isolation is only part of the picture. It is even less significant now when we consider Bhaktapur as a part of a much larger political and commercial framework than even when the palace was located within Bhaktapur. Furthermore, as a result of the conquest, Bhatapur's well developed and relatively independent merchant sector dispersed itself across the countryside into bazaars or shifted to Kathmandu, but nevertheless often maintained kinship and property links within Bhaktapur.

Given his equivocation of Bhaktapur with the primary urban generation, Levy now allows himself to draw an analogy between Bhaktapur and the ancient Mediterranean city described in Fustel de Coulanges' *La Cité Antique* (1864) in which, unlike in the modern city, the various levels of organization lost none of their individuality or independence.

"When different groups became thus associated, none of them lost its individuality, or its independence...."

There was a nesting of these cellular units—"family, phratry, tribe, city"—each level marked by its relevant gods and rituals, and in contrast to, say, a Frenchman, "who at the moment of his birth belongs at once to a family, a commune, a department and a country," (ibid., 128) the citizen of the ancient city moved via a series of *rites de passage* over many years into membership in successively more inclusive units.

Each increasingly inclusive level of structure ... had its proper gods and cult. ...

Each unit had its interior and its exterior, and the interior was protected by secrecy. Above all, this was true of the household. ...

The ultimate unit to which people were related at this "stage" was the ancient city itself. There was "a profound gulf which always separated two cities. However near they might be to each other, they always formed two completely separate societies. ..." (ibid., 201).

What anchored and tied together this structure of cells was its rootedness in a fixed and local space. ... The city came to define in itself its own proper social unit and was sacred for that group within the city boundaries. ...

The problem for a summary rejection of Fustel's vision is that the particular formal features of his "Ancient City" that we have chosen to review here are characteristic of Bhaktapur [20-2].

Besides similarity again being taken as unity, there are basic flaws in Coulanges's assumption that previous levels retained their individuality with the development of subsequent ones. Once a form becomes subordinated into another one it takes an entirely different content, and the content of the subordinate form must be explained in terms of the subsequent one. An adequate explanation must account for the full extent of intercourse. Furthermore, the different cellular units did not appear in terms of the order of priority subsequently given them. The Ancient patriarchal family appeared in the course of the development of the division of labor within the clan in the face of expanding intercourse and commerce, and emerged fully as a slave

holding institution only with the dissolution of lineage organized society. The separation of various levels has to do with the appearance manufactured by religion from the substance of the relations and life, in pursuit of the ends and purposes defined within the latter.

This perception of the city in terms of autonomous cellular units leads Levy in chapter 5 to argue,

for the purposes of the city's organization, we may emphasize again that it is the output of the *thar* [clan] that is essential, not its internal affairs and organization—as long as those internal features guarantee that output.

From the standpoint of ritual, this may be true, but from the standpoint of the life of the city and its production, distribution of labor, products, and so forth, for which symbols and rituals are providing the "orientation" (using Weber's term), the internal organization of the *thars* ("clan-like social unit whose members share the same surname"—774), and family extends from the purposes set for them in the larger life of the city. Changes in the form of production and reproduction of the city bring about changes in the internal productive and reproductive processes of its elements. Furthermore, the extent and forms of the *thar* and family differ according to people's social status and position within the city. For example, *thars* of low caste laborers may be truncated and insignificant, whereas those of large merchant houses may be extensive with an important role in expansion and control of mercantile capital and other properties; similarly, for prominent Brahmans the patriarchal family is the means of expanding the pool of clients.

In addition, Levy's identification of Bhaktapur with the early ancient Mediterranean city has basic problems. First, it contradicts his previous analogy with Wheatley's "primary urban generation" because the Mediterranean cities arose already as a secondary urban form with well advanced class development, commerce, agriculture, and so forth. Second, Levy finds himself confronted with the problem of explaining how such a city can persist into the late twentieth century Asia when, as he points out, it had already disappeared by the middle of the first millennium B.C. in the Mediterranean as

part of a worldwide wave of 'breakthroughs' within the orbit of the 'higher civilizations,' during the first 700 or 800 years before the Christian Era in an 'axial age' consisting in the 'transcendence' of the limiting definitions and controls of these ancient forms Those who did not participate in this transformation have simply been rejected as ancestors of the modern world [22-3].

Levy makes the claim that due to "the lack of a politically unifying force" the heterodoxies of this axial age, with their "powerfully transcending attack on the symbolically constituted social order" (23), never succeeded in asserting themselves in India, and thus the subcontinent did not go through such an "axial transition."

What did prevail was ultimately the static social order of Hinduism, which, whatever its peripheral inclusion in their proper place of the socially transcendent gestures of renunciation and mysticism, was hardly any kind of 'breakthrough' into whatever the idea of an axial 'transformation' was meant to honor.

All of which is to suggest that traditional India and Bhaktapur, *in so far as* it may be characteristic of traditional India, are very old fashioned places indeed [23, emphasis added].

First of all, Levy introduces another unsubstantiated conditionality ("in so far as") in order to make an equivocation. The point that he wants to make is that an unchanged Bhaktapur never lost the character of the "primary urban generation," so that symbols may be seen as still constituting the city's social order. It would follow then that an analysis of the symbols will actually allow the ethnographer to discover the Bhaktapur that people know and the people who know Bhaktapur. However, the constituting character of symbols is contradicted by the argument that the existence of a politically unifying force is necessary for making the axial transition. Political unification presumes sufficient development of production, commerce and industry, along with correspondent development of social relations, to provide a material base for such unification. Herein he contradicts his general position that symbols constitute the social relations.

To complicate matters further, the ancient Mediterranean city states did not experience lasting political unification until the rise of the Roman Empire, several hundred years later than the period attributed to the "axial transformation." It was the lack of political unity that provided the scope for innovation and ferment. The subsequent political unification was a period marked by intellectual constriction and reduction of the civil versus the political—a situation from which Europe did not recover for another millennium (Southall n.d.).

As Bhaktapur, like "traditional India," has failed to make the axial transition to modern society, Levy contemplates the question of what the city is to be. Although Bhaktapur has not become modern, neither is it the

opposite pole of the dichotomy—primitive—since according to Wheatley "the society of the temple-city was neither fully *contractus*, *civitatis*, *Gesellschaft* nor organic" (1971:349, quoted on p. 24). Disagreeing with Ernst Gellner's (1974) position that such a middle ground did not make up any sort of distinctive type, Levy sees that Bhaktapur is an intermediate stage which provides

a kind of continent in the Great Divide, which has its own distinctive typological features, exemplifies its own distinctive and important principles in relation to both sociocultural organization and to thought, distinctive features that are blurred and lost in these classical oppositions. Bhaktapur and places that might have been analogous to it in the ancient world are illuminating for this middle terrain. Neither primitive nor modern, Bhaktapur has its own exemplary features of organization and of mind [25].

Thus Bhaktapur, as an ancient city, is indeed distinctive, a sort of missing link between the primitive and modern. The question then is in *what* sense is Bhaktapur distinctive. The significant feature in the ancient city as opposed to the primitive is that due to the enlarged size and complexity of a society no longer based on face-to-face interaction, "culturally shaped common sense" is insufficient for integrating the community. Thus in Bhaktapur (and archaic cities in general) people must use "'marked symbols' ... to solve the problems of communication induced by magnification of scale" (26). Marked symbols are those in which "meaning must *evidently* be sought elsewhere than in what the object or event seems to mean 'in itself.' They are opposed to 'embedded symbols' which are "associated with cultural structuring of 'common sense.'"

It is untrue that "primitive" people do not utilize both marked and embedded symbols. The difference between the archaic city and primitive society was not that the former did not use marked symbols, but that the associations of these symbols were facilitated and controlled by a class of specialists, a priesthood, which had emerged out of a well-developed division of labour. These priesthoods elaborated and developed out of the ritual practitioners of the clan organized societies and priest-kings of the segmentary states (Southall 1956, 1984, 1988), some of which complexly integrated people on a continental scale (Wolf 1982)—certainly no longer face-to-face organization. The difference was that urban society was organized no longer primarily in terms of ranked clans but now in terms of separate strata of families, or classes, within a clear division of labor based on landed

property. Although Levy describes the ranked clans as the normative order of the society, these serve as an organizing principle and ideological framework but are no longer the substance of the society. Urban class based divisions of labor developed on the basis of the domestication of plants and animals and development of associated technologies which marked the "Neolithic Revolution" from 20-7,000 B.C. The role and use of symbols in archaic cities was derived from these developments, and the difference between primitive society and the archaic cities must be dealt with in these terms.⁵

Once priest classes had emerged, then the "marked" character or inaccessibility of symbols (in terms of the interpretations Levi chose to privilege, that is) took on the added character of being accessible only through the interpretation of priests. As symbols in Bhaktapur could not be satisfactorily interpreted (from the anthropologist's viewpoint) by lay people (or elders, medicine wo[men], shamans or other rudimentary specialists among them), and Levy, following Dumont, felt he had to go to a class of specialists and texts to properly interpret the symbols, he evidently mixed up this control of interpretation of the marked character of symbols by priests with the marked character itself. This led him to deduce that archaic cities were differentiated from primitive society by the dichotomy in the embedded versus marked character of symbols.

He is misled because he was operating under the assumption that the symbols were significant on their own terms (in which a particular Brahmanical interpretation is privileged *a priori*). He identified characteristics in the control and use of symbols in society as being properties of symbols themselves. Furthermore, if he had not stopped his analysis at the ideological sphere, but continued to analyze the social aspects from which the symbols were derived—the class makeup of the city, markets, the division of labor and so forth—he would have been forced to question the other equivocations that he was making—Bhaktapur as "archaic city," "city of orthogenetic transformation," "primary urban generation," "ancient city," lack of "axial transformation" and so forth. Instead, he proceeds along an entirely different path.⁶

Bhaktapur ... can be considered to have ... typological analogies with archaic cities insofar as it represents a community elaborately organized on a spatial base through a system of marked symbolism. The particular symbolic system made use of is a variant of Hinduism. ... Hinduism is in many of its features, which we contrast with the "world historical religions," a system for and of what we have called 'archaic urban order. [27-8]

His logic is that if Bhaktapur is organized on spatial base through a system of marked symbolism, then it has typological analogies with archaic cities. Having shown here that marked symbolism in itself is not a distinguishing characteristic of archaic cities, the typological analogies that the city may have with archaic cities are meaningless. Hinduism provides the symbols. Evidently because Hinduism was determined to not have made an axial transformation, it has "in many of its features ... a system for and of ... archaic urban order" (28): ahistoricity, rootedness in local space, pantheon and inheritance, distributive of godhead into pantheon and sacred in the here and now (27). But many of his "world historical religions," especially in their orthodox forms with their saints, pilgrimage sites, and so forth, have similar elements.

Accepting that Bhaktapur represents an archaic urban order (disputed here), Levy needs to define the extent of that order so as to ascertain the limits necessary for understanding Bhaktapur and its Newars. For this he utilizes Dumont's "little kingdoms," which emerge out of and are absorbed into larger polities with the wax and wane of empires, to provide a territorial framework for his conceptual whole. Following Dumont (who was criticizing the use of the *village* as a social whole), he presents Bhaktapur, in another equivocation, with this atomistic unit as the "social whole" that anthropologists were looking for in the village.

Whatever the shifting historical relations between caste and territorial units might have been, the conditions that allowed for the formation and development of little kingdoms allowed for the fulfillment of Hinduism's potentials for ordering a community. Such little kingdoms seem to have represented, to borrow a term from ecology, 'climax communities' of Hinduism, where it reached the full development of its potentials for systematic complexity, and with it a temporary stability, an illusion of being a middle world, a *mesocosm*, mediating between its citizens and the cosmos, a *mesocosm* out of time" [28].

His argument here is that the Hindu ideal type is a little kingdom, the little kingdom is a social whole of limited extent, established within a definite territory and self sufficient, therefore the little kingdom is a 'climax community'⁷ allowing for the full development of Hinduism's potentials. Defining the community in terms of political characteristics, more specifically political symbols, in a city with an important commercial aspect seems to be stacking the deck. An important basis of cities, even primary

urban generations, almost by definition was not self sufficiency but trade, which is a recognition of integration and a whole which transcends the city. Political orders usually have an interest in presenting themselves for legitimization purposes as a social whole, but this must not be mixed up with their substance.

In the last section of the second chapter Levy, believing that he has defined Bhaktapur, returns to the question of "what is a Newar that he or she may know Bhaktapur?" He approaches this by summing up the differences between primitive society and an "archaic" Bhaktapur. He describes the primitive in terms of "mind-forged manacles" in which thought is relatively homogeneous, takes the rural for granted and is directly mediated by symbols which appear as common sense reality—in other words, non-transcendent. This is compared to the complex experience of the people of Bhaktapur, for whom symbols contain many realities. From this he deduces that it is difficult for the primitive folk to engage in critical philosophical thought and discourse and thus they can only be passive subjects of anthropological analysis, while the people of Bhaktapur, being able to engage in skeptical and critical analysis, are able to become potential collaborators with the anthropologist (29-30). Since primitive people cannot engage in critical thought, they cannot deal with incompatibilities—which they consequently relegate to the unconsciousness—and they engage in their actions because they see them as "natural," although outsiders see them as constructed (30). In contrast, the people of Bhaktapur deal with contradictions, but by providing satisfying answers and enchantment in the form of marked symbols. Only do the moderns free themselves of marked symbolism and relegate it to just being symbolism. Here I think again empirical data contradicts all three pictures. Anyone who has lived through the uncritical standoff of communism versus capitalism, as just one example of the complex "constructions" of "modern" society, must reflect back on it as an immense elaboration of marked symbolism and self delusion, a complete abandonment of critical thought and sanity by entire modern civilization, and a waste of an entire generation and immense planetary resources. Ironically, some of the most coherent criticism of the constructed character of the moderns' symbols was coming from "primitives" such as the American Plains Indians more than a hundred years ago when confronted with the genocidal expansionism of industrial capitalism (see Dee Brown's *I Buried My Heart at Wounded Knee*, as an example).

Documentation of extremely critical thought among the so-called primitives negates Levy's position and makes me think rather that the difference he sees in Bhaktapur arises from his choice of elite intelligentsia who, due to their advanced education and western university training, make

basically the same assumptions that he does. Even for the Bhaktapur intellectuals, however, he terms them "literati," involved in "uncritical speculation," as opposed to modern critical intellectuals, since the former have yet to pass through the axial transformation which would allow them to transcend themselves. Conr ad and Szenl enyi (1978) have identified these contrasts as two poles of a gradient of roles for intelligentsia as a generic class type, in which on the one end they can accept the assumptions and purposes set by society, particularly in their role as pure technicians or "technical intelligentsia"—dealing with knowledge concerned with implementation (*techn e*)—or on the other end they can address the assumptions and ultimate ends (*telos*) of society as "teleological intellectuals."⁸ In practice most intellectuals combine both aspects to fall somewhere in between on the gradient. Being modern does not necessarily make an intellectual radical nor does being primitive preclude a critical consciousness.

In the concluding chapter of the book Levy addresses a similar dichotomy within the symbolic sphere of Bhaktapur between the specialists in "ordinary dharma" and the "cult of dangerous deities," concerned with political power and operations not produced fully by assent to the dharmic value system, on one side, and the specialists in "dharma" and "ordinary Brahmanical religion," concerned with values and norms, on the other (601-9). Levy identifies the former specialists, involved in direct "manipulation of materials and force" (603), as the tantric priests and Brahmans serving the role of tantric priests. He identifies the latter, "manipulators of purity," concerned with salvation, as the Brahmans. Yet as regularizers of dharma, the Brahmans also seem to be technical, while as shapers of the conditions of power, the tantric priests seem to be teleological.

With all this Levy aims to critique Dumont's delineation of secular versus religious spheres, showing that both the "common order" (dealing with issues of power and force and generally addressing the issues referred to as secular) and the "strange, mostly religious," order (dealing with religious values and norms) are actually contained within a larger "religious universe," each with its own gods and religious practitioners as described above. By identifying Dumont's analysis as being too singular, when there are many other oppositions⁹ involved which crisscross the sacred versus secular oppositions, he is able to show that action in both orders is oriented through religious symbols and ritual. However, though he recognizes that the "common order" addresses issues of concern to individuals other than religious functionaries, because he treats symbols as priors, he ends up circling around again and framing the entire issue in terms of gods and symbols, without being able to provide insight into the secular or material

realm, or the substance of its relation to the ritual one. I address this issue in a book in preparation:

The fact that an "ideal" [the symbolic] exists as the determining purpose of activity makes it easy to assume that the ideas or their mediating symbols constitute the material world. People's ideal conceptions, however, arise according to the conditions of their existence, which themselves are products of previous activity. This is not an economic determinism or reductionism as is often made of this perspective. Ideas and institutions *do* orient and determine human life, but always as the products of previous activity and according to the conditions provided by it. Only when ideas are looked at in isolation from the historical context given by previous human activity do they seem to be constituting the material world [Mikesell n.d.]

The final chapter of the first section of the book attempts to address the question of the material base of the city, what Levy calls "the other order." However, Levy's aim is to selectively reinforce his thesis of changelessness with reference to non-symbolic elements—spatial and ecological constraints, production and distribution, demography and so forth. He makes a vague jab at materialist¹⁰ and structuralist approaches for their tendency to de-emphasize symbols as "epiphenomenal or 'expressive' or at best to some modestly supplementary status" (53). The critique is valid, but Levy in turn limits his consideration of the orientation given by symbols to ritual and symbolically framed normative actions rather than relating them to historical action—outside the official history of kings and regimes, that is.

The bent of his argument is to reinforce the position of Bhaktapur's timelessness. Of the physical city he argues that its appearance has changed little from the end of the reign of Malla kings. He finishes with a description of decay, filth, earthquakes, fruit bats and jackals which steal children with the observation: "All this is a reminder that Bhaktapur was and is still a clearing in a yet more ancient world" (56). Of the demography he concludes, "All available indexes suggested that at the time of this study Bhaktapur's population was, and had been for a very long time, quite stable" (58). Of the population density he argues that the urban areas of Kathmandu have one of the highest population densities in the world of five to seven hundred persons per square mile, almost twice that of New York City, and Bhaktapur has a population of 117,000 per sq. mi., which is to imply that the city is a more crowded living space.

Without secondary analysis which deals with the two sets of data within their proper context, the comparison is superficial and spurious. New York City has large financial and industrial centers with non-residential industrial and office space. Great amounts of space are given over to the automobile transport system and public parks. And much of the population is dispersed to residences in outlying suburban areas and neighboring bedroom communities. In other parts of the city very large populations are densely packed into urban ghetto housing and public works housing— "The Projects" —with unrecorded "doubling up" of poor families (Dehavenon and Boone 1992). On Bhaktapur's side, given the city's largely agricultural population, as documented by Levy, the agricultural lands must be counted as part of Bhaktapur's urban space, which would greatly reduce the population density.

For the relationship with the central government Levy outlines the formal political organization and stresses its centralized character, implying that "modern" type politics have not yet entered into the city. "For the time being ... at the city level Bhaktapur has little effective local political control. There is plenty of politics within some of the component units of the traditional city organization, but that is another matter" (62). Although the activity of parties, underground at the time of his study, was not in its domain, ignoring the subsequent assertion of Communist Party control over city politics, the conditions and forces that gave rise to it, and the contradictions involved¹¹ allows Levy to avoid issues that would in many aspects contradict his analysis—that city politics takes an essentially "traditional" form, the city's changelessness and archaic character, the uncritical character of the city's intelligentsia as a literati, the exclusivity of a symbolic orientation, and so forth. Even if the communists were inaccessible to the analysts at that time, adequate analysis requires that the theory must subsequently be remade to fit all the facts and not stick to a certain, incomplete and highly selective kind of facts for heuristic purposes.¹²

In dealing with the agricultural economy, Levy observes that as the proportion of farmers is similar to that of rural communities, "Bhaktapur and its hinterland do not represent the familiar urban-peasant polarization prevalent elsewhere" (62). He argues that the agriculture is subsistence oriented, and that cash comes from non-farm activities and farm product sales. That sixty percent of the farming households own some land and pay 25 to 28 percent of the value of the produce in rents is attributed to the Land Acts dating from 1957 onwards. As a result, citing Acharya and Ansari (1980:113), he argues that the differentiation in income is much less than that found in Kathmandu or Patan (68-9). Assuming the success of the Land Acts he argues, without data, that the redistribution of land has preserved

conservatism by taking the land from the hands of "traditional landowning classes, the Brahmans and merchants," into those of the more conservative "farmers."

The land reforms with their resulting marked improvement in the economic and social position of the farmers in Bhaktapur has [sic] had an unintended effect. To the degree that traditional landowning classes, the Brahmans and merchants, lost their lands and land revenues and the farmers gained them, the newly wealthy farmers have come to be the supporters and clients of much of the traditional religious system as well as important employers of Brahmans. Less educated and less open to modernization than the higher classes, this transition has helped to slow down change and to support and conserve the old system [64].

This position, which contradicts one quoted from M. C. Regmi that the land reform had little effect, seems to be an apology for the modernization thesis that argues that progressive "rich" farmers are the agents of modernization; interestingly, his high caste interlocutors come from among the progressive group. In fact, the ownership of "some land," but not the most productive land, is an integral part of the general system of exploitation. The whole position indicates how the ethnographer can unconsciously become an unwitting collaborator in the class programs of his indigenous interlocutors, who themselves may unconsciously accept it as "common sense." By restricting itself to the symbolic sphere, the analysis limits its ability to take a critical stance and leads the anthropologist into the role of Levy's literati.

The whole analysis of "the other order" comes down to reinforcing Levy's main thesis that the city is changeless, justifying his designation of it as an archaic city stuck somewhere between the primitive and modern.

We have described a city that ... still retained many of the features which had long characterized it ... dense but stable population ... relatively little related to larger economic and political networks. Its economy, which had a large nonmonetary component, was still heavily based on internal (including its bordering farms) production and exchange. For the city as a whole it was more of an administered than a political unit, the sources of power and decision were elsewhere, in the non-Newar national government at Kathmandu. That external administration was minimally disruptive, and it was certainly not innovative. *Bhaktapur was then in both fact and ideology "self sufficient" and turned in on itself* [68, italics added].

In contrast, I have emphasized throughout this critique that Bhaktapur *appears* to be "self sufficient and turned in upon itself" because the full urban culture encompasses something wider than just the city itself, particularly a city defined in terms of Brahmanic texts, which Levy mistakenly attributes as being a "totality." As he says that it was "in fact" so, his analysis must also account for facts that argue otherwise.

This dichotomy of microcosm and mesocosm strongly parallels that of civil society and the state, which raises questions of the autonomy of the two spheres and the validity of speaking in terms of a separate mesocosm at all. The nineteenth century critique of this twentieth century argument was that contradictions that appear in the state originate out of the processes, interests and struggles within the civil society, and that not only are the two spheres not autonomous from each other, but that the state is constituted by the civil society rather than the other way around. The same sort of argument may be made here for the symbolic, which for Levy *is* the state in Bhaktapur, as opposed to the material world.

Notes

1. On this matter Declan Quigley (whose highly pertinent book I only obtained after completing this essay) writes that a mistake of the colonial understanding of caste "is the assumption that there is one unambiguous interpretation of the *varna* system which outstanding Sanskrit scholars have access to. The *varna* system is a set of ideas developed to explain an early division of labour, but these ideas have always been interpreted in different, contradictory ways" (1993:16). Even among Brahmins there are "at least six different Brahmanic personae, with dramatically conflicting characteristics, [which] manifest themselves in the Hindu world" (1993:56). Levi's use of university students and instructors as collaborators and authorities further complicates the picture, as does the existence of Brahmins as prime ministers, party leaders, and promoters of the sale of public enterprises to Indian businessmen and of IMF restructuring, World Bank programs, and so on.
2. This should reciprocally highlight the anthropologist's *own* collaborative relation with his indigenous specialist collaborators, particularly when he privileges their particular perspective as having authority over alternative views, statuses, and discourses in society. As Quigley (1993:48) reminds us, giving over authority to a particular view necessarily implies providing power with legitimacy: legitimacy of the class interests and programs his collaborators extend out of and represent. ("There cannot ... be status (authority) without power. The

- very concept of authority is premised on the idea that there is some relation of unequal power which would be problematic if not legitimated.")
3. If he is to refer to texts, it seems to me that school text books, which most young people of all social classes read, or now cable television would be much more valid.
 4. This is debateable; but what is certain is that the city was greatly transformed due to its defeat by Prithivi Narayan Shah, causing it to lose its character as a 'political' city (Weber) and in large part many elements of its commercial character: supplying garrisons, etc.
 5. See Mikesell (1991) for preliminary discussion of the process with reference to South Asia and Nepal.
 6. Quigley (1993:48) makes the same point: "But what Brahmanism represents as devine, unalterable truth, sociological comparisons quickly demonstrate to be contingent on a particular conjunction of factors thrown up by particular historical conditions. What Brahmanism cannot do (because to do so would be to deny its own legitimacy) is to explain what these conditions are, and why caste is not timeless as the ideology of Brahmanical purity would have us believe. Any adequate explanation must go beyond its conditional Brahmanical validation."
 7. It seems somewhat inappropriate to apply the term of climax community, which refers to a system of mutually interlinked biological organisms which have filled out the various ecological niches to the extent that they live together in a system of relative stasis—in which the subject is natural laws—to a highly differentiated and divided class society—in which the subject is human activity. As various traditions of sociology and history have addressed this issue and have developed an array of more appropriate terms, there is no need to go outside the discipline for a term.
 8. Hegel, for example, was a modern "critical" intelligentsia to a point, but beyond that he was a literati, serving as an apologist for the Kaiser's regime. Similarly, Lenin was revolutionary until he came to power, then once in power he started rationalizing the regime with his doctrine of revolution in one country.
 9. Dangerous deities vs. benign deities, tantric religion vs. ordinary religion, secular vs. religious, conventional vs. ritual, king vs. Brahman vs. other kinds of priests and polluting *thars*, worldly power vs. other worldly force, unclean sweeper vs. clean Brahman, purity irrelevant to order vs. purity relevant to order, bordering/outside city vs. inside city, pre-initiation vs. after initiation.

10. Specifically the dependency theory variation on materialism which Cameron, Seddon and Blaikie are the early foreign proponents and which is taught as "conflict theory" in the indigenous social science departments—and which in contradistinction to my own understanding beginning with creative activity or production, focuses on structures such as "infrastructures" mentioned disparagingly by Levy.
11. For example, the strife between Communist and Congress, and between the CP(M-L) and CP(Farm Labor) parties along the lines of untouchables versus Jyapu farmers, and the patron-client type leadership of the latter by a son of one of the big landowning families despite claims of being a workers' party.
12. At the time of his study, furthermore, there were other struggles brewing, such as the intense fight over the control of the Bhaktapur literacy programs arranged for Newar women between the women's groups and the Panchas (promulgating the government textbook financed and designed by international aid agencies—USAID, UNICEF, World Education, etc.—and accompanying pro-Panchayat reading materials versus locally developed curriculum). The women never capitulated, although they and the program workers were harrassed, jailed and beaten by the police. Levi's presentation of his limited analysis as the whole of Bhaktapur does great injustice to such initiatives and justifies reactionary policies against them in a struggle that continues unabated under the guise of "preserving" democracy.

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BOOK REVIEW

Industrial Growth in Nepal. 1994. Govinda Prasad Regmi. New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Pages XI + 235 including appendices.

Govind Prasad Regmi's book under review is a valuable contribution to the state of Nepal's industrial development. Divided into nine chapters, the book is a revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation. Chapter I deals with the objectives and methodology whereas chapter II concentrates mainly on the strategies and dependency analysis of industrialisation based on social and politicoeconomic relations between the centre and the periphery originating from colonial times. Since the analysis revolves around the conventional argument that the growth and development of the centre were based on and financed by the exploitation of the periphery either through imports of raw materials or exports of manufactured products to the periphery, the intention of the author seems to reveal the adverse effect of such mechanism on the growth and development of underdeveloped countries. The dependency paradigm, which goes beyond the classical view of centre-periphery equation that demands host of other structural elements into consideration, however, remains unexplained in the present book. Chapter III on the industrial growth in the Nepalese economy bypasses the operating system, method and issues on industrial production under the broader area of industrial production when the author analyses issues like technology, productivity levels and so forth.

Chapter IV while analysing the distribution, structure and growth of manufacturing industries in various regions of the country concludes that the percentage share of industrial units located in the Eastern and central regions has declined over the years, whereas those units located in the Western, Mid-Western and Far Western regions increased throughout the period of 1965-66 to 1986-87. An attempt is made to review other areas that help reduce regional imbalances in industrialization, like the development of transport, communication and power sectors, besides associating the connectivity with India in the bordering areas regarding the determination of the locational pattern of the industries. Further details on the Nepalese and Indian market

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sife, export market and so forth with a separate provision of the discussion of market of industrial product would have been an added advantage in reviewing the structure and growth patterns at various levels of industrial aggregation.

Capital-output ratio and profitability rate is calculated to find out capital requirement and profitability rates. Fair professional exercise is found to have been completed to analyse the sources of finance of various manufacturing industries and their capital structures in Chapter V.

Chapter VI attempts to estimate partial productivity of manufacturing industry, calculate total factor productivity indices, estimate the Cobb-Douglas production function and finally examine wage differentials across manufacturing industries by regions and major occupations. The study reveals that inspite of increases in labour productivity, the overall share of wages in value added declined over the study period of 1972-73 to 1986-87. Since the study has found out that the increases in labour productivity achieved during the study period were primarily determined by increases in capital intensity, the author disqualifies a previous study which concludes that increased supply of labour due to improved transport network as well as decreased skill intensity resulted in a decline in the share of wages.

Commendable work has been done in the calculation of total factor productivity index to examine the total factor productivity by industries and has found out that the manufacturing sector as a whole experienced a decline in total productivity over the years.

An attempt has been made in Chapter VII to review alternative measures of import substitution by comparing import availability ratios between two periods, current and previous. Similarly to assess the overall demand and supply situations of manufactured goods in the country, an analysis has been made on the domestic production, imports, exports and total supply situations by industrial commodities.

The study reveals that because of the import restrictions, only in the supply of a few consumer goods like beverages, cigarettes and tobacco, animal feed, and so forth, Nepal seemed to have attained an almost self-sufficient stage during 1981-82. However, several studies have exhibited that despite the import substitution orientation in consumer goods, substitution has been very limited, due mostly to the slow growth in domestic production in comparison to the growth in imports.

It is true that import substitution has been a major source of growth of industrial output in Nepal's economy, especially for investment goods. However, because of the fact that much of the consumer goods are still imported, they also provide a greater scope for further import substitution. In other words, the demand for such goods is so huge that it is not possible in the short-run to minimise imports.

The author's contribution in Chapter VIII lies only in highlighting the features of Selected Industrial Policies until 1987 on an *ad hoc* basis. Frequent changes in industrial policies, unreliable and unnecessarily delayed mechanism to offer committed incentives by the government, weaker employment generation schemes in the industrial sector, poor planning of investment in successive policies regarding specific product and size which have comparative advantages and so forth are not found documented appropriately to the extent a critical analysis of any industrial policy may demand. Some remarkable developments in the Industrial Policy, 1987, like the relaxation of licensing and registration procedure and revision in the level of effective rate of protection are also given insufficient treatment. Since policies on industry, foreign investment and one window, technology transfer, industrial enterprises and so forth that came during 1992 are not within the preview of the present work, confusing terminology 'liberalisation policies' (p. 156) without proper introduction could have been replaced by the term like 'economic reforms' and linked it with major features of the above mentioned new policies.

Chapter IX incorporates common features of less developed economies like higher share of consumer goods industries in the total manufacturing output, domination of consumer goods industries by food manufacturing, gradual emergence of investment goods industries as a component of modern manufacturing and so on. No effort seems to have been done to correlate the major findings of the study with the objectives and schemes prepared in Chapter I.

A creative and authoratative work with such a high level of expertise becomes an extremely pathetic venture when one quickly goes through Chapter VIII and IX. The mission of the scheme to offer critical appraisal of industrial policies in Chapter VIII and an effort to provide synoptic view of the major findings uniformly and rather exhaustibly in Chapter IX are defeated. Continuity is thus broken, coherence forgotten, and professionalism shaken. If we look at the work in its entirity, the author should nevertheless be commended for making an attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of important facts of industrialisation in the context of the changing Nepalese economic scenario.

– Bishwambher Pyakuryal