


# BULLETIN OF TIBETOLOGY



NEW SERIES

1980

Nos. 1—3

SIKKIM RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF TIBETOLOGY  
&  
OTHER BUDDHIST STUDIES  
GANGTOK : INDIA

The Bulletin of Tibetology seeks to serve the specialist as well as the general reader with an interest in this field of study. The picture portrays Tibetology's massive building in the typical Himalayan Architectural Style.

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# **BULLETIN OF TIBETOLOGY**

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## FOREWARD

In the following pages is presented a critical edition of Acarya Dignaga's (Dinnaga) famous work *Alambanapariksa* along with its Sanskrit commentaries, Tibetan texts and English translation by Prof. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, a distinguished scholar in the domain of Buddhist philosophical studies.

Considering the very paucity of such a kind of text we have thought it advisable to publish this book in our Quarterly Journal for the benefit of those interested in the Indian Logic.

The text was first rendered into Sanskrit from its Tibetan version and published in the Adyar Library Series, Madras (Tamil Nadu), 1941.

Dignagacarya was very likely Kalidasa's contemporary, who flourished between 400 and 550 A.D. Dignaga who flourished towards the end of the fifth century A.D. was a noted dialectician. He is regarded as the father of Indian logic.

Dignaga was first an exponent of Mahayana Vijnanavada. There are at least nine treatises to his credit. They are: *Abhidharmakosamarmapradipa*, *Astahasrika-prajnaparamita*, *Alambanapariksa*, *Trikalapariksa*, *Hetucakradamaru*, *Nyayamukha*, *Pramanasamuccaya*, *Pramanasamuccayavritti* and *Nyayapravesa*, excepting the first and the last, not a single one has come down to us in original Sanskrit. His *magnum opus* is, however, the *Pramanasamuccaya*, wherein he establishes the Vijnanavada philosophy, only fragments of this work have been quoted by the Hindu logicians.

The inordinate delay in printing the book is due to a woeful lack of scripts concerned in the press. It is, therefore, regrettable in the extreme.

Lastly, I must thank the Gangtok Press, Gangtok, for undertaking the publication of this text.

*Anukul Chandra Banerjee*

Gangtok,  
1.9.82

## PREFATORY NOTE


The ALAMBANAPARIKSA of DIGNAGA was first rendered into Sanskrit from its Tibetan version and published by me in the Adyar Library series in 1941. I have now added to it the Tika of Vinitadeva also rendering into Sanskrit from its Tibetan version. Dharmapala's Tika has now been revised in the light of two sub-commentaries in Chinese and included in this volume. It is hoped that this publication may benefit scholars of the subject as it has been provided with the Tibetan Texts in their original forms of both the text and the Tika for ready reference.

Lastly, I should like to offer my grateful thanks to the authorities of the Sikkim Research Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok for publishing my present volume in the Bulletin of the Institute.

*N. A. Sastri*

*Santiniketan*

5.4.80





**The ALAMBANA--PARIKSA**

( आलम्बन परीक्षा )

of

**Acarya Dignaga**

**With**

**Commentaries**

of

**Vinita-Deva**

**and**

**Dharmapāla**

**and**

**With**

**Tibetan Texts**

**Edited and translated**


**With Notes**

by

**N. Aiyaswami Sastri**

**Santiniketan**


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
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PART I

ENGLISH TEXTS



## A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE TREATISE PRELIMINARY NOTE

Acārya. Dignaga takes for granted the grasping by the mind of its object through process of assuming its form, i.e. *Sārūpya*, co-ordination between the subject (mind) and its object. This theory has served the author as a main weapon to dismiss the reality of external world in this treatise.

Now we have to find out who pleaded for reality of our objective universe and who propounded the said co-ordination-theory. The early Buddhists though they are realists, never pleaded for the theory. V. the latest champion of the school Bhadanta Subhagupta and his treatise *Bāhyārtha-Siddhi-kārikā* in this Bulletin, in 1967. Later Buddhists like Sautrantikas on the other hand have adopted freely the theory for their realistic approach to the universe, cfr. my *Bā. Siddhi with Notes*. But they were not original propounders of the theory.

It appears, therefore, that the Sankhya-yoga-masters were the first to draw attention to the ever-occurring phenomenon of co-ordination between the mind or intellect and its object. The idea will be made clear in the following statements of Patanjali, the author of the yoga sutras : yoga is an absolute check of *Citta-Vṛtti*; then at that time the soul remains in his own form. In the other states the soul is assimilated with *Vṛttis* (mind's functions). *Vṛttis* are five in all; they are: sensible experience, its reverse, empty thought, sleep and memory. Sensible experiences are: perception, inference and scripture, these 3 *Pramanas*. Reverse is a wrong knowledge founded on an absent object, e.g. knowledge of a silver piece on the shell, vain thought is devoid of the object occurring in pursuit of the word-meaning. Sleep is a metamorphosis of the mind having as the object the idea of non-existence (*abhāva-*

*prayyaya-dlambana* अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना ) The absolute check of these Vṛttis are secured by means of constant efforts and desirelessness.(yoga sutras, I, 2-12)

Of these statements the most relevant to our purpose is the 4th. Sutra which states that the soul in other states assumes the forms of the experienced things, i.e. *Vṛtti-Sārūpya* 'Other states' -when the man is engaged in pursuit of the world activity. The following is another noteworthy statement:

An entity becomes known or unknown to the mind because the mind acquires the image of the entity reflected in itself (IV, 17).

All the metamorphoses are known to the soul (Puruṣa) because he has no transformation of any kind, अपरिणामित्व v. IV, 18.

On the sankhya side the author of the Karika, Īśvara-kṛṣṇa does not speak much of the Sārūpya-theory, however the anonymous commentary, yuktidipika refers to it more than once. He explains vṛtti as विषयाकारपरिणामात्मिका, 'a transformation in the shape of its content' (v. pp. 103, 112-114). More interesting is its citation of two verses from an ancient author on p. 80:

Just as the intellect appears as if it is of the form of an object (अर्थाकार इव) just so the soul being brightened by the intellect (बुद्ध्या आभासमानः) is said to be intelligent, (boddha) like a jewel (maṇi). Whichever is the mind's act, i.e. metamorphosis, the soul, Puruṣa, also assumes all such forms of the intellect which forms pertain to other than the self because he is conscious (चेतन.)

Ample advantage of Sārūpya vāda has been taken by the Advaita Vedantins in expounding their epistemology of perception. Refer to the Vedānta Paribhāṣā of Dharmaraja Ch. I. pp. 13, 18:

"Just as the water of a tank, going out through a hole and entering the field through channels comes



to have even like those fields, a quadrangular or other figure, similarly, the internal organ too which is of the nature of light going out through the sense of sight, etc. and reaching to the locality of contents like pot, is modified in the form of contents like the pot. This same modification is called psychosis, *vṛtti* v. the text edited and translated by S.S.Suryanarayana Sastri, Adyar Library series, Adyar 1942.

Sri Sankaracharya has also accepted Jñāna as *sākāra*, endowed with the form of its content, v. for example the *Gitabhāṣya*, p. 446 of Gita Press edn. ad XVIII, 50.

The above citations would amply prove that the *sārūpya-vāda* was originally expounded by the Brahmanical writers, and then it was grafted on to Buddhism by the Yogacara-Buddhists in order to establish their Idealistic Philosophy. v. My *Bāh. Siddhi*, Notes: 151, 162, 165, 168—9 170, 183, etc. and my paper on Idealistic Buddhism in the *Journal of Tirupati Research Institute*, Vol. I pt. 3.

Now let us turn to the topics of the treatise.

The author, Acarya Dignaga in the first part of his treatise, i.e. Aphorisms 1-5, sets up the views of the Realists who consider the objective universe in the external as absolutely real in one form or other which the author proves to be something imaginary. In the second part the author's own opinion about the issue is presented. This is a convenient method of treatment generally adopted in the ancient India Scientific Treatises. The method goes under the heading: *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhānta* or *Anyā-Samaya* and *Sva-Samaya*, others' view and own view (cp. Vinitadeva's *Tika*, ad 6. Introductory).

According to the author the Realists may broadly be classified under three groups as follows:

1. The advocates of atoms as direct objects of our consciousness.

2. The advocates of the combined atoms acting as before.
3. The advocates of the atomic integrated forms behaving so.

As to the problem of the identifications of these philosophers, the first group may be taken for certain to be the early Buddhists like the Sarvastivadin-Vaibhasikas on the authority of Vasubandhu, Subhagupta and others. As to the second group we have no means to ascertain who they are except the well-known Chinese commentator Kue-Chi who reveals them to the authors of the Sutra-sect, perhaps the Sautrantikas. The advocacy of the third proposition is attributed to Vagbhata, etc. by Vinitadeva and to Sanghabhadra and his followers by Kue-Chi.

Vasubandhu also speaks of three opinions on the external objects: 1) The first opinion pleads that the object of our cognition is one whole, *avayavin* (like the pot, etc.); 2) the second one holds it to be many separate elements i.e. atoms and 3) the third view is: it is a totality of atoms (*Samghāta*) The first opinion is mentioned there as that of the Vaiśeṣika masters. The advocates of the second and the third view are not stated there. We may, however, surmise that they are the Sarvāstivadi-Vaibhāsikas from the context. Though the simple atoms do not get combined as they are partless, the molecules of atoms can get combined. So say the Kasmira Vaibhasikas (Vimsika, ad. 13th. ver.)

### REALISTS

1. The Buddhist Realists declare: The atoms are truly objects of the sensory consciousness, because they are the real cause of that consciousness.

Dignaga replies: They are not its object, because the atoms are not cognized directly (lit. not reflected in it); example: the sense organ. (Though it causes consciousness,

it is not, at all, cognized by it). Vasubandhu's answer to them is very simple, viz. the atoms are not proved to be real entities, (*paramāṇuḥ na siddhyati*).

The reason for Dignaga's complex answer is that he assumes two criteria for judging *ālambana*, (object-cause), viz. 1) causality and 2) image-imposing (*ākāra-arpaṇa*). Of these two the first criterion has been accepted by all schools of Buddhism and it is brought under the category of the four conditions: *hetu*, *samanantara*, *ālambana* and *adhipati* (Abh. Kosa, II, 62, Madh. Sastra I. 2. etc.) The import of causality is well kept in view in the usage of the term in the following contexts: The visible discharges the function of *ālambana* towards the visual consciousness (चक्षुर्विज्ञानस्य रूपमालम्बनकृत्यं करोति ।) Śālis. Sutra, p. 15, l. 4). *Alambana* is a thing by support of which consciousness arises, that is to say, a supporting element in the process of cognition is *ālambana* (Madh. Avatāra, my Skt. text. p. 77). *Samjñā* is taking up of content and *nimitta*, content (*visaya*) is the same as *ālambana*. *nimitta* is particulars of the same, i.e. blue, yellow and others and the factor of their determination (*Trimsikūbhāṣya*, p. 21 & 23). The Satya-Siddhi also equates *ālambana* with *nimitta* (ch. 77: निमित्तालम्बनं विज्ञानम् । cp. ch. 191). What is productive of knowledge is *ālambana* (Slokavartika, p. 285: उत्पादकस्यैवालम्बनत्वम् ।) The cause is the same as *ālambana* (Umbeka in Slokavārtika-tātparyatika, p. 278). Dharmakīrti also confirms this idea: "Causality is no other than objectivity" pra. var. II, 234: The object is what is a causal entity" Ibid. 246. "A non-cause is non-object" Ibid, 257. It is also noteworthy that Dignaga himself cites a śāstra in his comment on Aphorism 2 to stress the causality a main part of *alambana*. There is no mention of the other part, image-evoking, which omission Vinitadeva justifies by saying that this image-evoking is accepted in this system [of the Sautrantikas] v. his Tikā, pp95below.

Now we may be sure that the above said second criterion of alambana viz. image-imposing is a new element introduced by Dignaga under the dominant influence of the Sautrantika Realists who hold sway in the field of epistemology of the Buddhists. Since the early Buddhists could not conceive of the image or no-image of a knowledge, they hold that the atoms become a direct object of the sensory consciousness. The atoms are very subtle and invisible; how can they be admitted as a direct object? Bhadanta Subhagupta, a latest champion of the school provides a fitting answer. It is as follows:—

An atom which may manifest its own single knowledge cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form; how then could each of them appear in our knowledge? (Var. 43) Atoms cannot each individually and independently appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the atoms never flashes out in our consciousness (44). The atoms though they are mutually un-related and devoid of parts nevertheless become integrated and accomplish the gross things like the globe of earth and others (56)... The person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a mountain and such other places could count the atoms with their number and other distinction (59). Therefore it is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all exist.....(60). Refer to the *Bahyarthā Siddhi* in the Bulletin of Tibetology, Gangtok, 1967 for further details.

The Vaibhasikas appear to hold the view that the atoms are not perceptible to us. They nevertheless form the knowledge-object because they are basically the cause of knowledge. A Digambara Jaina, Sumati by name is also credited to maintain the atoms as direct object (v. our remarks below on the third proposition). There are two opinions about the atoms' behaviour: 1) they exist

allowing some inter space in their midst and 2) they remain without any intermediate space (१) सान्तराः परमाणवः २) निरन्तराः परमाणवः । ). The atoms of no interspace have been reciprocal support and are united. Vasubandhu in his Kośa says that the Kasmira Vaibhasikas advocate the atoms as having some inter space and remaining in a close vicinity ( सान्तराःपरमाणवः ) but do not get combined; and that Bhadanta, (a Sautrantika master) asserts that the atoms remain with no interspace and due to this they are termed combined ( निरन्तरत्वे तुस्पृष्टसंज्ञा) He prefers this Bhadanta's opinion ( भदन्तमत श्रेष्ठंयम्, १) Kośavyākhyā. I, p. 99, 3). See also my discussion on this topic in the Abh. Problem, Br. Vidya, XVIII, p. 226f. There is one more opinion holding the combined atoms as object-cause. (See Tattva. s. pañjikā, p. 556, and Haribhadra's Abhs. aloka, pp. 372-74). This is probably the opinion of the Sautrantikas, see discussion below.

Dignāga elucidates his meaning of “ the content ” (viśaya) thus: “ A content is that whose characteristics are specified by the knowledge; this is so because the knowledge appears in the form of content. The atoms cannot behave like that hence not object.”

2. Then let us take the combined atoms as object. The author demurs to it: “Consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it, (i.e. combined atoms do not cause the consciousness) because they do not exist in substance like the double moon.” For the combined atoms are not, in fact, different from the simple ones.<sup>2a</sup>

Vasubandhu's reply to this proposition is also simple. No atom is proved to be real (*paramanuh na Siddhyati*).

The author further makes his standpoint plain thus: “ What object evokes the consciousness endowed with its own image, that is properly regarded as actual object of

that consciousness: because that alone is spoken of duly as the productive cause of the consciousness. But the aggregates of atoms are not so. (i.e. productive cause). Example, double moon, it is perceived on account of one's own defective eye. Its perception is not caused by the double moon, as there exists no object like the double moon. Similar are the aggregates of atoms."

This proposition, according to Kue-Chi comes from the Sutra-sect, i.e. Sautrantikas; but this finding is not corroborated by any other source. We have, however, enough quotations pleading for the aggregate of atoms to be object-cause. Kue-Chi clarifies their views thus: The indivisible atoms that are substantially existing are not the object of the five-fold consciousness because no indivisible atoms are manifested in it. These seven indivisible atoms constitute jointly one *anurūpa*, a gross atom. This gross body of atoms though phenomenally true is the object of the five-fold consciousness, because there this gross form is reflected.....“(see p. below). This opinion of gross body of atoms joining together is also referred to as it is pleaded by the Kasmira Vaibhasikas in the *Vimśatika* ad 13. The characteristic of this opinion is that the gross body of atoms though it phenomenally true has been accepted as the object of consciousness. It is obvious that in this proposition the second criterion of *ālambana*, i.e. image-imposing has been much stressed and preferred. This is confirmed by the statement of the *Pramanavartikavṛtti* p. 230: आकारार्पणत्वं विषयलक्षणम् । “The characteristic of a content is its capacity of imposing image.” Note also *Pra. vartika*, II, 224: The Knowledge in what form appears, that form is spoken of as graspable of that knowledge ( तत्र बुद्धिर्यदाकारा तस्यास्तद्ग्राह्यमुच्यते । ) The graspable here is multitude of atoms, (anu-sancaya-vṛtti.) This is the reason for citing an earlier authority to the effect that the causality is equally an important ingredient of *ālambana* (v. Tikā on p. 92 )

Dignāga's objection stands on the ground that the aggregates of atoms are phenomenally true, hence cannot serve as the object-cause. This objection is dispelled by Dharmakīrti in these sayings: The same self-characteristic of things (*svulaksana*) is the ultimate substance (*dravya sat*) because the substantial thing is that which is capable of discharging a purposive action (Nyāyabindu, I, 14-15). We should remember that the above sayings are made from the Sautrāntikas' point of view. The idea of integrated atom, *Samcita-ānu* is also upheld by Subhagupta on the same pattern of argument: "The atoms being integrated discharge a uniform function and are termed *Sancita*, 'integrated' and to the upholder of this opinion how are the atoms non-substance, *adravya*? (Bāh. Siddhi ver. 39). Dharmakīrti also justifies this proposition in these sayings: "The effect is caused by several things; yet what (knowledge) arises imitating what form, that form is regarded as "grasped" by that knowledge" (Pr. var. II, 248). All knowledge flashes out from its contents, the knowledge though caused by others (like the sense, etc.) assumes the form of its content only, (but not of the sense-organ)" Ibid. 268.

The following citations would enable us to have a glimpse of how the advocates of the combined atoms as knowledge-content meet difficulties in their way:—

<sup>8</sup> Integration, multitude, homogeneity (are synonyms); the sensory consciousness is related to it. The sense of homogeneity (*sāmānya*) is necessarily geared up with discriminative knowledge. Pra. Vār. II, 194. comment: The five consciousness-bodies are of integrated *ālambana*; this is the conclusion, *siddhānta*. It is also stated (in Pra. Samuccaya) the perception as it is effected from more than one thing is focused on the homogeneity (*Samanya-gocara*) as its own content. Thus the multitude of atoms is termed *Sancita*,

'integrated'; the same is thought of as *sāmānya*; the sensory knowledge is centered upon it. The sense of *Sāmānya* is followed by a discriminative knowledge; how could it be then a discrimination-free perception? So the author says: "The atoms are formed in co-ordination with other atoms, then they are named *sancita* "integrated" and serve as *nimitta*, object-cause of the knowledge-rise." The so formed integrated atoms are meant in the saying: The five consciousness-bodies are of integrated *ālambana*. That they serve as *nimitta*, cause of the knowledge-rise is meant in the saying because "it is effected from more than one thing."

Such distinction of atoms is not possible in the absence of other atoms; the same (knowledge) is not fixed in a single atom, the knowledge is said as focused on *sāmānya*. (Pr. Var. II, 196). Comment: The distinction of atoms, is their capacity of evoking knowledge. The individual atoms are imperceptible, but they, being combined, become perceptible. Therefore, since the knowledge is not invariable with a single atom it is said by the truth-speaker (Dignāga) that knowledge is focused on the *sāmānya*, that is the knowledge has as its content the multitude of atoms (*paramāṇu-saṅghāta-viśaya*). But, it is not to mean that knowledge is focused on *Sāmānya*, generality other than the atoms. Then how can the objection of the perception becoming a discrimination-haunted be raised on pretext that the perception is focused on the generality? cp. The same idea is stressed in the Chap. I, 88-90.

The above statement of Dharmakīrti in his Pra. Vārtika makes obvious that Dignāga is explaining that the combined atoms evoke a pure perceptive knowledge by saying: तत्रानेकार्थजन्यत्वात् स्वार्थे सामान्यगोचरः ।

This fact admirably tallies with an accepted truth that Dignāga propounded his logical theories on the basis of the Sautrāntikas' metaphysics. But here in this present treatise Dignāga's attitude is quite different and unfavourable to the



theory of *Sanghātāmbana*, (combined-atom-object); hence he puts it under the category of his opponents' views.

3. Then the author takes up to examine the third proposition. "Some masters say that the integrated form of atoms is the cause of consciousness." Dignāga replies that the atomic form does not become its object, e.g. its solidity, etc. and so on.

The advocates of this proposition are in the opinion of Vinitadeva: Vāgbhata and others — which opinion is not corroborated by any other source. However, Kue-Chi ascribes it to the Neo-Sarvāstivādins, Sanghabhadra, etc. The material elements, they maintain, (*rūpādayo dharmā*) have each of them many a form (*ākāra*) but of these only one part becomes the object of perception. Therefore, indivisible atoms, being in co-operation with one another assume each an integrated form, *Sancita-ākāra*. This form being in substance produces the consciousness which resembles that form and hence becomes the object-cause (*āmbana*) of the five-fold consciousness. (v.p. more details below).

There is some anachronism here. Dignaga criticises the Neo-Sarvastivadin, without naming him and the Neo-Sarvastivadin dispels the criticism naming Dignaga according to Kue-Chi. We must guess that they must either contemporary of Dignāga or Dignāga speaks of some earlier spokesman of the school. It is also interesting to observe here that Dignaga ridicules the Sanghāta-vāda, (second proposition in this treatise) for which he pleaded in his standard work, *Pramana-Samuccaya* (see Dharmakirti's comment on p. above). These circumstances may suggest that Dignaga must have turned an arch-idealist in a later period of his life as his predecessor Vasubandhu did according to the tradition. While composing the *Pramana-Samuccaya* the author should be a neutral logician as he pleads for the both systems of the Sautrantikas as well as the yogacaras. cfr. my Bud. Idealism in journal, S.V. Institute, Vol. I, 3, pp. 71ff.

Kamalasila informs us that the above said third proposition was also advocated by a Digambara Jaina, Sumati by name. His plea is this; Atoms are two -fold viz. of common form and uncommon form in the pattern of all things having a general as well as a particular self. Of the two, the common form of atoms is cognized by the senses and their uncommon one never cognized. Thus the consciousness in a uniform pattern as related to the atoms never comes into clash; hence the atoms are accomplished as perceptible. (Tattva. pañjikā, p. 554).

Dignaga's reply to it is : "The atomic integrated form is not perceivable like solidity (i. e. hardness.) etc. Though they are in the atoms are not perceived by our eye-consciousness. So is the atomic integrated form." The author's weighty argument here is: "All gross things like pot, bowl, etc. would be seen in a identical shape if the integrated form and the atomic form are one and the same. Of course there are differentiations in their sizes, but they are related to things which are only *phenomenal* entities and which cannot be regarded as causal factors. For, if we eliminate atoms of the empirical things one by one, we shall have no more the experience of such things. What is substantially true and existent never ceases to evoke its perception; for example, colour and other atoms. They never cease to catch up our senses."

In this argument the author throws a sidelight on the latest phase of the Buddhist theory of matter as adumbrated in the *Satya-Siddhi*. According to this theory the so-called qualities, colour, taste, odour and touch are fundamental elements and all other four elements, earth etc. are formed out of the former four. Read S. Siddhi chs. 36,38-40 and cfr. in my *Dvdaśamukha*, p. 53,n.105.

4. Now the author set forth his own solution of the problem: "It is the content (artha) which exists internally

in the knowledge as a knowable aspect appearing to us as if it exists externally. Because the content is essentially in the nature of consciousness and because it acts a productive condition (to the consciousness) the knowable aspect is the object”.

The knowable aspect and the knowledge are one and designated differently. How can the principle of cause-and-effect relation be admitted between them? The author answers: “Though it is only a part of the consciousness, it becomes a productive factor of the latter because it is invariably and simultaneously associated with the latter; or it becomes so in succession by transmitting its force (Śakti).” In support of these two answers Dignāga cites the authority of his earlier Rationalists’ saying: “In the presence of cause is the presence of its result and in the absence of cause is the absence of its result: this is the characteristic sign of what is the cause and what is the result even if they happen simultaneous or in succession.” This saying proves beyond doubt that there is possibly a cause-effect-relation between the two simultaneous events if there is concomitance between them. This relation can be described as *Sahabhu-hetu*, co-existing cause in the Sarvastivādin’s terminology. This causal relation of simultaneity (*Sahabhū*) is applicable to the phenomenon of the mind and mental state, [citta-caitasika] that are appearing together. This relation also holds good in the case of four fundamental and four secondary elements (*bhūta-bhautika*) which are mutually inseparable and conditioned. A favourable example cited here is *pradīpa-prabhā*, lamp and light. They appear together and disappear together, hence they are mutually conditioned under the law of simultaneity (v. Kośavyā, Cal. edn, II, p. 123) conception of Buddhism, p. 25, Abh. Sangaha, Kosambi edn, VIII, 22).

This pattern of argument of the Sarvāstivādin is not accepted by a more rational school of Buddhism, like the

Satya-siddhi which disproves both the reason and the example in ch. 36 and 40. Item 1, etc. The Brahmanical, logicians like Kumārila also ridicule the causal relation between the co-existing events and its example. Kumārila's criticism of Dignāga's proposition is summed below along with his commentator, Pārthasārathi Mīśra's remarks:—

4

Let not the past be graspable as the Vaibhāsikas assume. It may then be possible that between two knowledges that are occurring simultaneous one is the graspable and the other grasper; therefore the following is stated: With reference to the two simultaneous events there will be no possibility of asserting one is proof and the other is proved (*māna-meya*) for the reason that two simultaneous events are mutually independent, and that there is a lack of action and actor. Causality in your system is graspable; in between the two independent events there is no cause-and-effect-relation, hence no idea of one is graspable and the other grasper (see Ślokavārtika, p. 309): Halloo, (we have accepted that) the characteristic of the cause-and-effect-relation is nothing but invariable concomitance of *Tatbhāva-bhāvin*, presence of effect on the presence of cause; this characteristic is obtainable in the case of two simultaneous events; so says our great Master (Dignāga) : “It is a simultaneous conditioning factor because of invariable concomitance”. Now, on this point the following is pointed out: The Rationalists do not proclaim that causation is mere *Tatbhāva-bhāvin*, ‘presence of the effect on the presence of cause’. That causation is geared up with the succession of time and never bereft of it. This is pointed out in the following:

“The causation-characteristic freed from the time-succession is not permissible between the cow and the horse;

the same is the case with the events of time-succession, or the simultaneous moment-events of a flux of elements with the other flux of elements. Therefore amongst things which are already previously present a thing is regarded as effect of that thing from which it is produced as in the case of pot that is produced in the presence of colour, etc.” (note this illustration from the opponent’s point of view).

The said example of lamp and light for simultaneous causation is unproved; to this effect the following is pointed out :

“The example of lamp and light, etc. to prove the simultaneous causation has been stated; even in this case there is a very subtle time-distinction. The illusion of simultaneity there is due to the time-distinction hardly discernible (*durlakṣa*) as in the case of a sharp pin piercing through several hundred of lotus-petals (*padmapatra-sata-vedha*)” .....This rejection of causation through the process of simultaneity is also applicable to the knowledge and its part and their graspability and grasping agency; so is said further:

“The rejection of causation by simultaneity is equally applicable to the parts (knowledge and its part)”. (see *Ibid.*)

As to Dignāga’s second alternative answer, viz. it becomes so in succession by transmitting the force (*Śakti*) the same critic continues: Between two successive events the previous may be graspable by the other. It is criticised previously that what is past cannot become graspable, this criticism is not valid; for, it is possible by transmitting its force. The self-form of knowledge on account of impression (*vāsanā*) imposed by a previous knowledge (upon itself) is produced subsequently. (This means that *ālambana* is similar to memory (*smaranam iva ālambana*)). Here also Kumāṛila says. “*Ālambana* is not possible by succession through the door of transmitting the force” (*Ibid.* pp. 311-312).

The above elaboration of the opponent's criticism is aimed at to acquaint ourselves with a clear understanding of the author's complicated proposition.

Dharmakīrti being one of the strongest champions of this school, his conclusive remark may also be recorded in brief which appears as an echo of Dignāga's view:

5

How and by what means do these atoms transform our consciousness as reflex of a gross form? (Pra. Var. II. 321). Therefore one consciousness has two aspects (graspable and grasper) and experienced and memorised; the realization of this in double aspect is regarded the fruit. (Ibid. 337). The self of the Knowledge though indivisible in truth is noticed (i.e. experienced) as though it is divided into graspable and grasper on account of our perverted visions (Ibid. 354).

In order to satisfy the scriptural declaration that the visual consciousness emerges on the basis of the eye and is visible the author states: "The sense-organ, (i.e. eye, etc) is only a sort of *śakti*, force as it acts as auxiliary to its objectivity". The sense-organ is inferred to be only a force of consciousness, but not material in character. It may be a non-contradictory part of consciousness or it may be in its own indescribable self. There can be no difference in the production of its result. Thus the objective aspect and the force of sense-organ go on mutually conditioned from immemorial time".

The author's statement about the sense-organ as of the indescribable is suggestive. It shows that he does not side with the Vaibhasikas for whom the senses are material, but with some early scripture according to which they are other than the visible etc; and supra-sensuous and inferable from the sensory consciousness and seated on the eye-ball, etc. (v. Yaśomitra's comm. Kośa, I, p. 24-25). Dharmakīrti too holds the

same view, v. Pra. Vartika II, 48 a-b: They are transcendental and designated as senses...Refer to Vinītadeva's comment for other opinions on the senses (p. 92 below).

The author's explanatory part of his last aphorism is very well elucidated by Vinītadeva in his Tikā, one may read my summary in English, pp: 33-36 below.

#### NOTES

1. The early Buddhists plead that the atoms though too subtle and imperceptible, serve as a hidden cause of our knowledge, because their gross forms that we experience are phenomenal and cannot be regarded as either different from or identical with the atoms, is not at all counted as a cause. The same principle holds good in the Buddhists' denial of the soul theory. The soul is not something real apart from its several parts, cfr. Sam. Nikāya, 1,135, the saying:

यथा अङ्गं संभारत् भवति शब्दो रथेन ।.....

एवं स्कन्धेषु सत्स्वेव भवति मत्वेति संवृतिः।

Cited in Satya - Siddhi, Ch. 38, p. 190.

The above position of the early Buddhists renders much easier the task of Dignaga of rejecting the combined atom-object proposition (i.e. his second one). However the Sautrāntikas assign some reality to it on the score that it discharges a purposive action. See discussion on this topic below.

2. See Tattvas Panjikā ( p. 556 ) mentioning such three opinions: 1 ) Atoms get combined one another ( *Samyujyante parcmāṇavah.* ), 2 ) they always appear with some interspace, but do not come into a mutual contact ( *Santara eva rītyān na sprsanti.* ) 3 ) when they appear without interspace, we call them combined ( *nirantaratve tu sprstasamjñā* ). Similar three views are noticeable in Abhis, Aloka, ( p. 372-74 ) : 1 ( *Sanghata-paksa*, view of the combined atoms, 2 ) *Santara-parivarapaksa*, view of atoms encircled with interspace, 3 ) *nirantara-parivarapaksa*, view of the same without interspace. These three are termed knowable categories (Jneya-paksa):

According to Th. Stcherbatsky's finding the combined atoms alone appear in phenomenal reality. Simple ones or infra-atomic elements presumably were relegated to a transcendental reality.....(v. Conception of Buddhism, p. 12).

2a. Kue-chi's interpretation of Vasubandhu's verse 11 in the Vimsikā as referring to four views: 1) " *eka-paksa*" of the Vaisesikas, 2) *anekapaksa* of the old Sarvastivadin, 3) *Paramanupakṣa* of the Sutra-sect and 4) *Samghata-pakṣa* of the Neo-Sarvastivadin (Nyayanusara) is not admissible and it is quite opposed to Vasubandhu's own comment. (v. his comment on the vimsika-vijnapti-chinese, Fas. III p. 2 ). Vasubandhu refers to the three views only, viz. 1) the view of the Vaisesika, 2) the view of the Sarvastivadin as atom-object and 3) the view of the Sautrantika holding the integrated-atom-object ( *Samghata-anu* )

3. सञ्चितः समुदायः स सामान्यं तत्र चाक्षयीः ।

सामान्यबुद्धिश्रावश्यं विकल्पेनानुबध्यते ॥ प्रमाणवार्तिक II. 194.

वृत्तिः । ननु सञ्चितालम्बनाः पञ्चविज्ञानकाया इति सिद्धान्तः । तत्रानेकार्थजन्यत्वात् स्वार्थे सामान्यगोचर इति चोक्तम् ( प्रमाणसमुच्चये ) । तथा च परमाणूनां समुदायः ( note रूपशब्दादेरष्टद्रव्यत्वात् ) सञ्चित इत्युच्यते । स एव च सामान्यमतः । तत्र च सामान्ये प्रत्यक्षधीर्जायते । सामान्यबुद्धिश्रावश्यं विकल्पेनानुबध्यते अनुस्रीयते । तत् कथमविकल्पं त्यक्षमुच्यते । अत्राह—

अर्थान्तराभिसम्बन्धात् जायन्ते येऽणवोऽपरे ।

उक्तास्ते सञ्चित्तास्ते हि निमित्तं ज्ञानजन्मनः ॥ Ibid 195.

वृत्तिः । .....येऽणवो जायन्ते ते सञ्चित्ता उक्ताः सञ्चितालम्बनाः पञ्चविज्ञानकाया इत्यादौ । ज्ञानजन्मन एव हि निमित्तमुक्ताः "तत्रानेकार्थजन्यत्वात् " इत्यादिना ॥

अणूनां स विशेषश्च नान्तरेणापरानणून् ।

तदेकानियमात् ज्ञानमुक्तं सामान्यगोचरः ॥ Ibid 196

वृत्तिः । अणूनां स ज्ञानजननसामर्थ्यविशेषः..... । नहि प्रत्येकमणवो दृश्याः । किन्तु सहिता एव तत् तस्मात् एकस्मिन् परमाणौ ज्ञानस्य नियमात् सामान्यगोचरं सञ्चितपरमाणूपङ्कातविषयं ज्ञानमुक्तं तन्त्रवादिना । न तु परमाण्वतिरिक्तसामान्यविषयम् । तत् कथं सामान्यविषयत्वात् सविकल्पत्वप्रसङ्गः ।

The same idea in Chapter I, 88—90.

4 मा भूदतीतस्य ग्राह्यत्वं (यथा वैभाषिकपरिकल्पितम् ) युगपज्जन्मनोरेव ज्ञानयानेरेकं तु ग्राह्यमितरन् ग्राहकं भविष्यतीति अत आह—

अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षत्वात् युगपच्चापिजन्मनि ।



मानमेयत्वनास्तित्वं क्रियाकारकवर्जनात् ।

कारणत्वमेव भवतां ग्राह्यत्वम् । यौगपद्ये चान्योन्यनिरपेक्षज-मनो  
कार्यकारणभावाभावात् न ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वम् । (p. 30<sup>4</sup>)

ननु तद्भावभावव्याभिचार एव कार्यकारणलक्षणम् । तच्च युगपज्जन्म-  
नोरपि विद्यत एव । यथाऽऽहुः— प्रत्ययोऽव्यभिचारित्वात् सह इति । तत्राह —

तद्भावभावितामात्रं हेतुर्केनैव वर्ण्यते ।

पौर्वापर्यनियमयुक्तं तद्भावभावित्वं तल्लक्षणं नतु तन्निर्मुक्तमिति । यथा  
पौर्वापर्यनियमसहितमेवेदं लक्षणं न नियमरहितं नापि पौर्वापर्यरहितं तथा दर्शयति —

पौर्वापर्यविनिमुक्तं कार्यकारणलक्षणम् ।

गवाश्वस्य यथा नास्ति पौर्वापर्येऽपि तत्तथा ॥

युगपज्जायमानेऽपि सन्तत्यन्तरजे क्षणे ।

रूपादिषु घटे यद्वत् तस्मात् पूर्वमवस्थिते ॥

यो यस्मात् जायते पश्चात् सन्तत्कार्यमितीष्यते ।

यत् परैरसत्यपि पौर्वापर्ये कार्यकारणत्वमित्यत्र सिद्धवद्दीपप्रभावदिति निदर्शनम् ।  
तदमिद्धमित्याह—

हेतुहेतुमतां मिद्धं यौगपद्यनिदर्शनम् ।

यत्रदीपप्रभाद्युक्तं सूक्ष्मः कालोऽस्ति तत्र नः ॥

कथं तर्हि यौगपद्याभिमानोऽत आह—

दुर्लक्षस्तु यथा वेद्यः पञ्चपत्रशते तथा ।

सन्तमपिकालभेदमतिसौक्ष्म्यात् अलक्षयतां पञ्चपत्रशतव्यतिभेद इव  
यौगपद्यभ्रगः । तुलानमनोऽनमनयोग्तु न मिथः कार्यकारणत्वम्, उभयोरैककारणत्वादिति ।  
इत्यश्व यौगपद्येन कार्यकारणत्वनिराक्रिया ज्ञानांशयोरपि ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वनिराकरणाद्य  
वक्तव्येत्याह —

भागयोर्योगपद्येन तथैव स्यान्निराक्रिया ।

मा भूद्यौगपद्यम् । क्रमभाविनोस्तु पूर्वमुत्तरस्य ग्राह्यं भवतु । यत्तु  
अतीतस्य ग्राह्यत्वं न सम्भवतीत्युक्तम्, तत्तु अयुक्तम्, शक्त्यर्पणद्वारेण सम्भवात् ।  
पूर्वज्ञानापितवासनावशेन हि तत्स्वरूपमुत्तरमुत्पद्यमानं भवति । स्मरणमिवात्मन्वनम् । तदुक्तम्—  
शक्त्यर्पणात् क्रमादिति । तत्राह—

न च शक्त्यर्पणद्वारं क्रमेणालम्बनं भवेत् । इति

(Slokavar. pp, 311-12)

The above criticism proves that in pleading for a simulta-  
neous causality Dignaga might have employed the Lamp-

and-light-example, but we miss it in the translations of the Alambanapariksā. Vinitadeva employs it in some other context, viz. self-affecting-action (atmani kriyā). It is the Sarvastivadin who first pleaded for the simultaneous causation with the same example; cfr. Poussin, Kosa, II, p.253; vyākhyā ad II. 51. cal. edn. p, 123; Kośabhāsyā p. 84-85).

5. सकृद्यन्ति तत्केन स्थूलाभायञ्च तेषणवः । 321.

तस्माद्विरूपमस्त्येकं यदेवमनुभूयते ।

स्पर्शते चोभयावारस्यास्य गवेदनं फलम् ॥ 337.

अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यामितदर्शनः ।

ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिर्भेदवानिव दृश्यते ॥ 354.

Vijnaptimatratā in Pramāna Var. II, 320-371.

### DIGNAGA'S VERSES (KARIKA)

1. Though atoms serve as cause of our sensory consciousness they are not its actual object like the sense-organs; because the consciousness does not represent the image of the atoms.

2. Consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it, because it does not exist in substance like the double-moon. Thus both the external things are unfit to be real objects of consciousness.

3. Some masters hold that the integrated form of atoms (*sancitakara*) is the cause of consciousness. The author replies: The atomic form does not become the content of consciousness e.g. the solidity, etc.

4. In that case the different perceptions of the pot, the bowl, etc. will be identical.

If the perception differs in accordance with the different forms of the pot and others, they never exist in the substantial atoms.

5. Their dimensions are different and therefore they are related to substantially non-existent things. For, if we remove the atoms one by one the perception illuminating the image of the pot, etc. will immediately vanish away.

6. It is the object ( artha ) which exists internally in the knowledge itself as a knowable aspect which appears to us as if it exists externally.

Because that object is essentially in the nature of consciousness and because it acts as the condition (to the consciousness) the knowable aspect is the object.

7a-b. Though it is only a part of the consciousness, it becomes condition to the latter because it is invariably and simultaneously associated with the latter.

Or it becomes condition also in succession by transmitting the force (śakti).

7c-d. What is the sense-organ is (nothing but) the force itself in consciousness by virtue of its acting as an auxiliary (*sahakarīn*) to its objectivity.

8. That force is not contradictory to the consciousness. Thus the objective aspect (*viśayarūpa*) of consciousness and the force (*śakti*) called sense-organ go mutually conditioned from immemorial time.

## SUMMARY OF THE TIKA BY VINITADEVA

The author Dignaga presents the first disputant's proposition by stating: Those who...

In this sentence the topics to be discarded are expressed. The opponents' perverse reasons are expressed in the sentence: "Because the atoms are cause of consciousness" and because the aggregates are productive of their image-bearing consciousness".

The purpose and its relevance to the treatise are to be inferred by virtue of its capacity thus. This treatise is commenced in order to refute the external objectivity and in order to establish the internal objectivity. This is the purpose and the treatise is its device. The same idea is repeated and elaborated further.

All disputants do not accept the external things as objects, hence it is stated : Those who.....  
The "eye and others" refers to the ear etc. upto the mind, thus the mind is reckoned as relied on the external things; hence they are also negated here.

Acarya Dharmapala in his Tika has elaborated a great deal in order to prove them; we do not understand his deep intention and reasoning.

"The external" is what is other than the consciousness. The term *artha* is expressed as a synonym of content (*visaya*), but not substantially existing. The aggregate is also to be understood likewise. *Alambana* is cognizable. Atoms are those which cannot be further divided and (dissected). The atoms alone appear and disappear together; yet the aggregates are considered as different and object (*alambana*). The sense-organs in their capacity are assigned to their respective objects like colour, taste, etc. Though the colour etc. are integrated in the aggregates they are cognized by their respective sense-organs. Likewise the consciousness in its capacity is fixedly assigned to graspable things (*dravya-pariccheda*) and hence it takes as its object the separate atoms as well as their collocations (*samanya*, सामान्य): this is known to us (from the Sarvastivadins' treatise). The atoms, though very subtle objects because they cause the consciousness and because they exist substantially. What serves as cause is *alambana*, object: this is the opinion of this (first dispu-

tant). Thus the advocates of the external things admit the atoms as objects in view of atoms being producing factor of consciousness.

The saying: "Or they conceive as object the aggregate of atoms" is presentation of the second proposition. They conceive so because the aggregate causes the knowledge invested with the image of the aggregate. This is the reason for this proposition. It is to state thus: In what form a consciousness emerges that form is its content.

So far are the propositions of the opponents.

The following line is to delineate the same: "Though atoms serve etc." Atoms in the ultimate sense are not substantial. They being accepted as constituted of parts become empirical (*samvṛta*) and being considered as partless, they cannot cast shadow and hiding etc. (छायावरणादि). cp. the same argument in Vasubandhu's *Vimśatikā*. Even then their causality is accepted and their objectivity is denied; for they do not cause consciousness reflecting their own image. The expression *indriya* indicates six senses inclusive of mind sense. "Like the sense - organ" is example. It causes the consciousness; however, it is not its content; for, its image is not reflected in the latter.

It is the content whose self-being (स्वभाव) is asserted while the consciousness arises in its image. Here the self-being is both the self-characteristic as well as the general characteristic. Its assertion is just its measured grasping. Consciousness cannot discharge any function of determining its object beyond representing its image. Therefore consciousness having arisen in the form of a blue-patch is spoken of as that it has determined the blue patch. What other function has the consciousness here (beyond representing its image)? However, it is metaphorically stated that consciousness grasps its object. There is no, in fact, any act of determination. For example, when the

son is similar to his father, he is said to have taken the form of his father. Though the atoms are its cause, if consciousness does not represent their individually fixed images how can it grasp their characteristics? When it does not determine them, how can the atoms become its objects.

The example is the sense-organ. Though it is a cause it is not the content of knowledge which bears not its image. Therefore, the objectivity does not lie in mere causality. Thus the atoms are not objects as they are deprived of the characteristics of the objectivity. Here is a syllogism: Atoms are not objects because they are incapable of causing consciousness similar to themselves; example: sense-organ. The knowable aspect is the heterogeneous example. Or they are so, because their characteristics are not cognized; the examples are the same. These two syllogisms are formulated by Acarya Dharmapala and also stated by me, though not formulated by the author Dignaga. Thus is negated the atoms-objectivity./1/

In order to negate the second proposition the following is stated: "Though the aggregates of atoms are alike the image of consciousness", they are not objects, because the consciousness does not arise from the aggregates. Though they are not causal factors, let them be objects, what is harm there? The author replies:

Consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it, etc.

What object form the consciousness imitates, that form would possibly be its object if it is also a causing factor. What is causing factor, that alone is the object: this is understood from the treatise (of the Sarvastivadins). It is stated there: A thing which is characterized as productive of the mind and the mental states is designated as object as it is experienced while the mind and mental states operate. The endowment of the object-image in the consciousness is

not stated in the Sastra as it is recognised in this system (of the Sautrantika-yogacaras) alone. It is to be stated thus: What is endowed with two characteristics is *alambana*, object.

Why is not the aggregate a causing factor ?

“Because it does not exist in substance”. What is substantially non-existent is incapable of causing any effect; e.g. double moon. Though it is reflected in consciousness, it does not cause the latter. Phenomenon of that consciousness is not however fortuitous as it is effected by a defective sense-organ. The double moon is perceived when the eye is affected by the eye-disease (*timira*). Hence it is not producer of its experience and becomes non-entity-non-object. The same is the case with the aggregate. The following is the syllogism: The aggregate of atoms is not producing factor of consciousness, because it is not a substantial entity, example: double moon. The heterogeneous example is the cognized part of consciousness. Or, it is not *alambana* because it is a non-cause. The examples are the same. If a non-cause is also *alambana*, the double moon etc. would also be true objects. These two syllogistic proofs are also formulated by Dharmapala.

“Thus both the external things are unfit to be real contents of the consciousness” as both of them are defective in one or another respect.

In the case of atoms there is productivity, but the capacity to impose the image on consciousness is lacking while the aggregate has the latter but lacks in the former. Therefore both are defective. //2//

The third proposition is presented next: Some masters hold that .....

Some masters, Vagbhaṭa and others hold the integrated form of atoms as the causes of consciousness. They maintain that there exists also an integrated form in the atoms. Whatever exists in the atom is all a substantial entity (dravyasat) hence it can serve as cause. Since the integrated form is gross i. is capable to impose its image on the consciousness. Thus the atoms become objects in another fashion (prakārāntaṇa, प्रकारान्तरेण)

The atomic form is too subtle; how can it combine in itself the gross integrated form? No harm, they argue that a material thing is combined with several forms or characters, viz: blue colour, fragrance, sweetness, hardness and others. The atoms also interalia has the integrated form. If so, why are not they cognized at once? So it is said: They are cognized in one or another form". Because they are assigned separately to their respective sense organs our senses do not grasp all of them indiscriminately.

This is said in accordance with the system of Buddhadeva, viz. ten bases are mere *bhutas*, elements (not distinguishable into primary and derivative ones).

"Even in the atoms, therefore, there exists the aspect which produces the consciousness possessed of integrated form". That is to say: The atoms are capable of producing the consciousness reflecting the integrated form of their own. Why is it said in this fashion? Because an *alambana* consists of two parts. The productivity is meant in the statement that the atoms are consciousness-producing factors. The part of the statement: "reflecting integrated form of their own" expresses the capacity of imposing images. Because *artha*, content imposes the image which exists in itself, but not one that does not exist there the integrated form is to be granted as existing in atoms.



If the gross form exists in the atoms, how can it exist there along with the atomic subtlety? Why do we not cognize the atomic form as if it is proximate to us? Therefore the author says: Atomic form, etc. (3c-d)-For example, solidity coldness, heat, etc. though existing, are not contents of the visual cognition because the perceptive powers of the senses are assigned to their respective domains of objects. Likewise are the atoms . ...//3//

“In that case the different perceptions of the pot, bowl, etc. would be identical”.

The advocates of this proposition are to be accused thus: The integrated form that is pleaded as existing in the atom is well known to be existing in the pot, etc. If that form of the atom is the same as that of the pot, etc. then the notion of the pot would arise from all other aggregates of the bowl, etc. Or if it is the same as that of the bowl, etc. then also the notion of bowl arise from all other aggregates of the pot, etc. We have, on the other hand, a distinct notion of pot from certain aggregate, and the notion of bowl from certain other aggregate. This distinction would be impossible in your thesis.

If the distinction is possible on account of number of atoms differing as related to the pot and the bowl, etc. such distinction is not at all admissible in the shape of atoms. If it is your view that the different shapes of the pot, etc. make possible the distinct notions of the pot, etc. we too do not negate them; however those shapes are not apportioned to the substantial atoms. //4//

“The dimensions of the pot, etc. are different, ... ..”

The atoms' dimension known as *pārimāṇdalya* cannot be differentiated. Though the atoms of the pot, bowl, etc. are different real entities; in their dimension i. e. *pāriman-*

ḍalya no differentiation is admissible. Therefore the atoms do not differ in their shapes. As in your system whatever exists in the atom all exists in substance. So also in our system whichever size the atoms has all is one pārimaṇḍalya size.

If the integrated form be admitted as identical, it must be then partless as it has been in substance. If it be admitted as having parts, it would never be in substance. Things having parts, acquire various capacities (*śakti*); then the arrangement of parts also would be possible; but that would not be possible in the case of partless things.

“The distinction of form co-exists with the non-substantial things”. Because the arrangement of parts is not possible in partless things as stated above. The distinction in shape is to be observed only in non-substantial things. The Vaiśeṣika system admits the pot, etc. as real substantial things, but they are empirical, i. e. non-substantial (in our system). For, if we remove atoms one by one the perception of the pot vanishes away. How could that alone prove that the pot. etc. are empirical? If they are substantially real, they would never cease to raise their own perception even when their parts atoms are eliminated. For example, the colour, taste, etc. never cease to evoke their perceptions even when their atoms get separated. Moreover the atoms being removed the conjunction creating the substance (*dravya*) disappear and the pot perishes, then no more arises its cognition.

If you think that the cognition arises no more because everything cannot happen everywhere, we may reply: If there is one whole (*avayavin*) other than the atoms, then you must say: while existing within the atoms, whether it exists covering entire atoms or partly. In the first alternative the whole would be everywhere in the parts constituting the whole. If it does not exist partly, it follows then it exists covering the

entire atoms. Therefore, one whole (*avayavin*) like the pot, etc. exists in as many atoms as there are, and hence when one part of the whole perishes, the substantial whole would become non-existent. For, the whole is constituted of the simultaneously existing entire parts like the chariot (*anasva-ratha*). The heterogeneous example here is *sva-laksana* (स्वलक्षण), self characteristic. If you say that the whole exists by way of *vastu*, substance, it will be vitiated by an unfavourable circumstance (as stated above) viz. impossibility in its formation by parts as the whole is constituted of simultaneously existing several things. //5//

After disproving the others' propositions (*anya-samaya*) the author sets forth his own (*sva-samaya*) in the following:

“It is the object which exists internally in the knowledge as a knowable aspect which appears to us as if existing externally”.

The knowable aspect is a graspable part serving as its content. It appears as though existing externally. When, for example, a patch of space being reflected in the well-water appears as if it exists on the surface of the water. Or the image of the moon, being reflected in the mirror appears as though it is in the mirror. Though no external thing is admitted as *alambana*, there is, nevertheless, something internal serving as the object-condition (*alambana-pratyaya*). An eye-diseased person, e. g. perceives the appearance of hairs, flies, etc. which are only some internal flashes (of the diseased mind). Similarly the internal perceivable part of the consciousness is considered as *alambana*.

How could this mind itself be characterised as *alambana*? Because the knowledge assumes the forms of the blue and the yellow patches as a result of matured forces (*vasana*) accrued from the daily talk of the blue and the yellow, etc. The knowledge is accomplished as endowed with the

forms of the blue and the yellow etc. Because the forms of the blue and the yellow are conditions to the consciousness, they become its causes also.

“The internal consciousness appears as object”..... Because consciousness existing internally becomes endowed with a form on the model of an object ( *arthakarana tadāk-āarakam* ) and this form ( of object ) evokes the consciousness, that consciousness becomes in possession of two *alambana* characteristics; hence it is said to be the proper *alambana*. Thus consciousness is possessed of an internally existing object. The form of consciousness is similar to that of the object. Because it is similar, it is said to be of that form. For example, a seal being curved in the form of a letter is (said to be) of that form. (When a consciousness is likewise similar to an object-form, it is known as possessing that form.) //6//

“(If) only the objective reflection of consciousness is experienced in the cognition, etc.”

The cognizable reflection that is internally existing is experienced in a cognition. When it is said that the knowable aspect of consciousness appears as though it is the external object in a definite shape (*niyatākāravat*), it becomes a part of consciousness. That knowable aspect appears simultaneous with the consciousness, how could that aspect be a producing factor of the same consciousness? It will amount, in that case, to accepting an action affecting its self (आत्मनि क्रिया भ्युपगम) and also evolve a formidable error (*atiprasanga*), viz. the cognizing aspect also will give rise to another cognizable aspect. Likewise the horns of the right and the left of an ox would interse produce one by the other. This is the objection raised by the opponent. The author replies: This is not a formidable rule (*aśāsāna*), because the cognizable part, though simultaneous it is,

becomes producing factor, i.e., preceding moment-cause of the self born consciousness. No cognition arises in the absence of the cognizable part which is resorted to for the purpose of a mere support in the fashion that a man rises up with the support of a staff. Therefore no causal function either entire or in part is imposed upon it.

If the cognizable part thiswise becomes cause, be it so, what contradiction would be there? In the absence of any concomitance between the right horn and the left the causal relation between them, one being the fruit of the other is not accepted. In certain cases a self-affecting action is also desired. The lamp is a fitting example here. The lamp (not only illumines others but) illumines its self also.

How is it proved that the concomitance is criterion for determining the cause-and-effect-relation? The logicians say: *Bhāva* and *abhāva*, i. e. existence and non-existence: These two are the characteristics of the cause and the effect which may appear in succession (or simultaneously). When certain thing present, certain thing happens; the latter is considered to be its effect (*hetumat*). Here in the present case the knowledge arises only when the cognizable part is present and not when it is absent. Therefore things, though simultaneous they are, become one as the cause and the other as the effect. *Haituka* is *Tarkika*. So far the subject and the object are shown to be simultaneous.

The author next states that they are in succession too. (This means:) the cognizable part while disappearing, deposits its force (*śakti*) in the store-consciousness. That force, if it accomplishes other necessary requisites in the second moment evokes in the same moment a consciousness similar to itself. If it does not accomplish in that moment it may

do so in the third or the fourth moment; then it would produce a similar consciousness by virtue of its maturity.

In this view (*paksa*) the said logical errors, self-affecting action, simultaneity, "being one part", etc. would never be raised. For, the previous knowledge is graspable, and what is endowed with the image of blue, etc. that evokes in a subsequent moment a similar kind of knowledge. Therefore those objections cannot be raised.

If the force causes perception the force will then be the object but not the previous graspable part. Such error is not there; because the graspable part produces a homogeneous knowledge by succession, it makes the force as deposited in the store-consciousness. If it does not make so, the force would not produce such type of knowledge. Therefore the knowledge that is arisen from the force is indeed produced from the graspable part alone; thus there lurks no contradiction. In this interpretation the fact of *alambana* with two characteristics is well accomplished. Thiswise the graspable part has two (*alambana*) characteristics as it produces subsequently its own homogeneous knowledge.

The opponent now observes: If the self form of a knowledge is accepted as object-condition, how does the visual consciousness arise relying on that self form and the eye? When the matter or colour (*rupa*) falls within the focus of the eye and together with it the eye is to produce its cognition, the self-form of consciousness does not, at all, fall within the focus of the eye. How is it possible that the eye together with the self-form evokes the visual cognition?

The author replies: If the sense-organ is a derivative element, then there may be a serious objection. We, however, desire to say that what force is accessory to objectivity (*visaya-sahakarīn*) that is regarded as the sense-organ. Thus,

in our system just as *rupa*, colour exists internally so also the eye exists internally. Therefore, how does the above stated flaw incur ? It is to be borne in mind that the force (*sakti*) that is accessory to objectivity is the sense-organ. The interpretation of *indriya* as what pertains to Indra would reduce it to something inseparable (from Indra).

How is it known as a sort of force ? Because the sense-organ is inferred to be a force from its result, viz. cognition, but not to be a derivative matter (*bhautika*). Again objection: One can infer merely some cause from result, but not a variety of causes (*karana visesa*); for no concomitance of *linga*, cause with the variety of cause has been previously determined. For example, the sight of the smoke can lead one to infer mere presence of fire, but not the kind of fire whether it is the fire of herbs or of the grass, etc. Likewise one could infer from the result i. e. sensory cognition merely a cause but not deduce the genus of the cause, viz: a derivative matter, etc. In the system of the Vaibhasikas the sense-organ is a derivative matter (*bhautika*); in the system of Bhadanta Buddhadeva it is a primary matter (*bhuta-rupa*); for the

Yogacaras it is a consciousness; it is conventional for the Madhyamikas; for the Samkhyas it is *ahankarika*, a derivative from Individuation, and so on. The said variety of cause cannot be inferred. In reply to this the Tika remarks that a simple force is inferred from the inferential process of various forces and their successive flux (*Saktiprabandha*). // 7 //

Again, the force depends on a possessor of the force. No force can be accepted without a support or base. The possessor of the force is the sense-organ which ought to be a derivative matter. Thus the sense-organ becomes again a derivative matter. Therefore the author states :

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1—Agamanusari Yogacara. Dignaga's system being known as the Nyayaanusarin Yogacara Vinitadeva specifies thus.

If a support is needed, let the consciousness be its support (*asraya*). The consciousness is well-known to be both as awareness of each object (*prativisaya-vijnapti-rupa*) and as self awareness (*sva-vijnapti-rupa*). Therefore, let it be its base as necessitated by karman previous deed. The force, nevertheless is not contradictory to the consciousness.

Again, some objection: The force that is situated in the derivative matter produces some result and the same situated in the consciousness produces some other result. Therefore the sense-organ ought to be a derivative matter. The author's reply is: There is no difference in the nature of result due to the difference in the basis of force. This means to say: Let the force be situated in the consciousness or somewhere else. That force gives rise to a perception of visible (*rupa*), etc. and hence there is not, at all, any difference in its result-productional act.

“Gr. (the force) be in its indescribable self-form”.

This is the opinion of some other system about indriya.

The sense-organ cannot be tested because it is not visible. What is not tested cannot be demonstrated. Therefore according to this system it is of indescribable character.

Then it is said by way of conclusion: “Thus the objective aspect of the consciousness.....” As this consciousness is produced from the force of sense-organ so the latter is also produced from the previous consciousness which causes the formation of the sense-organ (*indriya ksepaka*). That previous consciousness again is produced from the still anterior force of sense-organ. In this manner the force of sense-organ and the consciousness endowed with the image of the object go on mutually conditioned. Since there has been no starting moment of this flux of the cause and the effect these two are to be viewed as revolving from immemorial time.

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1. It is atindriya, transcendental, p. 12.



The author comments on the last aphorism:

“Depending upon the force called eye .....” Relying upon what is called the force of sense and the internal *rupa*, either simultaneous or of the previous moment the visual consciousness arises as having an indeterminate object (*anavasita-artha-akaraka*). In the system of Realists the consciousness arises from the already determinate object, but not so in our system: this is said:—

“Consciousness reflecting an object but indistinct from that object (*alambana*) arises”.

Some persons read: consciousness (arises) reflecting an indescribable object (*anirdistartha*). That object is not reflected as absolutely distinct (*vivikta*). Nothing is made distinct and it is indescribable; for every self-characteristic (*sva-laksana*) is incapable of being described.....

“These two act mutually conditioned.....” explained as before (see p. 34 above).

Sometimes thanks to the force known as (*vasanā*) of daily talk (*prapanca*) being matured consciousness is transformed into the form of an object and the force sometimes is produced from the mind (appearing) in the form of an object. In this continued succession of the cause-and-effect there is no break of the flux; hence it is understood to be of immemorial time.

One more question: The sense-organ and the object-force, whether they are different from the consciousness or identical with it? In the first alternative the dispute between us would concern only with the nomenclature. The object is external equally for both of us; for, we both accept the sense-organ and the object as distinct and different from the consciousness. In the second alternative none would be able to specify: this is the sense-organ consisting of the force and this is the object. In reply to this question the author says:

Considering the true nature of things the force is a particular stage (of consciousness) and is true only nominally (*samvrtisat*); and as such it is not to be specified as either different from or identical with the consciousness. Considering the worldly talk one can say as he likes. It is sometimes quite different from the consciousness or sometimes identical with it. For, people talk both ways of things which are empirically true. They having in view the idea of difference talk, for example, "the fragrance of the sandal" (*candanagandha*) etc. The idea of identity is also sometimes expressed in this talk: Pitcher is rupa (visible), etc.

Any way, in both cases, the object-condition (*alambana*) has been elucidated as existing internally and to this effect the author says in conclusion: Thus the interior object is endowed with two characteristics (image and causality), and therefore it is logically deduced [that the consciousness alone is transferred into the (external) object (*visaya*).]

### KUE-CHI'S COMMENT ON 'ĀLAMBANA

The following are the remarks on Ālambana made by Kue-chi while commenting on Vasubandhu's *Vivśatikā*. In view of the fact that those comments are quite useful to understand and appreciate the respective positions of the realists whose opinions Dignaga has taken great pains to combat in composing his treatise, *Ālambanaparīksā*. There are such three groups of the realists whose theories are set forth by way of *Pūrvapakṣā* in this treatise. Now we are at a loss to specify who are they and which group of the realists uphold which type of system. The two *Tikas* that are now available in translations (one in Tibetan and the other in Chinese) are not much of help to us in this respect. However, Kue-chi, the renowned Chinese commentator, though not writing a regular comment

on the treatise has shed invaluable light on the problems that we are confronting in this context. This is the reason which prompted me to reproduce his observations relevant to the problems. With regard to the first proposition, viz. the proposition of the atoms-object-view,<sup>1</sup> Kue-chi says :—

1. “This master (i.e. old Sarvastivadin)<sup>2</sup> considers that many dharmas (atoms included) in the base of visible, rūpa, etc. become the object of visual perception. Why is this so? Their indivisible atoms (*paramāṇu*) each substantially existing (*dravyasat*), constitute jointly one *aṇu* or molecule. This *aṇu* is *prajñaptisat*, phenomenally real and therefore not at all substantially existing.”

<sup>3</sup>  
“Five-fold consciousness relies on (*ālambate*) the substantially existing dharma as its object and hence it does not really rely on *aṇu*. Thus the compound of atoms are things which are only conventionally real (*prajñaptirupa*). Therefore, while the bases of the visible, etc. (*rūpāyatamādi*), become objects of visual perception (*cakṣur-vijnāna*), etc. each of the indivisible atoms (*paramāṇu*) which are substantially real, serves their object (*ekaikam*). Visual consciousness, etc. do not rely on (*alumbate*) the thing which is phenomenally real (*prajñaptisat*) because what is substantially existing (*dravyasat*) can (alone) produce consciousness”.

The above extract shows that Dignaga in the first proposition refers to the standpoint of the old Sarvāstivādi-vaibhāsikas.

In regard to the second and the third propositions, Kue-chi makes the following observations:

“The master of the Sutra-sect says: the indivisible atoms (*paramanu*) that are substantially existing are not the object of the five-fold consciousness because no indivisible atoms

are manifested there (-five-fold consciousness). These seven indivisible (atoms) constitute jointly one *anurūpa*, gross atom. This gross body of atoms (*samhata-anu*) though phenomenally true (*prajñapti*) is the object of five-fold consciousness, because there this ( gross ) form is reflected. No single substance atom can be manifested as *ulambana*, object-cause. Therefore, necessarily, the compound (of atoms, *anu*) constitute jointly one gross phenomenal (form), then only the five-fold consciousness takes it as object. Therefore the Sastra

( -Vimsatikā ) says: Multitude of indivisible atoms substantially existing constitute the objects in their combined form.

This, the master of Nyāya (Neo-Sarvastivadin) considers to be contradictory to his tenets (*Sva-paksa-viruddha*); he maintains that five-fold consciousness of the eye, etc. does not rely on (*alambate*) conventionally real thing. This distinguishes him from the Sūtra-sect (Sautrantika). If we follow the old (school) (i.e. old Sarvastivadin), then there will be

such logical fallacy ( as has been pointed out<sup>4a</sup> ) by Dinna (-Dignāga) of no *alambana*, object-cause, because no form of indivisible atoms is reflected in the five-fold consciousness. And further (the Neo-Sarvasti-Vadin) says: the material elements, etc. (*rūpādayo dharmāḥ*) have each of them many a form (*ākāra*). Out of these only one part (*bhāga*) becomes the object of perception. Therefore, indivisible atoms, being in co-operation with one another (*paraspara-sāpekṣa*) assume each an integrated form (*Sancitakara*). This form exists in substance and produces the consciousness which resembles that form and hence becomes the object-cause (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of the five-fold consciousness. A great number of atoms, for example, become integrated to form a mountain, etc. and by mutual assistance each of atoms assumes the dimension of the mountain, etc. (*parvatādi-pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa*). While visual consciousness etc. rely on (*alambate*), the mountain, etc. the number of atoms existing substantially and being in co-operation with one another

become (one) mountain so that five-fold consciousness could be brought into play. Hence they constitute *alambana*, object-cause. In such a case there will be no fallacy involving absence of *ālambana*, because what exists substantially is accepted as *ālambana*. Therefore, the *sāstra* (*Vimsatikā*) says that substantially existing number of atoms all get integrated. This is explained in detail in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* of Dinna and the *Vijnaptimātrā - siddhi-Sāstra*, Chuan. 1.

“In the old *Vijnaptimatratā* (treatise) the tenets of the *ping-shih-shih* (-Vaisesika) and the old *Sa-pa-to*. (-Sarvastivadin) only are stated. The *Sanghāta* and *Sancita* are said to be one, viz. *paramānu-Samudāya-rūpa*, a matter constituted of indivisible atoms. This is hardly intelligible and the statement is difficult to explain ” (vf.4b.L.1-f.5a,1.6)

On another occasion Kue-chi makes the following comments: “The Sutra-sect and others (hold) that the indivisible atom (*paramānu*) being in the nature of one single substance (*ekadravya-rūpa*) becomes the object of

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non-sensuous consciousness (*mano-vijnāna*) alone. The Sarvastivadins (*Sa-po-to*), etc. also hold that each of the ten bases (*āyatana*) includes this single atom which becomes perceptible by the consciousness relevant to it. Thus one indivisible substance-atom (*dravya-paramānu*) has been accepted by you (Sarvastivadin, etc). But I (Vijnanavadin) do not accept that it is (so); because there is no logic in your argument. Therefore it is stated (by the Vijnanavadins) that indivisible atoms be in their combination form (*Sanghāta, ho-ho*) or integration form (*Sancita-ho-chi*) artha, would, in all cases, be contradictory to *pramāṇa* (i.e. perceptual experience). So the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* criticises the masters of the Sutra-sect in this way: The compound (*Sanghata*) of *rūpa*, etc. because it is experienced in the visual consciousness and because it is revealed to the consciousness in the gross, behaves as *alambana* object, it nevertheless, is not a causal factor (*pratyayārīha*), because it is not a real substance (*adravyarūpa*). For example, ( a man of )

disturbed eye-sight sees a double moon. That being a non-substantial image it cannot constitute the cause of that consciousness. Then the treatise establishes the syllogism (*pramāṇa*) that the compound of atom (*ho-ho-saṅghāta*), though it is *ālambana* is not a *pratyaya* (cause) because it does not exist in substance. It is like the second moon.

The treatise of the *Vijnaptimātratā-Siddhi* criticises that theory thus: compounds (*Saṅghāta-lakṣaṇa*) isolated from the indivisible atoms cannot exist in substance. With the removal of the parts of a compound, one by one, the consciousness of that gross form invariably disappears. Hence the compound as such ceases to exist in substance and can no longer, be stated to be the cause of five-fold consciousness in the same manner as the second moon. (The idea of indivisible atoms) is even more inconceivable: If indivisible atoms exist in substance, it would follow that compounds exist conventionally. (If) what constitute the whole do not exist in substance, the constituted whole cannot be established.

The *Ālambanaparīkṣā* criticises the masters of Nyaya (Neo-Sarvastivadins) thus: Just as solidity, etc. (*Kāthinatādi-Lakṣaṇa*) though existing in substance, may be reckoned as cause (*pratyayārtha*) they cannot be *ālambana*, the objects (of consciousness), because that form does not exist in visual consciousness, etc. The same will be logically the case with the integrated form (*Sancita = ho-chi-hsing*) of the indivisible atoms of rūpa, etc. because that form (*Sancitākāra*) is regarded as no other than the form of indivisible atoms. Then the treatise establishes this syllogism: The integrated form (*Sancitākāra*) of indivisible atoms though it is the cause (*pratyaya*) of the consciousness of eye, etc. cannot be its object (*ālambana*), because it is reckoned to be atomic form itself in the same way as solidity, fluidity, etc. (*Kāthinya-Snehādi*). But we experience (grh)

the consciousness of the eye, etc. taking as their objects the integrated form of atoms. Furthermore we have distinct cognitions of the pot, bowl, etc. These cognitions would become vague and indistinct; for, no distinction (in cognition) is admissible on the basis of distinction in their respective forms. (The cognition of distinct forms is unreal) because the distinct forms are non-entities (*adravya*). The indivisible atoms too cannot have distinct form of their own. Why is this so? Because the indivisible atoms are of equal dimension (*pāramāṇḍalya*). The distinction in forms exists only in phenomena, (*prajñapti*). When it is broken up into indivisible atoms the cognition (of distinct form) disappears invariably.

The Vijnaptimātratā-Siddhi-Sāstra moreover states: The comprehension of that (integrated form) is not possible, because while in the process of unification (Sancitāvasthā) the atoms are essentially the same as at the time when they were simple and non-unified. The individual atoms of the pot, bowl, etc. being equal (in their dimension) consciousness relying on these things (*allaksanam pratītya*, i.e. the atoms of pot, bowl, etc.) would be identical. Every indivisible atom at the stage of being unified would each forsake its atomic dimension (*Pārimāṇḍalya*). So cognition of the object in its gross form cannot be derived from the object in its subtle form; because cognition of one object cannot be based on another. [If you do not accept this axiom] a single consciousness would be capable of comprehending (*ālambata*) the entire world of objects." (Vol. III, f. 7b 1.3-f.3b,1.7).


The foregoing two excerpts would definitely prove that the opinions that were cited by Dignaga as the second and the third propositions are those of the Sautrantika (i.e. Sutra-sect) and the Neo-Sarvastivadin (i.e. Nyaya-master)

respectively. It is well-known that both these schools are staunch advocates of the atomic theory of matter.<sup>6</sup> The fundamental difference between them is that while the Sarvastivadin regarded the indivisible atom as the direct object of our experience the Sautrantika assigned such position to the compound of atoms, the indivisible atom being cognisable (according to him) by non-sensuous consciousness (mano-vijnana) (v. Vol. iii.f.20a 1,7,-f. 20b, 1.1). For the Mahayanist even the indivisible atoms are conventionally real and included in the *Dharmāyatana* (12th. of 12 bases of dharmas, elements of existence). The Mahayanist further maintains that only great things can disintegrate into small particles (called atoms); but the converse is not true i.e. small particles cannot combine to constitute great things (Ibid. f. 20b, 11.1-3.)



PART II

TIBETAN TEXTS



- 1. ALAMBANA PARIKSHA  
DMIGS-PA-BRTAG-PA**
- 2. ALAMBANA PARIKSHA VRITTI  
DMIGS-PA-BRTAG-PAHI-HGREL-PA**
- 3. ALAMBANA PARIKSHA TIKI  
DMIGS-PA-BRTAG-PAHI-HGREL-BSHAD**





































ནམ་པར་རིག་པ་འདུས་པ་ཅན་ཏུ་སྒྲུབ་མེད་ཀྱི། འོན་ཀྱང་འདུས་པ་དམིགས་སུ་  
བ་ཅི་མ་ཡིན་དེ། འདི་ལྟར་ནམ་པར་རིག་པ་དེ་དེ་ལས་མི་སྤྱི་བས་སོ། དེ་ལས་  
མ་སྤྱིར་ཚུགས་པ་ཡང་དམིགས་སུ་བར་གོ་མེད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་མི་འགྲུབ་ཞེས། དེ་ལྟར་དམ་པར་  
ཞིག་རང་སྤྱང་བའི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྤྱོད་དེ། འདི་ལྟར་རོན་པར་ཞིག་རང་  
སྤྱང་བ་ལྟེ་བའག་ཉིད་ཏུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ནམ་པར་རིག་པ་སྤྱི་བར་ཅི་དམིགས་སུ་ཡིན་རུང་།  
ཅུང་ལོ།

འདི་སྐད་ཏུ་ནམ་པར་གཤམ་བ་རོན་གང་གི་ག་གི་ངོ་བོ་འོ་ཟེས་སུ་བྱེད་ལ། དེ་  
ཡང་སྤྱིར་བར་བྱེད་ལ། དེ་ཡང་སྤྱིར་བར་བྱེད་ཡིན་ན་དེ་མི་ཚོ་དམིགས་སུ་བའི་རྟོན་ཏུ་  
ཅུང་གི་གཞན་ཏུ་ཅི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

སྤྱིར་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཁོ་ན་དམིགས་སུ་ཡིན་པར་འགྲུབ་རོ། ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གང་  
ལས་གཤམ་པ་ འདི་ལྟར་དེ་ཅི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སྤྱོད་དེ།

འདི་ལྟར་དེ་ཅི་བརྟན་བཅས་ལས་སྤྱི་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཏུ་བཤད་རོ། བརྟན་བཅས་  
ལས་ནི་འདི་སྐད་ཏུ་རོན་གང་ཞིག་སེམས་རང་སེམས་ལས་ལྷུང་བ་ནམས་སྤྱི་བའི་རྒྱ་  
མཚན་ཡང་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ནམས་སྤྱི་བ་ནི་དེ་ནམས་སུ་སྤྱིང་བའི་མ་སྤྱིར་འདོགས་  
པར་ཡང་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ནི་དམིགས་སུ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་འདུང་ངོ། འདི་སྐད་ཏུ། རོན་གང་  
ཞིག་སེམས་རང་སེམས་ལས་ལྷུང་བ་དེ་ནམས་སྤྱི་བ་ནས་རོན་དེ་ལ་འདི་ལྟར་ནམས་སུ་  
སྤྱིང་ངོ་ཞེས་དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་མ་སྤྱིར་འདོགས་པར་བྱེད་པའི་རོན་དེ་ནི་དམིགས་སུ་ཞེས་བྱེད།  
ཞེས་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་སྤྱི་བའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་ཡང་ཡིན་པ་ཞེས་སྤྱོད་པས།  
དམིགས་སུ་བའི་རྟོན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་གྱུ་བོ། དེའི་ནམ་པར་ཉིད་ནི་ཚུལ་སུ་  
འདི་ལ་རབ་ཏུ་གྲགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་མ་བཤད་ངོ། དེ་ལས་ [191,a]གཤིས་ཀའི་  
མཚན་ཉིད་དང་ལྡན་པའི་རོན་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་དམིགས་སུ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།

1. X འདི་གང་ལས་གཤམ་ན



ལ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཕྱུང་བའི་འབྲུག་རོ་ཞེས་པ་འདྲ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། འདྲེན་པ་མེད་པ་  
ཞེས་ཀྱང་བཤེས་པའི་ཉམས་པ་བཞེད་ནོ།

རེ་རྩེད་དཔེ་པར་བརྟུ་(191.b)བརྒྱབ་སྐྱོད་ནས། དེ་ལོ་ལོ་ལོ་བའི་ཕྱིར་  
བའི་ཕྱིར། རེ་བཞིན་དུ་རྣམས་སུ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཞེས་ཀྱང་བཤེས་པ་སྐྱོད་ནོ།

མི་རྒྱུད་རྒྱ་བ་བཞིས་པ་རྣམས་སུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཤེས་པའི་རྒྱ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། རྒྱ་བ་  
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟེ་ཕྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་བཞིན་དུ་འདྲེན་པ་ཡང་རྣམས་སུ་མེད་པའི་ཤེས་  
བའི་རྒྱ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། རྒྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟེ་ཕྱུང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།

དེ་ལྟེ་རོ་བ་ཉི་འདྲེན་པ་ཉི་རྒྱ་བ་ཡིན་དེ། རྣམས་སུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རྒྱ་བ་  
གཉིས་པ་བཞེད་ནོ། ཚེས་མི་མཐུན་པ་ཉི་ཉམས་པར་ཤེས་པའོ། རྣམས་སུ་མེད་པ་ཉམས་  
ལ་རྣམས་པ་མེད་པའི་གཞན་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ཅན་མཐོ། ཡང་ན་འདྲེན་པ་དམིགས་པ་མ་  
ཡིན་དེ། རྒྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་བ་གཉིས་པ་བཞེད་ནོ། ཚེས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་ཅ་རྟེ།  
གཞུང་བའི་ཅ་རྒྱ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་དང་། དམིགས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་ནི་རྒྱ་བ་པར་འབྲུག་རོ།  
རྒྱ་བ་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་དམིགས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན། རྒྱ་བ་གཉིས་པ་སྐྱོད་པ་ཡང་དམིགས་པ  
ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་འབྲུག་བས་ཅ་ཅང་མཐོ་བར་འབྲུག་པ་ཉི་གཞན་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ཅན་མཐོ།  
ཅན་མ་འདྲི་གཉིས་ཀྱང་རྒྱ་བ་དཔོན་ཚོས་རྒྱོང་གིས་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

རེ་རྩེད་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་ཀ་བཀའ་ནས་མཚུགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་རྩེད་ཕྱི་རོ་  
གཉིས་ཀར་ཡང་རྒྱོ་ཡི་ཕྱུང་བའི་རྒྱ་བོ། ཞེས་ཀྱང་བཤེས་པ་སྐྱོད་ནོ། འདྲི་  
རྩེད་བཤད་པའི་ལུ་མ་གྱིས་ན་གཉིས་ཀ་རྩེད་ན་ཡང་ཕྱི་རོ་ཕྱི་རོ་ནས་པར་ཤེས་པའི  
ཕྱུང་བའི་རྒྱ་བོ་ཕྱི་རོ་པ་ནི་རྣམས་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལ་མ་གཏོགས་པའོ། གཉིས་ཀར་ཞེས་  
ཀྱང་བཞིན་དུ་ལུ་མ་ལྟར་གྱི་ཕྱོགས་དང་། འདྲེན་པའི་ཕྱོགས་རྩེད་རོ། རྒྱོ་དེ་ཞེས་ཀྱང་  
བཞིན་ཤེས་པའི་ཤོ། ཅི་རྩེད་མི་ཅུང་ཞེ་ན།









བ་གང་ཞིག་ཁང་ལེན་ རེ་ཞིག་འཇམ་གཉེན་ན་ནི་ཕྱི་མ་པ་དང་ཁམ་པོར་བ་འ་མོགས་  
 བ་དང་ཁ་བ་དང་རྩི་པ་སོགས་པ་པ་འདུས་པར་བྲགས་པོ། འདྲི་དག་གི་ནང་ན་ནམ་  
 བ་གང་ཞིག་རྒྱལ་ལྷ་རབ་ལ་ཡོད་པ་འདྲོད་དོ། གང་དེ་ཕྱི་མ་པའི་ནམ་པའི་ཞེ་ན་རེ་རི་  
 ཚོ་ཁམ་པོར་པ་སོགས་པ་འདུས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཕྱི་མ་པའི་ཚྭ་འདྲུང་བར་འདྲུང་དོ།  
 འོད་དེ་ཁམ་པོར་ཕྱི་ནམ་པའི་ཞེ་ན་རེ་རི་ཚོ་ཡང་[1936]ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཁམ་པོར་ཕྱི་  
 ཚྭ་འདྲུང་བར་འདྲུང་ཕྱི་ཁ་ཅིག་ལ་ནི་ཕྱི་མ་པའི་ཚྭ་ཁ་ཅིག་པ་ན་ཁམ་པོར་ཕྱི་ཚྭ་.....  
 ཞེས་བྲལ་བ་ཚོ་ཐ་དང་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་འདྲིར་མི་འདྲུང་དོ། འདྲི་སྐད་དུ། ཚྭ་ན་ཕྱུལ་  
 ལ་དང་ཕྱི་རོ་བོ་རི་ཚེས་ལྷ་ཕྱོད་ཅིང་སྒྲིལ། ཕྱུལ་ཡང་རོ་བོ་གཅིག་པ་ཡིན་ན་ད་རི་  
 རྒྱར་ཚོ་ཐ་དང་པར་འདྲུང་ཞེས་བཤད་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།

རེ་ལ་འདྲི་སྐྱེས་དུ་ཕྱི་མ་པ་ལ་ནི་རྒྱལ་ལྷ་རབ་པར་མང་ལ། ཁམ་པོར་ལ་ནི་ཚེས་ཉུང་  
 མེ། རེ་བཞིན་དུ་ནི་གཞན་དག་ལ་ཡང་མང་བ་ཉུང་བ་ཉིད་རིག་པར་བྱའོ། རེ་རི་  
 ཕྱིར་མང་བ་དང་ཉུང་བ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཕྱི་མ་པའི་ཚྭ་འདྲུང་བར་འདྲི་ཡོད་དོ་སྐྱེས་དུ་.....  
 མེས་མ་ན།

རེ་རི་ཕྱིར་ཕྱི་མ་པ་དང་ཁམ་པོར་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྒྱུ་ལྷ་རབ་ནམ་མཁུ་ལ་ནི་ཞེས་  
 བྲལ་བ་མོགས་པ་སྒྲིམ་དེ།

འདྲི་ལ་ནི་ཉུང་བྱེད་མང་པོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཕྱི་མ་པའི་ཚྭ་འདྲུང་བར་མི་རྒྱུ་མེ།...  
 འདྲི་སྐྱེས་ཕྱི་མ་པ་ལ་རྒྱལ་ལྷ་རབ་པར་མང་ལ། ཁམ་པོར་ལ་ཚེས་ཉུང་ཆེད་ཀྱི། འོན་  
 ཀྱང་རྒྱལ་ལྷ་རབ་དུ་གཏོགས་པ་ཕྱི་མ་པའི་ནམ་པ་ལ་རང་ལ་ཡོད་པའི་ཆུད་པར་ནི་...  
 འགའ་ཡང་མེད་དོ། རེ་རི་ཕྱིར་ཉེས་པ་རེ་མོན་འདུག་མེ། གང་དུ་རྒྱལ་ལྷ་རབ་  
 མང་བ་དེར་ནི་ཕྱི་མ་པ་ཚོས་གང་དུ་ཚེས་ཉུང་བ་དེར་ནོ་བྱུང་བ་ཆུང་བོ་ཞེས་བྲལ་བ་འདྲི་









རྟེན་ལྗོངས་ [195,6] བསྐྱེད་པའི་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་རྟོག་དམིགས་པ་རྟེན་  
དུ་མེད་པའདྲའི་ཞེས་པ་རྒྱུ་ལས་ན་མཚུགས་པ་ལྟར་བརྟེན་ཏེ།

རྟེན་པས་ན་དཔལ་པོའི་ཞེས་པུ་བ་པ་སོགས་པ་སྟོན་ཏེ།

གང་གི་ཕྱིར་རྟེན་དུ་ཡུལ་པ་ནས་སྐྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་བརྟེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དཔལ་  
པོའི་སྟོན་མཚུགས་ཕྱིར་རོལ་གྱི་རྟོག་ཕྱུལ་ཅན་ས་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་པུ་བར་གྲུབ་པོ། ॥4॥

རྟེན་གཞན་གྱི་གཞུང་ལྷན་པགས་ནས་ནས་པ་བསྐྱེད་ཅན་དུ་རྟོག་མཚུགས་པ་  
པགས་ན། ཁས་ཞུང་ས་པ་པ་གྲུབ་པས་པའོར་བར་ལྟུང་དུ་ཤོང་བས་རང་གི་གཞུང་  
ལྷན་ས་པ་རྟོག་མཚུགས་པ་ནས་པར་བཞག་པ་བཞུན་བརྟེན་ཏེ།

ཤེས་པུ་ནོར་གྱི་རོལ་ཞེས་པུ་བ་པ་སོགས་པ་སྟོན་ཏེ། ཅེས་པོ་རྟོག་གི་ཤེས་

པ་ལ། ཤེས་པུ་རྟེན་པ་ཤེས་པུ་བ་ཅན་ས་ལྟུང་སྟུང་བ་གང་ཡིན་པ་རོལ་ཞེས་  
པའི་ཕྱུལ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་པུ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཅེས་ཞེས་པུ་བ་ཞེ་ནང་གི། རྟེན་པའདྲེས་  
ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པར་བཞུ་བར་བུ་ལོ་ནང་ཞེས་པུ་བའི་སྐྱེད་པའི་རྟོག་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་འདུན་པའི་  
རྟོག་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེས་ན་ཤེས་པ་ལ་ཅན་ཞེས་པ་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཤེས་པུ་རོལ་གྱི་ཤེས་  
པུ་བ་ཞི་ཕྱུལ་གྱི་ནས་པ་གཞུང་བའི་ཅ་ཞེས་པུ་བའི་ཐ་མོག་གོ། ཞི་ཞེས་པུ་བའི་སྐྱེད་  
པེས་པར་གཞུང་བ་དང་། བར་དུ་ཅན་པའི་རོལ་དུ་བཞུ་བར་བུ་ལོ། ཕྱི་རོལ་ལྟར་  
སྟུང་ཞེས་པུ་བ་ཞི། ཕྱི་རོལ་ལྟར་སྟུང་སོན་པ་ལྟེ། ཅེས་པར་ཅན་པ་ལྟར་ཕྱུང་ཞེས་པུ་  
བའི་ཐ་མོག་གོ། རྟེན་རྟེན་སྟུང་བའི་སྐྱེད་ཅན་པར་ནས་ཁའི་ཁས་ས་སྟུང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།  
ནས་ཁའི་ནོན་ཅེས་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལ་སྟུང་བས་ན། ཅེས་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལས་ཤེས་པུ་བ་ཅན་  
པ་བཞིན་དུ། དེས་གཞུང་བའི་ཅན་སྟེན་པར་བུའ་དེ། དཔེར་ན་སྐྱེད་པའི་གཞུགས་  
བཞུན་སེ་ལོང་གི་རོལ་སྟེ་འདུང་བ་ན། ཅེས་ཁའི་ཁས་ས་ཕྱི་གཞུགས་བཞུན་གྱི་དཔལ་  
གིས་ཁོན་པ་ན་འདུག་ལྟར་ལོང་གྲུབ་ཅན་པར་སྟུང་བ་བཞིན་ནོ།







ལྷ་དང་མཚུངས་པ་དེ་མ་ཐག་པ་དང་། བདག་པོ་དག་པས་རྒྱུས་པའི་ནམ་པར་གྲེས་པའི  
 རྒྱུ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བས་སོ། ། འདི་རྣམས་གསུང་བའི་ཅེ་དེ་མེད་པར་ནམ་པར་གྲེས་པ་དེ་  
 མི་འགྲུང་སྟེ། དེ་ནི་དཔག་པ་ལ་རྟེན་པའི་རྣམས་དཔག་པར་བྱ་བ་པ་བཟུང་བའི་ཞིག་དུ་  
 ཟད་གྱི། འདི་རྒྱུ་རིམ་གྱི་བྱ་བ་བྱུང་བ་པས། རྒྱུ་རིམ་གྱི་བྱེད་པར་གས་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།  
 གཤམ་དེ་ཡང་གྲེས་པ་དང་གསུང་བའི་ཅེ་དེ་པས་པན་འདོགས་པ་ (197,a) མེད་ན་  
 ཅི་སྟེ་དེ་མེད་པར་ཡང་མི་འགྲུང་སྟེ། འདི་རྣམས་པན་མི་འདོགས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་པར་མི་  
 འགྱུར་ལ། པན་མི་འདོགས་པ་ནི་མེད་དུ་རྟེན་གྲུང་འགའ་ཡང་མི་འགྲུང་བར་མི་  
 འགྱུར་དོ། ། གཤམ་དེ་ནམ་པ་འདིས་གསུང་བའི་ཅེ་དང་རྒྱ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་ན་ནི་འགྱུར་དུ་  
 ཟད་དེ། འགཤ་བ་ཅི་ཞིག་ཡོད། བ་ཡང་གི་རུ་གཤམས་བཤོན་ནི་འགྲུབ་པའི་  
 རྒྱུ་ལྷ་དང་འགྲུས་བྱུ་ཉིད་པོ་མེད་དོ། ། བདག་ཉིད་ལ་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་ལ་ལར་འདོད་  
 པ་ཉིད་དེ། དཔེན་ནམས་མེ་ལྟ་བུ་རེ། དེ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ལོ་ནས་བདག་ཉིད་གསལ་  
 བར་བྱེད་དོ། ། ཚའི་བྱེད་པ་གཤམ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ལ་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་ཡོད་པེ་སྟེ། ལྷ་དང་  
 འགྲུས་བྱུ་ཉིད་པོ་མེ་འགྲུབ་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་ཅན་ཡིན་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་གཤམ་ཞེ་ན།  
 འདི་རྣམས་གསུང་ཚིགས་པ་དག་ནི་ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་དག་གི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས  
 བ་སྟེན་དེ། འདི་རྣམས་གསུང་ཚིགས་པ་དག་ནི་ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་དག་ནི་ཡོད་པ་དང་།  
 མེད་པ་ཉིད་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་རྣམས་རྣམས་ལ་དེ་རིམ་གྱིས་སྟེ་བདག་གི་ཡང་མཚན་  
 ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་སྟེ། གང་ཞིག་ཡོད་ན་གང་ཡིན་ལ། ཅིག་གིས་ནི་རྣམས་ལ་  
 ཡིན་ནོ། ། འདི་ལ་ཡང་གསུང་བའི་ཅེ་ཡོད་ན་གྲེས་པ་ཡོད་ལ་མེད་ན་མེད་དེ། དེ་རྒྱ་  
 བས་ན་རྟེན་ཅིག་འགྲུང་བའི་གཉིས་ཀྱང་རྣམས་ལ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་བོ། ། གསུང་  
 ཚིགས་པ་དག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གང་དག་གསུང་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་ཐ་སྣང་འདོགས་པ་དག་ནི་གསུང་  
 ཚིགས་པ་དག་སྟེ། ཉོག་གོ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་སྣང་གོ། དེ་དང་ལྷན་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་

བཅི་ཡོད་པ་དང་ཅེད་པ་དང་ལྷན་པ་ཉིད་དོ། ལྷ་དང་ལྷ་དང་ལྷན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ལྷ་དང་  
འབྲས་བུ་དག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་འདྲི་རྟོག་དོ།

ད་ལྟར་དེ་ཞེས་ལྷ་ལ་དང་ལྷ་པོ་ཅན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ལ་བཟུང་ནས་དེ་ནི་རིམ་  
གྱིས་ལྷ་ལ་དང་ལྷ་པོ་ཅན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་བཟུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཡང་ན་རྣམས་པ་འཛོམས་ཕྱིར་

རིམ་གྱིས་ཡིན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྒྲོས་སྟེ། [197,6] ཡང་ན་གཟུང་བའི་ཅན་རྣམས་པ་འཛོམས་བ་  
ན་རིམ་གྱིས་བསྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པའི་དོ་བོ་དེ་ལྷ་ལ་དྲུ་འབྱུང་དོ། འདྲི་རྟོག་གཟུང་བའི་...

ཅ་དེ་འགག་པ་ན། ཀུན་གཞི་ནས་པར་གྲེས་པ་ལ་རྣམས་པ་འཛོམས་པར་བྱེད་དོ། རྣམས་  
པ་དེ་གལ་དེ་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཉིས་པ་ལ་རྣམས་ཅིག་བྱེད་པ་ནས་སྐད་ཅི་དེ་དེ་ཅོ་སྐད་ཅིག་

མ་གཉིས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལ་དང་དང་མཐུན་པའི་ནས་པར་གྲེས་པ་བསྐྱེད་དོ། གལ་དེ་སྐད་ཅི་  
དེ་ཅོ་སྐད་ཅིག་གསུམ་པའམ། བཞི་བ་ཡང་ཅུང་གང་གི་ཅོ་འདྲི་སྐབ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་

དེ་དེ་ཅོ་ཡོངས་སུ་སྒྲིན་ནས་དང་དང་མཐུན་པའི་ནས་པར་གྲེས་པ་ལྱེད་པར་འབྱུང་དོ།  
ཕྱོགས་འདྲི་ལ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་ལ་བྱེད་པ་འགག་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་...

ཕྱིར་དང་། རྣམས་ཅིག་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་མི་སྲིད་དོ།  
འདྲི་རྟོག་གྲེས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་གཟུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་སྐོན་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ནས་པ་ཡོད་པ་གང་...

ཡིན་པ་དེ་རྣམས་པོ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ནས་པ་ཅན་གྱི་གྲེས་པ་ཕྱི་ན་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་དོ། དེ་ནི་  
ཕྱིར་ཉེས་འདྲི་ནས་སྐྱེད་དེ་སྐད་

གལ་དེ་རྣམས་པས་གྲེས་སྐྱེད་ན། དེ་རྣམས་འོ་ན་ལོ་རྣམས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ལྷ་ལ་དྲུ་འབྱུང་གྱི་  
གཟུང་བའི་ཅན་རྣམས་ནི་ས་ཡིན་ནོ་སྐད་དུ་སོམས་ན།

རིམ་གྱིས་ཀྱང་ཡིན་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་སྒྲོས་སྟེ།  
འདྲི་རྟོག་ཉེས་པ་ཅེད་དོ། འདྲི་རྟོག་རིམ་གྱིས་ཀྱང་གཟུང་བའི་ཅན་དེ་ནི་དང་མཐུན་པའི་ 1

འབྲས་བུ་སྐྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཀུན་གཞི་ནས་པར་གྲེས་པའི་དེ་ནི་ཅན་གྱིས་རྣམས་པ་བྱེད་དོ། །  
མཐུན་པའི་ 1 may be suggested





རེ་ལ་འདྲི་ལྷན་ཏུ་ལྷན་པ་ནི་ལྷན་པ་དང་ལྷན་པ་བཞུགས་ཏེ། ལྷན་པ་གཞི་མེད་  
ལས་མི་ལྷན་ཏེ། ལྷན་པ་དང་ལྷན་པ་ནི་དང་པོ་ཡིན་ལ། རེ་ལ་འདྲི་ལྷན་པ་  
ལས་ལྷན་པ་ཡིན་ལས་དང་པོ་འདྲི་ལྷན་པ་ལས་ལྷན་པ་ཡིན་ལས་ལྷན་པ་ཡིན་ཏུ་.....  
སེམས་ན། རེ་ལ་ལྷན་ཏེ།

རེ་ལ་འདྲི་ལྷན་པ་ལ་མི་འགའ་ཞེས་བྲུ་བ་ཞེས་ཏེ། གཤམ་ཏེ་རྟེན་ཞིག་པ་རྟེན་གྱི་  
མ་ལུང་དགོས་ན། ལྷན་པ་དང་གཉེས་པ་རེ་ཉིད་རྟེན་ཡིན་ཏུ་ཟེར་ཏེ། འདྲི་ལྷན་ལྷན་པ་  
གཉེས་པ་ལ་ནི་ལྷན་པ་སེམས་ལྷན་པ་དང་མིག་ལ་མིག་ཏེ་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ལྟུང་དང་། རང་མིག་  
པ་རྟེན་པོ་ཡིན་པ་རྟེན་པ་གཉི་ག་ལ་བྲགས་སོ། རེ་ལ་ལྷན་པ་རྟེན་ལས་གྱིས་ཡོངས་  
ལྷན་པ་ཞེས་པ་རྟེན་གྱི་ལྷན་པ་ནི་གང་གིས་ན་རེ་ལྷན་པ་དང་གཉེས་པ་རྟེན་ཅན་ཏུ་  
སེམས་པར་འགྲུབ་ལྷན་པ་དང་གཉེས་པ་དང་ལྷན་ཅིག་འགའ་བ་ནི་མེད་ཏེ།

རེ་ལ་འདྲི་ལྷན་ཏུ་འདྲི་ལྷན་པ་ལས་ལྷན་པ་ལ་ལྷན་པ་ (199,a) གནས་  
པ་ནི་ལྷན་པ་ལ་ལྷན་པ་བྲུ་བ་གཞན་ཞེས་ལ། ལྷན་པ་དང་གཉེས་པ་གནས་པ་ལ་ལྷན་  
ལྷན་ཏེ། རེ་ལ་ལྷན་པ་དང་པོ་ནི་གཞན་གྱི་མི་ལྷན་པ་ལྷན་པ་ལྷན་པ་ཡིན་པར་  
གཉེས་པར་བྱའོ། ལྷན་ཏུ་སེམས་ན་རེ་ཉིད་ལས་པ་བསུ་བར།

ལྷན་པ་ནི་ལྷན་པ་དང་གཉེས་པ་ལ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་ལྷན་པ་བྲུ་བ་སེམས་པ་ཞེས་པ་  
འདྲི་ལ་ནི་རྟེན་གྱིས་བྲུ་བ་པ་རྟེན་པར་མེད་ཏེ། འདྲི་ལྷན་ལྷན་པ་ནི་གཤམ་ཏེ་ལྷན་པ་  
གཉེས་པ་ལ་གནས་ཀྱང་ལྷན་ཏེ། འདྲི་ཏེ་གཞན་ལ་ལྷན་པ་གནས་ཀྱང་ལྷན་ཏེ། ལྷན་པ་  
མཉམས་ཅན་ཏུ་རེས་ནི་གཞན་གསལ་མཚོན་པ་ལ་སེམས་པ་ཙམ་ཞིག་བྲུ་བ་ལྷན་པ་ལས་རྟེན་.....  
ལྷན་པ་ལྷན་པ་བྲུ་བ་ལྷན་པ་ལྷན་པ་ལྷན་པ་ལྷན་ཏེ།

རེ་ལ་







རེས་འགའ་ནི་སྐྱོ་ས་པའི་བག་ཚགས་ཞེས་བའི་རྣམ་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་སྒྲིན་པ་ལ་སོགས་  
པར་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་འབྱུང་ལ། རེས་འགའ་ནི་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་  
པ་ཅན་གྱིས་སེམས་ལས་རྣམ་པ་སྐྱེའོ། འདི་ལ་ཡང་རྒྱ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་བརྒྱུད་པ་འདིར  
དེའི་རྒྱན་ཅད་པ་མེད་པས་ཐོག་མ་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་ཉིད་ཏུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ།

ཡང་ཅི་དབང་བོ་དང་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་འདི་དག་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལས་ཐ་དད་པ་  
ཞིག་ཡིན་རྒྱུ། འོན་ཏེ་མ་ཡིན། གཤམ་དེ་ཐ་དད་ན་དེའི་ཚོ་སྤང་ཙམ་ཞིག་ལ་སྐྱོག་  
པར་ཟད་ཀྱི་དོན་ནི་མཐུན་ཏེ། རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལ་མ་གཏོགས་པའི་དབང་བོ་དང་།  
དམིགས་པ་དག་ཁས་སྐྱབས་པའི་སྤྱིར་རོ། འོན་ཏེ་ཐ་མི་དད་ན་ནི་དེའི་ཚོ་རྣམ་པ་  
འདི་ནི་དབང་བོ་རོ་བོ་འདི་ནི་ཡུལ་ལོ་ཞིག་བའི་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ་འདིར་མི་འབྱུང་  
ཞེ་ན། དེའི་སྤྱིར།

རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དང་། དེ་གཉིས་ཞེས་བའི་བལ་སོགས་པ་སྐྱོས་ཏེ། གཤམ་  
དེ་དངོས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་དབྱུང་ན་ནི། དེའི་ཚོ་རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་གནས་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་གྱི་  
བདག་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར། རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལས་གཞན་...  
ཉིད་དམ་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། དེའི་སྤྱིར་རི་སྐད་རྣམས་  
པའི་ཉེས་པ་གཉིས་ཀར་ཐལ་བར་མེད་དོ། (ཕ. ཐལ་བ་སོང་དོ།) འོན་ཏེ་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་  
ཐ་སྐྱད་ལ་བརྟེན་ན་ནི། དེའི་ཚོ་ཅི་དགའ་རེས་འགའ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དེ་དག་ལས་  
གཞན་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་བརྗོད་པར་བྱ་ལ། རེས་འགས་ནི་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་འོ། འདི་རྣམ་  
གཞན་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ཡོད་པ་རྣམས་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་རེས་ (200,b) འགའ་ནི་ཐ་དད་  
པར་ཐ་སྐྱད་འདོགས་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་ཅན་དན་གྱི་དྲི་ཞེས་བའི་བལ་སོགས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ལྱེད་འོ།  
རེས་འགའ་ནི་ཐ་མི་དད་པ་སྟེ། དཔེར་ན་གཞུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་བྱས་པ་ཞེས་



**PART III**

**Sanskrit Texts**

**THE ALAMBANA—PARIKSA**

**Karika and Vrtti**

**of**

**ACHARYA DINNAGA**



## आलम्बनपरीक्षा

### कारिका

- १ यद्यपीन्द्रविज्ञप्तेः कारणं परमाण्वः ।  
अतदाभतया नास्या अक्षवद्विषयोऽणवः ॥
- २ यदाभासा न सा तस्मात्<sup>३</sup> द्रव्याभावाद्विचन्द्रवत् ।  
एवं बाह्यद्वयमपि न युक्तं बुद्धिगोचर ॥
- ३ साधनं सञ्चिताकार इतीच्छन्ति केचन ।  
अण्वाकारो न विज्ञत्पेरर्थः<sup>५</sup> कठिनतादिवत् ॥
- ४ भवेद्वटशरावादेस्तथा सति समा मतिः ।  
आकारभेदाद्भेदश्चेत् स नास्ति द्रव्यसत्यणौ ॥
- ५ तत्परिमाणभिन्नत्वात्<sup>६</sup> द्रव्यासति ततोस्ति सः ।  
अणूनां परिहारे हि तदाभज्ञानविप्लवात्<sup>७</sup> ॥
- ६ यदन्तर्ज्ञैरूपन्तु बहिर्वदिब भासते ।  
सोऽर्थो विज्ञानरूपत्वात्तत्प्रत्ययतयापि च ॥<sup>८</sup>
- ७ प्रत्ययोऽव्यभिचारित्वात्<sup>९</sup> हृशक्यर्पणारकृत्मा ।  
सहकारिवशाद्यद्वि शक्तिरूपं (तत्) इन्द्रियम् ॥<sup>११</sup>
- ८ सा चाविरुद्धा विज्ञप्तावेवं विषयरूपकम् ।  
प्रवर्तनेऽनादिकालात् शक्तिश्चान्योन्यहेतुके ॥<sup>१२</sup>  
इत्याचार्यदिडनागकृता आलम्बनपरीक्षाप्रकरण-  
कारिका समाप्ता ।

Foot notes  
to the Text

Tangyur (Narhang) Mdo. ce (xcv)Nos. 4-5.

1. This verse is cited in the Pramāṇavārtika-Alankāra by Prajñākara Gupta, Chap. II. ad ver.294.

The Tattva - sangraha-panjika [G O S]. P.582 the verse with different reading: यद्यपीन्द्रियविज्ञप्तेर्ग्राह्यांशः कारणं भवेत् ॥

अतदाभतया तस्यानाक्षवद्विशयः स तु ।

the pañjikā attributes the verse to one Bhadanta ( तेनैव भदन्नेन दुषणमुक्तम् ). May this Bhadanta be the same as Subhagupta ? The verse is not, however, traced in the Bahyartha Siddhi.

2. Or अद्रव्यत्वात् or द्रव्यासत्त्वात्.

3. This quarter is identical with one in the Pramāṇa Samuccaya cited in Pr. Vartikālankara, II, 302.

4. This line being put literally may read thus : केचित् सञ्चिताकारान् साधनमिच्छन्ति ।

5. Lit. विज्ञप्ति-अर्थः

6. The two quarters 4d-5a form one idea and they may be literally put thus : सः अणौ द्रव्यसति नास्ति परिमाणभेदाभावात् ।

7. This may literally read thus : परमाणुपरिहारे तदाभज्ञानविप्लवः ।  
The reading 'विप्लवात्' is adopted from the Tibetan version of the Vṛtti .

8. This verse is quoted in the Tattvas. pañjikā, p. 582. Sankaracharya cites the first half in his Sutra bhasya, ad II, 2, 28 with the reading of तत् for तु.

9. This line is cited by Parthasarathi Misra in his comment on Sloka-vartika, pp. 311-12. See discussion on this point p. 20 above.

10. Tib. mi-(ma)-hkhrol. phyir. na.

11. This quarter is cited in the Tattvas. Pañ. p. 582 along with the prose passage of the Vṛtti thus: अथवा शक्त्यर्पणात् क्रमेणापि, etc.

12. Or विषयरूपता शक्तिश्च अन्योन्यहेतुका अनादिकालात् प्रवर्तते ॥

## आलम्बनपरीक्षावृत्तिः

येचक्षुरादिविज्ञान्मनां बाह्यार्थं आलम्बनमितीच्छन्ति । ते तत्कारणत्वात्  
<sup>1</sup> परमाणून् वा तदाभासज्ञानजनकत्वात् <sup>2</sup> तत्सङ्घातं वा कलयन्ति । तत्र तावत्-

यद्यपीन्द्रिय विज्ञप्तेः कारणं परमाणवः ।

अतदाभतया नास्या अक्षवद्विषयोऽणवः ॥ १ ॥

<sup>3</sup> विषयो हि नाम यस्य ज्ञानेन स्वभावोऽवधार्यते । तदाकारोत्पत्तेः ।

<sup>4</sup> परमाणवस्तत्कारणत्वे सत्यपि न तथा इन्द्रियवत् । एवं तावत्परमाणवो नालम्बनम् ॥ १ ॥

<sup>5</sup> सङ्घातस्तदाभासत्वे सत्यपि [ नालम्बनम् ] ।

<sup>6</sup> यदाभासा न सा तस्मात्

योऽर्थः स्वाभासां विज्ञप्तिं जनयति । स ह्यालम्बनं युज्यते । यतः सा

<sup>7</sup> एवोत्पत्तिप्रत्ययतयोच्यते । सङ्घातस्तु न तथा ।

<sup>8</sup> द्रव्याभावात् द्विचन्द्रवत् ।

इन्द्रियवैकल्यात् द्विचन्द्रदर्शनस्य तदाभासत्वे सत्यपि तस्य विषयो नास्ति ।  
 एवमद्रव्यसत्त्वात् सङ्घातो नालम्बनम् ।

<sup>9</sup> एवं बाह्यद्वयमपि न युक्तं मतिगोचरः ॥ २ ॥

एकाङ्गवैकल्यात् बाह्यः परमाणु सङ्घातश्चेत्युक्तोऽर्थो <sup>10</sup> नालम्बनम् ॥ २ ॥

अत्र साधनं सञ्चिताकार इतीच्छन्ति केचन । <sup>11</sup>

सर्वेऽप्यर्था अनेकाकारा इति तत्र केनचिदाकारेण प्रत्यक्षमिष्यन्ते । <sup>12</sup> परमाणुष्वपि  
 सञ्चिताभासज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुभावोऽस्ति ।

अण्वाकारो न विज्ञप्तेरर्थः कठिनतादिवत् ॥ ३ ॥

यथा कठिनतादि विद्यमानमपि न चक्षुर्बुद्धेर्विषयः । एवमणुत्वमभिसमानम् ॥ ३ ॥

भवेद्धटशरावादेस्तथा सति समा मतिः ।

घटशरावादीनां परमाणुषु बहुष्वपि न कोऽपि विशेषोऽस्ति ।

आकारभेदाद्भेदश्चेत्



यदि मन्यसे श्रीवाद्याकारविशेषः <sup>13</sup> कर्म येन बुद्धेर्विशेष उपाधि भवेत्  
इति । अयमुपाधिर्घटादावस्ति ।

नास्ति तु द्रव्यसत्यणी ॥ ४ ॥

तत्परिमाणभिन्नत्वात्

<sup>14</sup> परमाणुषु द्रव्यान्तरेष्वपि न पारिमण्डल्ये विशेषोऽस्ति ।

<sup>15</sup> द्रव्यासति ततोऽस्ति सः ।

आकारभेदः संवृतिसत्त्वेवास्ति न तु परमाणुषु । घटादयः संवृतिसन् एव ।

<sup>16</sup> अणूनां परिहारे हि तदाभज्ञानविप्लवात् ॥ ५ ॥

<sup>17</sup> द्रव्यसत्सु <sup>18</sup> सम्बन्धिनामपनये वर्णादिवत् स्वबुद्धिर्न त्यज्यते । तथा सति इन्द्रिय-  
बुद्धीनां विषयो बहिर्नास्तीत्युपपन्नम् ॥ ५ ॥

अदन्तज्ञेयरूपन्तु बहिर्वदवभासते ।

सोऽर्थः

बाह्येऽर्थेऽसति बहिर्वदवभासनमन्तस्सदेवालम्बनप्रत्ययः ।

विज्ञानरूपत्वात् तत्प्रत्ययतयाऽपि च ॥ ६ ॥

<sup>19</sup> अन्तर्विज्ञानमर्थतयावभासते <sup>20</sup> तत उत्पद्यते चेति धर्मताद्वयविशिष्टमित्यतः  
अन्तस्सदेवालम्बनप्रत्ययः ।

<sup>21</sup> यदि तावदेवमवभास एव वेद्यते । कथं तदेकदेशः सहोत्पन्नः प्रत्ययः ॥ ६ ॥

<sup>22</sup> प्रत्ययोऽव्यभिचारित्वात् सह

सहभूतोऽपि <sup>23</sup> अव्यभिचारात् <sup>24</sup> अन्यजातस्य प्रत्ययो भवति । हेतुका एवमाहुः-  
भावाभावयोस्तद्वत्ता हि (कार्यकारणयो) हेतुहेतुमतोः क्रमेण जायमानयोश्च लक्षणम्  
<sup>25</sup> इति । अथ वा

सक्त्यर्पणात् क्रमेण [वा] ।

<sup>26</sup> क्रमेणापि सोऽर्थवभासः स्वानुरूपकार्योत्पत्तये शक्तिं विज्ञानाधारां करोतीत्यविरोधः ॥

यदि तर्हि <sup>27</sup> अन्तः रूपमेवालम्बनप्रत्ययः । कथं त [द्वयं] प्रतीत्य चसुश्च  
चक्षुर्विज्ञानमुत्पन्न इति ।

<sup>28</sup> सहकारिवशाच्च शक्तिरूपं तदिन्द्रियम् ॥ ५ ॥

इन्द्रियं स्वकार्याच्छक्तिरूपमेवानुमीयते न तु भौतिकम् ॥ ७ ॥

सा चाविरुद्धा विज्ञप्तेः

<sup>29</sup> शक्तिस्तु विज्ञाने वास्तु । अनिर्देश्ये स्वरूपे वास्तु कार्योत्पत्तौ न विशेषः ।  
<sup>30</sup> एवं विषयरूपकम् ।

<sup>31</sup> प्रवर्तते जादिकालात्शक्तिश्चान्योन्यहेतुके ॥ ८ ॥

चक्षुराख्यां शक्तिमन्तः <sup>32</sup> रूपञ्च प्रतीत्य विज्ञानमथाविभासमालम्बनादविविक्त-  
<sup>32-b</sup> मुत्पद्यते । इदं द्वयमपि अनादिकालमन्योन्यहेतुकम् । कदाचित् शक्तिपरिपाकाद्विज्ञानं विषया-  
कास्तया भवति । कदाचिच्च <sup>33</sup> तदाकाराच्छक्तिः । विज्ञानञ्च सा चोभयमन्यत्वेन अनन्यत्वेन  
<sup>34</sup> च यथेष्टमुच्यताम् । एवमन्तरालम्बनं धर्मताद्वयविशिष्टत्वात् विषयतयोपपद्यते ॥ ८ ॥

इत्याचार्यदिङ्नागकृता

आलम्बनपरीक्षावृत्तिः

समाप्ता ।

## FCOT NOTES TO THE VRTTI.

1. The expression परमाणून् वा.....सङ्घातं वा .... is supported by Vinitadeva and Dharmapāla v. their tikas in this context.

The advocates of the atom-object perception are the old Sarvāstivādin and those of the aggregate-object perception the Sutra sect, ie. Sautrāntika (v. Kwei-Chi's comment below pp. ) A Digambara jaina, Sumati also pleads for the perceptibility of atoms, v. note 12 below p.

- 2.= *hdus.pa* v. Nyāyabindu Index. Or it may be also *Sañcaya*

3. This sentence is quoted in the Naya-cakra (Sri Jambu vijayaji's edition) p. 91. from Dignāga.

- 4.= de. lla.ma. yin. te=न तदाकारः, तदाभाः ।

5. Supported by Vinitadeva. Paramartha and Hsuan Tsang interpret as: ज्ञानस्य तदकारत्वेऽपि etc.

6. cp. Pramānavārtikālankāra, II. 302: कथं तर्हिअणचार्येणोक्तम्

यदाभासा न सा तस्मात् चित्तालम्बं पञ्चकम् । (Pramānavārtika I,17)

न हि परमाणुभ्य उत्पद्यमानं तदाकारं चक्षुरादिज्ञानम् । अन्याकारस्यापि विज्ञानस्य कारणत्वेन आलम्बनत्वे चक्षुरादिपरमाणूनामपि आलम्बनप्रसङ्गः । तेहि तथा अन्यथः वा भवन्तो द्विचन्द्रनीलाद्याभासविज्ञानहेतुरिति ।

7. एव is to be used after उक्तप्रत्यय according to Tib. This is a quotation from Āgama in Dharmapala's tikā and the Sastra in Vinitadeva's tikā.

8. Cfr. Naya-cakravrtti, p 91 ( Muniji's edn. ) : अद्रव्यत्वात् परमार्थसत्त्वाभावात् कुत आभासविज्ञापनम् ।

9. बाह्यद्वयं चापि

- 10.= *tshogs* is rendered as *Sanghāta* as it is previously spoken of. The word *tshogs* is generally for *kāya*, (v. Śālistambasūtra Index), *kalāpa* (Bodh. pañjikā, p. 473, n. 1. 1. 4)

Sambhāra [ Dasabhūmika Sutra, Index] and *Samudāya* [Nyāyabindu Index].

11. This is the opinion of Neo-Sarvāsti-vādin according to Kwei-chi [v. his comments on Alambana. p.38]
12. cp. the opinion of Sumati, a Digambara cited in the *Tal!v. pañjikā* p. 554:

सामान्यविशेषात्मत्वात् सर्वत्रादायानां तुल्यातुल्यरूपेण द्विरूपाः परमाणवः ।  
तत्र समानं यद्रूपं तदिन्द्रियैर्गृह्यते नासमानम् ततश्च काकारं विज्ञानमणुष्वविरूढमिति  
प्रत्यक्षसिद्धाः परमाणवः ।

13. This passage is rather difficult to put in Sanskrit. My reading is as literal as possible. *Khe.l. par. du. hgyur. bai= Viśeṣabhūta. Khyed par-viśeṣa, upādhi, atīśaya, prakarṣa, etc.* See Nyāyabindu Index. *Upādhi* see Bodhic. pañ. p. 363, n. 4 and p. 316, n. 1. *Karman* here seems to be a gramatical karman, object of cognition, see Dignaga's expression प्रतिकर्म विभज्यते cited in the Ślokavār. Comment of Umbeka. *Sūnya-vāda ver. 20.*
14. Tib. Zlum. po.
15. Or तस्मादद्रव्यसत्सु सः ।
16. Or परमाणुपरिहारे तदाभज्ञान हानितः ।
17. No plural particle in Tib.
18. = नीलादिवर्णं v. Hsuan Tsang's version.
19. More literally: अन्तविज्ञानमर्थाभासं तत उत्पन्नञ्चेति धर्मद्वययुक्त मिति ( Or युक्त त्वात् ) अन्तः ..... (See *Abhisamaya. aloka (Gos)* p. 382 ff. for a lengthy discussion on this point.
20. = अर्थात् cp. vṛtti ad 2a.
21. Or अस्त्येवं चावन् तद्व्यतिभासम्

22 This line is quoted by Ehatta Umbeka in his comment on Ślokavār. p. 271. Tib. reads literally: एकांशोऽपि अव्यभिचारित्वात् प्रत्ययः ।

23. Lit. अन्यस्मात् जातस्य.....v. Vinitadeva's Tikā.

24. Gtan-tshigs pa. dag. =Chinese [Hsuan Tsang] yin-ming [31-3; 74-4]. Vinitadeva takes them to be some Tārkiika, rtog. ge. pa.

A Similar citation in the kosa bhasya, p. 84 in the context of pleading the *Saha-bhuhetu*:

इतस्तर्हि भावाभावयो स्तद्वत्त्वात् । एतद्वि हेतुहेतुमतोर्लक्षणमाचक्षते. हेतुकाः

यस्य भावाभावयोः यस्य भावाभावो जियमतः स हेतुरितरो हेतुमान् । . . . . .

Here Vasubandhu refers to the Haituka, perhaps an impartial logician who pleaded for the successive causation by law of concomitance; but Vasubandhu utilizes the definition of causation to his theory of simultaneous causation, cfr. Vinitadeva's Tikā on this passage. It is note-worthy that Dignaga cites the definition in a fuller form. Kumarila's criticism of the simultaneous causation theory of Buddhists is to be found in note 4 on p. 18.

The Haituka is an impartial logician, cfr. Kumarila's अलौकिकविवादाश्च वज्र्यास्ते हेतुकस्ततः । Anumana ver. 17. Haituka = Nyāya-vid-Parthasarathi's comment. Kumarila sometimes speaks of Dignaga as Nyāya-vid. v. Nirālambana-vāda ver. 118.

25. The passage: अथवा . . अविरोध is quoted in the Tattv. pañ p.582 which quotes the passage omitting the words क्रमेण वा in the ver. 7b.

26. Tib. རང་དང་མཐུན་པ་ནི་
27. " རང་གི་གཞུགས་
28. " རྣམ་ *vaśa*, वश See Nyaya bindu Index.  
My Madh. avatara. VI.62 with Bhasya.
29. " རྣམ་པ་ནི་
30. " རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་
31. Cp. Kumarila's verse. अन्योन्यहेतुका चैव ज्ञानज्ञ हृत्योरनादिका ।  
ŚlokavārSūnya ver. 19. Note this line quite agrees  
with Paramartha's reading.
32. =rañ. gi gzugs རང་གི་གཞུགས་
- 32a. cp. संवेदनात् नीलं न भिन्नम् Slokavartika, p. 325 (Chaukhamba)
33. རྣེ་རྣམ་པ་ལ་རྣམ་པ་ To have the sense clear read the  
Chinese version here in this context. According to  
Vinitadeva तदाकारकवित्तात् शक्तिर्मवति ।
34. Better reading will be: अन्तर्विज्ञानम् cfr. vṛtti ad 6 c-d.

## आलम्बनपरीक्षाटीका

विनीतदेवकृता

नमः सर्वबुद्धबोधिसत्त्वेभ्यः

कृपाविष्टाशयं नत्वा सर्वज्ञं शिरसा [मया] ।  
आलम्बनपरीक्षाया विवृतिः सुविरच्यते ॥

ये चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानामित्यनेन प्रथमपदेन प्रकरणस्यास्याभिधेयं विपर्ययकारण-  
लक्षणञ्च प्रदर्शयन्ति । प्रयोजनसम्बन्धौ च सामर्थ्यादनुमीयते । सामर्थ्यञ्च प्रकृते प्रदर्शयि-  
तव्यम् । प्रकरणस्यास्य सम्बन्धाभिधेयप्रयोजनान्यवश्यं वक्तव्यानि । तथा नो चेत् असम्बन्ध-  
मनभिधेयमप्रयोजनञ्च प्रकरणं प्रतिपत्तेः पूर्वमेवोपेक्ष्य अनभ्युपगतं स्यात् । अतोऽत्र—

ये चक्षुरादि विज्ञानानां, बाह्यार्थं आलम्बनमितीच्छन्ति । ते परमाणून् सङ्घातं व  
कल्पयन्ति । इत्यनेन हेयस्वभावाभिधेयनिर्देशः ।

तत्कारणत्वादिति  
तदाभज्ञानजनकत्वात्

इत्यनेन च विपर्ययकारणलक्षणनिर्देशः । प्रयोजनसम्बन्धौ च सामर्थ्यान्निर्दिष्टौ ।  
तत्र सामर्थ्यन्त्वित्यवगन्तव्यम् । बाह्यालम्बनप्रतिषेधाय अन्तरालम्बनप्रसाधनाय च  
प्रकरणमिदमारभ्यते । अतो बाह्याध्यात्मिकार्थप्रतिषेधप्रसाधनायै प्रकरणारम्भसामर्थ्यात्  
प्रतिषेधप्रसाधने प्रयोजनम् । प्रकरणन्तुपायत्वेन निर्दिष्टं भवति ।

एवं प्रतिपत्तेः पूर्वमेवोपेक्षितारो नाप्रयोजने प्रवर्तेरन् । नाप्यनुपाये । अत्र  
ज्ञानेन बाह्यालम्बनप्रतिषेधे अन्तरर्थप्रसाधने च वक्तव्ये तदुभयोः प्रतिषेधः प्रसाधनञ्च  
प्रयोजनम् । तच्च प्रयोजनं प्रकरणेनानेन क्रियते । तत्प्रकरणन्तु प्रयोजनस्यास्वोपायः ।  
तस्मात् प्रकरणप्रयोजनाभ्यामुपायोपेयलक्षणाभ्यां सम्बन्धो भवति । एवञ्च बहुचान्तरार्थ-  
प्रतिषेधप्रसाधनार्थं प्रकरणारम्भ इति स्थितिः ।

एवं स्थिते कदाचित्प्रतिषेधप्रसाधने, किमाभ्याम् । ते तु कुत्रापि नस्त इति  
संवर्यन्ति चेदत्रोच्यते हेयोपादेयप्रतिषेधप्रसाधने ये स्तः ते । तयोर्भयोर्हानोपादाने क्रियते ।  
एवं बाह्यार्थहानाय प्रतिषेधः त्रिदते । कथञ्च प्रतिषेधः । बाह्यार्थो हेय एवेति ज्ञात्वा  
हीयत इति प्रतिषिध्यते । तथा प्रसाधनमन्तरर्थं उपादेय एवेति ज्ञात्वा उपादीयत इति  
प्रसाध्यते । अतो बाह्याध्यात्मिकौ हेयोपादेयौ । हेयस्योपादानात् प्रतिषेधः [उपादेयस्य  
हानात्] प्रसाधनञ्च क्रियते इत्यतः प्रयोजनं पुनरुक्तं भवति ।

एवं तर्हि यथा प्रथमवाक्येन हेयस्वभावोऽभिधेयो निर्दिश्यते । तथा उपादेय-  
स्वभावोऽपि निर्देष्टव्य इति चेदत्रोच्यते—बाह्यार्थवादिनो बाह्यार्थ परिकल्पयन्तोऽत्यन्त-  
बाधिताः । तस्मात्तेनैव निर्दिश्य [यत्] खण्डयते तत् प्रतिषिध्यते । पञ्चादवसरे—

यदन्तर्ज्ञेयं यत् बहिरिवावभासते । सोऽर्थ इत्यनेन अन्तर्यं उपादीयते  
अयं समुदायार्थः ।

अवयवार्थस्तूच्यते । ये चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानामिति न सर्ववादिनो बहुधार्थमालम्बन-  
मिच्छन्ति । अत एव इत्युक्तम् । यानीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुरादीनि सन्ति तानि चक्षुरादीनि । आदि-  
वचनेन श्रोत्रादीनि मनः<sup>१</sup> पर्यन्तानि गृह्यन्ते । एवं मनोऽपि बाह्यमालम्बनकमिष्यत एव ।  
अतस्तदालम्बनमप्यत्र एकधा प्रतिषिध्यते । किं तत् प्रतिषेधस्थापनेन कार्यम् । येन शास्त्र-  
कारेण अन्त [रथो] व्यवस्थाप्येत । न तेन [बाह्य] विषयो सुमतिषिद्धो भवति ।

अत्र आचार्यधर्मपालेन स्वटीकायां मनोविज्ञानस्यालम्बनस्थापनाय यत् बहूक्तम् ।  
तत् स एव जानाति । तदाशयस्य गभीरत्वान्न वयं विद्मः<sup>२</sup> ।

चक्षुरादीनां विज्ञानं चक्षुरादिविज्ञानम् । चक्षुराद्याकाराणां बहुत्वादेव विज्ञानाकारा  
बहुतया निर्दिश्यन्ते । अतो विज्ञाने बहुबचननिर्देशः । तद्यथा ताम्रपत्राणां लौहित्यविकारः ।  
बाह्यार्थं आलम्बनमित्यत्र बाह्यार्थो बाह्यो विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्त इत्यर्थः । प्रतीयमानोऽर्थः  
स ज्ञेय [ रूपः ] ग्राह्य इत्यर्थः । अर्थशब्दोऽत्र विषयपर्यायतया निर्दिष्टो न वस्तुन विहितः  
एवं सङ्घातोऽपि विषयतया ख्यापितो न द्रव्यसन् । आलम्बनमितीच्छन्तीति । ग्राह्यमभ्युप-  
गच्छन्तीत्यर्थः ।

ते परमाणून् वा इति ।

ते वादिनो विज्ञानस्य विषयः परमाणव इति वाभ्युपगच्छन्ति । ते तु अणुषु  
परमाश्रैति परमाणवः । यद्दूर्ध्वं परममन्यन्तास्ति । अतोऽत्यन्तसूक्ष्मा इत्यर्थः । यद्यपि  
परमाणवः संहताः एवोत्पन्नरूढाः । तथापि अन्य एते संहताः ते चालम्बनमितीच्छन्ति ।  
यथेन्द्रियशक्तीनां प्रतिनियमात् रूपरसादय एकत्र संहता अपि प्रतिनियतेन्द्रियग्राह्याः । तथा  
विज्ञानस्यापि द्रव्यपरिच्छेदे शक्तिनियमात् अणवः पृथगालम्बनं न तु सामान्यमिति प्रसिद्धिः ।  
संहता यद्यपि तथापि तेऽतिसूक्ष्माः कथमालम्बनं स्युः । अतः तत्कारणत्वादित्याह । ते  
यद्यपि सूक्ष्माः तथापि यस्मात् द्रव्यतः सन्तीति विज्ञानस्य कारणभावतो भवन्ति । तस्मा-  
दालम्बनमिच्छन्ति । आलम्बनस्यार्थो हेतुरिति तदाशयः । प्रत्ययेषु आलम्बननिर्देशात्, प्रत्य-  
यस्य च हेतुत्वात् हेतुता । इयञ्चान्यदृष्टौ परमाणव आलम्बनमिति परिकल्पनायां विपर्यय-  
हेतुलक्षणम् । एवं तेषां विज्ञानकारणभावे सति बाह्यार्थवादिनः [परमाणव] आलम्बनमिती-  
च्छन्ति । तत्कारणत्वादित्यत्र तच्छब्दो विज्ञानेन सम्बध्यते ।



द्वितीयपक्षोऽन्याज्ञाय तत्सङ्घातं वा कल्पयन्ति इत्याह । विज्ञानस्यालम्बनं परमाणुसङ्घातं कल्पयन्ति खलु । तेषां कायरतसङ्घातः । तच्छब्देन परमाणवो गृह्यन्ते । तेन परमाणु [सङ्घात] इत्युक्तं भवति । अपि च कस्मात् तत्सङ्घातमालम्बनमिच्छन्ति । तदाभज्ञानजनकत्वादित्याह । यस्माच्चक्षुरादिविज्ञानं सदा सङ्घाताभासं जायते । तस्मात्सङ्घातमालम्बनमिच्छन्ति । अत्र च सङ्घात आलम्बनमेवेति परिकल्पनायां विपर्ययहेतुलक्षणं संङ्घाताभासता । यस्मात् विज्ञानं सङ्घाताभासम् । तस्मात् परः सङ्घात आलम्बनमिति मन्यते । एवं विज्ञानं यादृशाभासमुत्पद्यते । स तस्य विषय इतीच्छन्तीत्युक्तं भवति । विज्ञानेऽस्मिन् तादृश आभासोऽस्तीति तदाभासम् । अत्र च तच्छब्देन सङ्घातेन सम्बध्यते । इदानीं तदाभासश्च विज्ञानञ्चेति विगृह्य तदाभासविज्ञानजनकमिति समासः । एवञ्चात्र पर आलम्बनलक्षणतोऽप्येतेः परमाणवः सङ्घातो वा आलम्बनमिति मन्यन्ते : इति पूर्वपक्षः ।

तत्र तावपूर्वपक्षद्योतनायाह —

(1) यद्यपीन्द्रियविज्ञप्तेः कारणं परमाणवः ।

इत्यादि । परमाणवः परमार्थतो न द्रव्यसन्तः । सावयवत्वकल्पनायां संवृत्तिसन्त एव प्रसज्यन्ते । निरवयवत्वकल्पनायामपि ह्यायावरणाद्यभावप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादेषां कारणता दृश्यते । तथापि परमाणूनां कारणतां स्वीकृत्य आलम्बनता प्रतिषिध्यते । परमाणवो यद्यपि विज्ञप्तेः कारणम् । तथापि यस्मात् ते परमाध्वाकारविज्ञानं नोपादयन्ति । तस्मान्नालम्बनम अक्षवत् । अक्षे यद्यपि विज्ञप्तिकारणभावोऽस्ति । [तथापि] तत् तस्य विषय इति परो नेच्छति । यतो विज्ञानमक्षाकारकतया नोत्पद्यते । इन्द्रियविज्ञप्तेरित्यत्र इन्द्रियपदेन मनः-पर्यन्तमिन्द्रियषट्कं गृह्यते । अत्र हेतुरुक्त एव । परमाणव इतीदमर्थप्रतिपादकम् । यद्यपीत्यनेन अभ्युपगमप्रदर्शनम् ।

अतदाभतयेत्यत्र यत् तददाभाति तत् तदाभम् । तच्छब्दः परमाणू भ सम्बध्यते । न तदाभम् , अतदाभम् । तृतीयाविभक्त्या हेतुनिदिश्यते । तेन परमाध्वाकारकत्वाभावादित्युक्तं भवति । तस्या इति इन्द्रियविज्ञप्तेः ।

(1c.d) नाक्षवद्विषयोऽणव इति ।

यथेन्द्रियाणि न विषयदृशानि । तथा परमाणवोऽपि तत्समा इत्यर्थः । अक्षशब्देनात्र अधिपतिकरणानि उच्यन्ते । यदि विज्ञानं परमाण्वाकारकं न स्यात् । तत् तेनैव दुष्टं भवेत् खलु । परमाणवो बुद्धिजनका इव कस्मान्न विषयः इति चेदाह —

तस्य विषय इत्यादि ।

विषयो हि यस्य स्वभावः तदाकारोत्पन्नोऽवधार्यते [Lit. तस्य] सः।

हि शब्दो यस्मादित्यर्थे । स्वभावोऽवधार्यत इत्यत्र स्वभावग्रहणेन स्वसामान्यलक्षण-मभिप्रेतम् । तदवधारणम् अत्रगतिः । परिच्छिद्रं गृह्यत इत्यर्थः ।

तदाकारोत्पत्तेरिति ।

विषयाकारोत्पत्तिं विना नान्यद्विज्ञानेन विषयावधारणं शक्यते । तस्मान्नीला-  
कारणोत्पद्यमानविज्ञानेन नीलाद्यर्थोऽवधार्यत इत्यत्र को व्यापारः । विज्ञानमिदं विषय-  
मत्रप्रारथ्यतीति व्यापार उच्यते । अत्रधारणक्रिया न काप्यस्ति । [यथा] पितुराकारानुकारेण  
जायमानः पुत्रः पितृरूपं गृह्णातीति । विज्ञानं विषयाकारमनुकुर्वदुत्पद्यत इत्यतोऽपि विषयं  
गृह्णातीति व्यवहारोपचारः । तत्रैवं परमाणूनामपि तदाकारोत्पत्तेः स्वभावोऽवधार्य इत्याश-  
यश्चेदत आह -

परमाणवस्तत्कारणत्वे सत्यपि न तथा ।

इत्यादि । परमाणूनां तत्कारणत्वे सत्यपि विज्ञानं [तेषां] प्रतिनियताकारान्  
यदि नातुरोति । तत् कथं तेषां स्वभावं गृह्णीयान् । अनवधारणे च कथं [ते] विषयाः  
स्युः । तत्कारणत्वे सत्यतीति विज्ञानकारणत्वे सत्यतीत्यर्थः । अत्र दृष्टान्तः-

अक्षवत् इति ।

यथा अक्षे कारणभावे सत्यपि तदाकारोत्पद्यमानं विज्ञानं न तत्स्वभाव  
मत्रप्रारथ्यतीति [तस्य] विषयता नेष्यते । परमाणवोऽपि तादृशा द्रष्टव्याः । अक्षमपि  
आलम्बनताप्रसङ्गयोग्यम् । अत आलम्बनं नैव केवलं हेतुलक्षणम् । एवं परमाणूनामा-  
लम्बनतां प्रतिषिद्धोपहारयाह -

एवं तावत् इत्यदि ।

आलम्बनलक्षणायोगात्परमाणवो नालम्बनमित्यर्थः ।

अत्र प्रयोगः- परमाणवो नालम्बनम्, स्वाभासविज्ञानाजनकत्वात् । अक्षवत्  
वैधर्म्यं [दृष्टान्तो] ग्राह्यभागः । स्वाभासविज्ञानाजनकमपि यद्यालम्बनम् । अतिप्रसङ्गो  
बाधकं प्रमाणम् । अथवा परमाणवो नालम्बनम्, स्वभावानवधारणात् अक्षवत् । वैधर्म्यं  
[दृष्टान्तो] ग्राह्यभागः । ग्राह्यभाग आलम्बनमेव सिध्यति । स्वभावानवधारणमपि  
यद्यालम्बनम् । अतिप्रसङ्गो बाधकं प्रमाणम् । इमौ द्वौ प्रयोगौ आत्रार्थधर्मपालेन  
भाषितौ<sup>१</sup> मया च कथितौ । न स्वभाषितौ । एवं तावत्परमाणूनामानम्बनता प्रतिषिद्धैव ॥ १ ॥  
सङ्घातस्यापि प्रतिषेधायाह -

सङ्घातस्तदाभासत्वे सत्यपि इति ।

यद्यपि विज्ञप्तिः सङ्घातवत्तदाऽवभासते । तथापि सङ्घातो नालम्बनम्  
यतः सा विज्ञप्तिः न ता उत्पद्यते । ततो नोत्पद्यताम् । अथाप्यालम्बनं कस्मान्न भवेत् ।  
अत उत्तरमाह -

(२) यदाभासा इत्यादि ।

तथाहि

योऽर्थः स्वभासामात्मभासां विज्ञप्तिमुत्पादयति स ह्यालम्बनं युज्यते । एवं विज्ञानं यस्यार्थस्य रूपमनुकरोति । स चोत्पादकश्चेदालम्बनप्रत्ययो युज्यते नान्य इत्युक्तं भवति ।

उत्पादक एवालम्बनं स्यादिति कस्मात् ज्ञायते । इति चेदाह—एवं स इति ।

यतः स तु शास्त्रे उत्पत्तिहेतुलक्षणयोक्तः । शास्त्रे ह्येवं भवति—योऽर्थश्चित्त-  
चैतानामुत्पत्तिहेतुलक्षणश्च, तेषूत्पन्नेषु सोऽर्थोऽनुभवव्यवहार उपचर्यते स च आलम्बनम् इति -  
एवं योऽर्थश्चित्तचैतानामुत्पादकः, चित्तचैत्तेषु चोत्पन्नेषु तस्मिन्नर्थे अयमनुभूयते इति  
तथाभूतव्यवहार उपचर्यते । सोऽर्थ आलम्बनम् इत्युक्तं भवति । तस्मादुत्पत्तिहेतुलक्षणश्चेति  
वचनात् आलम्बनप्रत्यय उत्पादकतया तिद्धः । तदाकारता तु एतत्पक्ष [मात्र] प्रसिद्धत्वा-  
दनुक्ता । तेनोभयलक्षणान्वितो योऽर्थः स आलम्बनमित्युक्तं भवति ।

तत्रैवं मन्यते—सङ्घातोऽप्युत्पादक इति । अत आह—

सङ्घातस्तु न तथा इति ।

सङ्घात उत्पादको न भवति । विज्ञप्त्यनुत्पादे स कथमालम्बनं स्यात् । कुतो  
चोत्पादक इति चेदाह—

(2b) द्रव्याभावात् इति ।

यस्मात् सङ्घातो द्रव्यं न भवति । तस्मान्नोत्पादकः अद्रव्याणां फलोत्पत्ता  
वशाक्तत्वात् । सङ्घातो नैव द्रव्यम् इत्यधस्तात्साधयिष्यते । यत् द्रव्यं न भवति न तदुत्पादक  
मित्यत्राह—

(2c) द्विवन्द्रवत् इति ।

एवमद्रव्यत्वात् द्विवन्द्राभासज्ञानकारणभावो न भवति । तथा सङ्घातोऽपि  
स्वाभासज्ञानकारणवस्तु न भवति । यदि चन्द्रद्वयं न तदुत्पादयति । तर्हि तदहेतुलक्षणक  
स्यात् इति चेदत आह—

इन्द्रियवैकल्यात् इत्यादि ।

5

नाहेतुलक्षणकम् । एवमुपहृतेन्द्रियेण चन्द्रद्वयं दृश्यते । यदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं  
तिमिरोपहृतं भवति । तदा चन्द्रद्वयाभासज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । न तत् चन्द्रद्वयसमुत्पन्नम् । यदा  
तेन नोत्पन्नं तदा चन्द्रद्वयज्ञानेन चन्द्रद्वयं भासमानमपि न तस्य विषयः । तेन अनुत्पादक-  
त्वाद्विषयो न भवनीत्युक्तं भवति । अत्र वैकल्यशब्देन उपहृतिरुच्यते ।

एव दृष्टान्ते प्रसाधयित्वा [द्राष्टान्तिके] वस्तुनि उपयोजयितुमाह—

एवमद्रव्यसत्त्वात् इत्यादि ।

यथा चन्द्रद्वयमद्रव्यत्वान्न ज्ञानकारणम् । अकारणत्वान्न तद्विषयः । तथा सङ्घा-  
तोऽपि अद्रव्यत्वान्न ज्ञानकारणम् अकारणत्वान्न तद्विषयः । तत्र प्रयोगः—

सङ्घातो न ज्ञानकारणम् अद्रव्यत्वात् चन्द्रद्वयवत् इति । वैधर्म्यं [दृष्टान्तः] विज्ञानम् । अद्रव्याणामशक्तत्वं बाधकं प्रमाणम् । अथवा सङ्घातो नालम्बनम् अकारणत्वात् , चन्द्रद्वयवत् । वैधर्म्यं [दृष्टान्तः] ग्राह्यभागः । ग्रहचभागः कारणमेव आलम्बनमेव च प्रविध्यति । अकारणमपि आलम्बनमेवेति चेत् चन्द्रद्वयादपि आलम्बनं स्यादिति अति-  
प्रसङ्गो बाधकं प्रमाणम् । ६इदं प्रमाणद्वयमपि आचार्यधर्मपालेनोक्तम् ॥ 2a-b ॥

एवं पक्षद्वयं प्रतिषिध्योणसंहरायाह—

(2c.d) एवं बाह्यद्वयमपि न युक्तं बुद्धिगोचरः ॥ २ ॥

इत्यादि । एवमुक्तरीत्या दृष्टिद्वयेऽपि बाह्यार्थो विज्ञानविषयो न युज्यते । बाह्यं विज्ञान व्यतिरिक्तम् । द्वयमिति । परमाणुपक्षः सङ्घातपक्षश्चेति दृष्टी । बुद्धिरिति विज्ञानम् । कस्मान्न युज्यते । अत आह—

एकाङ्गवैकल्यात् इत्यादि ।

एवं परमाणुपक्षे कारणतास्ति न तदाकारता । सङ्घातपक्षे च तदाकारतासि-  
न कारणता । एवं सति अङ्गेन तेन वैकल्यात् परमाण्व स्यः सङ्घाताख्यश्चार्थो नालम्बनम् । एवमालम्बनताया अङ्गद्वैविध्यम्—स्वाकारार्पणं कारणता च परमाणुसङ्घातयोर्नास्तीति न तयोर्द्वौविषयता इत्युक्तं भवति । अतो विषयो धर्मताद्वयवान् इति भवति । तत्र च तदङ्गद्वयमेव धर्मताद्वयस्य प्रपञ्चः सम्पद्यते ॥ 2 ॥

एवं द्वयं प्रतिषिध्य तृतीयपक्षोपन्यायायाह—

अत्र केचित् इत्यादि ।

7  
बाह्यार्थवादपक्षे चास्मिन् वाग्भटादयः केचित् परमाणुसञ्चिताकारान्  
इन्द्रियविज्ञानकारणमिच्छन्ति । त एवं वदन्ति—परमाणुषु सञ्चिताकारोऽप्यास्ति ।

8  
परमाणुषु यत्किञ्चिदस्ति तत् सर्वं द्रव्यसत् । द्रव्यसत्त्वात् सञ्चिताकारो विज्ञानकार-  
णकारणतया भवति । स्थूलत्वात् विज्ञाने स्वभावमप्यर्पयति । तेन परमाणवः प्रका-  
रान्नरेण विषया एवेति । हिशब्दश्चार्थो द्रष्टव्यः । सञ्चिताकारोऽत्र स्थूलाकारः ।  
साधनं कारणम् । परमाणुनामाकारोऽतिमूक्ष्मः प्रसिद्धो ननु । तेन तेषां सञ्चिता-  
कारोऽयं कुल सम्भवेत् सम्भवतु वा, एकत्र कथं द्वैविध्यं युज्यते इति चेदाह—

सर्वेऽप्यर्था अनेकाकारका इत्यादि ।

अयमत्र न दोषः । यस्मात् सर्वस्य रूपिणा भावस्य अनेकाकारत्वात् तथाहि रूपं सर्वं चतुर्महाभूतरूपमेव । तानि च नीलसुरभिमधुरकर्कशाद्याकार-वत्त्वाद्नेकाकाराणि । यथा च परमाणुषु अनेकाकारतास्ति तथा सञ्चिताकारोऽयमपि तेषु भवेत् । यदि सर्वे अर्था अनेकाकारकाः । कस्मदाकाराः सर्वे न ज्ञायन्ते । अत आह -

तत्र केनचिदाकारेण इत्यादि ।

ते यद्यपि अनेकाकाराः । तथापि केनचिदाकारेण ते प्रत्यक्षमिष्यन्ते । न तु सर्वाकारेण । यतस्तेषां प्रतिनियतशक्ति [ग्राह्य] त्वादिन्द्रियाणि न सर्व-मर्थं गृह्णन्ति ।

9

इदन्तु भदन्तबुद्धदेवसमयानुसारेणोक्तम् । तथा सति दशायतनानि भूतमात्राणि । एवमनेकाकारतां प्रसाध्य प्रकृते योजनायाह -

परमाणुष्वपीत्यादि।

परमाणुष्वपि सञ्चिताभासज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुभावोऽस्ति । परमाणवः सञ्चिता-कारकज्ञानमुत्पादयन्तीत्यर्थः । परमाणुषु सञ्चिताकारास्तितासाधनात् परमाणुषु सञ्चिता-कारोऽस्तीति वक्तव्यं ननु । कस्मादेवं परमाणुष्वपि सञ्चिताभासज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुभाव इष्यते चेदत्रोच्यते । आलम्बनस्य भागद्वयप्रदर्शनात्तथोक्तम् । तत्र ज्ञानोत्पातहेतुभाववचनेन वारणतास्तीति स्वशब्दनिर्दिष्टम् । सञ्चिताभासवचनेन तदाकारार्पणं सञ्चिताकारास्तिता च प्रमाध्यते । यस्मादर्थेन विज्ञाने स्वात्मनि सन्नाकारोऽप्यन्ते नासन् । तस्मात्सञ्चिता कारोऽस्तीत्युक्तमेव ।

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यदि परमाणुषु स्थूलाकारोऽस्ति । कथं तेषु परमाणुसाहित्यं कार्यम् । कथं परमाण्वाकारं सन्नहितवचनं गृह्णीमः । तस्मादाह -

(3e.d) अण्वाकार इत्यादि ॥ 3 ॥

तथैव व्याख्यानायाह -

यथा कटिनतादि इत्यादि ।

यथा काठिन्यशैत्यौष्ण्य दयो विषयाः सण्णोऽपि बृहद्बुद्धिः अल्पे शरावबुद्धि-  
रूपद्यत इत दं न भवति ॥ 4a. b ॥

परस्य वचनावकाशप्रदर्शनायाह —

इन्द्रियशक्तीनां प्रतिनियत्वात् चाक्षुषबुद्धिविषया न भवन्ति । तथा परमाणवोऽपि  
त्रयैव न भवन्ति । तमेवाकारं निश्चित्य चैषु परमाणुसाहित्यव्यवहार उपचर्यते ।  
चशब्द एवकारार्थो द्रष्टव्यः । एवं तृतीयं पक्षमुपन्यस्य दूषणमुद्गावितम् ॥ 3 ॥

(4) भवेद्धटशब्दादे स्तथा सति समा मतिः । इत्यादि ।

ये परमाणु सञ्चिताकारोऽस्तीति स्वीकृवन्ति । तेषु पर्यनुयोगः कार्यः  
[यदुत] परमाणुषु यः सञ्चिताकारः स्वीकृतः । [स] लोके तावत् घटशरावभ्रकादौ  
हिमादौ च सञ्चयः प्रसिद्धः । तेषामाकारो यः परमाणुवस्ति । [स] यदि घटाकार  
इति चेत् तदा शरावादिसङ्घाते सर्वत्र घटबुद्धिर्भवेत् । अथ शरावाकार इति चेत्  
तदापि सर्वत्र शरावबुद्धिर्भवेत् । किन्तु वचचित् घटबुद्धिः क्वचित् शरावबुद्धिरिति यो  
बुद्धिभेदः । स न भवेत् । इति । बुद्धिविषयस्य स्वरूपमनुकृत्योत्पद्यते । विषयश्च एकस्वभावः  
सन् कथं बुद्धिभेदक उच्येत ।

तत्रैवं घटे परमाणुबहुता शरावेऽल्पता । तथान्यत्रापि बहुल्पता ज्ञेया ।  
अतो बहुल्पताकृतोऽयं बुद्धिभेदोऽस्तीति मतञ्चेदत आह—

घटशरावादीनां परमाणुषु इत्यादि ।

अत्राल्प बहुताकृतो बुद्धिविशेषो न युक्तः । तथाहि गद्यपि घटे परमाणुबहुता  
शरावेल्पता । तथापि परमाणुगतकायाकारे स्वतः सन् विशेषः कोऽपि नास्ति ।  
तस्मात्सदोषस्तत्र तदवस्थः । यत्र परमाणवो बहवः तत्र घट भ्रमः । यत्राल्पघमंता  
तत्र क्षुद्रघट इति सत्यपि सदृशं सङ्घाताकारे बृहद्बुद्धिः अल्पे शराव - बुद्धिरूपद्यत  
इत दं न भवति ॥ 4a. b ॥ परस्य वचनावकाशप्रदर्शनायाह —

(4c. d) आकारभेदाद्भेदश्चेत् इति ।

तस्यैव व्याख्यानायाह —

यदि मन्यस इत्यादि ।

यदि मन्यसे—घटस्य ग्रीवा वक्रा दृश्यते । स च घटः । उदरं पृथु भवति तदपि आयतं भवति । एवमादयोऽस्याकारभेदाः । शरावेऽपि पादं निम्नम इत्याद्याकारभेदाः । अत आकारभेदद्वारा घटशरावादिबुद्ध्यो भिद्यन्त इति ।

आकारविशेषः कर्म इत्यत्र आकारभेदः संस्थानं सन्निवेश अवस्थान मित्यर्थः ।

आकारभेदो नैव विषय इति प्रदर्शनायाह —

अयमुपाधि[र्यद्यपि] घटादावस्ति इत्यादि ।

भवतो घटशरावाद्याकारोपाधिर्यो निर्दिष्टः तेषां विशेषकः अयमस्ति । तं वयमपि यद्यपि नापलपामः । तथापि ये द्रव्यसन्तः परमाणवः । तेषु स आकारभेदो नास्ति ॥ 4 ॥

तत्कस्मादिति चेदाह—

(5) [तत] परिमाणाभिन्नत्वात् इति ।

एवं परमाणूनां पारिमाण्डल्यं यत् तत्र भेदो नास्ति । घटपरमाणवो द्रव्यान्तराण्येव शरावस्थापि द्रव्यान्तराणि ननु । तत्कथं परिमाणभेदो नास्ति इति चेदाह—

परमाणुषु इति ।

यस्मात् घटशरावादीनां परमाणुषु द्रव्यन्तरेष्वपि पारिमाण्डल्ये भेदो नास्ति । तस्मात्परमाणुषु आकारभेदो नास्ति । यथा भवतां दर्शने परमाणुषु

यावत्किञ्चिदस्ति तत्सर्वं द्रव्यसत् । तथा [नः] परमाणुषु यत्किञ्चित्परिमाणमस्ति ।  
तत्सर्वं पारिमाण्डल्यरूपमेकमेव । तस्मात्कथं तेषां भेदाद्भिद्यते ।

यद्यपि सञ्चिताकार अभेद इष्यते । तथापि द्रव्यसत्त्वात् तेन च  
निरवयवत्वयैव भवितव्यम् । एवमसति तु तस्य सावयवत्वे द्रव्यमन्नेव न भवेत् ।  
अनवयवत्वात् स्वस्मिन् सन्निवेशभेददर्शनं कुत्रास्ति । ये सावयवाः ते नानाशक्तिहा इति  
सन्निवेशो भवेत् । न तु निरवयवानाम् ।





एवं परमाणुनामाकारभेदं प्रतिषिध्योपसंहारायाह—

(5b) द्रव्यमति ततोऽस्ति स इति ।

यस्मादेवमुक्तेनाकारेण निरवयवेषु सन्निवेशभेदो न सम्भवति । तस्मात् सोऽद्रव्यसत्स्वेव द्रष्टव्यः । शास्त्रविरचनेन सूत्रार्थनिर्देशायाह—

आकारभेदः इत्यादि ।

य आकारभेदः स संवृतिसत्त्वेवास्ति । सावयवत्वात् । न परमाणु, निरवयवत्वात् । विशेषिकदर्शने घटादयः द्रव्यमन्न एव । तस्मात् कदाचित् ते घटादयः संवृतिसन्त इतीदं कथं ज्ञायत इत्युक्तावाह—

घटादयः संवृतिसन्त एव इत्यादि ।

घटादयः संवृतिसन्त एवेति ज्ञेयम् । तथाहि—

(5c) अणूनां परिहारे हि

घटाकारकज्ञं नोत्पद्यते ।

(5d) तदाभज्ञानविप्लवादिति ॥ 5 ॥

ज्ञानेऽस्मिन् तादृश आभासोऽस्तीति तदाभासम् । तच्छब्दः घटेन सम्बन्ध्यते । आभाशब्दः सदृशमाह । तदाभञ्च तत् ज्ञानञ्च तदाभज्ञानम् । तद्विप्लवत् तदाभज्ञानविप्लवः । तदाभज्ञानं विप्लवते । तस्मात् । प्रत्येकपरमाणुपरिहारे घटाद्याकारकज्ञानेऽनुत्पन्नेऽपि किं तन्मात्रेण घटादयः संवृतिसत्तया स्युः । अत आह—

द्रव्यसत्सु इत्यादि ।

11 तथा ये द्रव्यसन्तः ते सम्बन्ध्यपनये स्वबुद्धिं न हापयन्ति । यथ वर्णादयः । यदि घटादयोऽपि द्रव्यसन्तो भवेयुः । तदा तेऽपि स्वसम्बन्धिपरिहारेऽपि स्वबुद्धिं न त्यजेयुः । परमणूनां परिहारे कृते द्रव्यारम्भक्रियःयोगनाशात् घटनाशः । तस्माद्धटबुद्धिर्नोत्पद्यते ननु ।

सर्वस्थं सर्वत्राभावान्नेति चेति चेत् अत्रोच्यते यदि परमाणुभ्य व्यनिरिक्तघटाद्यङ्गि धर्मः कश्चिदस्ति । तदा परमाणुष्वस्तीति वक्तव्यम् । किं तेषु यावत्सद्रूपेण अस्ति किं वा एकदेशेन । तत्र आरम्भकावयवव्यातिरिक्ता

ये [मन्त्र], तत्र तत्र [सर्वत्र] भवेदवयवी न तु एकदेशेन यद्येकदेशतो नास्ति तथा  
 आवत्सद्रूपतोऽस्तीति भवेत् । तस्मात्परमाणवस्ते यावन्तः तावत्सु घट एववयी स्यात् ।  
 तेनावयविनि एकस्यैव विनाशे सति अवयविद्रव्यं नास्ति । एककालमनेकभावो-  
 पादानात् अनश्चादिवत् । वंधर्म्य [दृष्टान्तः] स्वलक्षणम् वस्तुरूपतोऽस्ति चेत् उक्ता-  
 कारेण एककालमनेकभावोपादानत्वाग्निवेशो बाधकं प्रमाणम् ।

एवं सति पक्षसाकल्येऽपि बाह्यार्थालम्बनता नोपपद्यत इति प्रसाध्य  
 उपसंहारायाह —

तथा सतीन्द्रिय [बुद्धिना] मित्यादि ।

यस्मादेवं परमाणव आलम्बनानि न युज्यन्ते । तस्मान् इन्द्रियबुद्धयो  
 न बाह्यर्थविषयिका इति सिध्यति ॥ ५ ॥

एवमन्यसमयप्रतिषेधेन सर्वथालम्बनप्रतिषेधेन, अभ्युपगमप्रसिद्धेर्बाधा  
 भवेदिति स्वसमब आलम्बनव्यवस्थानिर्देशायाह—

(6) यद तर्ज्यरूपम् इत्यादि

सूत्रार्थः— ज्ञाने ज्ञेयाकारः शकलवत् योऽवभासते स एव ज्ञानविषय  
 इति । अन्तरिति आध्यात्मिकः । स चात्र ज्ञानं द्रष्टव्यम् । अन्तश्शब्दोऽयं  
 स्वभावसन्निहितार्थः । तेन ज्ञानमन्तरिच्युच्यते । ज्ञेयरूपमिति विषयाकारो  
 ग्राह्यभाग इत्यर्थः । तुल्यशब्दोऽवधारणव्यवधानार्थो द्रष्टव्यः ।

(6b) बहिरिवावभासत इति ।

बाह्यवदवभासते । आकारखण्डवदिति भवः । तदेवमवभासकारण-  
 लक्षणमपि आकाशधातुवभासते । तदाकाशं विज्ञाने भासते । तेन  
 विज्ञानात् शकलवत् तेन ग्राह्यभाग आरुच्यते । तद्यथा चन्द्रप्रतिबिम्बमादर्श-  
 तले भवति । आकाशं प्रतिबिम्बवशात्कूपे भवति । शकलाभासवत् ।

बाह्यविषयेऽसति विज्ञानस्यालम्बनप्रत्ययता न काप्यस्ति ननु । इति  
 चेदत आह —

बाह्येऽर्थे इत्यादि ।

अवालम्बनप्रत्ययाभावदोषो नास्ति । तथाहि यद्यपि बाह्यार्थो नास्ति ।  
 तथापि अन्नर्बाह्यवदवभासनमस्त्येव । अतः तदेवालम्बनप्रत्ययो भवति यथा  
 तंमिरिकस्य केशमक्षिकाद्याकारबुद्धौ केशाद्याकारवद्भवति । एवं ग्रह्यभाग आलम्ब-  
 नलक्षणयुक्तत्वात् आलम्बनप्रत्ययतयोच्यते ।

चित्तमिदं कथमालम्बनलक्षणतया युज्यत इति चेदाह—

(6c) विज्ञानरूपत्वात् इत्यादि ।

यस्मात् ज्ञानं नीलपीतादिप्रपञ्चवासनापरिष्कारकवशात् नीलपीताद्या-  
कारकमुत्पद्यते । तस्मान्नीलपीताद्याकारकमित्यतस्तदाकारकतया सिध्यति ।  
यस्मात् नीलाद्याकारस्तस्य विज्ञानस्य प्रत्ययः तस्मात्कारणतयापि सिध्यति ।  
तत्प्रत्यय एव तत्प्रत्ययता । तच्छब्दो विज्ञानेन सम्बध्यते । तद्रूपा तत्प्रत्ययता ।  
तत्प्रत्ययतास्ति तस्मात् । तृतीयेय हेतौ द्रष्टव्या ।

शास्त्रकारेण सूत्रार्थव्याख्यानोपयेनोपसंहारायाह—  
अन्तर्विज्ञानमर्थतयावभासते इत्यादि ।

यस्मात् विज्ञानमन्तस्सदर्थकारेण तदाकारकम् । सोऽर्थकारः सन्  
तदुत्पादकः । तस्मात् धर्मताद्वयवान् । तेन अन्तरेवालम्बनं युज्यते । एव विज्ञानं  
हि अन्तस्सदर्थ[क]म् । विज्ञानाकारस्तादृशः । तादृश इत्यतस्तदाकार[क]म् ।  
तद्यथा मुद्रालेखाकारेण तदाकारकः । यस्माद्ग्राह्यभागे सति उत्पद्यते ।  
तस्मात्तद्विज्ञानं तत् उत्पद्यते इत्यत आलम्बने भागद्वयमस्तीत्ययमालम्बनतया  
युज्यत इत्युक्तं भवति ॥ ६ ॥

अत्र परवचनस्यावकाशदर्शनायाह—

[यदि] तावदेवमवभास[एव]वेद्यत इत्यादि ।

विज्ञानेऽन्तः सन् ज्ञेयावभास एव वेद्यते । एवं स तु ज्ञेयाकारो नियता-  
कारवदुत्पद्यत इत्युक्ते तदेकदेशो भवति । यः सहजातो ज्ञेयाकारः स कथं  
तद्विज्ञानस्य प्रत्ययो भवति । एवं सति आत्मनि क्रियाभ्युपगमः अतिप्रसङ्ग-  
श्च स्यात् । ग्राह्यभागोऽपि ग्राह्यभागजनकः स्यात् । गोर्वाग्दक्षिणविषाणे  
मिथो जतकतया प्रसक्ते ननु किल । इति पूर्वः पक्षः । इदम् अशासनमिति परिहरति—

(7a) प्रत्ययोऽव्यभिचारित्वात् इति ।

तस्यैव विवरणायाह—

सह भूतोऽपीत्यादि ।

नायमत्र दोषो भवति । यस्मात् ग्राहयत्वात् भागः सहभूतोऽपि प्रत्ययः अन्यः समनन्तरहेतुः स्वतो जातविज्ञानस्य प्रत्ययतया भवति । तं ग्राह्यभागं विना विज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते । स च (त्रि)दण्डाश्रयनयेन केवलं द्रष्टव्यः । न तु अखण्डप्रत्ययव्यापार एकैकप्रत्यय (व्यापारो) वा आरोप्यते । यदि च ज्ञानं तद्ग्राह्यभागान्नाहितोपकारकम् तदा (तं विना) नोत्पद्यते । एवमनाहितमुपकारमपेक्ष्य न भवति । अनाहित उपकारः । असत्यपि च न किञ्चिदुत्पन्नं भवेत् ।

यद्यनेनाकारेण ग्राह्यावयवः कारणतया भवति । भवतु । को विरोधः । गोर्वाभदक्षिण-  
विषाणयोर्व्यभिचारान्न हेतुफलभावः । आत्मनि क्रियां क्वचिदिष्यते एव । यथा प्रदीपः । स तु  
आत्मनैवात्मानं प्रकाशयति । वचनविशेषेण चात्मनि क्रिया सम्मता । हेतुफलभावोऽव्यभिचा-  
रहेतु लक्षणक इतीदं कुतः ।

हेतुका एवमाहुः— भावाभावयोः (तद्वत्ता) इत्यादि ।

हेतुका एवं भावाभावौ अस्तित्वा नास्तित्वा च या सा हेतुहेतुमतोः क्रमेण  
जायमानयोश्च लक्षणम् इति वदन्ति । यस्मिन् सति यद्भवति । (तयो) रेको [हेतुः इतरो]  
हेतुमान् । अत्र च ग्राह्यभागे सति ज्ञानं भवति । नासति । तस्मात्सहभूतोऽपि द्वे  
हेतुहेतुमत्तया सिध्यतः । हेतुका इति हेतुव्यवहारिणः तार्किका इति भावः ।  
तद्वत्तेति भावाभाववत्ता । हेतुहेतुमदिति हेतुफल इत्यर्थः ।

एवं विषयविषयिभावं समकालं प्रदर्श्य क्रमेण विषयविषयिप्रदर्शनायाह—  
अथवा, शक्तचर्पणात्क्रमेण वा इति ।

अथवा ग्राह्यभागः शक्तिमर्षयन् क्रमेण समुत्पादकरूपो विषयो भवति ।  
एवं स ग्राह्यभागे निरुद्धः सन् आलयविज्ञाने शक्तिमर्षयति । स शक्तिर्यदि  
द्वितीयक्षणे सहकारिणः साधयति तदा । द्वितीयक्षणे एवं स्वसदृशं विज्ञानमुत्पाद-  
यति । यदि न साधयति तदा तृतीयक्षणे चतुर्थक्षणे वा युज्यते । यदा साधयति ।  
तदा परिपाकात् स्वसदृशं विज्ञानमुत्पादयति । पक्षेऽस्मिन् आत्मनि क्रियाविरोधात्  
एकदेशत्वात् सहजातत्वादित्यादयो दोषा न सम्भवन्ति । एवं पूर्वज्ञानस्य ग्राह्यत्वात्  
नीलाद्याकारवत् यदस्ति । तत् नीलाद्याकारकं ज्ञानं पश्चादुत्पादयति । तस्मादिमे दोषा  
नैव सम्भवन्ति ।

यदि शक्तिज्ञानमुत्पादयति । तथा सति पुनः शक्तिरेव विषयो भवति ननु पूर्वं

ग्राह्यभाग इत्याशये (सति) ग्राह-

[7b] क्रमेणापि इत्यादि ।

नायं दोषः । एवं क्रमेणापि स ग्राह्यभागः स्वसमानं फलमुत्पादतीत्यत आलयविज्ञानाश्रयितया शक्तिं करोति । यदि स ग्राह्यभागः शक्तिं नार्पयति । सा शक्तिस्तथाविधं ज्ञानमपि नोत्पादयेत् । अतः शक्तिरुत्पन्नं ज्ञानं तदपि ग्राह्यभागादेव समुत्पन्नमिति न कश्चिद्विरोधः । अस्मिन् पक्षे तु धर्मताद्वयव(त्ता)सुतरामुपपद्यते । एवं स ग्राह्यभागः स्वदृशं ज्ञानं पश्चादुत्पादयतीत्यतो धर्मताद्वयवान् भवति ।

अत्र परस्य वचनावकाशप्रदर्शनायाह—

यदि तर्हि स्वरूपमेव इत्यादि ।

यदि भवान् स्वरूपमेवालम्बनप्रत्ययमिच्छति । तदा कथं तत् स्वरूपं चक्षु-  
श्रोत्रोपादाय चक्षुर्विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । तथाहि चक्षुषः पूर्वमाभासगतं यत् रूपम् । तेन सह  
चक्षुषा स्वविज्ञाने समुत्पाद्ये स्वं रूपं चक्षुषः पूर्वमाभासगतमेव न भवति । तत् कथं तेन स्वरूपेण  
सह चक्षुश्चक्षुर्विज्ञानमुत्पादयतीत्युच्यते । तत् कदापि पुरतो नास्ति । तत् कथमाभासगत-  
मितिपूर्वपक्षः ।

शास्त्रकारस्तत्परिहारायाह—

(7c.d) सहकारिवशात् शक्तिरूपम् इत्यादि ।

यदीन्द्रियं भौतिकम् तदात्र दोषो भवेत् । वयन्तु इन्द्रियतयेष्टा विषयसह-  
कारिशक्तिर्या तदिन्द्रियमिच्छामः । अतोऽस्मद्दर्शने यथा रूपमन्तरसि । तथा चक्षुरपि  
अन्तर्वस्तु इत्यतो यथोक्तदोषदृष्टिः कुत्रास्ति । सहकारिवशादिति [य]दिदं विषयसहकारं  
[तत्]इन्द्रियमिष्यते इत्येवं द्रष्टव्यम् । एवमसति इन्द्रस्य [इदं] इन्द्रियमिति कृते  
[इन्द्रस्य] अविद्युक्तं स्यात् । इन्द्रस्य [इदं] इन्द्रियमित्युक्तिः शोभनमेव न भवति ।  
इन्द्रियञ्च शक्तिरूपमेव इतीदं कथं ज्ञायते । अत्र आह—

इन्द्रियम् इत्यादि ।

यस्मात् इन्द्रियं स्वकार्यात् विज्ञानलक्षणाच्छक्तिरूपतयानुमीयते । न तु भौतिक-  
तया । एवं कार्यात् कारणमात्रानुमाने शक्तिः न तु कारणविशेषे । विशिष्टे लिङ्ग-  
व्याप्य भावात् । यथा धूमात् वह्निमात्रानुमाने शक्तिः न तु वह्निविशेषे तृणपत्रादि  
(वह्नौ) । तथा कार्याद्विज्ञानलक्षणात् हेतुमात्रमनुमातुं शक्यते न तु हेतुविशेषाः

भौतिकत्वादयः । एवं वैभाषिकदर्शने भौतिकमिन्द्रियम् । भदन्तबुद्धदेवदर्शने भूत-

रूपमेव । योगाचारदर्शने विज्ञानमेव । माध्यमिकदर्शने संवृतिसत् । साह्य-  
दर्शने आहङ्कारिकम् इत्येवमादिविशेषानुपातं न शक्यते । तस्माच्छक्तिप्रबन्ध-  
मात्रानुमानात् शक्तिमात्रमनुमीयते ॥ ७ ॥

तत्रैवं भवति— शक्तिः शक्तिमदपेक्षते । शक्तिर्निराधारा न युज्यते । शक्तिमत्  
इन्द्रियम् । तच्च भौतिकमिति भौतिकमिन्द्रियं सिध्यति । इति । तस्मादाह-

(8a) सा चाविद्धा विज्ञत्पेरिति ।

यद्याश्रयः कश्चिदवश्यम् । तद्विज्ञानमेवाश्रयोऽस्तु । एवं विज्ञानस्य  
प्रतिविषयं विज्ञतिरूपत्वात्स्वं विज्ञतिरूपत्वादुभयं प्रसिद्धम् । तस्मात्तदेव कर्मणा  
आरोपित आश्रयो भवतु । शक्तिस्तु विज्ञानेनाविरुद्धा येन तद्विज्ञानाश्रयता न युक्ता  
भवेत् ।

तदेवं भौतिके व्यवस्थिता शक्तिरपि कार्यमन्यदुत्पादयति विज्ञाने स्थिताऽपि  
अन्यदुत्पादयति । तथा सतीन्द्रियमवश्यं भौतिकं ज्ञेयमिति चिन्तयतस्तदाश्र-  
प्रत्युद्गमनायाह —

शक्तिस्तु विज्ञाने वास्तु इत्यादि ।

एवमाश्रयकृतभेदो नास्ति । तथाहि शक्तिर्यदि [वा] विज्ञाने स्थिता  
च भवतु । अथान्यत्र स्थिता च भवतु । सर्वथा तथा रूपदर्शनादिमात्रं क्रियत  
इत्यतः फलोत्पत्तिक्रियायां न विशोषोऽस्ति ।

अनिर्देश्ये स्वरूप इति तु

12a .

मतान्तर इन्द्रियस्वरूपम् । इन्द्रियमनवभासान्न परीक्षितुं शक्यते । अपरीक्षितञ्च  
न निर्देष्टुं शक्यते । तस्मादन्यमतेनेन्द्रियमनिर्देश्यस्वरूपम् ।

अथेन्द्रियशक्तिः— तत्कारणं किम् । उपसंहारव्याजेन तत्प्रदर्शनायाह—

(8b) एवं विषयरूपकम् इत्यादि ।

यथा विज्ञानमिदं इन्द्रियशक्तिरुत्पद्यते तथा इन्द्रियशक्तिरपि इन्द्रियाक्षेपकात्पूर्ववि-  
ज्ञानादुत्पद्यते । तच्च पूर्वविज्ञानं [ततो]ऽपि पूर्वतरेन्द्रियशक्तेरुत्पद्यते । तथा च  
इन्द्रियशक्तिविषयकारकविज्ञानञ्च इदमुभयमन्योन्यहेतुकं प्रवर्तते । हेतुफलप्रबन्धस्यास्य  
कालादिनास्तीति इदमुभयमनादिकालं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

शास्त्रकारः सूत्रार्थं प्रदर्शनायाह—

चक्षुराख्यामित्यादि ।

चक्षुराख्येन्द्रियशक्तिर्या निर्दिष्टा, तां अन्तरूपञ्च सह वा पूर्वभूतं वा प्रतीत्य अनवसितार्थाकारकं विज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । यथा बाह्यार्थवादिदर्शने अवसितादर्थदेव विज्ञान-मुत्पद्यते । न तथा भवतीत्यत इदमुक्तम्—

विज्ञानमर्थावभासमालम्बनादविविक्तमुत्पद्यत इति

अन्ये तु वदन्ति—अनिर्दिष्टार्थावभासमिति । स चार्थोज्ज्वलन्तविविक्तो नावभासते ।

13

अनिर्दिष्टमेवात्र न किञ्चिदवश्यं विविच्यते । यतः स्वज्ञानं सर्वमिति ईश्वर्यम् । यदि तदवभासं ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तेन किञ्चिद्वस्तु सिद्धं भवति । अथार्थाकारकं ज्ञानमुत्पन्नं यदस्ति । तन्निर्देष्टुं न शक्यत इति । तत्र च कस्याभावान्निर्देष्टुं न शक्यते । अथ स्वलक्षणत्वात् । यदि [कस्याचित्]अभावादिति तन्न युज्यते । यतोऽसन् शशविषाणादिरपि निर्दिश्येत । अथ स्वलक्षणत्वादिति चेत् अत्रोत्तरं दत्तमेव ।

चक्षुराख्यां शक्तिं प्रतीत्येत्यत्र आदि[पद]मध्याहार्यम् । तेन चक्षुराद्याख्येत्युक्तं भवति । अथ सा शक्तिः कस्मादुत्पद्यते । इति चेदाह —

इदं द्वयमन्योन्यहेतुकम् इति ।

सा च शक्तिरिन्द्रियाक्षेपकात् पूर्वविज्ञानादुत्पद्यते । तच्च विज्ञानं [ततो]ऽपि पूर्वतरशक्तेरुत्पद्यते । सा च शक्तिरिन्द्रियाक्षेपकपूर्वविज्ञानादुत्पद्यत इति हेतुफल-भावपरम्परेयमनादिकालिका । एवं तावदिन्द्रियशक्तिर्विज्ञानञ्च हेतुफलभावतो निर्दिष्टम् । द्वयमिदमन्योन्यहेतुकमनादिकालमित्युक्त्यैव विषयशक्तिर्विज्ञानञ्चान्योन्यहेतुकानादिकालतया च निर्दिष्टम् । अन्योन्यहेतुकतानिर्देशादाह—

कदाचिच्छक्तिपरिपाकात् इत्यादि ।

कदाचित्प्रपञ्चवासनाख्यशक्तिपरिपाकाद्विज्ञानं विषयाकारतया भवति । कदाचि-द्विषयाकारकचित्ताच्छक्तिरुत्पद्यते । अत्र च हेतुफलपरम्परायामस्यां तत्सन्तत्यविच्छेदेना-नादिकालिकता ज्ञेया ।

किञ्च किमिन्द्रियं विषयशक्तिश्च विज्ञानादन्मा उत न । यद्यन्या । तदा नाममात्रे विप्रतिपत्तिः । अर्थस्तु समानः । विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तेन्द्रियालम्बनयोरभ्युपगमात् । अथानन्या । तदा शक्तिरियमिन्द्रियरूपा विषयो [ ज्यम् ] इति व्यवस्थान्न व्यवस्थान्न न भवेत् । इति चेदत आह—

विज्ञानञ्च सा चोभयमित्यादि ।

यदि वस्तुनीति दृश्यते । तदा शक्तिरवस्थाविशेषात्मतया संवृत्तिसत्त्वात्  
विज्ञानादन्या वा अनन्या वेति नाभिधेया । अथ लोकव्यवहार आश्रीयते ।  
तदा यथेष्टं कदाचित्सास्माद्विज्ञानादन्यैवोच्येत । कदाचिदनन्येति । यतः संवृत्ति-  
सत्त्वं लोके कदाचित् पृथग्व्यवहार आरोप्यते । तद्यथा चन्दनगन्ध इत्यादि । कदा-  
चिदपृथक्तया । यथा रूपादि इति ।

तथा पक्षद्वयेऽपि आलम्बनमन्तर्निर्दिष्टमित्युपसंहारायाह— एवमन्तरिति । तथा  
सत्युक्ताकारेण विज्ञानादनन्य आलम्बने धर्मताद्वयविशिष्टत्वात् विषयतोपपद्यते ॥ ८ ॥

आलम्बनपरीक्षायाः संप्रकाशितवृत्तितः ।

पुण्यं यल्लभ्यते तेन बुद्धत्वं जगदाप्नुयात् ॥

14

टीकाऽदिकमिकमुदे व्यपेतदशधातुका ।

विनीतदेवेन कृता, प्रबद्धं ततो बुधा ॥

15

हातुकाम इमां दोषग्रहं न दययेक्षताम् ।

स्वविकल्पवशाद्बुद्धावदुष्टाऽपि च भासते ॥

आलम्बनपरीक्षाटीका आचार्यविनीतदेवेन

ज्ञानालम्बनकात्स्न्यावतरणवादिसिंहेन

तीर्थिकमहागजप्रमथनेन

कृता समात्पा ॥

भारतपण्डितशाक्यसिंहेन संशोधकलोत्सव-

श्रीकृतेन च परिवर्त्य

पृष्ठाव् विनिश्चितां



Foot Notes  
To Vinitadeva's Tikā

1. Vinitadeva counts *manas* as the 6 th sense-organ whereas Dharmapāla denies it in accordance with Dignāga's view: न सुखादिप्रमेयं मनो वास्तीन्द्रियम् । (Pram. Sam. I.) cited in the Nyayav. Tātparyatikā, p. 97 cp. Abh. kośavyākhyā I. p 40 l. 24. The Vaibhasika describes it: षण्णामनन्तरातीतं विज्ञानं यद्धि तन्मनः । Kośa, I, 17. Santaraksita repeats the Same:

चक्षुराद्यतिरिक्तं तु मनोऽस्माभिरपीष्यते ।

षण्णामनन्तरोद्भूतप्रत्ययो यो हि तन्मनः ॥

Tattvas. p. 209. v b31. Ref. Th stcherbatsky's Bud. Log. II, P.318,n-9 for detailed information on this point.

2. See his Tikā, Introductory part.
3. This prayoga is not found in the tikā printed here; so it appears that the Chinese translation is defective.
4. See p. above for explanation of this term.
5. To be amended.
6. The said prayoga is also not in his Tikā.
7. Not mentioned by Dharmapāla.
8. Substantially existing. It is nominal for Buddhists.
9. A well-known master who denies distinction between *bhūta* and *bhautika* so the ten bases āyatana are mere *bhūta*, primary matters, the Satyasiddhi would also support this view, cfr. chs. 36ff.
10. Because subtle and gross are mutually contradictory.
11. They are ultimate elements for the Sautrantika cfr. Satyasiddhi; ch.36—39.
- 11a Cp. Kośabhasya p. 85, त्रिदण्डान्योन्यबलावस्थानवत्
- 12 The Same Buddhadeva as stated above, v. note 9. Here the yogācāra system is probably the Agamanusāri yogācāra of pre. Dignāga-period.

- 12a. This opinion is perhaps of the Sautrāntika, read yasomitra's remark ad Kośavyā. I, 9 and my Eng. translation of the Kośa, I in IHQ. Sept. 1953, p. 242 and Sarvāstivāda in JORM. Vol. IX, 1, p. 23.
13. *Anirdeśya* in the sense of *anabhilāpya* as in the Vimsika of Vasubandhu, ad ver. 10 and 21, and Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu I, 5. cp. also the Pra. Samuccaya I, 5; स्वसंवेद्यमनिर्देश्यं रूपमिन्द्रियगोचरः ।
14. *Khams. bcu. dañ. ni bral. bar byas.*
15. This verse may be continued thus :—  
दोषं गृहीत्वा ह्यानुकाम इमां दयया नेशताम् ॥  
स्वविकल्पवशात् । [मन] बुद्धौ अदुष्टाऽपि च भासते ॥



**TIKA  
of  
DHARMAPALA**

(Chinese Version of I-tsing, Nanjio No. 1174.  
Taisho Vol. 31 No. 1625. The Sanskrit rendering  
is based on the Nanking Edition.)

## आलम्बनपरीक्षाटीका

### आचार्यधर्मपालकृता

दुर्मेधसां प्रज्ञां परिदीपयितुमवद्याशुभानि ।

परिहर्तुञ्च यो जगद । [ तं ] प्रणम्य तदर्थं परीक्षे ॥

शास्त्रमाह । ये चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानामिति ।

हेयस्य हानमुपादेयस्य चोपादानं परीक्षाफलम् । अतो हेयं विपर्ययहेतुश्च प्रदृश्यते । तद्वादिवचनं तानि रूपेन्द्रियाश्रितानि पञ्च विज्ञानानि सङ्गच्छति ।

परे हि प्रतिपद्यन्ते तानि प्रतिनियतवस्त्वालम्बनानि इति । मनोविज्ञानन्तु न तथा । अप्रतिनियत [ विषय ]त्वात् । संवृतिसद्रथद्यालम्बनतयाऽभ्युपगमाच्च । यद्यपि

मनोविज्ञानं विषयवस्तु प्रतीत्य साकारम्, तथापि विज्ञानाकारव्यभिचारि अतद्विषयमपि गृह्णाति । चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानान्तु विषयोऽव्यभिचारीति प्रसिद्धया सिद्धः । अतो नात्र प्रयासः कार्यः ॥

किञ्च भावनासाध्यज्ञानवेद्यरूपस्य तत्त्वतस्तर्कागोचरत्वात् दृश्यवदवस्थित-त्वाच्च । तदिह श्रुतचिन्तालम्बनज्ञानस्य विषय इत्येव द्रष्टव्यम् । तथा

मनोविज्ञानालम्बनं सर्वथा सिध्यतीति न भवति । तस्य हि स्वकालापयोरनालम्बनत्वात् अतीतानगतालम्बनयोश्चासंस्कृतवदवस्तुत्वात् । अत [ 1<sup>b</sup> ] आदिवचनं पञ्च विज्ञान-कायान् सङ्गच्छति ॥

तर्हि चक्षुरादिविज्ञानोपनीतं यत्किञ्चिन्मनो विजानाति । तत्कथम् । न

तदिन्द्रियज्ञानममकालम् अनन्तरं वा । निरुद्धरूपाद्यालम्बनत्वात् । न वा वर्तमानालम्बनं तत् । इन्द्रियविज्ञानवेद्यत्वात् । मनोविज्ञानं स्वतो बाह्यार्थालम्बन-

स्वभावम् [ इति चेत् ] तदा अन्धवधिरादीनामभावः स्यात् । अनुमानविरोधि चेन्द्रियान्तरम् । तस्याधिकरूपस्य निराकर्तुमिष्टत्वात्, तथा न पुनरस्ति मनोविज्ञान आग्रहः । चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानामाश्रयमात्रम्बनं कुर्वन् रूपमस्ति । अविज्ञप्तिस्तु

अक्रियास्वभावेति नास्तीयमिति स्वयमेष्टव्यम् । तथैव करणं मनः ।

## आलम्बनम्

॥

प्रत्यक्षभावि । ग्राह्यस्वभावतया कुपथपरिभ्रमणात्, सम्यङ्मताय आलम्बनता प्रतिषिध्यते । तदुपादाय तदाश्रयतापि प्रतिषिध्यते । समकालीनेन्द्रियशक्तेः रूपं

12

तदिति कल्पयति ।

आह—

बाह्यार्थं इति ।

ते प्रतिपद्यन्ते तद्व्यतिरिक्तमस्ति अर्थान्तरमिति । तत् तेषां विपर्ययं प्रकाशयति । ते प्रतिपद्यन्ते अस्त्यर्थान्तरम् । तत् ग्राह्यत्वादर्थं इत्युच्यते इति ।

12a

कथं षक्तव्यं [तत्] सङ्घातमालम्बते । सङ्घाताभावे च द्रव्यं [आलम्बनं] युज्यते इति । [तत्र] सन्ति तत्त्वतो यथाऽऽगतानि दूषणानि । किञ्च तत् स्वतः पूर्वोत्तरविरुद्धम् । मम तु का हानिः । [भवता] हि स्वीक्रियते तत् द्रव्यमालम्बते

13

सङ्घातञ्चालम्बते इति । दोषान्तरं वक्ष्यते । अतोऽयं दोषः पुनरुपेक्ष्यते ।

परमाणुं वा स्वीकुर्वन्ति ।

[२] यद्यपि परमाणवः संहता उत्पन्नमात्रनिरुद्धाः । तथापि द्रव्यमेकैकमालम्बनं न तु सङ्घातः । तद्यथा । रूपादीनि स्वेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्युपस्थितविषया अप्यसङ्कीर्णाः । तेषु इन्द्रियशक्तेः प्रतिनियतत्वात् । वस्तुषु <sup>14</sup> व्यवच्छिन्नशक्तिष्वपि

14 a

एकैकः परमाणुरालम्बनं सिध्यति ।

तत्कारणात्वादिति ।

तेषां चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानां कारणत्वात् । तानि अवयवार्थसन्निकर्षसमुत्पन्नानि ।

15

तथाच्चाहुः— स आलम्बनार्थः [यः] प्रत्ययेषु विज्ञानजनकः । इति ।

तत्सङ्घातं वा इति ।

15 a

तद्वादिनो वदन्ति परमाणुकलापनिष्पन्नः सङ्घातस्तदालम्बनमिति ।

तदाकारकविज्ञानस्य जायमानत्वात् इति ।

सङ्घातस्य तज्ज्ञानजनकत्वान्निश्चीयते स आलम्बनमिति । यथाह कश्चित्— यत्

विज्ञानं यदाकारवत् सोऽस्य विषय इति । तौ द्वौ वादिना वाहेतुः— [विज्ञाने]  
तदाकारयोगो युक्त इति ।

17 17 a—

यो हेतुरुक्तः । अस्य हेतोर्दृष्टान्तो नास्ति । तद्यथा हेत्वादिस्वभावसाधन-  
18 हेत्वादीनाम् । परमाणुसामान्यलक्षणमालम्बनमित्येतत्साधयति । यदीष्यते स्वतो  
- 17 a  
न विज्ञाने बाह्यमेव वस्तु प्रत्यय इति । [तदा] धर्मिस्वरूपविरोधः स्यात् । तथा  
19 धर्मोऽनभ्युपगमं कीर्तयति । यत् तावत् परस्यापि सम्मतम् । तदेव दृष्टान्तीक्रियते । यत्  
20 यथेत्युच्यते । साध्येऽपि तत् सम्बन्धि भविष्यति । पूर्वप्रमाणमभिसन्ध्यायाह—वाद्मूलं  
21 हेतुद्वयम्, इदं हेतुप्रकाशनमात्रसाधनम् । नैवास्त्ययं हेतुः । साधारणसिद्धदृष्टान्ताभावात् ।  
22 अत आपतति तदाकारयोगहेतुः केन भवेदिति ।

अथ पुनः प्रवर्शयति स्ववादस्य [2b] अव्यभिचारिणीं युक्तिम् । पञ्चमीनिर्देशेन  
परसम्मतः प्रकाशिता ।

(1) यद्यपि कारणम् इति ।

यथासाधारणसम्मतम् । अविद्यमान (= अनुलभ्यमान) वस्तूनामस्वभावत्वात् परमाणु-  
रकारणम् । यद्यपि परमाणुस्वरूपाणां तत्कारणता । [तथापि] असंहतमेवालम्बनमुच्यते ।

(1 a) अतदाभतयेति ।

[अ] परमाण्वाभतया इत्येतदाह ।

(1 d) तेन्द्रियविज्ञत्पेरक्षवद्विषयोऽणवः इति ।

यथेन्द्रियं विज्ञानसन्निकर्षाश्रयहेतुरपि न तस्या विषयः । अनिन्द्रियाकारत्वात् ।  
तथा परमाणुरपि । ये अतदाकारा न ते तद्विषयाः इत्येतदुक्तं भवति । तदर्थमाह—

विषयो हि नाम इत्यादि ।

स्वभावः स्वाकारोऽवधार्यते निश्चीयते । कथं तत्पुनरवधार्यते ।

तदाकारतयोत्पत्तेरिति ।

24

अस्यायमभिप्रायः । तदाकारसमानं विज्ञानमुदेति । यत् तत्स्वरूपानुवर्तनं तत्  
विषयनिर्धारणमित्युच्यते । विज्ञानं विना विज्ञेयान्तरस्यासतस्तद्विज्ञानोत्पादहेतुता कथम् ।  
तथापि अस्त्येव पूर्वं विषयाकारः । स तदात्मनि आदर्शो विम्बवदप्यते । तद्विषयनिर्धा-  
रणतया सम्मतम् । तथापि नैकैकपरमाणुस्वरूपस्याकारं विज्ञानमनुवर्तते । येन  
परमाणुविषयो भवेत् ।

कारणत्वे सत्यपि इति ।

29

नैतावता कारणत्वेऽपि आलम्बनम् ।

अक्षवत् इति ।

कारणमपि नालम्बनम् । यदि कारणत्वेनालम्बनक्रिया सम्मता । इन्द्रियमपि

30

तद्वत् तत्साधयेत् । पूर्वोक्ततदाकारयोगहेतुरसिद्धिदुष्ट इत्यतस्तदाह । तथा चायमपिप्रायो  
न केवलं कारणत्वम्, इन्द्रियस्यालम्बनलक्षणमपि [स्यात्] । यदि पूर्वोक्तेहेतुः  
साधनं भविष्यति । तदा तस्य कारणत्वात् किमालम्बनता भवति । इन्द्रियस्यापि  
[कारणत्व] मस्ति । आलम्बनत्वं स्यात् इत्यनैकान्तिकदोषः सिद्धः ।

31

तथा चेत् अतदाभतया इति किमर्थमिदम् ।

स्वप्रतिज्ञासंस्थापनार्थम् । न परपक्षदोषमात्रेण स्वार्थः सिध्यति । स्वविज्ञानाकाराजनकत्वात्  
विषयो न परमाणुश्चक्षुरादिवत् इति प्रकटनार्थमिदं वचनम् । यदीदं तद्धेतुताया  
वचनम् । शास्त्रकारः परपक्षं स्थापयन् परपक्षात् प्राक् प्रकाशयतीति  
भवेत् । [3b] परकथित प्रतिषेधाशयेन अर्थसिद्धिं दूषयन् तद्वचनं निक्षेपयति ।  
तदेकान्तिकः पक्षोऽभ्युपेयते । अनैकान्तिकः परपक्षः सोऽनिष्ट इति शाङ्क्यते ।

32

पूर्वं परं प्रति [यत्] अनैकान्तिकसाधनोद्भावनं, तदेव दूषणम् । कथं स्वपक्षे  
मिथ्यानुमानमनुकूलयसि ॥ सर्वे वदन्ति अनैकान्तिकमनियतमसाधनम् । तत् संशयप्रापकमिति ।  
अतः पुनः प्रमाणं स्थापयेत् । सम्भवेद्वा तत् अतदाभ इति अनिर्धारितस्वभावेषु  
परमाणुषु । यथाकारं विज्ञानमुत्पद्यत इति यन्निर्धारणं तस्यैवाभावात् स्पष्टं ज्ञायते  
तन्निर्धारणमपि नास्ततीति । अनिर्धारितस्वभाव इति वक्तव्यत्वात् । स कारण

नालम्बनम् इन्द्रियपरमाणुवत् इति केवलमायाति । सन्त्यन्ये पुनर्विज्ञानकारकविशेषा-  
श्रक्षुर्विज्ञानसाधनानीति प्रदर्शिताः । न ते परमाणुरूपं प्रत्याययन्ति । अतदाकारत्वात् ।

33 34  
अन्येन्द्रियविज्ञानवत् । एवमन्यद्विज्ञानं तद्विपर्ययेण वाच्यम् ।

इन्द्रियवदिति वचनं वस्तुतः प्रदर्शनार्थम् । दृष्टान्तान्तरमर्थापत्त्या आयाति ।  
अथेदं कारणताभ्युपगमवचनं निष्प्रयोजनम् । तस्य 35 कारणवृत्तित्वेऽपि नालम्बनता ।  
अयमप्येवमिति सार्थकम् । तथापि न शब्दादिपरमाणवोऽन्येन्द्रियविज्ञानजननकारणानि  
भवेयुः ।

36  
कश्चिदाह— न ज्ञाने स्थूलाभास इति । अतो नालम्बनम् इन्द्रियपरमाणुवत् ।  
विज्ञाने विषयाकारार्पणाधीना हि तदाकारता । तदभावात् युक्तमुक्तं न स्थूला-  
भास इति । एवञ्च कथितं न परमाणवस्तदालम्बनम् इति । तस्य साधनं  
आकारयोगाभावात् । नापि प्रमाणसिद्धा विषयता ॥ १ ॥  
36a

37  
तर्हि सङ्घातो विषयोऽस्तु । उक्तभावानां स्थापनेन महापक्षं वाञ्छसि ।  
तदा असिद्धता स्यात् इत्ययं न्यायः ।

2. [4] सङ्घातस्तदाकारवानपि इति ।

अयमालम्बनं सम्भवति । न [तस्य] कारणता ।

न तदाकाराद्विज्ञानमुत्पद्यत इति ।

सङ्घाताकारकविज्ञानस्य न सङ्घातो जनकः । न स एव तद्विज्ञानं जनयति ।  
कथमिदं तत्प्रतीत्य भवति । आलम्बनलक्षणायोगात् नालम्बनमित्यर्थः । तेन पूर्वोक्तं  
तदाकारयोगयुक्तिर्न सिध्यति ।

तथाचेत् किमालम्बनस्य लक्षणम् । [आह—]

38  
योऽर्थः स्वाभासां विज्ञप्तिमुत्पादयति [स ह्यालम्बनं] युज्यत इति ।

39  
यथाविषयं विज्ञानमिति य एव जनकः स एवालम्बनम् । केचिदाहुः—  
योऽर्थ इति चित्तचैतसिकानां समुत्पादकारणं युज्यते । स समुत्पन्नो विषयवत् वेद्यमानः  
शब्देन व्यवह्रियते । तदोच्यते स आलम्बनार्थ इति । योऽर्थः 40 द्विविधाङ्गसम्पन्नः



स मिलितमालम्बनमुच्यते । [यो] जनकः स आलम्बनविषयः [ इत्यत्र ] आगममुदाहरति—

43  
स उत्पत्तिप्रत्यय उच्यत इति ।

अतो [यो] जननहेतुः स यद्विज्ञानस्योत्पत्तिप्रत्ययः । स तदालम्बनार्थः सम्मतः ।  
44 [विज्ञाने] स्वाकारोऽवभासते । न तत्राधिकमस्तीत्यतः [ विषयाकारता ] 44 a नोक्ता ।

सङ्घातो नोत्पादकः । (2b) अद्रव्यत्वात् । इति ।

[4b] न हि सङ्घातो द्रव्यम् । तस्य सङ्घातिनामेकत्वात्त्वामनिर्वचनी-  
यत्वात् । न चाद्रव्यस्य सतः कार्योत्पादकशक्तिः सम्भवति ।

[2 b] द्विचन्द्रवत् इति ।

यथा द्वितीयश्चन्द्रः न द्वितीयचन्द्राकारविज्ञानजनकः । तथा चेत् किमुपादाय  
नदाकारोऽवभासते । [ग्राह-] 45

इन्द्रियवैकल्यादिति ।

यदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं तिमिराद्भूपतहतप्रकाशम् तदा उपहतेन्द्रियस्य तत्र द्विचन्द्र-  
दर्शनं भवति । न वस्तुविषयतः ।

तेन द्विचन्द्र[दर्शन]स्य तदाभत्वे  
सत्यपि न तस्य विषयोऽस्ति । इति ।

यथा द्वितीयश्चन्द्रस्तद्विज्ञानस्य तदाकारवत्त्वेऽपि अनुत्पादकत्वान्न विषय इत्युच्यते ।

46  
तद्वत् सङ्घातो द्रव्यासत्त्वेन  
तद्विज्ञानस्य न जननकारणम् इति ।

अद्रव्यत्वात्, द्वितीयचन्द्रवत् । तस्याकारणत्वात्  
नालम्बनम् इति ।

द्विचन्द्रवत् इत्यावर्तते । अनेन पुनर्द्विचन्द्रदृष्टान्तेन तदाकारताहेतोरनैकान्तिकदोष उक्त इति द्रष्टव्यम् । अथ विज्ञानरूपार्थस्य न्यायसिद्धत्वात् [5] विरोधदोषश्च । चक्षुः प्रतीत्य विज्ञानं, न नीलादिसङ्घातपरमाणून् । ततोऽजनितत्वात् <sup>47</sup> अन्येन्द्रियविज्ञानवत् । स दृष्टान्तः सर्वसम्मतः । अतो नान्य उच्यते ।

द्वितीयचन्द्रदृष्टान्तस्याद्रव्यत्वात् ज्ञातव्यं <sup>48</sup> तस्याकाण्त्वे तत्साधयति । यथोक्तस्य साकारत्वेऽपि न स विषयः । इदं पुनः <sup>49</sup> तत्कारणत्वं विनास्ति ।

यदि नास्ति द्वितीयश्चन्द्रः । कथमाकारद्वयवत् प्रत्यक्षं भवति । तथाहि अन्तर्वीत-शक्तिविशेषक्रमेण तत्समानाकारं विज्ञानं प्रवर्तते । यथा सुप्तो विषयान् पश्यति । तदा-भासमिथ्याचेष्टास्तत्संविदश्च करोति । [एवं] तस्मिंश्चन्द्रे <sup>50</sup> अन्यमारोप्य पश्यति ।

केचिदाहुः— <sup>51</sup> चक्षुर्विज्ञानेनोभयधा तदुपलम्भे तयोः क्रमस्य दुर्निर्णयत्वात् ऐक्या-लिकर्मिति गृह्यते । तद्वि विधाकारपाष्ठिकं मनोविज्ञानं भवति चन्द्रस्य द्वितीयं पश्यामीति ।

अन्ये केचिदाहुः— [एकत्वेन] सर्वसम्मते चन्द्रे सङ्ख्याविपर्ययः इन्द्रियवैक-त्यात् इति । बाह्यार्थपक्षमनभ्युपगच्छतः तादृशस्थून् दृष्टिमृषाग्रह एव । नहि <sup>52</sup>

चक्षुर्विज्ञानालम्बनसमनन्तरमुपनीतं मनोविज्ञानमेककाल एवोभयाकारमवलम्बते । तथा चन्द्रद्वयं पश्यतीति कथमध्यवसायः । शब्दादिषु तत्प्रतीत्य [मनो] विज्ञानम्, तत्क्रमाज्ञाने शब्दद्वयादिदर्शनमैककालिकं किं भवेत् । <sup>53</sup>

स्वस्थनेत्रस्य पुरुषस्य मनोविज्ञान क्रमिकमेव भूयसा दुरध्यवसायम् । किं पुनः रूपेन्द्रियाश्रितविज्ञाने तद्विशेषपरिच्छेदे । तदा सिध्येद्भूयसा द्वयाकारादिदर्शनम् । एकश्चन्द्रो विज्ञानातिरिक्तो वस्तुसन् इति यदा स्वीकरोति । सोऽपि किं कृत्वा

चन्द्रद्वयं मृषा समारोप्य <sup>53a</sup> सङ्ख्याविपर्ययं वदेत् ॥ 2a-b ॥

<sup>53b</sup> विज्ञानविरिक्तं बाह्यद्वयम् इति

[5b] परमाणुः सङ्घातश्च तयोरेकाङ्गवैकल्यात् यथोक्तस्थानखण्डनयुक्तिबलाच्च । स विषयो न युक्तः । एकाङ्गवैकल्यात् इति ।

स्वाकारप्रतिभास उत्पादकता चेति द्वयङ्गमालम्बनम् । परमाणौ विकल-

माद्यमङ्गम् । द्वितीये द्वितीयम् । यच्चेवम्, यथापूर्वं विचारितं दोषद्वयं पुनरभेदं ग्राहयति ॥२॥<sup>53c</sup>

(3) सञ्चिताकारः [ साधन ]<sup>54</sup> मितिच्छन्ति केचन इति ।

परमाणुषु प्रत्येकं सञ्चिताकारोऽस्ति । स सञ्चिता एव विषयः साकारः प्रतिभासते । तदनुयायिनो विद्यमाना बह्वल्पपरमाणवः । ते सर्वे वस्तुसन्तः । परमाणुष्वस्ति सञ्चिताकारः स्वाकारविज्ञानजनकः । द्रव्यसत्त्वात् ।

<sup>55</sup>  
आलम्बनं स्यात्

अस्य तु उभयाङ्गवत्त्वात् । स च पूर्वसिद्ध एव । अतो न जिज्ञासाऽवतरति सञ्चिताकारः परमाणुरेव किं वा न तथा इति ।

सर्वे ह्यर्था बह्वाकारा इति ।

ते परमाणव एवाण्वाकाराः सञ्चिताकाराश्चाभिमताः । कथं युज्येत एक वस्तु सन्निविष्टमाकारद्वयवदिति । बह्वाकाराः सर्वभावा रूपसमवायरूपाः पृथिव्यादिचतुर्भूतात्मकाः । ते स्वभावतो विशिष्टशक्तिकाः ।

<sup>56</sup>  
नीलवर्णाद्याकारः द्रव्यादिन्द्रियाच्च [6] प्रतिविज्ञायते । सोऽपि बह्वाकारेषु परमाणुषु

अस्ति सञ्चिताकारः ।

अस्यैवाकारस्य चक्षुरादिविज्ञानगोचरत्वात्  
प्रत्यक्षत्वम् ।

<sup>57</sup> यच्चेवम् । अणूनां विज्ञानं सञ्चिताकारकमिति किं न ब्रवीषि ।<sup>58</sup> अणुः सञ्चिताकारः । कुतो न ब्रवीषि विज्ञानं सञ्चिताकारकमिति । अत आह-  
परमाणुष्वस्ति सञ्चिताकार इति ।

<sup>59</sup>  
इदमेव वचनं तत्प्रयोगात्मकं सत् प्रदर्शयति विज्ञानं परमाणुस-  
<sup>60</sup>  
ञ्चिताकारमित्यपि । तथा चेत् एकैकः परमाणुः त[त्स्वा]कारकः । कस्माद्ब्रवीषि सञ्चिताकारक इति ।

रूपसङ्घातपरमाणवो विभिन्नावयवा एतच्छास्त्राभिमताः । ते सञ्चितत्वादेव न द्रव्यसन्तः इति यथावदुक्तमेव । किं कृत्वा पुनर्वचनम् । अगत्याशयान्तरम् । वस्तुनि पृथक् पृथक्विभिन्नस्वरूपेऽपि स आकारः सञ्चितदेशमात्रे सन्निहितः । अतः[स्त्व] परिज्ञायते । तदा कथयन्ति सञ्चिताकार एवावलोक्यते नान्य इति । किञ्च यद्यपि सर्वे भावाः परमाणुसङ्घातात्मकाः । तथापि एकस्य वस्तुनोऽस्ति उत्कर्षापकर्षः । यथावस्तु तत्त्वश्यामः । यथा च नीलं पृथिवीत्पादिवचनं तत्त्वतो न्याय्यम् । एवमभ्युपगमे सति अतिरिक्तपदार्थस्येवाद्योत्पत्तिकाले बहूनि वस्तूनि प्रबलानि तिरोधानं यान्ति । तिरोधानस्थलं [मिथ्या] निश्चित्य कृतोऽयं मृषाव्यवहारो [ननु] ।

तथा चेत् कथं परमाणवो नेन्द्रियग्राह्याः । कथञ्च पुनर्यथा-  
[र्थ]ज्ञानमात्रेण परमाणून् पश्यन्ति । [आह-]

[6<sup>b</sup>] अण्वाकारो न विज्ञप्तेरर्थं इति । (3c)

नायमिन्द्रियविज्ञप्तेविषय इत्यनिन्द्रिय इत्युच्यते । अनिन्द्रियोऽर्थश्च यथा[र्थ]ज्ञानचिन्त्यः । का पुन युक्तिः । नहि प्रत्यक्षतः परमाण्वाकारो दृष्टः ।

कठिनतादिवत् । यथा काठिन्यशंत्यादि ।

तत्र नीलत्वादिवस्तुसदपि न चक्षुरादिविज्ञप्तिविषयः । इन्द्रियशक्तेः प्रतिनियतत्वात् ।

एवमण्वाकारोऽपि । इति ।

न सर्वसम्पत्तिविरोधः । ननु अण्वाकारो भातु । न कठिनता

स्वभावान्तरत्वात् । तत्प्रति दशायतनसाधारणः पक्षधर्म इष्टः । इदञ्च

भूतमात्रम् इति तद्वचनमदुष्टम् । [अतो]युक्तमुक्तम् ॥ 3 ॥

(4) भवेद्धटशरावादे मतिः इति ।

[7] एवं पश्यतस्ते घटे शरावे च निष्पन्नेन्द्रियबुद्धिः ।  
समा दृश्यते ।

तत्स्वविषयविज्ञप्ती भेदाभावात् । इन्द्रियबुद्धेः प्रत्युपस्थितविषयत  
 आकारप्रवृत्तेश्च विज्ञप्तिविषयो न भिद्यते कथं ज्ञायते ।<sup>68</sup>

न घटशरावादीनां बहुषु परमाणुषु विशेषोऽस्ति इति ।<sup>69</sup>  
 इदं वचनमाह । परमाणवः सञ्चिताकारेण विषया भवन्ति । नैवास्ति  
 तु तेषां घटादीनां स्वरूपप्रतिविज्ञप्तिकाले बहुषु अणुसङ्घातेषु प्रविभागः ।  
 तेषां वास्त्वाकाराद्बुद्धिः पृथक् सञ्चित रूपस्यानुपलम्भात् । तत्प्रत्ययेन्द्रिय-  
 विज्ञप्तिरभिन्नाकाराऽसिद्ध्येत् । अनेनाणुस्वरूप आलम्बनता सिध्यति ।

न पुनस्तेषामवशिष्ट आकारे प्रत्यवमर्शप्रत्ययः । नीलादि प्रतीत्येव  
 संविदन्तरत्वात्<sup>70</sup> ॥4a-b ।  
<sup>71</sup>

(4c) आकारभेदाद्भेद उच्यते चेत् । इति ।

आकारो बिम्बं भेदापेकम् ।

घटशरावयो ग्रीवोदरपादा दिभि-

भिन्नाकारत्वात्

विषयवशेन विशिष्टा बुद्धिर्भवति भेदानुवर्तिनी च ।

सत्यं युज्यते ।

(4d) नेदं वस्तु इति ।

(7b) नेन्द्रियविज्ञप्तिदृष्टे विषये परमाणवो भेदवन्तः । यद्यपि स  
 सङ्घातः संवृत्तिसन् । तथापि स सङ्घातो नेन्द्रियविज्ञप्तिविषयः स यदा विविच्यते ।  
 न हि युज्यते अविषयविशेषो भेदवद्विज्ञप्तिकारकः सम्भवतीति ।

कथं पुनर्जायते परमाणुषु आकारभेदो नास्तीति । परमाण्वाकारे<sup>72</sup>  
 भेदाभावात् । सर्वे पदार्थाः सावयवाः इत्यवश्यं तत्त्वाकारभेदः प्रवर्तते । परमाणूनां  
 स्वरूपस्य तु नास्ति दिग्भागो यत्र निष्ठा प्राप्येत । [अतः] कथमस्याकारभेदो  
 लभ्येत ।

घटशरावादिषु भिन्नवस्तुष्वपि  
(5a) परमाणुस्वरूपे भेदा नास्ति ।  
एकरूपस्यास्योपचयापचयाभावात् ।

ततोऽवधार्यते

(5b) सङ्घातेऽस्ति सः इति ।

न वस्तुभावे । सर्वं सदिग्भागमारोपिताकार नेन्द्रियविज्ञप्तिगोचरः ।  
एवं सन्ति पूर्वागतानि बहूनि खण्डनानि । अस्त्याकारभेद इति  
प्रदर्शनस्याभीप्सितत्वात् । नहि घटशरावादिबुद्ध्यो विभिन्नं वस्तु आलम्बनाय  
विषयाकुर्वन्ति । यथा सुखस्य दुःखस्य वा वेदनम् । तथाच परमाणवो  
न विषयभेदकाः । आकारोऽयं [8] न तद्विषयरूपः ।

आकारभेदाद्भेद उच्यते चेत् (4c) इतोदं वचनं नाविशिष्टं वस्तु  
विषयो भवतीति पदर्शयितुमिष्टं सत् सिद्धसाधनं भवति । ते ह्यशेरते परमाणवो  
विषयकृतो वस्तुतोऽभिन्नाः । तथापि आकारभेदाद्भेद इति । परमाणवोऽभिन्ना  
इति ममापि सम्मतम् । इदं सिद्धसाधनम् । परमाणुनां परिमाणभेदाभावात् (5a)

इतोदं वस्तुभेदाऽयं भेदक इति प्रदर्शनस्य अमिद्धि प्रवक्ति । अथवा इदं च तयति  
घटशरावादिषु इन्द्रियविज्ञप्तीनां परमाण्वाकारत्वाभावात् नालम्बनम् इति ।  
यथान्यविज्ञानस्य । मनो वा अन्येन्द्रियविज्ञप्तिर्वा अन्यविज्ञानमुच्यते ।  
नीलप्रत्ययकाले पीताकाराभावात् । परमाणुनां स्वरूपे बहून्यपि अविशेषात्  
इन्द्रियविज्ञप्तानाञ्च विशेषाकारत्वात् इदं तावत् संसिध्यति- [आलम्बनप्रत्ययो]  
नाण्वाकृतिरूप इति

<sup>75-</sup> श्लोके परमाणुनां विज्ञेषवचनं [वा] पूर्ववत् पृष्ट्वा प्रतिवक्तव्यम् । यदि  
<sup>77</sup> तत्सङ्घातां व्यत्यस्ताकार इष्ट इति । [स] आकारो न द्रव्यमिति न्यायतः साध्यम् ।

एवं न्ययविशेषोऽयं साधयितव्यः । [इत्याह]-

(5c.d) अणूनां परिहार इत्यादि ।

यदा ते [5गत्र.] परिहियन्ते तदा तद्बुद्ध्यभावात् इति । सेनादिवत् । घटादि-

वचनमिदम् न वास्तविकोऽर्थः। तेन नास्ति वस्तुतः । पक्षान्तरप्रदर्शनमिदम्-अनङ्ग-  
 व्याणि अतन्मुक्तानीति वस्तुविरुद्धम् । यथा शब्दादौ सति न नीलबुद्धिरस्ति ।  
 स आकारभेदो व्यत्यस्ताकारभूतः, घटादिविषयत्वात् इति । यद्यपि बहुकमाद्भिक्ते ।  
 अन्यत् दृश्यत इति युक्तम् । तथापि परमाणूनां द्रव्याणां स्वरूपं सविशेषमिति  
 प्रदर्शयितुमत्यन्तमशक्यम् ॥5॥

(6) [8b] [यत्] अन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपम् इति

स्वपक्ष आलम्बनवस्तु माधयति । यदि मामान्यतोऽप्योह्यते  
 नास्त्यालम्बनमिति । तदा लोकविरोधः स्वपक्षस्य दोषः । चत्वारः  
 प्रत्यया इति सूत्र उपदिष्टत्वात् । तत्र अन्तःशब्दो विज्ञानाद्विना आलम्बनं  
 नास्तीति प्रदर्शनार्थम् । ज्ञेयस्य ग्राह्यांशो विज्ञानपरिणामो ज्ञेयाकारोऽर्थ इति  
 [प्रदर्शयति] । तथा विज्ञानगत ग्राह्यमिति विकल्पित विषयया स्थाप्यते ।  
 लोकविरोधदोषः पुनः पूर्ववद्वर्तते । लौकिकानां हि सम्मतं विषयस्य बहिर्वर्तन-  
 मिति । [अत] उच्यते बहिर्वदति । न विज्ञानं विना नास्ति । तस्य ग्राह्यांशः-

(6b) बहिर्वदवभासते ।

विषयमह पश्यामीति वचनमाभिमानिकम् । वस्तुतत्तद्धेतुकम् यथा  
 केशाद्यवभासि चाक्षुषं विज्ञानम् ।

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बाह्यार्थो यद्यप्यसन् इति ।

अर्थात् वस्तुतो नास्ति तस्य बाह्योऽर्थः । अनुपलभ्यमानत्वात् ।  
 नहि युक्तिकाष्ठाव्यवसायेन उपलभ्यते तत्स्वरूपं नियमेन बहिर्वर्तत इति ॥

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यद्यपि तत् वस्तुसत् बाह्यलक्षणम् । तथापि न विज्ञानप्रत्ययः । अतदा-  
 कारत्वात् । नहि परमाण्वाकारोऽवभासते ।

बाह्याकारवदवभासमानः स एव तदालम्बनप्रत्ययः । तदाकारयुक्तत्वात् ।  
 यत् [यदा]कारयुक्तं तत् तदेव । यथा कारणत्वादिः स्वाकारयुक्तः । पुनः[9]  
 आलम्बनस्य स्वरूपविशेषं प्रदर्शयति । यथाह—

(6c) विज्ञानस्य तदाकारवत्त्वात् इत्यादि

असत् बाह्य वस्तु, अर्थो न भवतीति स्पष्टम् । यथावामनाकल्पितं  
 विषयाकारोऽनुप्रवर्तते । नहि वासनाकल्पितं विज्ञानं भूत्वा बहिरस्ति ।

तद्विषयाकारो न विज्ञानं विनाऽऽदितोऽस्ति ।

तेन अन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपमित्युच्यते । तन्नान्तःशब्दो विज्ञानं विना नास्तीति वदति ।  
तत् बहिः प्रकृतितोऽविद्यमानमन्तरिष्यते ।

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तत उत्पद्यते च इति ।

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स भाग उत्पादकः तत [एव] कदाचित् स्यात् । सप्तमस्य पञ्चपदार्येभ्यः सवि-

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शेषत्वात् । ज्ञेयं विना न तद्विज्ञानसत्ता लभ्यत इत्यत एतत्तावद्विज्ञानजनकम् । न पञ्चम  
—82  
उच्यते ।

धर्मद्वयविशिष्टत्वात्

स्पष्टतरं तदेवालम्बनं न्याययुक्तत्वात् साधनञ्च प्रदर्शयते । तदुभयलक्षणं ज्ञेयमेव  
साधनं भवति । यद्विशिष्टं तद्विज्ञानं न बाह्यं वस्त्ववलम्बते । स्वप्नावस्थायामिदं  
83  
प्रदर्शयितव्यम् । यथोक्तद्वितयमेकं साधनं भवति । विज्ञानं तदाकारवत् विज्ञानजनक-  
ञ्चेति । इमे द्वे वृत्ती प्रतीत्य एकं प्रमाणं सिध्यति ।

[9b] तदन्तरूपमेवेति स्वीकारेऽपि

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बाह्यार्थस्य मिथ्याभूतलक्षणस्य परीक्षितत्वादेव नास्त्यन्यलक्षणम् इत्युक्तम् ।

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यथावासनाकल्पनं हि विषयस्तद्वेदनां जनयति । विषयाकारस्तु अन्तर्वर्तते इति न्याय्यं  
भविष्यति ।

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कथं तदेकांशः सहजातस्य प्रत्ययः ।

तद्ग्राह्यांशस्य विज्ञानं विनाऽभावात् तदेकांशः पुनर्विज्ञानं जनयति । तदा सिध्येत्  
स्वात्मविरोधदोषः । पुनस्तदेकांशत्वात् । ग्राह्यांशवत् । तदाह्यस्य जनकता नैव सिध्यति ।  
वाह्याकारविलष्टमेव विज्ञानं प्रवर्तते । स एकैकांशो विज्ञानसहजातः नद्वयोः समकालीनयोः  
कार्यकारणभावोऽस्ति । यथा गोः शृङ्गद्वयम् । न चारित तदभिन्नं वस्तु एककालं सहवर्तते  
इति । सहशब्दः तत्संयोगवाची । नापि विज्ञानात्पृथग्विषयोऽस्तीत्युच्यते । अस्य तावत्  
कथंसहजातत्वमित्थारूपा ।



सत्यमेवम् । तथापि आकारविभागबलाद्भिन्नं कृत्वा निरुच्यते । दर्शनांशाकारांशभिन्न-

मस्तीति तत् विज्ञानं सविशेषमित्यायाति । यद्येवम्, प्रत्ययरूपं ग्राह्यमात्रं स्यात् । न विकल्पितं वस्तु सस्वभावकम् । तस्य तावदप्रत्ययत्वं सिद्ध्येत् । इदमविहङ्गम् । अन्यग्राह्यविभिन्नविषय[वत्] अयं प्रत्यय इति सर्वसम्मतम् । यथा समनन्तरनिरोधः सभागे

विज्ञाने निरुद्धे तदेव विज्ञानं चतुर्भिः प्रत्ययैः प्रत्ययो भवति ॥

Notes  
to  
Dharmapala's Tika.

There are two Sub-commentaries in Chinese, not included in Nanjio's Catalogue. One by Shomen, Ming-yu belonging to the Ming period and to Shu province= Szechwan, and the other by chih-hsu, popularly called Ou-i, born 1597 and died in 1654 A.C. (v. Fu-hsueh tzu-tien= Dictionary of Buddhist forms. p. 1383). In the following notes I have given excerpts from these two Sub-commentaries, read in Sanskrit bearing upon the obscure passages of Dharmapala's Tika, Ming-yu's comment is referred to hereafter as C.I and Chih-hsu's one as C.II. References quoted below are to folio-number. obverse (=a) columns 1 and 2 and reverse (=b) columns 1 and 2.

1. C.I.: दुर्मोधा इति अव्यक्तप्रज्ञः पुरुषः। अव्यक्तप्रज्ञया चित्ताद्वहिरर्थं गृह्णाति । धर्मकाय-  
ञ्च हन्ति । प्रज्ञाजीवितञ्च ध्वंसयति । अतो दुर्मोधाः । त्रिषु दोषेषु (lit.  
विषेषु) मोहविषं परिपूर्णम् कामविषस्यैको भागः । बाह्यार्थस्य कामांशसम्ब-  
न्धित्वात् । कथं द्वेषांशो नोक्तः । स कामसंयुक्तः । अर्थे रागः (lit. तृष्णासंक्लेशः)  
एवास्ति । न तं विद्वेषयति । अतो नास्ति द्वेषः । (f. 184a, 1).
2. हेयं—तीर्थिकगृहीतपरमाणुसघातरूपद्विविधार्थः । [तस्य] नियमेनासत्वात् माहायानिकः  
तं खण्डयित्वा त्यजति । उपदेयं-तीर्थिकस्यानिष्टः द्वयाकारबद्धविज्ञानजननवादः । अर्थेऽभ्र-  
मात् माहायानमापाततस्तं स्वीकरोति । एवं हेयस्य हानमुपादेयस्योपादानम् । .....  
तत्र परमाणु-सङ्घातरूपद्विविधबाह्यवस्तुग्रहस्त्याज्यः । विपरीतहेतुप्रदर्शनेन तद्गृहीत-  
परमाणुसङ्घातवस्तुग्रहं खण्डेत । तद्वस्तुग्रहखण्डनेन नालम्बनप्रत्ययं [तद्वस्तु]  
[स्वी-] कुर्मः । चित्ताद्वहिनारित धर्मं हृत्यपि प्रदर्शयेत् ।—C.II, p.200b, 2.
3. अन्ययानिका अपि स्वीकुर्वन्ति मनोविज्ञानं संवृत्तिसदालम्बते इति । रथदिप्रज्ञप्ति-  
धर्मावलम्बित्वात् । ते यद्यपि स्वीकुर्वन्ति मनोविज्ञानं वस्तुविषयं प्रतीत्य साधारणमिति ।  
[अथ च] मनोविज्ञानाकारविनाभूतं तद्ग्राह्यबाह्यविषयमपि भस्तके वहतीति ।—  
C.II, 201a, 1.

3<sup>a</sup>. Lit. सभागम् । *pien-fen* (91, 18-2)

4. *Pu-chi-yin-chin* (61-10,61-13); *yin-chin*, attentive, particular about

5. रूपमिति संज्ञादृष्टौ प्रज्ञप्तिपरमाणुरूपा मेव । *Tan-chia* (30-5-162-5) = तर्कित-मनोविज्ञाननिर्देशः । इदं रूपं मनोविज्ञानस्यालम्बनमिति परवक्षः । प्रत्युत आह-न वस्तुतो मनोविज्ञानस्य गोचर इति । -C.I. (184b. 2).

6. •••••••• ज्ञानस्य विषय इति । ज्ञानं षष्ठं मनोविज्ञानमेव । विषयः श्रुतचिन्ताविषयः । ie. इदं मनोविज्ञानं श्रवणगृहीतात् विषयात् जातम् । स विषय एवालम्बनं द्रष्टव्यम् । श्रुतचिन्ताविषयो मनोविज्ञानजनक इत्येव द्रष्टव्यमित्याशयः । एवं द्रष्टव्यमिति मनोविज्ञानं तद्विषयमात्रमवलम्बत इति प्रदर्शनार्थम् । *Ibid.*

7. स्वं = परमाणुः, कलापः = सङ्घातः । मनोविज्ञानं न परमाणु सङ्घातं वा विषयमवलम्बते । ••• *Ibid.*

8. अनन्तरमिति—मनोविज्ञानमवश्यं पञ्चविज्ञानानन्तरमुत्पद्यते । [यदि] नाभ्युपैषि-पञ्चविज्ञानैः समालम्बनमिति । तदा मनोविज्ञानमवश्यं निरुद्धपञ्चविषयानवलम्बते । तत्र दूषणमाह—यद्यतीतमनागतञ्च वस्तुसत् । तदा [तत्] सम्भवेत् । -C.I. 185a 1

9. मनोविज्ञानेन पञ्चविषयविज्ञाने [गृहीते] सति उत्पादकमिन्द्रियं पृथक् भवति । अतो न पञ्चेन्द्रियैः समं पञ्चविषयानवलम्बते । तदा अधिकरूपं कस्मात् भवति । अधिकरूपमिति—पञ्च विषयाः प्रत्येकं स्वलक्षणानि । न्यायतः पञ्चविज्ञानानि आलम्बनकाले शुद्धान् विषयान् गृह्णन्ति । इदमेव प्रत्यक्षं स्वलक्षणमात्रप्रापकम् । मनोविज्ञान-मालम्बनकाले न्यायतोऽधिकरूपं दीर्घह्रस्ववृत्तरिमण्डललक्षण [मवलम्ब्य] प्रवर्तते । स्वलक्षणप्रतिद्वन्द्वितोक्तमधिकरूपम् । न पञ्चालम्बनसमम् । स्वलक्षणमेव नास्ति । किं पुनरधिकरूपम् ॥

अनुमानमिति—यथा दृष्टम्—(इयं) पृथिवी । अनुमेयं कठिनता । दृष्टम् आपः । अनुमेयं—स्नेहः । दृष्टम्—तेजः । अनुमेयं—औष्ण्यम् । दृष्टम्—वायुः । अनुमेयं—ईरणम् । अथमनुमानन्यायोऽवश्यमधिकरूपाभ्युपगममपेक्षते । अधिकरूपं प्रतिषिद्धमेव । अनुमान-न्यायोऽवश्यं विरुध्यते । -C. I ff 18: a 2 —185 b, 1.

10. इदं मन [इन्द्रियं]—प्रकृतितो नास्ति । अविज्ञप्तिरूपस्य विज्ञानजनकत्वाभावात् Ibid.
11. परमाणुरालम्बनं प्रत्यक्षभावीति । ते पाक्षिकताग्रहं प्रतिपद्यन्ते । कुपथपरिभ्रमणञ्च । शास्त्रे प्रमाणस्थापनम्, [तेन] आलम्बनप्रतिषेध एव सम्यङ् मतम् । तदा आश्रयता प्रतिषिध्यते । आलम्बनप्रत्ययः—अयमेक एव धर्मो विज्ञानजनक आलम्बनीक्रियते । तदालम्बनताया एव प्रतिषेधे कथमस्तीयमाश्रयता ।—C.I,185 b,2
12. Vide Hsuan Tsang's version ad ver. 8. for clear exposition of this point.
- 12a. This whole para has no parallel in Vinītadeva's Tīkā
13. शास्त्रकारोऽनुमानेन दोषान्तरं प्रदर्शयिष्यति । अतो न विचारयति चित्ताद्वाह्य-धर्मसत्तादोषम्—C.I, 186a, 1.
14. पञ्चगुणाः (=पञ्चविषयाः) प्रत्येकं विभिन्नाकाराः—Ibid. चक्षु रूपं गृह्णाति श्रोत्रं शब्दं गृह्णाति ... कायः स्पष्टव्यं गृह्णाति । तानि व्यवच्छिन्नशक्तिकानी-त्युच्यन्ते ।—C.II.202a,2.
- 14 a. अत्र प्रमाणम्—परमाणुधर्मी । आलम्बनार्थः पक्षः (=साध्यः)तत्कारणत्वात्—हेतुः । तथा समदृष्टान्तो नास्ति ।—C.II.202b, 1.
15. Cfr. Ślokavārtika, p.285; उत्पादकस्यैवालम्बनत्वम् । Pramānavārtika, II.244: हेतुभावादृते नान्या ग्राह्यता नाम काचन । also v. verses : 248, 368.
- 15a. तत्र प्रमाणमाह— सङ्घातो धर्मी । विज्ञानस्यालम्बनमिति पक्षः (=साध्यः) विज्ञानाकारजनकत्वात्—हेतुः । समदृष्टान्तस्तु नास्ति । —C.II.202b, 1.
16. The same in the Pra. vārtika, II, 224: तत्र बुद्धिर्यदाकारा तस्यास्तद्ग्राह्यमुच्यते । Vṛtti: ग्राह्यमुच्यते अणुसञ्चयः ।
17. The following is according to C. I. and to be applied after vṛtti ad ver. 1. (Hsuan Tsang's version). Here *hetu*—पक्षहेतुदृष्टान्तव्यवयवमतुमानम् — C. I. 186 b, 2.

17a -17 a. पक्षः=साध्यः, हेतुः साधनम् । हेतुः योज्यः दृष्टान्तो योजकः । अधुना तयोर्द्वयोर्वादीयोः प्रत्येकं हेतुः प्रदर्शयते । समो दृष्टान्तस्तु नास्ति । आपाततो यद्येकविधहेतुर्नोक्तः । हेतुद्वयस्यापि दृष्टान्तो नास्ति । तद्यथा हेतुर्नैव हेतुस्वभावः साध्यते । पक्षेणैव पक्षस्वभावः साध्यते । तेनोक्तपरमाणुसामान्यलक्षण-द्वैविध्येनैव अयमालम्बनस्वभावः साध्यते । हेतुयोजनाय दृष्टान्तो नास्ति । पक्ष-साधनाय हेतुर्नास्ति । अतो द्वौ वादावयुक्तौ ।—C. II. 202b. 2.

18. Or हेत्वादयः ।

19. C.I ..... स्वशासनं नाभ्युपैति विज्ञानाद्बाह्यवस्तुप्रत्यय इति । यदि बाह्यं रूपमालम्बनीक्रियते । इदं स्वशासनविरुद्धम् । (f 187 a, 1)

C. II. —. आत्मन इष्टमन्तराकारभागरूपमालम्बनप्रत्यय इति । न विज्ञानात् बाह्य [मेव] वस्तुप्रत्यय इति । तदा विज्ञानाद्बहिरस्ति वस्तु इति संशयो [भवति] । “स्वात्मविरोधदोषः स्यात्” । तथा अन्तराकारभागरूपधर्मो अन्ययानिका अनभ्युपगमं कीर्तयन्ति । (f. 203 a, 1)

Note: According to this C. II. the reading will be: स्वात्मविरोध - for धर्मस्वरूपविरोध - and धर्मोऽनभ्युपगमं...for...धर्मो ।

20. महायानिकपक्षो नाभ्युपैति बाह्यरूपं पञ्चविज्ञानानामालम्बनप्रत्यय इति— C. I. 187 a,2. C. II's interpretation is noted in the previous note. The expression 'Fa - chêng(85-5,115-9) is well - known translation of the name *Dharmakīrti* v. m. vyutpatti;

21. Chien - liang - i (18-7, 166-5, 61-9). C. I. take in this context to mean *anumāna* as in a previous passage, See note 17.

C. II. पूर्वोक्तान्ययानिकपूर्वप्रसाण (=पूर्वपक्ष) मभिसन्धायाह—तेषां वादमूलं आकारवाहिविज्ञानजननहेतुद्वयम्, इदं हेतुप्रकाशनमात्रनिदानम् । त्रिषु अवयवेषु नायं हेतुरेव, साधारणसिद्धदृष्टान्ताभावेन हेत्वसिद्धेः । (f.203 a.1.)

22. प्रत्येकं समदृष्टान्तो नास्ति । Ibid.

23. See at the end of this introductory *vṛtti*, p. 113.
- 23 a Lit. आकारवत् .... ।
24. तदाकारसमानं विज्ञानमुदेति । अयं विषयो विज्ञानजनकशक्तिः प्रत्यय इत्युच्यते ।  
C.I. 188 a,1.
- 24 a Lit. अनुवर्तनात् etc.
25. Lit. किं संभवति ?
26. Lit. तं .... अर्पयति ।
27. प्रतिबिम्बवत् । ..... परमाणुरादर्शकल्पः । तदुत्पन्नं विज्ञानमादर्शदृष्टप्रतिबिम्ब-  
कल्पम् । -C.I. 188 a,2. This seems to be wrong. C. 11.  
202, b.2:-तदात्मनि as विज्ञाने. So *vijñāna* must be conside-  
red as आदर्शकल्प.
28. Lit. तेन.
29. lit. कारणार्थे.
30. तथा चाद्यमभिप्रायः । परमाणुस्वरूपस्य न केवलं कारणत्वम्, आलम्बनलक्षणमपि  
उपलभ्यम् - अध्यासः । तदिन्द्रियमपि आलम्बनलक्षणं भविष्यति-लक्षणदूषणम् ।  
यदि पूर्वोक्तेतुः साधनं भविष्यति । तदा कारणत्वात् कुत आलम्बनतास्ति । [त]  
दिन्द्रियस्थाप्यस्ति इति अनैकान्तिकशेषः सिध्यति । -खण्डनम् - C. I.  
188 b,1-2
31. कुतो न साक्षात्खण्डयसि चित्राद्विहितान्यः परमाणुरस्तीति । किन्त्वाह-अतदाभतयेति ।  
तदर्थः कः । उच्यते । चित्ताद्विहितोऽस्ति धर्म इति स्वप्रतिज्ञास्थापनार्थम् । चित्ता-  
द्विहितस्तु धर्म इति परपक्षे न दोषकथनार्थम् । ... शास्त्रकारः पूर्वं परपक्षं  
स्थापयति न वस्तुतः । परसम्मतिप्रकाशनं तुलनामात्रम् । तदा परालम्बनाभाव  
[रूप] प्रतिषेधमभिप्रेति । ततः प्रदर्शितेनानेन तत्सिद्धार्थखण्डनं चिकीर्षति । अतः  
तदभ्युपगतं वचनमध्यस्य निक्षिपति । प्राय इदानीं [त]त्पक्षधर्मस्थापनं तन्नि-  
यमनियतमेकवर्थापाततः पूर्वमभ्युपैति । यत् प्रायः परपक्षनियतं तस्य ममापि  
अनभ्युपगमात् । C. II. 204 a,2.

32. शास्त्रकारस्थापितमनुमानं पूर्वमित्युच्यते । शास्त्र उक्तमुभयं न न्यायः । [य] दनैकान्तदोषसिद्धिरुक्ता तदेव खण्डनम् । कथं etc. ॥ सर्वे वदन्ति etc. इदं पूर्वप्रश्नोत्तरम्, ie: अनैकान्तिकमत्रयमनियतमसाधनम् । यदनैकान्तिकं तदवश्यं संशयप्रापकम् । अतः शास्त्रकारोऽवश्यं पुनस्तन्निवृत्तमनुमानं स्थापयत् । सम्भवेद्वा तत्स्थापितमनुमानम् । अतत् ( =परमाणा)भ इति । तेन (-Causing) तेषु परमाणुषु अनिर्धारित विषय इति ज्ञातेषु । यथाकारं विज्ञानमुत्पद्यत इति यन्निर्धारणम् इति । ie. परमाणुरनिर्धारितविषय इति मन्यते । सूक्तं परमाणुविज्ञानजनक इति । अतः पूर्वपक्ष आह तदाकारसमं विज्ञानमुत्पद्यत इति । तदाकारानुविधानात् तदा तद्विषयवेदनम् । तस्वैवाभावात् स्पष्टं ज्ञायते निर्धारणमिति ie. स परमाणुरेव न विज्ञानजनकः । सुज्ञायते निर्धारणं न परमाणुविति । अतो नालम्बनं क्रियते । ..... वक्तव्यत्वात् ie. यदि पुनस्तनुमानं न सधीक्रियते न हेतोरवकाशस्तदा । अनिर्धारितस्वभावः परमाणुरिति खण्डनम्- C. I. 189 a,1-2. According to C. II पूर्वं etc. प्रश्नः । सर्वे वदन्ति etc. उत्तरम् । सम्भवेद्वा तत्परमाणुः अतत् - चक्षुरादिपञ्चविज्ञानालम्बन - आभ इति । परमाणुषु etc. इदं परखण्डनमात्रम् । अथ स्वानुमानानुकूलनम्—यथाकारं.....निर्धारणम् । नहि तानि पञ्चविज्ञानानि यथापरमाणाकाराणि दृष्टानि । अतः स्पष्टं ज्ञायते ... .. वक्तव्यत्वात् । (f. 204b, 1)
33. Ie.अन्येन्द्रियविज्ञानं ज्ञदं गन्धं रसं स्पर्शं वावलम्बते । इति रूपलक्षणपरमाणुरालम्बनं भवतीति सुलब्धम् । - C.I.189b, 1
34. अन्यद्विज्ञानं न चक्षुर्विज्ञानसमानम् । चक्षुर्विज्ञानं रूपालम्बनम् । अन्यद्विज्ञानं रूपलक्षणमालम्बते । Ibid..
35. स परमाणुः कारणवृत्तिरपि नैवालम्बनम् । यद्यस्य अन्यविज्ञानस्य परमाणुरूपवृत्तिहेतुरपि । सुतरामिष्टं परमाणुर्वस्तुतः पञ्चविज्ञानानामुत्पादक इति । खण्डनम्— तथा न शब्दगन्धरसस्पर्शेषु विद्यमानपरमाणुरूपकारा अन्येन्द्रियविज्ञानोत्पत्तिकारणानि भवेयुः । यदेव न विज्ञानजनकं न [त]दालम्बनकरम् । Ibid.
36. According to C.I. and C.II.this sentence is applicable to Diñnaga's vṛtti on the second verse.
- 36 a. See vṛtti on ver. 1 this should be in syllogistic form as

attested by Vinītadeva, v. his *tikā*, Page No. 22. English translation. n. 14.

37. भाव=परमाणुः सङ्घात इति धर्मद्वयम् । महापाक्ष—महायानम्, mo-a,(149-11,170-5) =महा. C.I. 190 a, 1.
38. सर्वे पञ्चविज्ञानविषयाः न्यायतः पञ्चविषयाभासपञ्चविज्ञानजनकाः । चक्षुषा रूपे प्रतिहृते रूपविषयाभविज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । यथारूपं नामस्थापनम् । etc. C. I, 190 b.1.
39. एक एव धर्मः शक्तिद्वयवान् । स विज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुः आलम्बनकृत् । तदभिप्रायः— न केवलं महायानस्याभिमतम् । हीनयानिकस्यापि । तत्प्रमाणमुदाहरति—केचिदाहुः etc. अर्थो नाम.....युज्यत इति । इदं प्रतिपादयति न बाह्यरूपमालम्बनप्रत्ययताकृत् इति । स उत्पन्न ... उच्यते । आलम्बनार्थ इति विवृणोति एक एव धर्मः जनकालम्बन[रूप] द्विविधशक्तिसम्पन्न इति । अतः सिद्धान्तमिति—योऽर्थः etc. Ibid.
40. अयं सिद्धान्तः । अङ्ग=lit. लक्षण.
41. That Sutra explains so.
42. आगम इति हीनयानिकमहायानिकानां सूत्रम् - Ibid,
43. =विज्ञानं यत (lit. ततः) उत्पद्यते तत्विषयमवलम्बते । अतः etc. व्याख्या—अतो यो जननहेतुः etc.
44. इमानि त्रीणि [पूर्व] वाक्यानि प्रतिपादयन्ति - तन्निकायस्य सम्मत-लक्षणद्वयवत् आलम्बनकृत् इति C.I. 190 b,2. Read Vinītadeva's *tikā*.
- 44 a. On the basis of the same *Tikā*.
- 44 b Cf. Dignaga's Syllogism: नान्योऽव्ययी-प्रवयवेभ्यः तुलानतिविशेषाग्रहणात्—In Pra. var. *vṛtti* ad IV 152.
45. अर्थ प्रश्नः— द्वितीयश्चन्द्रः सङ्घातसमः । सङ्घातधर्मः परमाणुसिद्धप्रज्ञप्तिरिति ज्ञातः । प्रज्ञप्तिस्तु चन्द्रद्वयलक्षणं किमुपादायास्ति ।—C.I,191 a,1.



46. तद्वत् etc. in accordance with Tib. but Hsuan Tsang interprets. तस्य द्रव्यतो नास्तीति । etc.
47. =श्रोत्रादिविज्ञानं न रूपलक्षणमालम्बते । इति जनानां ज्ञातं सम्मतम् । इदं दृष्टान्तयति - चक्षुर्विज्ञानं न नीलादिसमुत्पन्नम् । न च नीलाद्यालम्बते इति । यथान्यदिविज्ञानं न रूपलक्षणमर्थमालम्बते, नापि रूपलक्षणसमुत्पन्नम् । C.I, 191b, 1.
48. [अनेन] दृष्टान्तेन बाह्यरूपं न वस्तु । किन्तु विज्ञानाजनकत्वेऽपि तत्साधयति अयमध्यासः । - Ibid.
49. इदं वचनं - यथोक्तस्य .....विषय इति वचनम् । तत्कारणत्व (or-अर्थ) विना नालम्बन [ता] लभ्यते । - Ibid.
50. चन्द्रारोपसदृशमवशिष्टसङ्घातज्ञानम् । इदमपि मनोविज्ञानालम्बनम् । को मियतं गृह्यते चक्षुर्विज्ञानस्यार्थः । - C.I.191 b, 2.
51. इदं चन्द्रलक्षणम् । तत्र चाक्षुषविज्ञानस्य पूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोरूपलम्भकाले, तयोः क्रमस्य दुर्निर्णयत्वात् ऐककालिकता क्रियते । अतः तत्क्षणपूर्वोत्तरचाक्षुषविज्ञानम् । तद्वि-  
वित्ताकारमनोविज्ञानम् etc. C. II. 206 b, 2.
52. ज्ञातव्यं न केवलं चन्द्रद्वयं चाक्षुषविज्ञानस्य विषयः मनोविज्ञानस्यापि न विषयः इति । यदि चन्द्रद्वयग्रहः अज्ञातक्रमं मनोविज्ञानम् । तदा शब्दे श्रोत्रविज्ञानं..... स्पष्टव्ये कायविज्ञानं तत्प्रतीत्य मनोविज्ञानमज्ञातक्रमम् । शब्दद्वयस्य ..... स्पष्टव्यद्वयस्य दर्शनमपि ऐककालिकं किं न भवेत् ? । तद्यथा घण्टाशब्दश्रवणम् । एकं शब्दं शृण्वन् न पूर्वोत्तरक्षणे युगपच्छब्दाध्यवसायं करोति । कथं केवलं चन्द्रे चन्द्रद्वयस्य युगपदुपलम्भाध्यवसायं करोति । - C.II.207 a, 1.
53. अतः क्षणिके धर्मे नित्याभासैकाभासदृष्टिं करोति । किं पुनः रूपेन्द्रिया-  
श्रितचक्षुर्विज्ञाने तत्क्षणपूर्वोत्तरक्षणविशेषान् परिगणयतीति । तदा बत सिध्येत् भूयसा द्व्याकारादिदर्शनम् । Ibid. Here punctuation is according to C. II.
- 53 a. According to Vinītadeva here also Dharmapāla has

formulated a *prayoga*, but we miss it in Chinese version.

53.b. kār. 2c.

53.c. विषयविज्ञानयोरिति शेषः ।

54. Or वदन्ति । kār. 3 ab.

55. Not in the Tib. Text.

56. Lit. द्रव्यमनुसृत्य इन्द्रियमनुसृत्य

57. अणुषूत्पन्नं चक्षुर्गादिविज्ञानम् C.I. 193 a, 2.

58. अणोरस्ति सञ्चिताकारः । स एव वदेत् विज्ञानस्य सञ्चिताकारोऽपि दृश्य इति । Ibid.

59. प्रयोगेण प्रदर्शयति — इन्द्रियविज्ञानमालम्बनताप्रापकपरमाणुसञ्चिताकारकम् इति । Ibid

60. परपक्षा [न]भ्युपगमतः खण्डनम्—यदि स (सञ्चिताकार) एव परमाणाकारः सञ्चिताकारो नोपलभ्येत । तदुभयं न युगपद्वर्तते । Ibid.

61. Śāstra of the two previous schools.

62. पुनः परपक्षकल्पनाप्रकटनम् ..... दृष्टान्तमाहरति—यथा etc. नीलरूपमात्रं नीलरूपं दृष्ट्वा जानाति पृथिवीधातुरिति । तस्य नीलरूपमुत्कृष्टम् । पृथिवीधातुरपकृष्टः । तत्त्वतो न्याय्यमिति । तस्योत्कर्षाकर्षवचनं सिद्धान्तः ।—C.I, 193 b, 1-2

62 a. Lit नीलरूपं पृथिवी धातुः ।

63. दृष्टान्तखण्डनम् — अतिरिक्तवस्तुनः प्रथमोत्पत्तिकाले तदव्यवस्तूनि प्रबलानि प्रथमोत्पत्तिकरक्तवस्तु न तिरोधापयति । तिरोधानस्थल etc ie.

एकत्र रक्तवस्तुत्पत्तिकाले [तदन्यवस्तूनि] तिरोधापयति, तान्यदृश्यानि करोति । भवतः पक्षमभ्युपगम्य कृतोऽयमुत्कर्षापकर्षवचनमिथ्याव्यवहारः ।  
ie. अयं परस्य पक्ष—परमाणुस्पष्टः सङ्घात (or सञ्चित) उत्कृष्टः । उत्कृष्टे-  
नापकृष्टस्तिरस्क्रियते । अती नावभ्यं परमाणुदर्शनसंरक्षणम् इति । अतो  
धर्मपालाचार्य [आह]—रक्तवस्तुदृष्टान्तेन परमाणोरपकर्षोऽपि [अन्यानि] बहूनि  
वस्तूनि प्रबलोत्कृष्टानि न तिरोधातुं शक्यानि इति ।— C.I, 193 b, 2. सम्भव-  
स्थलं मृषा समाश्रित्य कृतोऽयं किं नु खलु मिथ्याव्यवहारः, C. II. 208 a. 1.

64. Ie. यदि रक्तवस्तुदृष्टान्तेन परमाणुदर्शनं संरक्ष्यते । भवतो महायाने कथं वचनं  
भवति—परमाणूनां स्वरूपं न चक्षुर्विज्ञानदृश्यमिति । कथञ्च पुनः etc. ie. भवतो  
महायाने पुनर्वचनम्—परमाणुपरीक्षकमनोविज्ञान [रूप] यथाभूतज्ञानमात्रं [तत्]  
पश्यतीति । अयं मनोविज्ञानविकल्पो मृषादर्शनम् ।— Ibid.

64. a Kār. 3-cd. अण्वाकारः—सञ्चिताकारः cfr. Hsuan Tsang's version  
and C.II. under nn. 67—68.

65. कठिन्यशैत्यादि=काठिन्यशैत्यौष्ण्येरणानि चत्वारः स्वभावाश्रतुर्णां महाभूतानां  
बीजानि न चक्षुरादिविज्ञानदृश्यानि ।— C.I. 194 a, 1. cp. my. Pañca-  
vastuka, p. 2.

65. a, = सर्वसम्मतार्थविशेषः—C.II. 208, a, 2.

66. More. lit. किं नाणुः प्रकाशते ? न कठिनता । ie. चक्षुर्विज्ञाने न [अवभासते]  
कठिनता । चक्षुर्विज्ञानाच्च नास्ति परमाणुभिन्नः । परमाणुमृषावासनाकल्पितमात्रं  
न कठिनतावस्तुसद्वीजसमानम् ।— C.I, 194 a, 1.

67. Ie. अस्मिन् विज्ञानमात्रपक्षे पूर्वाभ्युपगतकाठिन्यशैत्यादि विकारकं भवति ।  
इन्द्रियाण्यो दशायतनानि विकृतानि । विकारकं बीजमेव । विकृतं तदाकार भाग  
(hsiang-fen, 109-4, 18-2) एव । बीजेन (विकृत) आकारभागः  
चित्तमात्रदृश्यः । अत आह तद्वचनं etc. C. 194 a, 2.

दूषणम्—कठिनतादिना दृष्टान्तयमि परमाणुगतसञ्चितं । कथं नेच्छसि परमाणौ-  
नास्ति कठिनतेति प्रदर्श्यं कठिनताभाव[ञ्च] ग्रहीतुं, सञ्चितसत्ता-  
प्रतिषेधाय । दृष्टान्तद्राष्टान्तिकयोर्भेदात् । तत्तावत्सर्वसम्मतार्थविरुद्धम् ।  
उत्तरम्—तत्प्रत्ययोऽपि नालम्बनमिति (V. h. s version). पक्षधर्मः अन्तरिन्द्रि-  
यबाह्यविषयदशायतनरूपं स्वीकृतमपि महाभूतसिद्धं महाभूतमेव । कथं लभ्यते

सञ्चितमात्रमस्ति न काठिन्यं स्नेहः । अतो ज्ञायते दृष्टान्तद्राष्टान्तिकौ नावश्यं  
भिन्नौ । C II. 208, a, 2.

- 67 a. This is the Sautrantika's opinion, v. Pañcavastuka, Intro p.VII.
68. The above punctuation is according to the Chinese text. But C.I and C II construe this sentence with the following.
69. Lit. —दिषु. No case-ending after *paramāṇu*. प्रविभागः lit. खण्डः, भागः pien-fen(91. 18-2)
70. Fu-shen (146-12,40-12)- प्रत्यवमर्शः ? C.I. अवशिष्ट आकारेः= परमाणोरभिन्न आकारे । [न] प्रत्यवमर्शप्रत्ययः परमाणुस्वरूपेण घटशरावो निवृतः । परमाणुदर्शनरिरक्षायामवश्यमयं प्रत्ययो गृह्यते । f. 195 a,2,11.1-3.
71. See Eng.translation, note. 39.
72. No case ending in Chinese kār, 4d.
73. Vaiśeṣikas ?
74. परमाणुस्वरूपमभिन्नमेव । घटशरावादयो भिन्ना अपि नालम्बनम् । C.I.196 a,2.
- 75- 75. श्लोक आह—'परमाणुपरिमाणसाम्यात्' (5a) आकारभेदः प्रज्ञप्तिमात्रवर्ती । पूर्ववत् पृष्ट्वा प्रतितक्तव्यमिति । पूर्वभाग आह— कथं पुनर्जायते परमाणुषु नास्त्याकारभेद इति अयं प्रश्नः । परमाण्वाकारे भेदाभावात्— इदं प्रतिवचनम् । यदि तत्सत्सङ्घातः.....न्यायतः साध्यम्— इदं व्याख्याति पूर्वपदद्वयम् ie. यदि ते जानन्ति परमाणुपरिमाणः समः । [त] दाकारोऽभिन्नः सङ्घाताकारो व्यत्यस्तः । सङ्घाताकारश्च प्रज्ञप्ति [रूपः] न वस्तु इति । अयं सम्यङ्न्यायः । अत आह सम्यङ्-न्यायः साध्यितव्यः अणूनां परिहार इत्यादि । ... .. सेनादिवत्— इदं व्याख्याति उत्तरपदद्वयम् । परिहारः = अपोहः । ie. आकारभेदे उत्पद्यमानबुद्धघाकारोऽपि भिद्यते । यावत्परमाणु तदाकारापोहे उत्पद्यमानबुद्धघाकारो नियमेन न भवति ।

अतः स्वतो व्याख्याति - इदं घटादिवचनं वस्तुविरुद्धम् । सामान्यतः [अयं] परपक्षसिद्धान्तः । अद्रव्यवस्तु अनद्रव्यवस्तु च विरुद्धम् । अद्रव्यवस्तु घटादि अनद्रव्यवस्तु परमाणुः । i.e. घटादिविरोधदुष्टः इत्यनेन प्रदर्शित एव परमाणुरपि विरोधदुष्ट इति । घटादिरद्रव्यं नालम्बनप्रत्ययो लभ्यते । परमाणुर्द्रव्यमपि नालम्बनप्रत्ययो लभ्यते । C.I.196 b, 1.

76. Lit. पूर्वतुल्य, -सम
77. Or. व्यवहित
78. See Hsuan Tsang's version.
79. Tsung - ling - hsü (120-12, 9-3, 149-4).
80. आलम्बकं विज्ञानं आकारभागादर्थादुत्पद्यते - C. II. 210
- 81-81. स भाग उत्पादकः=स आकारभागो नियमेन पूर्वं सत्त्वात् (भागः)विज्ञानजनकः । भागे नियमेन सत्यपि विज्ञानोत्पत्तिकाल एवाकारभागस्य पृथग्दर्शनात् । तत एव कदाचित् स्यादिति=पूर्वोदाहरणे वासनाकल्पितं ज्ञेयं प्रवर्तते, इदं तस्मादाकारात् क्लिष्टं [मनो] विज्ञानं प्रवर्तते । अत आह- तत इति । कदाचित् स्यादिति -अर्थानुवर्तने आकारोऽनुवर्तते । ततः पृथक् प्रवर्तते । य आकारभागो विज्ञानेन सहोत्पन्नः । अयमाकारोऽर्थाद्भवति । य एकाकी ज्ञेयाकारः, स आकारभागमाश्रित्य क्लिष्टविज्ञानपरिणामोऽवभासते । अकारभागदेवोत्पद्यते । अयमुत्पन्नार्थात् [भवति] ॥ षष्ठस्य पञ्चार्थेभ्यः सविशेषत्वात् इति=पूर्वपञ्चाकारभागाः वस्तुसन्तो बीजानि जनकानि वस्तुरवभावज्ञेया इत्युच्यन्ते । षष्ठ आकारभागः क्लिष्टबाह्याकारजनकः केवलज्ञेयाकार इत्युच्यते । अतोऽस्ति विशेषः । पूर्वं पूर्वपञ्चसम्यागर्थान् व्याख्यातुमाह- ज्ञेयं बिना न तद्विज्ञानसत्ता लभ्यत इति=नाकारभाग- ज्ञेयं बिना विज्ञानालम्बनं लभ्यते । अत एतत्रावद्विज्ञानजनकम् ।=एतदाकारभाग- ज्ञेयं तावत् सुतरां विज्ञानजननमाक्षिपति ॥ न पञ्चम उच्यत इति । पूर्वं पञ्चमः शब्दोऽर्थः - न विपक्षेण (i-pien=different category) मन इष्टकथनं क्रियते । (This explanation of *pañcama* is not very clear)- C.I.198 a, 2-b, 1.
82. This reading of *saptama* is adopted in the Nanking edition of the text. So also in C.II. But. C. I. reads *ṣaṣṭha* as noted in the previous note. The seventh

consciousness is, according to Yogācāra. *kliṣṭam manas*.  
V. Śatadharmavidyā- Appendix to the Pañcavastuka.

83. तद्विज्ञानं (*pi-jo-nam*) = विज्ञानस्कन्धः = मनोविज्ञानम् । .....स्वप्नावस्थार्या  
प्रकाशमानमिति = स्वप्ने प्रत्ययोऽर्थो न बाह्यं वस्तु प्रकाशेत चान्तर्ज्ञेयाकारः । -  
C.I. f.19<sup>b</sup> b. 2.
84. Read *ta* (9-3) for *ti* (32-3) of the text as in the C.I.
85. Or ज्ञेयम्.
86. सहजातस्य is supported by C.I.
87. आलयविज्ञाने भागद्वयं सहोत्पद्यमानं दृष्टम् । अत्र आर्हविभाग इति । भेदं  
कृत्वा निरुध्यत इति ie. विज्ञानं धर्मद्वयमादावनाम जनयति । आर्या एव  
दर्शनाकारभेदाय परिच्छेदं कल्पयति [?] । दर्शनांशाकारांशभिन्नं ... ie.  
आलयविज्ञानस्वरूपमादौ तथता दर्शनांशाकारांशभिन्नम् । तत्प्रदर्शयति आलय-  
विज्ञानं भेदं जनयतीति । - C.I.199a,2.
88. यद्येव दर्शनांशाकारांशौ [भिन्नौ] कृत्वा निरुध्यत इति । तदा प्रत्ययरूपं .....  
.... । - C.II. 210b, 1.
89. C.II.remarks at the end thus: The rest is not commen-  
ted on: or the original text has not come down, or the  
establishing the *Ālambana pratyaya* is finished. There-  
fore no need to comment on.

## ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DHARMA—PALA'S COMMENTARY

In order to light up the wisdom in the poisoned-and dull-minded men and in order to let them extirpate their evils who spoke, I pay homage to Him and investigate the / true/  
meaning of that.

The Sastra says:- “ Of the consciousness of the eye, and others:-

The fruit of investigation comprises the rejection of what is rejectable and adoption of what is worth adopting, therefore what is rejectable and the opponents' perverted cause thereof are demonstrated here.

The word “others” (*ādi*) includes the five-fold consciousness which arises having support of the material objects and the senses as accepted by other schools of philosophy. They conceive that the senses are directed each to an [invariable external] real object. But the consciousness born of the mind is not so; for it is not directed to an invariable real object, but to an object which is only conventionally true, for example, the chariot and the like. Though it may be permitted that the non-senseous consciousness is conditioned by a  
2  
real object and becomes endowed with its image yet it also grasps an object which is not its own and which lacks form reflected in the consciousness. But for the consciousness of of the eye and others, there is established a separate object invariably associated with each of the senses. Therefore no effort is needed(to include it in (*ādi*))

Moreover, the atom-form which is to be cognized by the contemplation-achieved knowledge never, really, falls within the perview of the discriminative thought (*tarka-mano-vijñāna*); and again it appears as though it is perceivable, and it is to be understood (in this Śāstra) that it becomes object of only the wisdom born of listening and thinking (*śruṭ-cintā*.) Thus the object of the ordinary non-sensuous consciousness becomes absolutely non-existent; for it grasps neither the atom nor the aggregate as *ālambana*. Things past and future are unreal like unmanifest things [and hence cannot act as objects to it]. For this reason the word “others” is said to include the body of five sorts of consciousness

Then; if [you say]<sup>2 a</sup> the mind cognizes whichever is brought home by the sensuous consciousness;<sup>3</sup> how is that also possible? It cannot take place either in the same moment of the sensuous consciousness or in the immediate next moment; for it takes as its *ālambana* the past things [which are unreal] Nor does it take so the present things; because the latter are cognized by the sensuous consciousness.

[If you say that] the non-sensuous consciousness grasps naturally the external object of its own accord, then there will not possibly exist the blind and deaf,<sup>4</sup> etc. [To accept] a sense-faculty other than the eye, etc. is contradictory to the inferential knowledge.<sup>5</sup> The denial of the extra-material object [which may suit to the non-sensuous consciousness] being accepted, there is no need to entertain any bias for inclusion of the non-sensuous consciousness



in *ādi*. To the visual consciousness, etc. there are material things functioning as supporting causes. [There is no such thing for the non-sensuous consciousness]. The thing-like *Avijñapti* is in the nature of non-action;<sup>5 a</sup> hence it is admitted as a non-existent thing. Likewise the mind as a sense-faculty is to be denied.

The [external] object-cause (*ālambana*),<sup>6</sup> would be perceptible. Since it consists in the nature of cognized aspect of the mind and since it (causes to) move astray in a wrong and perverted path, nature of the external thing as *ālambana* is rejected in order to establish a right view. Basing upon it, its nature of being support is also rejected. However, (the author) will establish that it is a visible aspect (*rūpa*)<sup>7</sup> of the forces which constitute the senses and operate simultaneously (with the consciousness).

#### “An external thing”

The opponents hold that there is an external thing apart from the mind. This exhibits their pervertedness. They hold that the thing other than the mind is called *artha* because it is cognized (according to them).

How could you say: the mind grasps the aggregate of atoms (*Saṅghāta*), and in case there exists no aggregate as real it ought to be a substance (= ātom)? There are logical errors as will be stated below. That (= your standpoint) is contradictory to preceding and following reasons, but it causes no harm to me. As for you, it

is accepted by you that the mind grasps the substance as well as the aggregate. We shall demonstrate other errors on your thesis, therefore this error is presently dropped.

“They postulate the Subtle atoms”

Though the subtle atoms being assembled perish no sooner than they appear, nevertheless each atom becomes separately <sup>7a</sup> *ālambana* and not in their aggregate form. For example, the visible (*rūpa*) and others, though they are simultaneously present before the senses, become objects [only of their respective senses] without any confusion on account of the fact that the faculty of grasping a particular object is fixedly assigned to each sense. Although things are endowed with the capacity being definite and distinguished from each other, <sup>7b</sup> yet each atom serves as object separately. [Syllogism will be this : Atoms are objects]

“Because the atom serves as the cause for that”.

[But no example has been given here].

The word “that” means the consciousness of the eye, etc. It arises on contact (of the sense-organ) with object which is constituted of parts. So say some (Ācāryas): Among the causes that which acts as the productive cause becomes its actual object. <sup>8</sup>

“Others postulate the aggregate of atoms”

The advocate of this thesis say that the aggregate formed of atoms serves as the actual object of consci-

ousness. [Here also the syllogism will be this : The aggregate is *ālambana* ;

“ Because consciousness arises representing the image of the aggregate of atoms ”. ( No example is available here ).

The aggregate is believed to be the actual object of consciousness, since the latter is born of the aggregate. It is so as somebody says : “ A thing whose form is represented in a consciousness is really its object ”— These two advocates say : “ Consciousness is endowed with that image and it is logically correct.

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When the *hetu* is stated, that *hetu* has no example. Just as the ( *anvaya* - ) *hetu* etc. achieve ( in the *pakṣa*-*hetu* )

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the nature of the being *hetu*, etc. the atom and the aggregate (*śāmānya*) which are in the nature of *ālambana* achieve that. If you accept that the *ālambana* is not within the consciousness itself but exists substantially outside of it, there

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will be contradiction with *dharmin* (= *Śāsana* = teaching).

13

The ( *Mahāyāna* ) *dharma* does not accept that there exists *ālambana* externally. This ( proposition ) has been accepted by opponents also, and ( so ) the same is considered to be *dīṣṭānta*, example. If what is stated ( by opponents is only example ), *probandum* also will be only what is

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accepted by opponents. ( The commentator ) says having

in view the first (two) syllogisms, *pramāṇas* (set forth by the opponents): "The *hetus*, proposition which are the source of the dispute are mere prepositions displaying the *hetus*. They not, in fact, *hetus* because there exists

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no example accepted by both parties." Hence it follows: in what manner may the representation of the image in consciousness be established as valid reason ?

Then the author will show a conclusive reasoning. By employing the ablative usage, the consent of opponents has been exhibited.

(1a) " Though atom serves as the cause "

as accepted generally, nevertheless the atom serves as no cause because things that are non-existent, i. e., non-cognized are bereft of their own nature. Though the selves of atoms may act as the cause of consciousness, they serves as *ālambana* only while uncollected together.

(1c) " Because the consciousness does not bear the image of that "

i. e. of atoms.

(1d) " Atoms are not the objects of the sensuous consciousness like the senses "

Just as a sense-faculty, though it serves as the base to the consciousness and to the contact with the object never becomes its object ; because it does not bear the image of the sense faculty. The same is the case with atoms. Hence it is concluded that what do not posses

the image of consciousness are never considered to be its objects.

Therefore the author says :—

“ That is the object, etc ”.

“ Its own being ” means the image of consciousness itself. “ It is cognized precisely ” means “ it is determined ”

How is it cognized precisely ?

“ Because it arises in that form ”

The idea of the passage is this : Consciousness arises in a form similar to that of an object (*grāhyabhāga*). When there is a mutual co-ordination between the consciousness and its object then we call it precisely cognizing the

object by consciousness. ( The commentary criticises : ) When there is no cognizable other than consciousness, how is it possible that the cognizable causes the consciousness to arise ? ( You may assume thus : ) there is already the image of the object ( in the atom ) ; when that object-

image is brought home in the self of consciousness just like an image in the mirror, it is considered that the consciousness has precisely cognized its object ( and also that the latter has produced the former ). Nevertheless the consciousness exhibits no image of each atom whereby the atom would become the actual object.

Though the atom is considered to be the cause, it becomes by no means the actual object.

“like the sense-organ ”

If you accept that whichever is cause, becomes object, then the sense-faculty also could possibly become object of consciousness. The other reason previously stated, viz. possession of the image by consciousness suffers a fallacy of its being not established : this has been pointed out already.

Thus the following is the main purport : The mere capacity of being cause is not sole criterion for its being object of consciousness. (Accepting this proposition) the sense-faculty would also assume the nature of being *ālambana*, (since it acts as cause for consciousness). If (you persist that) the said reason will be a factor (to achieve the proposition), does it follow that the atom becomes object ? Then the sense-faculty being the cause; would also become *ālambana*. Thus a fallacy of reason, called inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika*) has been proved.

Then, of what use is this sentence : Because consciousness does not represent the image of that ? It purports to establish our own proposition. One cannot consider one's proposition to be established by merely<sup>17a</sup> criticising other's thesis. This is in order to formulate this proposition : The object of consciousness is not the atom like the sense-faculty, because it does not produce the consciousness bearing its own form.

If the above sentence speak of the reason for the proposition, it would follow that the author of this Śāstra (i. e., Dinnāga) having set forth at the outset the opponents' propositions discloses their consent. With a

view to denying what is stated by the opponents the author points out the defect on their propositions and places accordingly their statements. By doing so the author apparently accords his own consent partly to the item of the propositions which stands the logical test, and expresses his dissent to what stands no such test (by saying) that it is not acceptable to us<sup>18</sup>

<sup>19</sup>  
The disclosure at the outset (i.e. in first logical formulation) of the defect of the opponent's inconclusive reasoning serves itself as a criticism. How false a syllogism you have maintained? Even the ordinary folk says that the reason which is found separated from and never associated with the object to be proved is not at all a reason, but it gives rise to the doubt as to the existence of *probandum*. Therefore other syllogism must

<sup>I9a</sup>  
be set forth. It may perhaps happen that the atom is bereft of the image reflected in the consciousness (*atadābha*) while atoms are indeterminate nature. But the resolve that consciousness always arises in co-ordination with the image of the object is not correct. Since that resolve cannot at all be possibly upheld, we must say that atoms are of indeterminate nature. However, this much follows that what produces consciousness does not become its object just like the atom of the sense-faculty. There are well-known other causes which produce the visual consciousness; none of them makes known to us the innate natures of atoms, because the consciousness never exhibits that form like the other sensuous consciousness. What has been said in respect of the sensuous consciousness must also be equally applied to other types of consciousness.

The sense-faculty given above as example is in fact

stated with a view to particularisation (*pradarśanāham*). Other examples may also be obtained by way of implication (<sup>20</sup>*arthāpatti*). Then (the author's) statement accepting the productivity (*Kārnatā*) (of the sense-organs)<sup>21</sup> is without any value; because the sense-organs, though functioning as causes become no actual objects of consciousness. So also is the case with this (atom); thus the statement becomes really full of value. But nevertheless the atoms of the sound and others would not cause to rouse up the consciousness of other sense-organs<sup>22</sup> (the eye, etc.)

Someone says: "In the self of consciousness the gross form is not perceived;<sup>23</sup> "hence does not become object just like the atom of the sense-faculty. Because the theory that the image of consciousness is due to the bringing home of the object-image upon consciousness is not acceptable, the saying that no gross form is perceived (in the self of consciousness) is very appropriate. Thus, so far we have spoken that "atoms are not objects of consciousness". The reason for this is that they do not possess the form (that is experienced in consciousness) and the hypothesis that they are its objects is not well proved by any source of knowledge (*pramāna*). ॥ 1 ॥ .

If so, (the opponent says:) then let the aggregate of atoms be its object. (That could not be possible). If you, (says Dharmapāla) desire to have a Mahāyanic thesis by proving the atoms and their aggregates above spoken of; then I may reply that your reason is not an established one; this will be a true logic.



[ 2 ] “ Though the aggregate possesses the image of consciousness ” and this may become an apparent object : it does not, nevertheless, act as its cause.

“Consciousness does not arise from the aggregate”.

The aggregate does not produce the consciousness which bears a form ( similar to that of ) the aggregate. How can this ( consciousness ) arise depending upon that ( aggregate ) ? It means that the aggregate does not become its object because it is endowed with no characteristic of an object (*ālambanālākṣaṇa*). Therefore the said reason of bearing the aggregate-form is not proved.

What is, then, characterised as object (*ālambana*) ? “ What object (*artha*) produces the consciousness reflecting the image similar to itself (=object) that

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is said to be its proper object ”.

In accordance with the object, consciousness arises; so what is productive cause of consciousness, that is only its object. Some Hinayanists also say : “ What object is properly said to be the cause of the mind and mental elements, that being produced and cognized as an object is spoken of in a common parlance. ” What object possesses the two-fold characteristic ( i. e., causality and form ) that alone combined with that characteristic is called *ālambana*. What is productive of consciousness, that becomes its object ; To this effect the author ( i. e.

26a

Dinnāga) cites an Āgama :

“ That above is said to be the productive cause of consciousness ”.

Therefore what is productive cause, that is the condition for production of its consciousness ; that is regarded as its perceivable object. There is experienced ( in the mind ) its very self-same image ; Therefore the reflection of the object-image is not stated (in the Āgama).

“ The aggregate of atoms does not produce ( its consciousness ) ; because it is not an entity in substance.”

The aggregate is not a real entity; because it cannot be either different from or one with its constituents. <sup>26b</sup> Whichever is non-entity has possibly no efficiency of producing any result.

(2b) “Like the double moon”.

No second moon could produce the consciousness possessed of the form of the second moon. If so, what is the cause of representing that image that is experienced (in the consciousness) ?

“Because of the defect of the sense-organs”

When the eye has its sight disturbed by cataract <sup>26c</sup> and other diseases, then there arises the appearance of the double moon in a person of defective sense-organ; and that too is not as a real entity.

“The double moon-cognition has not its object, though the image of the double moon is reflected in it”.

Just as the double moon is not spoken of as object of its consciousness though the latter is endowed with the image

of the former (i. e. double moon); because this does not produce its consciousness.

“(Similarly) the aggregate, as it does not exist in substance, does not act as cause of its consciousness”.

Since it is not a real entity just like the double moon it is not at all the cause. Hence

“it does not become its object”.

Here again the word “the double moon” is to be repeated. This repeated double moon-example, it is to be understood, points out that the reason, the possession of the object-image (by consciousness) is an inconclusive one. The existence of an object internally as a part of consciousness could also be proved by a sound logic ; hence there lurks a defect of contradiction. The (visual) consciousness arises depending upon the eye only and not upon the aggregate atoms of the blue, etc; because the consciousness is not produced from the latter, like the consciousness born of other sense-organs. This example is acceptable to all and hence no other example is needed.

The example “double moon” does not exist in substance; hence, it is to be understood that this (double moon) being in the nature of no cause (of double-moon-<sup>26a</sup>consciousness) proves the same (i. e., its non-objectivity). (Similarly) the aggregate previously stated, though it is endowed with image (of its consciousness) cannot become a real object (corresponding to its consciousness). This<sup>27</sup> statement again (says that) this (aggregate) is bereft of causality; (hence lacks objectivity).

If you ask me: Well, there exists no second moon; how does one directly perceive the two images of the moon? Let me explain this. Because of some potent force (*śakti*) laid down within consciousness, this consciousness appears as though it is endowed with the image of double moon. Just as a man, while asleep, dreams that he actually sees many objects, and also imagines in dream that he discharges so many false acts; so also he imagines another moon upon the single one.

28

Some philosophers say: When the visual consciousness perceives the moon twice (i. e., in consecutive two moments), and when the order of perceiving it in two moments being hardly noticed, one mistakes that perception to be simultaneous, immediately after this twice perceived image a mental thought arises murmuring: I perceive the second moon.

29

Some others say: It is due to a mistake in number (of the two for one) in the moon, that mistakes, too, happens out of the defect in the organ of the sight. Even for (us) who do not hold the external things to be real such vision of gross form is merely a perversive thought.

(Dharmapala criticises the first view.) No mental impression that is brought about just after (twice) perception of *alambana* by the visual consciousness grasps *alambanu* in double form simultaneously. Then how could there be a sub-thought that "I see the double moon." Does it happen that even in the case of sound, etc. while the non-sensuous consciousness has arisen depending upon the sound, etc. (twice perceived) and not noticing their order the (mental) perception of the double sound, etc. takes place?

Even for the person of sound sense-organs the non-sensuous consciousness and its order are hardly noticeable in several cases. What to speak of that (there is an order) in the case of consciousness based on the visible (*rūpa*) and the sense-organ, and in estimating its distinctions. Then, in such case the perception in double form (or in triple form), etc. would conveniently be proved. When one accepts that there is one moon substantially existing apart from consciousness, with what labour would he too maintain the mistake in number falsely assuming the double moon ?

(2cd) “There are two things grasped externally apart from consciousness”.

Because the atoms and their aggregate are both devoid of one or other of two constituents (of *ālambana*) and because of the force of logical principle criticising what it has been established previously,

“both of them are not proper objects”.

*Alambana* consists of two parts, viz. presentation of its own image and causality for its consciousness. The atom lacks in the first part, i. e. its image not being presented in consciousness, and the second in the second, i. e., causality. Then these two defects as have been discussed so far, point out to the identity between the object and its consciousness. ॥ 2 ॥

30a

[ 3 ] “Some Ācāryas hold that integrated form of atoms (*sañcitākāra*) is the cause of consciousness.”

In each atom there exists the integrated form. That alone is perceived as an object and imageful. The

atoms obtained there either more or less in number are all substantially existing. The integrated form (existing there) produces the consciousness of the form of itself. Because it exists substantially,

“It would become an actual object”;  
for, it fulfils the said two conditions. This (integrated form) is already an accomplished fact. Hence no question<sup>31</sup> arises whether the integrated form is the same as the atom or different.

“All things are possessed of many forms”.

These atoms themselves are regarded as possessed of atomic form as well integrated form. How can a single substance be properly described to possess two forms? All things of many forms lie in the combination of material elements, i. e., are constituted of four great elements, earth, etc. They are naturally possessed each of distinct forces (*Śakti*). The image of the blue and other colours is experienced each in accordance with (the nature of) the substance and the sense-organ. Amongst atoms of varied forms,

“that integrated form exists”

Only this form becomes domain of the visual and other consciousness: so it serves as

“the direct object of perception”.

If so, why do you not say that the cognition of atoms is possessed of the integrated form? (You admit that) the atom is of the integrated form. Why do you not likewise admit that its cognition is also of the integrated form? Therefore says the author:<sup>32</sup>

“There exists the integrated form at atoms”.

This sentence having the nature of a sentence formulated to that effect, shows as well that their cognition is possessed of the integrated form of atoms. If so, each atom has the form of its own. How do you say that it has the integrated form?

(The Opponent says:) The aggregate atoms of the matter consisting of different parts are admitted in this (our) system of thought. The aggregate atoms, since they themselves constitute of parts are not existent in substance: this has already been appropriately stated. Why is it then repeated again? There is a motive to do so. Though the substance-elements are each different in their nature that (integrated) form ( of the atom ) is present only at a place where atoms are integrated, and hence (the integrated form) is experienced there alone; then they say that only the intergrated form is perceived and no other form (i.e., atomic form). Moreover although all things are essentially the aggregates of atoms, nevertheless a thing has its own qualities one being superior and the other inferior.<sup>33</sup> (The superior quality overcomes the inferior one; therefore)<sup>34</sup> we see it in accordance with (the nature of ) things. For example the expression like “the blue colour is earthelement”<sup>35</sup> is as a matter of fact correct logically.

(Dharmapala says: ) In case of such an assumption (the following objection crops up.) Suppose a thing deve-

loses red colour; in the first moment of the developing the red colour other qualities which are more powerful will not become out of sight (though the inferior atomic form is invisible). (Is it not then that) your illusive talk is made (wrongly) having in view such cases where the superior possibly overcomes the inferior?<sup>36</sup>

(The opponent says:) If so, how do you admit (in your Mahayana) that atoms are grasped by none of the five senseorgans, and how do you again maintain that only a man of true knowledge sees the atoms.

(3c) (The reply follows): "The atomic form becomes no object of (five-fold sensuous) consciousness".

This does not become object of the sensuous consciousness; hence it is termed beyond the senses. The object which does not fall within the operation of senses ought to be guessed by a true (supramundane) knowledge alone. What is the argument for this? It is simply this: the atomic form never comes within the range of our direct perception,

"Just like its solidity and others"

Solidity, coldness, and others, (blueness. etc.) though existing substantially do not become objects of the visual and other consciousness because the powers of the sense-organs are fixedly assigned each to particular objects.

"So also atomic form".

This is not contradicted to the well accepted fact.  
(The opponent objects) : Let the atomic form appear (as



perceptible) and not solidity, because they both differ one from the other in their nature. (We reply): The <sup>36a</sup> *paksadharmā*, *probandum*, (ie, non - perceptibility) is desired to be common to ten bases *āyatana*; and this latter is nothing but great elements. Therefore my statement is in no way defective.

“(Different) perceptions of the pot, cup, etc. // 3 // will be identical”.

For you who hold the above opinion, the <sup>37</sup> sensuous cognition that arises relating to the pot and cup

would be of identical nature;

for, there is absolutely no difference in the (supposed) cognition of its one atom-object; and the sensuous cognition is only in accordance with that object (i e. real atoms) lying in our front, and has accordingly its form arise. Therefore the object of cognition does not differ. How does one know (the distinction between the pot and the cup) ?

“There exists no distinction whatever amongst the atoms of the pot, cup, etc. though the atoms are many and their number varies in each case).

This statement says: Though atoms only in their integrated form become objects of our cognition, nevertheless while the self-nature of the pot, etc. being cognized, there exists in the selves of many atomic aggregates <sup>38</sup> no definite division. Since we do not experience (as real) the integrated form distinct in each aggregate, apart from their own real (atomic) forms, the sensual cognition that is arising depending upon that (forms) will be identical. It is thereby settled that the objectivity

centres only on the self of atoms. Nor does exist in the undifferentiated form of atoms any element that causes to produce some discriminating and re-investigating thought (regarding the differentiated gross form, e.g. the pot, etc.) for, such thought will be a separate one, just like a thought springing up from a blue patch,<sup>39</sup> etc.

(4 c) "If, (the opponent says that) the cognition differs on account of differences in the forms (of the pot, etc.)"

Here "the form" means the image that brings forth distinction.

"The pot and cup are distinguishable in their forms by virtue of their different parts, neck, belly, bottom, etc: and our cognitions differ on that account."

(The author replies:) It is quite true, that distinct cognition arises on account of distinct objects.

(4 d) "But (the different forms) do not exist in substance"

No atoms constituting the object that is cognized by the sensuous consciousness, are varied (in their size) Though the aggregates of atoms are empirically true, nevertheless they, being closely analysed do not fall within the cognizance of senses. Nor is it proper to say that variety of non-objective thing (avigaya visesa) can be called makers of cognitions in different forms

(The opponent asks:) How do you know that there exists no distinction in the form amongst atoms?

( The author replies: )

“(It is so) because the atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension”.

All things are constituted of parts and these things necessarily admit of distinct forms. The selves of atoms, however, are devoid of any special distinction where an extreme limit can be reached. Therefore how can we assign to it any distinction of form?

“Though the pot, cup, etc. are (apparently) are (5 a) varied objects, there exists absolutely no distinction in their atomic nature.

For, anything destitute of parts, neither increases nor decreases.

“Therefore, it is asserted that

[5b] the distinctions are in the aggregates.

and not in the substances”.

Everything of special distinction has forms attributed to it; and hence it does not fall within the domain of sensuous consciousness. Thus there are several criticisms

(when one) desires to demonstrate that the atoms have different forms. For, the cognitions of the pot, cup, etc. do not take as objects the different real entities, just like the feelings of *Sukha*, pleasure and *Dukha*, displeasure. (It is made clear so far that) atoms (which are equal in size) do not cause to differentiate objects, Nor can this (gross) form be proper nature of that true object (i.e., *alambana* of the visual and other consciousness).

Or “If the cognition differs on account of differen-

ces in the forms of the pot, etc"; when this sentence intends to show the proposition that the non-differentiated thing (i. e., atom) becomes no-object, it incurs a logical fallacy called *Siddhaśādhana*, proving of what is already proved. The opponent (Vaiśeṣika) holds that atoms which constitute the objects are identical in their nature; nevertheless different cognitions arise on account of differences in the forms of objects. We also admit that atoms are undistinguishable, and hence this incurs the fallacy of *Siddhasadhana*. The sentence: "Because atoms are absolutely identical in their dimension" points out the fallacy of *Asiddhi*, non-accomplishing to the proposition that the differences in substances (*Vastu*) constitute differences in

<sup>41</sup>  
objects (*Artha*).

Or, it makes clear that the sensuous cognitions pertaining to the pot, etc, do not bear the images of atoms; hence they are not actual objects of their cognitions in as much as they are not objects of other cognitions. By "other cognitions" is meant either non-sensuous consciousness or one born of the senses; for, a cognition of some patch of blue having arisen, the same cognition does not bear the image of some patch of yellow. In view of the fact that the selves of atoms are many, they cannot be differentiated one another in any way, but the sensuous cognitions, however are distinguishable one another in their forms; it becomes evident that the object of condition (*ālabana pratyaya*) is not in the nature of atomic form (*anvākṛt*).

Or, we may take the verse (5 a-b) to mean: An objection that atoms are distinguishable by themselves has been put forth and answered as before. If the aggregates of atoms are regarded as having forms other

than the ones of atoms; then it is logically to be established that those forms of the aggregates are not real.

Now, in order that a more specific reasoning is likewise to be established: (the author says):

(5 cd) "If those atoms are removed one by one, etc.

When the atoms are removed the perception of the pot, etc. do not arise and hence unreal like *Sena*, army and others; therefore they do not exist in substance. The following is another mode of reasoning: "What are other than the non-substantial things, those things are not deviated from the latter" (i. e. Atoms which are other than the pot, etc. are not deviated from the pot, etc.) This reasoning is contradictory to the real state of things. When, e. g. a sound-object is present, no cognition of a blue patch arises. Thus the (said) distinguished form is a form reversed (of what is really there), as it takes as object the aggregate like the pot, etc. It may be reasonably

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stated that the multiplicity (of atoms) is brought home (before our eyes) and some other thing (i. e. the pot, etc.) is thought of; nevertheless it is absolutely impossible to prove that the selves of atoms that are substantially existing have any distinction. || 5 ||

(6) "(It is the object) which exists internally in the knowledge: itself) as knowable aspect".

This establishes what the actual object of consciousness is in our system. If, an object is denied in general then it would evolve *lokavirodha*, contradiction to the world, a defect in our proposition. For the scripture says: There are four conditions (for raising up consciousness).

The term “internally” is in order to show that there is no object-cause apart from the consciousness. The term *jñeyarūpa*, “knowable aspect” shows that the cognizable form is the consciousness-product (*Vijñā-parināma*) and a cognizable part of consciousness (*Grāhyāmśa*). Thus what exists in knowledge itself and is thought of as cognizable form is proved to be object. Now the contradiction with the worldly experience again persists; for, men of the world all accept the object as externally existing. Therefore the author says:- “as if externally”. The object, however, does not exist apart from consciousness. Its knowable aspect.

“Appears to us as if it exists externally”.

The expression “I see the object externally” is based on wrong notion, but in fact caused by it (= wrong notion); the visual consciousness representing the form of the hair-like object, etc. in the sky is apt example here.

“Though the external thing is denied”

i. e. the external thing does not exist in reality, because it is not experienced as such. Nor is it found that its real self-substance exists invariably in the external even if we earnestly search for it with an extremely subtle reasoning. Even though that thing may be assumed to be existing in substance and characterised as external, nevertheless it cannot act as object-cause of consciousness. For, consciousness does not exhibit its form. Nor is the atomic form reflected (in our cognition).

That (*grāhyāmśa*) which appears to us as though existent externally, serves as the actual object-condition,

because (that alone) possesses the form of that (i.e. object). (To prove the above the following syllogism is formulated:.) Whatever thing possesses whatever form, that thing is identical with that form; for example, the causality is possessed of its own form, (i. e. the nature of being cause: that causality is not distinct from the nature of being cause).

Again the author shows some distinct character of the perceivable object (*ālmbanā*) when he says:-

45

“Because consciousness is the essence of that (i. e. object) etc.”

It is evident that the external thing is non-existent and hence the object is not obtainable. The form of an object follows only in conformity with what is imagined by our habitual reckoning (*vāsanā* or *tarka*). What is imagined by our *Vāsanā* does not at all exist externally and apart from consciousness.

“The forms of the (experienced) objects do not, from the outset exist apart from consciousness”.

Hence it is called “knowable aspect of consciousness. The term “internally” indicates that the knowable does not exist beyond consciousness. That (knowable) non-existent externally by its nature is regarded as internally existent.

“It also arises from that”

That part (i. e. आकरभाग *ākārabhāga*) is productive (of consciousness); from it (= that part) sometimes arises consciousness; because the seventh (consciousness)

(=*Kliṣṭam manas*) has a characteristic distinct from the (first) five (consciousness) object-things. Since its consciousness is not obtained in separation from its knowable aspect (Jñeya) that part (i. e. *ākārabhāga=rūpa=*<sup>45a</sup>*artha*) produces consciousness .....

Because (the knowable aspect, *grhyāmsā*) is endowed with two qualities (i. e. image and casolity), the same will be very well the object-condition as it accords quite with logic and it is demonstrated as cause of consciousness (*Sādhana*). The knowable aspect alone which is characterized as having two constituents (of *ālambanā*)<sup>46</sup> becomes *Sādhana*, cause. What is characterized (= *Kliṣṭam manas*) that consciousness does not take the external thing as the perceivable object; this is experienced in the<sup>47</sup> dream-stage. The set of two qualities (*dharma*) as stated above becomes a single cause (*ekam Sāadhanam*). Consciousness (i. e. its knowable part) is endowed with the form of that (object) and also productive of consciousness; on account of these two functions it becomes a single source of knowledge (*ekam pramānam*).

Now, though what exists internally within consciousness is admitted (as object-condition):

it is evident that the external things are of unreal character as analysed above and that there can be no other real character thereof. The object-cause is experienced only in pursuance of our habitual imagination. But the image of the object is immanent in consciousness itself, and that alone will be logically correct. (The opponent asks)



How can a part of consciousness become condition to (the consciousness) arising simultaneously?

(The author replies:) The knowable aspect (*grāhyāmsā*) does not exist in the absence of consciousness; hence its part (i.e. knowable aspect) gives rise to another consciousness. (The opponent continues:) Now, (you have) a logical fallacy called self-defacing (*svātmavirodha*), as it is again only a part of consciousness just like its part that

<sup>48</sup>  
cognizes. (How can a *grāhakāmsā* produce a *grāhakāmsā*? Then, in that case the nature of its being cause can never be achieved. Moreover, consciousness arises only being discoloured by the forms of external things That image-part itself springs up simultaneously with consciousness. No two things simultaneously arising can act mutually as cause and effect, e. g. a pair of horns of the cow. Moreover it is not proper to say that an object which is in fact no other than consciousness itself is co-existent with it. For, the term "co-existence" denotes some connection between two distinct objects. But you do not admit that there is an object distinct from consciousness. How is it then termed co-existent?

<sup>49</sup>  
(Dharmapala replies:) It is true. Nevertheless, by virtue of distinction in aspects (*ākāra*) two distinct parts are assumed in the Ālaya consciousness and described.

<sup>50</sup>  
Thus it follows that the consciousness is distinguished and differentiated into the perceiving and perceptible aspects.

(The opponent again objects:) If it is so, what constitutes *patyaya* (causal condition) will be the cognizable<sup>51</sup>

aspect. Nothing of the assumed character would be regarded as possessing the self-substance. And such an object turns to be something other than *pratyaya*.

(Dharmapala replies:) This is not contradictory (to our experience.) It is an accepted fact that perceivable aspect becomes the causal condition, (like) varied objects experienced somewhere else. (Such as the flower in the sky, or objects in dream etc. which though unreal and only images conceived by their thoughts are accepted as

<sup>52</sup>forming causal-conditions.) For example, the disappearance (of the mind and mental states) in the immediately preceding moment (*samanantaranirodha*) is a causal con-

<sup>53</sup>dition:- the moment a consciousness of homogeneous character (*Sabhāga*) disappears, the same <sup>54</sup>consciousness is reckoned as condition by way of four modes of condition.

## FOOT NOTES

1. Cp. Tattvas. pañ. p.206; Nyāyavārtika, p. 80-1 Where different explanations, are given for *rathādivat*.
2. Lit. Part. bit, bhāga, *pien-fen* (91; 18-2)
- 2 a This and the following paragraph criticise the theory of *Mānsapratyaksa* see Nyayabindu 1,
3. whole discussion below, cf. Pramāravāctikavitti, II, 239-244
4. cf. Tattvas pañ. p.825; Nyāyabinduṭikā, p. 10.
5. cp. Pramānasamuccaya I, 21, Sense-organs are inferred, but the mind as the sense-organ cannot be inferred.
- 5a A sautrāntika view, v, kośavy. p. 352, 8; my *pañcavas-tuka*, Intro XI.
6. cf. Nyāyavārtika, 521 where similar anumāna is referred to न चित्तव्यतिरिक्ता विषयाः ग्राह्यत्वात् वेदनादिवत् । Tatparyatika, P.656: अत्र विज्ञानवादीरवदक्षे प्रमाणमाह-न चित्तं
7. Ref. to the author's exposition of this point in the vritti *ad* ver. 8 with Hsuang Tsang's version, p. and *Vinitadeva's* Tikā, p.
- 7a cp. Abhi. kośa : एकशः समग्राणां कारणभावात् । व्या=एकशः=प्रत्येकं, समग्राणां=समुद्दितानां कारणत्वात् I, ver. 20.
- 7b C.I—five objects. C. II five senses.
8. cf. Śloka-vārtika, 285: उत्पादकरयेवालम्बनात्वम् । V. Pramāna-vārtika II. 224: हेतुभावादृते नान्या ग्राह्यता नाम काचन । Vp. 12 above Pr. var. 246: विषयः कारणात्मकः । नाकारण विषयः- Ibid, 257.

9. Ref. Pramānavārtika, II, 224: तत्र बुद्धिर्यदाकारा तस्यास्तद्ग्राह्यमुच्यते  
Vitti : ग्राह्यमुच्यतेऽणुसञ्चयः ।
- 9a This shows that the advocate of the atom-object does not deny the image of the object in consciousness. But this is rather incorrect. See Vinita. Tikā. p. 8(Ms). Dharmapala seems to have the same idea, See below p. 12 this Tika.
10. Here we have to omit the negative particle pu in Chinese to make the sense much clearer; for, it has been pointed out that in the two previous propositions there is no homogeneous example even though an appropriate reason, *hetu*, is stated in each case, see notes to the Sanskrit text, 14a and 15a.
11. = *Samudāya*. cf. the Pramānavārtika cited in the pp. 16, 24 above and the Vaisesikasutra, I, 1—2b.
12. According to C.I. C. II. has : *Svātma-virodha-dosa*, Contradiction with its own (consciousness) self.
13. According to C. I.
14. These 2 *hetus*: *Vijnana-janakatva* and *akaratva* are stated by the Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika. v p. 13f. above
15. See *Hetubindutika*, p. 13. न हि दृष्टान्तमन्तरेण हेतोः साध्येन क्वाप्तिः प्रदर्शयितुं शक्यते । and p. 39. पक्षक्षयस्य प्रत्यक्षेण अनुमानेन वा प्रसिद्धिः । cp. *Nyayamukha*, p. 13, n. 20
16. Cp. Pra. vartika-vrtti p. 230: आकारार्पणत्वं विषयलक्षणम्
17. According to C II. see note 27 to Dharma. Tikā.
- 17a Cfr. *Pramānanayatattvaloka* of Vadideva suri, last page.

18. See Note 31 to Dh. Tika.
19. See Note 32 (Ibid) for interpretations of this para in C.I and C.II
- 19a Lit. (we) set forth other syllogism.
20. *I-chun* (123-7); (85-10) = "meaning - criterion."
21. The interpretation according to C.II. See Note 35 to Dh. Tikā.
22. According to C. II
23. Cp. *Pramānavārtika-vṛtti* II. 211: तस्मान्नार्थे नचज्ञाने स्युला-  
भास स्तदात्मनः ।
24. See *vṛtti ad. ver. 2.*
25. See Note 39. (Dh. Tikā) cp. *Kośavyākhyā*, I, p. 46:  
सर्वं धर्मस्वभावो धर्मधातुः
26. More Lit. "in accordance with an object".
- 26a According to *Vinītadeva* this is *Śāstra*. p. 151 below.  
The idea seems to be like this: The *Agama*=*Sastra* does not speak of the object image, *Visayakara* because the co-ordination theory is unknown to it. The reason probably is that according to some early Buddhists, the form of the object is a mental image. v. *Bahyarthasiddhi*, ver. 36, note 61. (p. 39).
- 26b Contrast the opinion of the *Vaibhāsikas* referred to in the *Kośavva*. (B.B. 89. 20. the *Kośa* (Tib. Text) I. P. 83, l. 15, :-- न च परमागु भ्यो न्ये संवाताः यथा वैभाषिकाः कल्पयन्ति  
See Dh. Tikā, note 44 b. for *Dignaga's* reverse opinion.
- 26c Cp. *N. Sutra*, iv, 2,13: केश समूहे तैमिरिको पलब्धिवत्तदुपलब्धिः  
with *N. Vartika* P. 508.
- 26d See to C.I. This is *pūrvapaksa*. v Note 48 (Dh. Tikā)
- 27 See Note 49 (Dh. Tikā)


28. See Pramānavārtika, II, 294 : and II. 256 with vṛtti :  
 मानसं तदपीत्येके (=कृणादयः) अबिच्छिन्ना थ भासेत तत्संवित्तिः क्रमग्रहे ।  
 तल्लाघवाच्चित्तनुत्प्रमित्यसंवेदनं न किम् । धियोयुग्दुत्पत्तिः —  
 See also ver II. 502-504 & 507-12
29. See Prakaranapañjikā, p 38, verses 58-60 ; Ślokav.  
 Nirāl. 54 with Pārtha Sārathi's comment, Pramāna-  
 var. II, 505-12
30. Ibid. II 570.
- 30a cp. सञ्चितालम्बनाः पञ्चविज्ञानकायाः । in the Kośavyā. ad.  
 ver 30. p. 47, 18 (B.B.)
31. Lit. to beseech and advance.
32. The author says from the standpoint of the opponent.
33. Superior and=integrated form *Sañcitākāra*, inferior  
 =atomic form, *pārimandalya*. - C II
34. According to C. II
35. It is explained : *Sañcitākāra* of blue colour is superior,  
 and atomic form of the earth-element inferior.  
 Hence seeing only the blue colour, one knows it  
 as earth-element. - C. II, 207 b2.
36. The interpretation is according to C. II; See Note  
 63 (Dh.Tikā)
- 36a Consult note. 67 (Dh.Tikā)
37. i.e. the visible, *Sancita*, is of atomic self-form,  
*paramānusvarūpa*.
38. Lit parts = *pien-fen*.
39. After all the blue patch never produces the cogni-  
 tion of the yellow patch. Now if the many atoms  
 of the result and objective, the pot, etc. just remain


many atoms, they will not separately produce different cognitions of the pot, etc. C.II. 208b,1. (Dh.Tika)

40. This is according to C.I. 195, 62. But C. II (208, 62) interprets that consciousness has —
41. The objective differences are not in atoms. Therefore the Hinayanists say in vain that atoms have differences - C II, 209, al.
42. According to C.I, the pot, etc.
43. (Atoms) in aggregates can be definitely removed one by one. When they are not done so, the pot, etc. are only perceived and not atoms. After removing the atoms, the form of the pot is not there. Then the pot is not real. Atoms, however, are not actual objects. Therefore that multiplicity - C.II, 209,b1.
44. That *ākārabhāga* is only consciousness-product (*Vijñāna-p'riṇāma*)
45. Chin. literally reads : "Because consciousness possesses the form of the object".
- 45a The expression '*na pañcama*', etc. is left untranslated, as its meaning is not clear.
46. Lit. if the consciousness, etc.
47. That is to say : things experienced in dream-thought are not external, but they prove to internal, C.I. 198,b2.
48. Added from C.II of 210.a2.

49. According to C.II. we must supply here Diñnāga's reply: *pratyayo' vyabhicāritvāt.....*
50. Or "then it follows", Sui-Chiang (162-9, 41-9).
51. See PārthaSārathiMiśra, *Slokavārtikavyākhyā*, p.309: कारणत्वमेव भवतां ग्राह्यत्वम् ।
52. Added from C.II, 210,b1.
53. Explained in C.II. Thus : Mind and mental states (*cittacaitta*) that disappeared in the immediately preceding movement, e.g. while a consciousness of homogeneous character disappears, the previously disappeared mind though not different, becomes *Samanantarapratyaya* of the following one. Ibid.
54. Four modes of conditions are : *hetu*, *ālambana* *Samanantara* and *adhipati*.







## APPENDIX

### *Variation of the present text with Dege Edition of the Same BSTAN- hGyur*

ཅེ་      page 86  
**DEGE**

page	Line	present	
43	7	གཉིས་ཀར་ཡང་	གཉིས་ཀ་ཡང་
"	13	ཉམས་འགྱུར་གྱིས་	ཉམས་འགྱུར་གྱིང་
"	14	གང་ཡིན་ཏེ་	གང་ཡིན་ཏེས་
"	18	རེ་ཡང་	དེང་
"	19	མེད་དུས་	ཐོགས་མེད་དུས་ནས་
"	20	དམིགས་པ་བརྟག་པ་རབ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་	དམིགས་པ་བརྟག་པ་
44		སློབ་དཔོན་སློབས་ཀྱི་སྒྲུབ་པས་	སློབ་དཔོན་སློབས་ཀྱི་
		མཛད་པ་	སྒྲུབ་པས་མཛད་པ་
"	7	དབང་པོ་ནི་	དབང་པོ་
"	9	དེ་ལྟུང་གི་	དེ་ལྟུང་གི་
"	11	གིས་ལས་རང་གི་རོ་པོ་	གིས་ལས་གང་གིས་
			རང་གི་རོ་པོ་
"	12	རྒྱལ་པོ་ལྟ་གི་	རྒྱལ་པོ་ལྟ་གི་ནི་
"	22	ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་འདུས་པ་	ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་འདུས་
		ས་ཡིན་ནོ་	པ་དམིགས་པ་ས་ཡིན་ནོ་
45	17	མང་མེད་ཀྱང་	མང་དུ་མེད་ཀྱང་

46	3	ལྷོ་མ་པ་པ་མི་ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྷོ་མ་པ་པ་མི་ལྟོན་པོ་པ་
			མེད་པོ་
"	6	པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
"	10	ལྷོ་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྷོ་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
"	12	གང་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	གང་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
46	15	མང་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	མང་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
"	18	ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྟོན་པོ་
47	1	པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
"	3	གཟིགས་ལྟོན་པོ་	གཟིགས་ལྟོན་པོ་
"	5	གཟིགས་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	གཟིགས་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
		པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
		ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྟོན་པོ་
"	10	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
"	12	ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྟོན་པོ་
"	13	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
"	19	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
			པོ་
"	20	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་
47	2	ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྟོན་པོ་
"	4	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་	ལྟོན་པོ་ལྟོན་པོ་

"	6	ཉམ་པར་གྱིས་པ་ཉི་	ཉམ་པར་གྱིས་པ་ཉི་
"	7	ཉམ་པར་གྱིས་པ་ཉི་	ཉམ་པར་གྱིས་པ་ཉི་
49	10	ཉམ་པར་གྱིས་པ་ཉི་ཞེས་ པ་པའི་	ཉམ་པར་གྱིས་པ་ཉི་ ཞེས་པ་པའི་
"	12	ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་
49	16	ལྟ་ཉི་ལོ་	ལྟ་ཉི་ལོ་
"	20	ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་
50	3	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ རྒྱ་ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ རྒྱ་ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ ལྟ་ཉི་
"	5	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ རྒྱ་ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་ རྒྱ་ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་
"	6	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་
"	8	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་
"	9	ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་
"	13	ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་
"	14	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་
"	15	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་
50	17	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་ལྟ་ཉི་
"	21	ལྟ་ཉི་	ལྟ་ཉི་

51	1	ར་གཉིས་འདྲོ་བ་ལ་མེད་པར་	རེ་གཉིས་འདྲོ་བ་ དང་མེད་པར་
"	2	འགོ་གཤམ་པ་ལྱེད་རྒྱུ་	འགོ་གཤམ་པ་ལྱེད་རྒྱུ་
"	5	ལ་ཉེ་ལྷན་ལ་ཉེ་	ལ་ཉེ་ལྷན་ལ་
"	10	རྒྱལ་ལ་ཉེ་ལ་	རྒྱལ་ལ་ཉེ་ལ་
"	"	འདྲི་ལ་	འདྲི་ལ་
"	17	དཔལ་པ་གྲང་དཔལ་	དཔལ་པ་གྲང་དཔལ་པ་
"	19	མཁུ་ལ་	མཁུ་ལ་
"	"	མི་དུང་ལྷོ་ལ་ལྷོ་དམིགས་པ་	མི་དུང་ལྷོ་ལ་ལྷོ་ དམིགས་པ་
52	1	གང་གིས་ནི་མཉམ་པར་	གང་གིས་ནི་རེ་གཉིས་ པར་
"	4	མང་པ་ལྷོ་ལ་	མང་པ་ལྷོ་ལ་ལ་
"	9	མོ་མ་དག་དམར་པར་	མོ་མ་དག་ལ་དམར་ པར་
"	11	ལ་མཉམ་	ལ་མཉམ་
"	13	མ་ལོན་ཉེ་	མ་ལོན་ཉེ་
52	16	ཞེས་ལྱ་བ་ལོ་ལ་ལོ་རེ་དག་ ཉམ་ཞེས་པར་	ཞེས་ལྱ་བ་ལོ་ལོ་ ལ་རེ་དག་ཉམ་པར་ ཉམ་པ་ལོ་ལྱལ་ལྱལ་ལོན་ ལྱལ་ལ་དམར་ལོན་པར་

	19	རྒྱལ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་བརྟུན་ཁོ་ན་	རྒྱལ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་བརྟུན་པ་ཁོ་ན་
53	3	གཙོ་བོ་	གཙོ་བོ་
	17	ཞེས་པའི་ནི་དུས་པའི་	དུས་པའི་ནི་དུས་པའི་
54	7	ཞེས་པའི་ལྷན་པའི་	ཞེས་པའི་ལྷན་པའི་
	8	ཞང་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པ་ལས་	ཞང་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པ་ལས་
		པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པས་	པ་ལས་ལས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པས་
	12	ལྷོ་གསུང་ལྷན་པའི་ལྷོ་གསུང་	ལྷོ་གསུང་ལྷན་པའི་ལྷོ་གསུང་
			ལྷོ་གསུང་
	18	དགག་གོ་	དགག་གོ་
	19	ཞང་པ་ལས་པའི་	ཞང་པ་ལས་པའི་
55	1	དཔང་པོ་ནི་	དཔང་པོ་ནི་
	4	རིག་པའི་ཞེས་པའི་	རིག་པའི་ཞེས་པའི་
	8	ཞང་པའི་ནི་	ཞང་པའི་ནི་
	9	ལྷན་པའི་	ལྷན་པའི་
55	10	ཞང་པའི་ལྷན་པའི་	ཞང་པའི་ལྷན་པའི་
	12	ཞང་པའི་རིག་པའི་	ཞང་པའི་རིག་པའི་
55	17	ལྷོ་གསུང་ལྷན་པའི་	ལྷོ་གསུང་ལྷན་པའི་
	18	རིག་པའི་	རིག་པའི་
	21	རྒྱ་ནག་	རྒྱ་ནག་

56	2	མཁུ་མཁུ་པ་ལྟེ།	མཁུ་པ་ལྟེ།
"	6	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།
"	8	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ། ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
"	10	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
"	19	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།
"	21	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
57	9	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
"	12	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
"	17	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
58	3	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
"	6	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
"	20	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།
59	17	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ། ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ། ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
"	20	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
"	"	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།
60	15	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ།
"	"	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།
"	"	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ།	ལྟེ་པ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ། ལྟེ་ལྟེ།



"	17	གཉིས་པ་མོ་གསུམ་པ་	གཉིས་པ་པ་མོ་གསུམ་པ་
"	19	ལྟེན་པ་པ་	ལྟེན་པ་པ་པ་
"	19	ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཉི་	ཞེས་བྱ་བ་པ་ཉི་
61	4	རྟེན་པ་མེད་པའི་	རྟེན་པ་མེད་པའི་
"	10	ཉེ་བར་རྟེན་པའི་ལྟེན་	ཉེ་བར་རྟེན་པའི་ལྟེན་
"	"	འདྲི་བ་ཉེ་བར་	འདྲི་བ་ཉི་ཉེ་བར་
"	13	རྟེན་པ་པ་པ་ཉེ་བར་	རྟེན་པ་པ་པ་ཉེ་བར་
"	15	ལྟེན་པ་པ་པ་	ལྟེན་པ་པ་པ་
"	16	འདྲི་བ་པ་ཉེ་བར་	འདྲི་བ་པའི་ཉེ་བར་
63	6	རྟེན་པ་	ཉི་ཉེ་བར་
"	10	རྟེན་པ་པའི་ཉེ་བར་	རྟེན་པའི་ཉེ་བར་
"	13	ཉེ་བར་པའི་ཉེ་བར་	ཉེ་བར་པའི་ཉེ་བར་
64	3	འདྲི་བ་	འདྲི་བ་
"	3	ཉེ་བར་ཉེ་བར་	ཉེ་བར་ཉེ་བར་
"	6	གསུམ་པའི་ཉེ་བར་	གསུམ་པའི་ཉེ་བར་
"	18	ལྟེན་པའི་ཉེ་བར་	འདྲི་བ་པའི་ཉེ་བར་
"	20	ལྟེན་པ་པའི་	ལྟེན་པ་པའི་
"	"	འདྲི་བ་ཉེ་བར་	འདྲི་བ་ཉེ་བར་
65	1	མང་པོའི་ལྟེན་པའི་	མང་པོའི་ལྟེན་པའི་
"	17	ལྟེན་པའི་འདྲི་བ་	ལྟེན་པའི་འདྲི་བ་

"	"	མི་ཡུལ་མེད་	མི་ཡུལ་མེད་
66	15	གང་དག་ཅེ་གས་མེད་པ་	གང་དག་ཅེ་གས་
			དང་ཡུལ་པ་དེ་དག་
			ནི་ཉམས་བརྩེ་མོགས་
			དཔེ་བཞུགས་པ་
			འབྲུག་གྱི་
67	7	བརྒྱ་ཞིག་ལ་	བརྒྱ་ཞིག་ལ་
"	13	རྩ་མཚན་	རྩ་མཚན་
"	17	ལྷན་པ་དེ་ལྟེན་པ་	ལྷན་པ་དེ་ལྟེན་པ་
68	6	ལུས་ན་	ལུས་ན་
"	7	མི་ལྟེ་བ་ལ་ཡིན་ལས་	མི་ལྟེ་བ་ལ་ཡིན་ལས་
"	9	ཆོས་ཤིག་ཡོད་ན་	ཆོས་ཤིག་ཡོད་ན་
"	11	ཆོས་ལྟེ་བ་ལ་ཡིན་པ་	ཆོས་ལྟེ་བ་ལ་ཡིན་པ་
"	16	འབྲུག་པ་ནི་ཅེ་གས་ཅན་	འབྲུག་པ་ལྟེ་
			ལྟེ་བ་ལྟེ་
69	1	གསུམ་པ་ཡང་	གསུམ་པ་ཡང་
"	2	བརྒྱ་བས་ན་	བརྒྱ་བས་ནས་
"	5	ཉམས་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་	ཉམས་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་ལྟེ་
			ལྟེ་ལྟེ་
"	7	བཀག་ན་	བཀག་ནས་
"	10	ཤིག་ལྟེ་ཅན་ལ་	ཤིག་ལྟེ་ཅན་ལ་

69	12	བདུན་པའི་རོན་	བདུན་པའི་རོན་
"	21	བདུག་ལྟར་	བདུག་པ་ལྟར་
70	2	མ་ཡིན་ཞེན་	མ་ཡིན་ནམ་ཞེན་
"	18	བལྟ་བའི་ལྷོང་	བལྟ་བའ་ལྷོང་བའི་ལྷོང་
"	19	ཤེས་པའི་	ཤེས་པ་ཉི་
71	2	ནམ་པ་ཤེས་པའི་	ནམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་
"	3	ནམ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ་	ནམ་པ་ཅན་ཡིན་ཏེ་
"	7	ལྷོང་བ་ཡིན་པ་ཉི་རེག་ན་	ལྷོང་བ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་ཉི་
"			རེག་ན་
"	9	དེས་ལུས་པའི་	དེས་ལྷིས་པའི་
"	17	ལྷོས་པོ་	ལྷོས་ཏེ་
72	2	ནམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་	ནམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་
"		རྒྱུ་ཉིད་ཏེ་	དམིགས་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཉིད་ཏེ་
"	3	འཇམ་ཞེན་།	འགའ་ཞེན་
72	5	མེད་ན་	མི་རེ་ན་
"	8	མ་དང་	མ་ཡང་
"	"	ཁོ་ནས་	ཁ་ནས་
"	17	གང་ཡིན་ལ།	གང་ཡོད་ལ།
		ཅིག་ཤོས་ནི།	ད་མེད་ན་མེད་པ་
			དེ་ནི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་ལ།
			ཅིག་ཤོས་ནི

"	20	འཛོགས་པ་དབུ་ཉི་	འཛོགས་པ་རེ་
			དག་ཉ་
73	3	རེ་ཉི་	རེ་ཉི་
"	5	མ་	མ་རྟེ་
"	10	མར་ཅིག་	མར་ཅིག་མ་
"	14	གཞུང་པའི་ལྷོ་པ་	གཞུང་པའི་མ་
"	16	ཉེ་མ་ཉེ་	ཉེ་མ་པ་
"	17	གཤམ་ལྷོ་དུ་ཉ་	གཤམ་པའི་ལྷོ་དུ་ཉ་
"	20	མར་རེ་	མར་རེ་
74	1	མེ་ལྷོ་ཉ་	མེ་ལྷོ་ཉ་
"	4	ཡང་མེ་འཕྲུག་རེ་	ཡང་འཕྲུག་རེ་
"	5	ལྷོ་མ་ལྷོ་	ལྷོ་མ་རེ་
"	9	རེ་དག་མེ་ག་	རེ་དག་རེ་མེ་ག་
"	19	འཛོགས་པའི་ལྷོ་པ་	འཛོགས་པའི་རེ་པ་
			པ་
"	20	འཛོགས་རེ་	འཛོགས་རེ་
75	1	ཉར་གེ་དངོས་པོ་	ཉར་གེ་ཁོ་ཉ་
"	16	ཉེ་རེ་ཉ་	ཉེ་རེ་ཉེ་
"	17	ཉེ་རེ་ཉ་	ཉེ་རེ་ཉེ་
"	"	ཉེ་རེ་ཉ་	ཉེ་རེ་ཉེ་
76	1	ཉེ་མ་པའི་གཞི་མེ་རེ་པའ་	ཉེ་མ་པའི་ཅན་གཞི་

		མི་ལུང་རྒྱུ་	མེད་པར་ཉི་མུ་
			མེད་པོ་
"	9	མེད་མེད་ཀྱི་	ཉི་མུ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་
76	13	ལྷུང་བ་ལ་ལྷུང་བ་	ལྷུང་བ་ལ་ལྷུང་བ་
			ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་
"	16	ལྷུང་བར་ལྷུང་བ་ལ་	ལྷུང་བར་ལྷུང་བ་
		ལྷུང་བར་ལྷུང་བར་	ལ་ལ་ལྷུང་བར་
			ལྷུང་བར་ལྷུང་བར་
77	2	ལྷུང་བ་ལ་ལྷུང་བ་ལ་	ལྷུང་བ་ལ་ལྷུང་བ་
		ལྷུང་བ་	ལྷུང་བ་
"	12	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་ལྷུང་བ་ལ་	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་ལྷུང་བ་
			ལྷུང་བར་
"	18	ལྷུང་བ་	ལྷུང་བ་
78	6	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་ལྷུང་བ་	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་ལྷུང་བ་
"	9	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་ལྷུང་བ་	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་ལྷུང་བ་
		ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་
"	16	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་ལྷུང་བ་	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་ལྷུང་བ་
"	17	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་
"	18	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་
79	1	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་	ལྷུང་བ་ལྟོ་ཀྱི་

"	9	འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་	འཇམ་ལུ་
79	9	འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་	འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་ འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་ འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་
80	7	འཇམ་ལུ་	འཇམ་ལུ་
"	8	འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་	འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་
"	12	འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་	འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་འཇམ་ལུ་

*Jampa Yeshi*

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