

A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE TREATISE PRELIMINARY NOTE

Acārya. Dignaga takes for granted the grasping by the mind of its object through process of assuming its form, i.e. *Sārūpya*, co-ordination between the subject (mind) and its object. This theory has served the author as a main weapon to dismiss the reality of external world in this treatise.

Now we have to find out who pleaded for reality of our objective universe and who propounded the said co-ordination-theory. The early Buddhists though they are realists, never pleaded for the theory. V. the latest champion of the school Bhadanta Subhagupta and his treatise *Bāhyārtha-Siddhi-kārikā* in this Bulletin, in 1967. Later Buddhists like Sautrantikas on the other hand have adopted freely the theory for their realistic approach to the universe, cfr. my *Bā. Siddhi with Notes*. But they were not original propounders of the theory.

It appears, therefore, that the Sankhya-yoga-masters were the first to draw attention to the ever-occurring phenomenon of co-ordination between the mind or intellect and its object. The idea will be made clear in the following statements of Patanjali, the author of the yoga sutras : yoga is an absolute check of *Citta-Vṛtti*; then at that time the soul remains in his own form. In the other states the soul is assimilated with *Vṛttis* (mind's functions). *Vṛttis* are five in all; they are: sensible experience, its reverse, empty thought, sleep and memory. Sensible experiences are: perception, inference and scripture, these 3 *Pramanas*. Reverse is a wrong knowledge founded on an absent object, e.g. knowledge of a silver piece on the shell, vain thought is devoid of the object occurring in pursuit of the word-meaning. Sleep is a metamorphosis of the mind having as the object the idea of non-existence (*abhāva-*

prayyaya-dlambana अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना) The absolute check of these Vṛttis are secured by means of constant efforts and desirelessness.(yoga sutras, I, 2-12)

Of these statements the most relevant to our purpose is the 4th. Sutra which states that the soul in other states assumes the forms of the experienced things, i.e. *Vṛtti-Sārūpya* 'Other states' -when the man is engaged in pursuit of the world activity. The following is another noteworthy statement:

An entity becomes known or unknown to the mind because the mind acquires the image of the entity reflected in itself (IV, 17).

All the metamorphoses are known to the soul (Puruṣa) because he has no transformation of any kind, अपरिणामित्व v. IV, 18.

On the sankhya side the author of the Karika, Īśvara-kṛṣṇa does not speak much of the Sārūpya-theory, however the anonymous commentary, yuktidipika refers to it more than once. He explains vṛtti as विषयाकारपरिणामात्मिका, 'a transformation in the shape of its content' (v. pp. 103, 112-114). More interesting is its citation of two verses from an ancient author on p. 80:

Just as the intellect appears as if it is of the form of an object (अर्थाकार इव) just so the soul being brightened by the intellect (बुद्ध्या आभासमानः) is said to be intelligent, (bodhdha) like a jewel (maṇi). Whichever is the mind's act, i.e. metamorphosis, the soul, Puruṣa, also assumes all such forms of the intellect which forms pertain to other than the self because he is conscious (चेतन.)

Ample advantage of Sārūpya vāda has been taken by the Advaita Vedantins in expounding their epistemology of perception. Refer to the Vedānta Paribhāṣā of Dharmaraja Ch. I. pp. 13, 18:

"Just as the water of a tank, going out through a hole and entering the field through channels comes

to have even like those fields, a quadrangular or other figure, similarly, the internal organ too which is of the nature of light going out through the sense of sight, etc. and reaching to the locality of contents like pot, is modified in the form of contents like the pot. This same modification is called psychosis, *vr̥tti* v. the text edited and translated by S.S.Suryanarayana Sastri, Adyar Library series, Adyar 1942.

Sri Sankaracharya has also accepted *Jñāna* as *sākāra*, endowed with the form of its content, v. for example the *Gitabhāṣya*, p. 446 of Gita Press edn. ad XVIII, 50.

The above citations would amply prove that the *sārūpya-vāda* was originally expounded by the Brahmanical writers, and then it was grafted on to Buddhism by the Yogacara-Buddhists in order to establish their Idealistic Philosophy. v. My *Bāh. Siddhi*, Notes: 151, 162, 165, 168—9 170, 183, etc. and my paper on Idealistic Buddhism in the *Journal of Tirupati Research Institute*, Vol. I pt. 3.

Now let us turn to the topics of the treatise.

The author, Acarya Dignaga in the first part of his treatise, i.e. Aphorisms 1-5, sets up the views of the Realists who consider the objective universe in the external as absolutely real in one form or other which the author proves to be something imaginary. In the second part the author's own opinion about the issue is presented. This is a convenient method of treatment generally adopted in the ancient India Scientific Treatises. The method goes under the heading: *Pūrvapakṣa* and *Siddhānta* or *Anyā-Samaya* and *Sva-Sāmayā*, others' view and own view (cp. Vinitadeva's *Tika*, ad 6. Introductory).

According to the author the Realists may broadly be classified under three groups as follows:

1. The advocates of atoms as direct objects of our consciousness.

2. The advocates of the combined atoms acting as before.
3. The advocates of the atomic integrated forms behaving so.

As to the problem of the identifications of these philosophers, the first group may be taken for certain to be the early Buddhists like the Sarvastivadin-Vaibhasikas on the authority of Vasubandhu, Subhagupta and others. As to the second group we have no means to ascertain who they are except the well-known Chinese commentator Kue-Chi who reveals them to the authors of the Sutra-sect, perhaps the Sautrantikas. The advocacy of the third proposition is attributed to Vagbhata, etc. by Vinitadeva and to Sanghabhadra and his followers by Kue-Chi.

Vasubandhu also speaks of three opinions on the external objects: 1) The first opinion pleads that the object of our cognition is one whole, *avayavin* (like the pot, etc.); 2) the second one holds it to be many separate elements i.e. atoms and 3) the third view is: it is a totality of atoms (*Samghāta*) The first opinion is mentioned there as that of the Vaiśeṣika masters. The advocates of the second and the third view are not stated there. We may, however, surmise that they are the Sarvāstivadi-Vaibhāsikas from the context. Though the simple atoms do not get combined as they are partless, the molecules of atoms can get combined. So say the Kasmira Vaibhasikas (Vimsika, ad. 13th. ver.)

REALISTS

1. The Buddhist Realists declare: The atoms are truly objects of the sensory consciousness, because they are the real cause of that consciousness.

Dignaga replies: They are not its object, because the atoms are not cognized directly (lit. not reflected in it); example: the sense organ. (Though it causes consciousness,

it is not, at all, cognized by it). Vasubandhu's answer to them is very simple, viz. the atoms are not proved to be real entities, (*paramāṇuḥ na siddhyati*).

The reason for Dignaga's complex answer is that he assumes two criteria for judging *ālambana*, (object-cause), viz. 1) causality and 2) image-imposing (*ākāra-arpaṇa*). Of these two the first criterion has been accepted by all schools of Buddhism and it is brought under the category of the four conditions: *hetu*, *samanantara*, *ālambana* and *adhipati* (Abh. Kosa, II, 62, Madh. Sastra I. 2. etc.) The import of causality is well kept in view in the usage of the term in the following contexts: The visible discharges the function of *ālambana* towards the visual consciousness (चक्षुर्विज्ञानस्य रूपमालम्बनकृत्यं करोति ।) Śālis. Sutra, p. 15, l. 4). *Alambana* is a thing by support of which consciousness arises, that is to say, a supporting element in the process of cognition is *ālambana* (Madh. Avatāra, my Skt. text. p. 77). *Samjñā* is taking up of content and *nimitta*, content (*visaya*) is the same as *ālambana*. *nimitta* is particulars of the same, i.e. blue, yellow and others and the factor of their determination (*Trimsikūbhāṣya*, p. 21 & 23). The Satya-Siddhi also equates *ālambana* with *nimitta* (ch. 77: निमित्तालम्बनं विज्ञानम् । cp. ch. 191). What is productive of knowledge is *ālambana* (Slokavartika, p. 285: उत्पादकस्यैवालम्बनत्वम् ।) The cause is the same as *ālambana* (Umbeka in Slokavārtika-tātparyatika, p. 278). Dharmakīrti also confirms this idea: "Causality is no other than objectivity" pra. var. II, 234: The object is what is a causal entity" Ibid. 246. "A non-cause is non-object" Ibid, 257. It is also noteworthy that Dignaga himself cites a śāstra in his comment on Aphorism 2 to stress the causality a main part of *alambana*. There is no mention of the other part, image-evoking, which omission Vinitadeva justifies by saying that this image-evoking is accepted in this system [of the Sautrantikas] v. his Tikā, pp95below.

Now we may be sure that the above said second criterion of alambana viz. image-imposing is a new element introduced by Dignaga under the dominant influence of the Sautrantika Realists who hold sway in the field of epistemology of the Buddhists. Since the early Buddhists could not conceive of the image or no-image of a knowledge, they hold that the atoms become a direct object of the sensory consciousness. The atoms are very subtle and invisible; how can they be admitted as a direct object? Bhadanta Subhagupta, a latest champion of the school provides a fitting answer. It is as follows:—

An atom which may manifest its own single knowledge cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form; how then could each of them appear in our knowledge? (Var. 43) Atoms cannot each individually and independently appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the atoms never flashes out in our consciousness (44). The atoms though they are mutually un-related and devoid of parts nevertheless become integrated and accomplish the gross things like the globe of earth and others (56)... The person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a mountain and such other places could count the atoms with their number and other distinction (59). Therefore it is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all exist.....(60). Refer to the *Bahyarthā Siddhi* in the Bulletin of Tibetology, Gangtok, 1967 for further details.

The Vaibhasikas appear to hold the view that the atoms are not perceptible to us. They nevertheless form the knowledge-object because they are basically the cause of knowledge. A Digambara Jaina, Sumati by name is also credited to maintain the atoms as direct object (v. our remarks below on the third proposition). There are two opinions about the atoms' behaviour: 1) they exist

allowing some inter space in their midst and 2) they remain without any intermediate space (१) सान्तराः परमाणवः २) निरन्तराः परमाणवः ।). The atoms of no interspace have been reciprocal support and are united. Vasubandhu in his Kośa says that the Kasmira Vaibhasikas advocate the atoms as having some inter space and remaining in a close vicinity (सान्तराःपरमाणवः) but do not get combined; and that Bhadanta, (a Sautrantika master) asserts that the atoms remain with no interspace and due to this they are termed combined (निरन्तरत्वे तुस्पृष्टसंज्ञा) He prefers this Bhadanta's opinion (भदन्तमत श्रेष्ठंयम्, १) Kośavyākhyā. I, p. 99, 3). See also my discussion on this topic in the Abh. Problem, Br. Vidya, XVIII, p. 226f. There is one more opinion holding the combined atoms as object-cause. (See Tattva. s. pañjikā, p. 556, and Haribhadra's Abhs. aloka, pp. 372-74). This is probably the opinion of the Sautrantikas, see discussion below.

Dignāga elucidates his meaning of “ the content ” (viśaya) thus: “ A content is that whose characteristics are specified by the knowledge; this is so because the knowledge appears in the form of content. The atoms cannot behave like that hence not object.”

2. Then let us take the combined atoms as object. The author demurs to it: “Consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it, (i.e. combined atoms do not cause the consciousness) because they do not exist in substance like the double moon.” For the combined atoms are not, in fact, different from the simple ones.^{2a}

Vasubandhu's reply to this proposition is also simple. No atom is proved to be real (*paramanuh na Siddhyati*).

The author further makes his standpoint plain thus: “What object evokes the consciousness endowed with its own image, that is properly regarded as actual object of

that consciousness: because that alone is spoken of duly as the productive cause of the consciousness. But the aggregates of atoms are not so. (i.e. productive cause). Example, double moon, it is perceived on account of one's own defective eye. Its perception is not caused by the double moon, as there exists no object like the double moon. Similar are the aggregates of atoms."

This proposition, according to Kue-Chi comes from the Sutra-sect, i.e. Sautrantikas; but this finding is not corroborated by any other source. We have, however, enough quotations pleading for the aggregate of atoms to be object-cause. Kue-Chi clarifies their views thus: The indivisible atoms that are substantially existing are not the object of the five-fold consciousness because no indivisible atoms are manifested in it. These seven indivisible atoms constitute jointly one *anurūpa*, a gross atom. This gross body of atoms though phenomenally true is the object of the five-fold consciousness, because there this gross form is reflected.....“(see p. below). This opinion of gross body of atoms joining together is also referred to as it is pleaded by the Kasmira Vaibhasikas in the *Vimśatika* ad 13. The characteristic of this opinion is that the gross body of atoms though it phenomenally true has been accepted as the object of consciousness. It is obvious that in this proposition the second criterion of *ālambana*, i.e. image-imposing has been much stressed and preferred. This is confirmed by the statement of the *Pramanavartikavṛtti* p. 230: आकारार्पणत्वं विषयलक्षणम् । “The characteristic of a content is its capacity of imposing image.” Note also *Pra. vartika*, II, 224: The Knowledge in what form appears, that form is spoken of as graspable of that knowledge (तत्र बुद्धिर्यदाकारा तस्यास्तद्ग्राह्यमुच्यते ।) The graspable here is multitude of atoms, (anu-sancaya-vṛtti.) This is the reason for citing an earlier authority to the effect that the causality is equally an important ingredient of *ālambana* (v. Tikā on p. 92)

Dignāga's objection stands on the ground that the aggregates of atoms are phenomenally true, hence cannot serve as the object-cause. This objection is dispelled by Dharmakīrti in these sayings: The same self-characteristic of things (*svulakṣaṇa*) is the ultimate substance (*dravya sat*) because the substantial thing is that which is capable of discharging a purposive action (Nyāyabindu, I, 14-15). We should remember that the above sayings are made from the Sautrāntikās' point of view. The idea of integrated atom, *Samcita-āṇu* is also upheld by Subhagupta on the same pattern of argument: "The atoms being integrated discharge a uniform function and are termed *Sancita*, 'integrated' and to the upholder of this opinion how are the atoms non-substance, *adravya?* (Bāh. Siddhi ver. 39). Dharmakīrti also justifies this proposition in these sayings: "The effect is caused by several things; yet what (knowledge) arises imitating what form, that form is regarded as "grasped" by that knowledge" (Pr. var. II, 248). All knowledge flashes out from its contents, the knowledge though caused by others (like the sense, etc.) assumes the form of its content only, (but not of the sense-organ)" Ibid. 268.

The following citations would enable us to have a glimpse of how the advocates of the combined atoms as knowledge-content meet difficulties in their way:—

⁸ Integration, multitude, homogeneity (are synonyms); the sensory consciousness is related to it. The sense of homogeneity (*sāmānya*) is necessarily geared up with discriminative knowledge. Pra. Vār. II, 194. comment: The five consciousness-bodies are of integrated *ālambana*; this is the conclusion, *siddhānta*. It is also stated (in Pra. Samuccaya) the perception as it is effected from more than one thing is focused on the homogeneity (*Samanya-gocara*) as its own content. Thus the multitude of atoms is termed *Sancita*,

'integrated'; the same is thought of as *sāmānya*; the sensory knowledge is centered upon it. The sense of *Sāmānya* is followed by a discriminative knowledge; how could it be then a discrimination-free perception? So the author says: "The atoms are formed in co-ordination with other atoms, then they are named *sancita* "integrated" and serve as *nimitta*, object-cause of the knowledge-rise." The so formed integrated atoms are meant in the saying: The five consciousness-bodies are of integrated *ālambana*. That they serve as *nimitta*, cause of the knowledge-rise is meant in the saying because "it is effected from more than one thing."

Such distinction of atoms is not possible in the absence of other atoms; the same (knowledge) is not fixed in a single atom, the knowledge is said as focused on *sāmānya*. (Pr. Var. II, 196). Comment: The distinction of atoms, is their capacity of evoking knowledge. The individual atoms are imperceptible, but they, being combined, become perceptible. Therefore, since the knowledge is not invariable with a single atom it is said by the truth-speaker (Dignāga) that knowledge is focused on the *sāmānya*, that is the knowledge has as its content the multitude of atoms (*paramāṇu-saṅghāta-viśaya*). But, it is not to mean that knowledge is focused on *Sāmānya*, generality other than the atoms. Then how can the objection of the perception becoming a discrimination-haunted be raised on pretext that the perception is focused on the generality? cp. The same idea is stressed in the Chap. I, 88-90.

The above statement of Dharmakīrti in his Pra. Vārtika makes obvious that Dignāga is explaining that the combined atoms evoke a pure perceptive knowledge by saying: तत्रानेकार्थजन्यत्वात् स्वार्थे सामान्यगोचरः ।

This fact admirably tallies with an accepted truth that Dignāga propounded his logical theories on the basis of the Sautrāntikas' metaphysics. But here in this present treatise Dignāga's attitude is quite different and unfavourable to the

theory of *Sanghātāmbana*, (combined-atom-object); hence he puts it under the category of his opponents' views.

3. Then the author takes up to examine the third proposition. "Some masters say that the integrated form of atoms is the cause of consciousness." Dignāga replies that the atomic form does not become its object, e.g. its solidity, etc. and so on.

The advocates of this proposition are in the opinion of Vinitadeva: Vāgbhata and others — which opinion is not corroborated by any other source. However, Kue-Chi ascribes it to the Neo-Sarvāstivādins, Sanghabhadra, etc. The material elements, they maintain, (*rūpādayo dharmā*) have each of them many a form (*ākāra*) but of these only one part becomes the object of perception. Therefore, indivisible atoms, being in co-operation with one another assume each an integrated form, *Sancita-ākāra*. This form being in substance produces the consciousness which resembles that form and hence becomes the object-cause (*āmbana*) of the five-fold consciousness. (v.p. more details below).

There is some anachronism here. Dignaga criticises the Neo-Sarvastivadin, without naming him and the Neo-Sarvastivadin dispels the criticism naming Dignaga according to Kue-Chi. We must guess that they must either contemporary of Dignāga or Dignāga speaks of some earlier spokesman of the school. It is also interesting to observe here that Dignaga ridicules the Sanghāta-vāda, (second proposition in this treatise) for which he pleaded in his standard work, *Pramana-Samuccaya* (see Dharmakirti's comment on p. above). These circumstances may suggest that Dignaga must have turned an arch-idealist in a later period of his life as his predecessor Vasubandhu did according to the tradition. While composing the *Pramana-Samuccaya* the author should be a neutral logician as he pleads for the both systems of the Sautrantikas as well as the yogacaras. cfr. my Bud. Idealism in journal, S.V. Institute, Vol. I, 3, pp. 71ff.

Kamalasila informs us that the above said third proposition was also advocated by a Digambara Jaina, Sumati by name. His plea is this; Atoms are two -fold viz. of common form and uncommon form in the pattern of all things having a general as well as a particular self. Of the two, the common form of atoms is cognized by the senses and their uncommon one never cognized. Thus the consciousness in a uniform pattern as related to the atoms never comes into clash; hence the atoms are accomplished as perceptible. (Tattva. pañjikā, p. 554).

Dignaga's reply to it is : "The atomic integrated form is not perceivable like solidity (i. e. hardness.) etc. Though they are in the atoms are not perceived by our eye-consciousness. So is the atomic integrated form." The author's weighty argument here is: "All gross things like pot, bowl, etc. would be seen in a identical shape if the integrated form and the atomic form are one and the same. Of course there are differentiations in their sizes, but they are related to things which are only *phenomenal* entities and which cannot be regarded as causal factors. For, if we eliminate atoms of the empirical things one by one, we shall have no more the experience of such things. What is substantially true and existent never ceases to evoke its perception; for example, colour and other atoms. They never cease to catch up our senses."

In this argument the author throws a sidelight on the latest phase of the Buddhist theory of matter as adumbrated in the *Satya-Siddhi*. According to this theory the so-called qualities, colour, taste, odour and touch are fundamental elements and all other four elements, earth etc. are formed out of the former four. Read S. Siddhi chs. 36,38-40 and cfr. in my *Dvdaśamukha*, p. 53,n.105.

4. Now the author set forth his own solution of the problem: "It is the content (artha) which exists internally

in the knowledge as a knowable aspect appearing to us as if it exists externally. Because the content is essentially in the nature of consciousness and because it acts a productive condition (to the consciousness) the knowable aspect is the object”.

The knowable aspect and the knowledge are one and designated differently. How can the principle of cause-and-effect relation be admitted between them? The author answers: “Though it is only a part of the consciousness, it becomes a productive factor of the latter because it is invariably and simultaneously associated with the latter; or it becomes so in succession by transmitting its force (Śakti).” In support of these two answers Dignāga cites the authority of his earlier Rationalists’ saying: “In the presence of cause is the presence of its result and in the absence of cause is the absence of its result: this is the characteristic sign of what is the cause and what is the result even if they happen simultaneous or in succession.” This saying proves beyond doubt that there is possibly a cause-effect-relation between the two simultaneous events if there is concomitance between them. This relation can be described as *Sahabhu-hetu*, co-existing cause in the Sarvastivādin’s terminology. This causal relation of simultaneity (*Sahabhū*) is applicable to the phenomenon of the mind and mental state, [citta-caitasika] that are appearing together. This relation also holds good in the case of four fundamental and four secondary elements (*bhūta-bhautika*) which are mutually inseparable and conditioned. A favourable example cited here is *pradīpa-prabhā*, lamp and light. They appear together and disappear together, hence they are mutually conditioned under the law of simultaneity (v. Kośavyā, Cal. edn, II, p. 123) conception of Buddhism, p. 25, Abh. Sangaha, Kosambi edn, VIII, 22).

This pattern of argument of the Sarvāstivādin is not accepted by a more rational school of Buddhism, like the

Satya-siddhi which disproves both the reason and the example in ch. 36 and 40. Item 1, etc. The Brahmanical, logicians like Kumārila also ridicule the causal relation between the co-existing events and its example. Kumārila's criticism of Dignāga's proposition is summed below along with his commentator, Pārthasārathi Mīśra's remarks:—

4

Let not the past be graspable as the Vaibhāsikas assume. It may then be possible that between two knowledges that are occurring simultaneous one is the graspable and the other grasper; therefore the following is stated: With reference to the two simultaneous events there will be no possibility of asserting one is proof and the other is proved (*māna-meya*) for the reason that two simultaneous events are mutually independent, and that there is a lack of action and actor. Causality in your system is graspable; in between the two independent events there is no cause-and-effect-relation, hence no idea of one is graspable and the other grasper (see Ślokavārtika, p. 309): Halloo, (we have accepted that) the characteristic of the cause-and-effect-relation is nothing but invariable concomitance of *Tatbhāva-bhāvin*, presence of effect on the presence of cause; this characteristic is obtainable in the case of two simultaneous events; so says our great Master (Dignāga) : “It is a simultaneous conditioning factor because of invariable concomitance”. Now, on this point the following is pointed out: The Rationalists do not proclaim that causation is mere *Tatbhāva-bhāvin*, ‘presence of the effect on the presence of cause’. That causation is geared up with the succession of time and never bereft of it. This is pointed out in the following:

“The causation-characteristic freed from the time-succession is not permissible between the cow and the horse;

the same is the case with the events of time-succession, or the simultaneous moment-events of a flux of elements with the other flux of elements. Therefore amongst things which are already previously present a thing is regarded as effect of that thing from which it is produced as in the case of pot that is produced in the presence of colour, etc.” (note this illustration from the opponent’s point of view).

The said example of lamp and light for simultaneous causation is unproved; to this effect the following is pointed out :

“The example of lamp and light, etc. to prove the simultaneous causation has been stated; even in this case there is a very subtle time-distinction. The illusion of simultaneity there is due to the time-distinction hardly discernible (*durlakṣa*) as in the case of a sharp pin piercing through several hundred of lotus-petals (*padmapatra-sata-vedha*)”This rejection of causation through the process of simultaneity is also applicable to the knowledge and its part and their graspability and grasping agency; so is said further:

“The rejection of causation by simultaneity is equally applicable to the parts (knowledge and its part)”. (see *Ibid.*)

As to Dignāga’s second alternative answer, viz. it becomes so in succession by transmitting the force (*Śakti*) the same critic continues: Between two successive events the previous may be graspable by the other. It is criticised previously that what is past cannot become graspable, this criticism is not valid; for, it is possible by transmitting its force. The self-form of knowledge on account of impression (*vāsanā*) imposed by a previous knowledge (upon itself) is produced subsequently. (This means that *ālambana* is similar to memory (*smaranam iva ālambana*)). Here also Kumāṛila says. “*Ālambana* is not possible by succession through the door of transmitting the force” (*Ibid.* pp. 311-312).

The above elaboration of the opponent's criticism is aimed at to acquaint ourselves with a clear understanding of the author's complicated proposition.

Dharmakīrti being one of the strongest champions of this school, his conclusive remark may also be recorded in brief which appears as an echo of Dignāga's view:

5

How and by what means do these atoms transform our consciousness as reflex of a gross form? (Pra. Var. II. 321). Therefore one consciousness has two aspects (graspable and grasper) and experienced and memorised; the realization of this in double aspect is regarded the fruit. (Ibid. 337). The self of the Knowledge though indivisible in truth is noticed (i.e. experienced) as though it is divided into graspable and grasper on account of our perverted visions (Ibid. 354).

In order to satisfy the scriptural declaration that the visual consciousness emerges on the basis of the eye and is visible the author states: "The sense-organ, (i.e. eye, etc) is only a sort of *śakti*, force as it acts as auxiliary to its objectivity". The sense-organ is inferred to be only a force of consciousness, but not material in character. It may be a non-contradictory part of consciousness or it may be in its own indescribable self. There can be no difference in the production of its result. Thus the objective aspect and the force of sense-organ go on mutually conditioned from immemorial time".

The author's statement about the sense-organ as of the indescribable is suggestive. It shows that he does not side with the Vaibhasikas for whom the senses are material, but with some early scripture according to which they are other than the visible etc; and supra-sensous and inferable from the sensory consciousness and seated on the eye-ball, etc. (v. Yaśomitra's comm. Kośa, I, p. 24-25). Dharmakīrti too holds the

same view, v. Pra. Vartika II, 48 a-b: They are transcendental and designated as senses...Refer to Vinītadeva's comment for other opinions on the senses (p. 92 below).

The author's explanatory part of his last aphorism is very well elucidated by Vinītadeva in his Tikā, one may read my summary in English, pp: 33-36 below.

NOTES

1. The early Buddhists plead that the atoms though too subtle and imperceptible, serve as a hidden cause of our knowledge, because their gross forms that we experience are phenomenal and cannot be regarded as either different from or identical with the atoms, is not at all counted as a cause. The same principle holds good in the Buddhists' denial of the soul theory. The soul is not something real apart from its several parts, cfr. Sam. Nikāya, 1,135, the saying:

यथा अङ्गं संभारत् भवति शब्दो रथेन ।.....

एवं स्कन्धेषु सत्स्वेव भवति मत्वेति संवृतिः।

Cited in Satya - Siddhi, Ch. 38, p. 190.

The above position of the early Buddhists renders much easier the task of Dignaga of rejecting the combined atom-object proposition (i.e. his second one). However the Sautrāntikas assign some reality to it on the score that it discharges a purposive action. See discussion on this topic below.

2. See Tattvas Panjikā (p. 556) mentioning such three opinions: 1) Atoms get combined one another (*Samyujyante parcmāṇavah.*), 2) they always appear with some interspace, but do not come into a mutual contact (*Santara eva rītyan na sprsanti.*) 3) when they appear without interspace, we call them combined (*nirantaratve tu sprstasamjñā*). Similar three views are noticeable in Abhis, Aloka, (p. 372-74) : 1 (*Sanghata-paksa*, view of the combined atoms, 2) *Santara-parivarapaksa*, view of atoms encircled with interspace, 3) *nirantara-parivarapaksa*, view of the same without interspace. These three are termed knowable categories (Jneya-paksa):

According to Th. Stcherbatsky's finding the combined atoms alone appear in phenomenal reality. Simple ones or infra-atomic elements presumably were relegated to a transcendental reality.....(v. Conception of Buddhism, p. 12).

2a. Kue-chi's interpretation of Vasubandhu's verse 11 in the Vimsikā as referring to four views: 1) " *eka-pakṣa*" of the Vaisesikas, 2) *anekapakṣa* of the old Sarvastivadin, 3) *Paramanupakṣa* of the Sutra-sect and 4) *Samghata-pakṣa* of the Neo-Sarvastivadin (Nyayanusara) is not admissible and it is quite opposed to Vasubandhu's own comment. (v. his comment on the vimsika-vijnapti-chinese, Fas. III p. 2). Vasubandhu refers to the three views only, viz. 1) the view of the Vaisesika, 2) the view of the Sarvastivadin as atom-object and 3) the view of the Sautrantika holding the integrated-atom-object (*Samghata-anu*)

3. सञ्चितः समुदायः स सामान्यं तत्र चाक्षयीः ।

सामान्यबुद्धिश्रावश्यं विकल्पेनानुबध्यते ॥ प्रमाणवार्तिक II. 194.

वृत्तिः । ननु सञ्चितालम्बनाः पञ्चविज्ञानकाया इति सिद्धान्तः । तत्रानेकार्थजन्यत्वात् स्वार्थे सामान्यगोचर इति चोक्तम् (प्रमाणसमुच्चये) । तथा च परमाणूनां समुदायः (note रूपशब्दादेरष्टद्रव्यत्वात्) सञ्चित इत्युच्यते । स एव च सामान्यमतः । तत्र च सामान्ये प्रत्यक्षधीर्जायते । सामान्यबुद्धिश्रावश्यं विकल्पेनानुबध्यते अनुस्रीयते । तत् कथमविकल्पं त्यक्षमुच्यते । अत्राह—

अर्थान्तराभिसम्बन्धात् जायन्ते येऽणवोऽपरे ।

उक्तास्ते सञ्चितास्ते हि निमित्तं ज्ञानजन्मनः ॥ Ibid 195.

वृत्तिः ।येऽणवो जायन्ते ते सञ्चिता उक्ताः सञ्चितालम्बनाः पञ्चविज्ञानकाया इत्यादौ । ज्ञानजन्मन एव हि निमित्तमुक्ताः "तत्रानेकार्थजन्यत्वात् " इत्यादिना ॥

अणूनां स विशेषश्च नान्तरेणापरानणून् ।

तदेकानियमात् ज्ञानमुक्तं सामान्यगोचरः ॥ Ibid 196

वृत्तिः । अणूनां स ज्ञानजननसामर्थ्यविशेषः..... । नहि प्रत्येकमणवो दृश्याः । किन्तु सहिता एव तत् तस्मात् एकस्मिन् परमाणौ ज्ञानस्य नियमात् सामान्यगोचरं सञ्चितपरमाणूपङ्कातविषयं ज्ञानमुक्तं तन्वदादिना । न तु परमाण्वतिरिक्तसामान्यविषयम् । तत् कथं सामान्यविषयत्वात् सविकल्पत्वप्रसङ्गः ।

The same idea in Chapter I, 88—90.

4 मा भूदतीतस्य ग्राह्यत्वं (यथा वैभाषिकपरिकल्पितम्) युगपज्जन्मनोरेव ज्ञानयन्तरेकं तु ग्राह्यमितरन् ग्राहकं भविष्यतीति अत आह—

अन्योन्यनिरपेक्षत्वात् युगपच्चापिजन्मनि ।

मानमेयत्वनास्तित्वं क्रियाकारकवर्जनात् ।

कारणत्वमेव भवतां ग्राह्यत्वम् । यौगपद्ये चान्योन्यनिरपेक्षज-मनो
कार्यकारणभावाभावात् न ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वम् । (p. 30⁴)

ननु तद्भावभावव्याभिचार एव कार्यकारणलक्षणम् । तच्च युगपज्जन्म-
नोरपि विद्यत एव । यथाऽऽहुः— प्रत्ययोऽव्यभिचारित्वात् सह इति । तत्राह —

तद्भावभावितामात्रं हेतुर्केनैव वर्ण्यते ।

पौर्वापर्यनियमयुक्तं तद्भावभावित्वं तल्लक्षणं नतु तन्निर्मुक्तमिति । यथा
पौर्वापर्यनियमसहितमेवेदं लक्षणं न नियमरहितं नापि पौर्वापर्यरहितं तथा दर्शयति —

पौर्वापर्यविनिमुक्तं कार्यकारणलक्षणम् ।

गवाश्वस्य यथा नास्ति पौर्वापर्येऽपि तत्तथा ॥

युगपज्जायमानेऽपि सन्तत्यन्तरजे क्षणे ।

रूपादिषु घटे यद्वत् तस्मात् पूर्वमवस्थिते ॥

यो यस्मात् जायते पश्चात् सन्तत्कार्यमितीष्यते ।

यत् परैरसत्यपि पौर्वापर्ये कार्यकारणत्वमित्यत्र सिद्धवद्दीपप्रभावदिति निदर्शनम् ।
तदमिद्धमित्याह—

हेतुहेतुमतां मिद्धं यौगपद्यनिदर्शनम् ।

यत्रदीपप्रभाद्युक्तं सूक्ष्मः कालोऽस्ति तत्र नः ॥

कथं तर्हि यौगपद्याभिमानोऽत आह—

दुर्लक्षस्तु यथा वेद्यः पञ्चपत्रशते तथा ।

सन्तमपिकालभेदमतिसौक्ष्म्यात् अलक्षयतां पञ्चपत्रशतव्यतिभेद इव
यौगपद्यभ्रगः । तुलानमनोऽनमनयोग्तु न मिथः कार्यकारणत्वम्, उभयोरैककारणत्वादिति ।
इत्यश्व यौगपद्येन कार्यकारणत्वनिराक्रिया ज्ञानांशयोरपि ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वनिराकरणाय
वक्तव्येत्याह —

भागयोर्योगपद्येन तथैव स्यान्निराक्रिया ।

मा भूद्यौगपद्यम् । क्रमभाविनोस्तु पूर्वमुत्तरस्य ग्राह्यं भवतु । यत्तु
अतीतस्य ग्राह्यत्वं न सम्भवतीत्युक्तम्, तत्तु अयुक्तम्, शक्त्यर्पणद्वारेण सम्भवात् ।
पूर्वज्ञानापितवासनावशेन हि तत्स्वरूपमुत्तरमुत्पद्यमानं भवति । स्मरणमिवात्मन्वनम् । तदुक्तम्—
शक्त्यर्पणात् क्रमादिति । तत्राह—

न च शक्त्यर्पणद्वारं क्रमेणालम्बनं भवेत् । इति

(Slokavar. pp, 311-12)

The above criticism proves that in pleading for a simulta-
neous causality Dignaga might have employed the Lamp-

and-light-example, but we miss it in the translations of the Alambanapariksā. Vinitadeva employs it in some other context, viz. self-affecting-action (atmani kriyā). It is the Sarvastivadin who first pleaded for the simultaneous causation with the same example; cfr. Poussin, Kosa, II, p.253; vyākhyā ad II. 51. cal. edn. p, 123; Kośabhāsyā p. 84-85).

5. सकृद्यन्ति तत्केन स्थूलाभापञ्च तेषुणवः । 321.

तस्माद्विरूपमस्त्येकं यदेवमनुभूयते ।

स्पर्शते चोभयावारस्यास्य गवेदनं फलम् ॥ 337.

अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यामितदर्शनः ।

ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिर्भेदवानिव दृश्यते ॥ 354.

Vijnaptimatratā in Pramāna Var. II, 320-371.

DIGNAGA'S VERSES (KARIKA)

1. Though atoms serve as cause of our sensory consciousness they are not its actual object like the sense-organs; because the consciousness does not represent the image of the atoms.

2. Consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it, because it does not exist in substance like the double-moon. Thus both the external things are unfit to be real objects of consciousness.

3. Some masters hold that the integrated form of atoms (*sancitakara*) is the cause of consciousness. The author replies: The atomic form does not become the content of consciousness e.g. the solidity, etc.

4. In that case the different perceptions of the pot, the bowl, etc. will be identical.

If the perception differs in accordance with the different forms of the pot and others, they never exist in the substantial atoms.

5. Their dimensions are different and therefore they are related to substantially non-existent things. For, if we remove the atoms one by one the perception illuminating the image of the pot, etc. will immediately vanish away.

6. It is the object (artha) which exists internally in the knowledge itself as a knowable aspect which appears to us as if it exists externally.

Because that object is essentially in the nature of consciousness and because it acts as the condition (to the consciousness) the knowable aspect is the object.

7a-b. Though it is only a part of the consciousness, it becomes condition to the latter because it is invariably and simultaneously associated with the latter.

Or it becomes condition also in succession by transmitting the force (śakti).

7c-d. What is the sense-organ is (nothing but) the force itself in consciousness by virtue of its acting as an auxiliary (*sahakarīn*) to its objectivity.

8. That force is not contradictory to the consciousness. Thus the objective aspect (*viśayarūpa*) of consciousness and the force (*śakti*) called sense-organ go mutually conditioned from immemorial time.

SUMMARY OF THE TIKA BY VINITADEVA

The author Dignaga presents the first disputant's proposition by stating: Those who...

In this sentence the topics to be discarded are expressed. The opponents' perverse reasons are expressed in the sentence: "Because the atoms are cause of consciousness" and because the aggregates are productive of their image-bearing consciousness".